OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS

DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PAMPHLET No. 31

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DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918

PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

Director of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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WASHINGTON
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The documents here gathered together are representative rather than exhaustive of the peace proposals, statements of war aims or peace terms, and replies thereto which have been made since December 12, 1916. Nevertheless, it is believed that no important utterance has been omitted. In general, few semi-official or private utterances have been included. It is believed that the exceptions will explain themselves, as in the case of the three speeches of former Prime Minister Asquith, which were included in order to give some evidence of the unity of all parties in England on the matter of war aims.

No attention has been paid to the various subterranean currents of opinion or events of which the official utterances were often the expression, and which were frequently of more importance in themselves than the formal statements. It is assumed that the reader will have this in mind in using the collection.

The texts have in most cases been cut down to eliminate material not bearing on the topic under examination.

It is a pleasure to add that the texts were collected and annotated by Mr. Pitman B. Potter, of the Division of International Law.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,
Director of the Division of International Law.

Washington, D. C.,
November 11, 1918.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Statement of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag. December 12, 1916	1
Proposals for Peace Negotiations Made by Germany. December 12, 1916	2
Note of the German Government to the Vatican Regarding the Peace Proposals. December 12, 1916	3
Austrian Official Statement Regarding the Peace Proposals. December 12, 1916	5
Speech of Premier Briand on the Peace Proposals in the French Chamber of Deputies. December 13, 1916	7
Speech of Nicolas Pokrovsky, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Duma. December 15, 1916	9
Resolution of the Russian Duma against Acceptance of the German Peace Proposals. December 15, 1916	11
Speech of Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber of Deputies. December 18, 1916	12
Note of President Wilson to the Belligerent Powers Suggesting a Statement of Peace Terms. December 18, 1916	12
Speech of Premier Lloyd-George on the German Proposals in the House of Commons. December 19, 1916	16
Swiss Response to President Wilson's Peace Note. December 23, 1916	21
German Reply to President Wilson. December 26, 1916	22
Austro-Hungarian Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note. December 26, 1916	23
Turkish Reply to President Wilson. December 26, 1916	23
Austro-Hungarian Reply to the Swiss Peace Note. December 27, 1916	24
German Reply to the Swiss Peace Note. December 28, 1916	25
Entente Reply to German Proposals. December 29, 1916	26
Scandinavian Peace Note. December 29, 1916	29
Bulgarian Reply to President Wilson. December 30, 1916	29
Declaration of Premier Radoslavoff in the Bulgarian Sobranje. December 30, 1916	30
Spanish Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note. December 30, 1916	30
Austro-Hungarian Reply to the Scandinavian Peace Note. January 1, 1917	31
Reply of Brazil to President Wilson's Peace Note. January 6, 1917	32
Greek Reply to President Wilson. January 8, 1917	32
Chinese Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note. January 9, 1917	34
Entente Reply to President Wilson. January 10, 1917	35
Belgian Reply to President Wilson. January 10, 1917	38
German Comment upon Entente Reply to President Wilson. January 12, 1917	40
Austro-Hungarian Comment upon the Entente Reply to President Wilson. January 12, 1917	42
Proclamation by Kaiser Wilhelm II to the German People. January 13, 1917	45
British Supplement to Entente Reply to President Wilson. January 13, 1917	45
Address of President Wilson to the Senate. January 22, 1917	49

457143

PAGE

Speech of Viscount Motono, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on Japan's Aims. January 23, 1917 55
Comment of Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the Address of President Wilson. January 24, 1917 57
Speech of Premier Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament on the Address of President Wilson. January 25, 1917 59
German Note to the United States Announcing the Opening of Unrestricted Submarine War. January 31, 1917 61
Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Germany. February 3, 1917 66
Address of President Wilson to Congress. February 3, 1917 . . 68
Announcement of the Department of State Relative to a Resumption of Negotiations with Germany. February 12, 1917 72
Proposals of the *de Facto* Government of Mexico for Terminating the European War. February 12, 1917 73
Address of President Wilson on Armed Neutrality, Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress. February 26, 1917 76
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's Address to the Reichstag on the Aims of the Submarine War. February 27, 1917 80
Statement Issued by Secretary Lansing Embodying the Decision of the Government of the United States in the Matter of Arming American Merchant Ships. March 12, 1917 82
American Reply to the Mexican Proposal of February 12, March 16, 1917 82
Address of President Wilson Recommending the Declaration of a State of War between the United States and the Imperial German Government, Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress. April 2, 1917 85
Congressional Resolution Declaring the Existence of a State of War between Germany and the United States. April 6, 1917 . . . 93
Telegram from the American Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna Announcing the Breaking off of Diplomatic Relations between Austria-Hungary and the United States. April 9, 1917 94
Proclamation of the Russian Provisional Government in Reference to its War Aims. April 10, 1917 95
Official Announcement of Secretary Lansing on the Severance of Diplomatic Relations between Turkey and the United States. April 23, 1917 96
Statement Issued by Secretary Lansing in Respect to the Possibility of Russia Concluding a Separate Peace. April 23, 1917 . . . 97
Address of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag on Germany's War Aims and Her Attitude toward Peace with Russia. May 15, 1917 98
Statement of the Reorganized Russian Provisional Government on its Policy with Respect to War Aims, the Alliance, and a Separate Peace. May 19, 1917 102
Resolution Passed by the Chamber of Deputies in Paris on Peace Terms, Alsace-Lorraine and Indemnities. June 5, 1917 . . . 103
Message from President Wilson to Russia on the Occasion of the Visit of the American Mission. June 9, 1917 104
Reply of the British Government to a Russian Note in Regard to Allied War Aims and their Revision. June 11, 1917 106
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George at Glasgow on Peace Terms. June 29, 1917 107
Resolution on Peace Terms Passed by the Reichstag. July 19, 1917 . 114
Address of Chancellor Michaelis to the Reichstag on Peace Terms and the Reichstag Resolution. July 19, 1917 115
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George in London in Reply to Chancellor Michaelis, July 21, 1917 117
Allied Declaration on Balkan Policy and Peace Terms. July 26, 1917 120
Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin on Peace Terms in Reply to Mr. Lloyd-George. July 28, 1917 120

PAGE

Reply of Foreign Minister Balfour in Debate in the House of Commons on British Peace Terms. July 30, 1917 122
Peace Proposal of Pope Benedict XV. August 1, 1917 129
Statement of War Policy by the Russian Provisional Government Following the July Revolution. August 2, 1917 132
Reply of President Wilson to the Peace Appeal of the Pope. August 27, 1917 133
Statement of Premier Painlevé in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris on Peace Terms: Alsace-Lorraine. September 18, 1917 . . . 136
Reply of Austria-Hungary to the Papal Peace Proposal. September 21, 1917 137
Reply of Germany to the Papal Peace Proposal. September 21, 1917 139
Address of Mr. Asquith on Peace Terms Including Comment on the German Reply to the Pope. September 26, 1917 141
Address of Chancellor Michaelis to the Main Committee of the Reichstag. September 28, 1917 147
Statement of Foreign Minister von Kühlmann to the Main Committee of the Reichstag on the German Reply to the Pope and in Reply to Mr. Asquith. September 28, 1917 148
Statement of Chancellor Michaelis to the Main Committee of the Reichstag on Germany's Attitude in Respect to Belgium. September 28, 1917 152
Address of Foreign Minister Czernin on Austro-Hungarian Peace Terms. October 2, 1917 152
Statement of Chancellor Michaelis in the Reichstag on Germany's Peace Terms. October 9, 1917 156
Statement of Foreign Minister von Kühlmann in the Reichstag on German Peace Terms. October 9, 1917 157
Statement of Mr. Lloyd-George to a Deputation from Approved Insurance Companies and other Organizations in Reply to von Kühlmann's Address. October 11, 1917 161
Address of Mr. Asquith at Liverpool on War Aims. October 11, 1917 162
Instructions Issued by the Central Executive Committee of Soviets to their Representative for the Paris Conference of the Allies on War Aims. October 20, 1917 167
Speech of Foreign Minister Terestchenko, in the Preliminary Congress in Petrograd, on a Separate Peace. October 29, 1917 . . 168
Statements of the Department of State and the Russian Embassy in Washington on the Possibility of Russia Concluding a Separate Peace. November 2, 1917 170
Foreign Minister Balfour in Debate in the House of Commons on War Aims. November 6, 1917 171
Proclamation of the Military Revolutionary Committee after the November Revolution in Petrograd. November 7, 1917 187
Statement of British Policy in Palestine by Foreign Minister Balfour. November 8, 1917 188
Note of Foreign Minister Trotsky to the Allied Embassies in Petrograd Offering an Armistice. November 21, 1917 188
Proclamation of the Council of National Commissioners in Reference to a Separate Peace. November 22, 1917 189
Protest of the Allied Military Missions in Russia to the Russian Commander in Chief against a Separate Peace. November 27, 1917 . 191
Speech of Chancellor Michaelis in the Reichstag on War Aims and a possible Russian Peace. November 29, 1917 191
Address of President Wilson Reviewing American War Aims and Recommending the Declaration of a State of War between the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Government, Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of the Congress. December 4, 1917 193
Proclamation of Foreign Minister Trotsky on the Armistice and Urging Allied Participation and a Statement of War Aims. December 6, 1917 202

PAGE

Official Roumanian Announcement of an Armistice with the Central Powers. December 6, 1917 203
Speech of Foreign Minister Czernin in Reply to President Wilson and on War Aims. December 7, 1917 204
Congressional Resolution Declaring the Existence of a State of War between Austria-Hungary and the United States. December 7, 1917 206
Address of Mr. Asquith on War Aims and Peace Terms. December 11, 1917 206
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George on War Aims. December 14, 1917 210
Reply of Chancellor von Hertling to Mr. Lloyd-George's Speech. December 17, 1917 215
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George in the House of Commons on Peace Terms. December 20, 1917 216
Statement of Count Czernin at Brest-Litovsk of the Terms on which the Central Powers were Willing to Conclude a General Peace. December 25, 1917 221
Reply of Belgium to the Papal Peace Note. December 27, 1917 . . 223
Statement of British War Aims by Prime Minister Lloyd-George. January 5, 1918 225
Telegram from Premier Clemenceau to Prime Minister Lloyd George Endorsing his Statement of January 5. January 6, 1918 . . 233
Address of President Wilson on the Conditions of Peace Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress. January 8, 1918 234
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George on the Fourteen Points. January 18, 1918 240
Opinion of Foreign Minister Trotsky on the German Position at Brest-Litovsk. January 23, 1918 245
Reply of Chancellor von Hertling to the Statement of President Wilson of January 8, 1918. January 24, 1918 246
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin to the Fourteen Points. January 24, 1918 255
The Origin of the Separate Peace at Brest-Litovsk According to Foreign Minister von Kühlmann. January 25, 1918 261
Official Statement of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on the Statements of von Hertling and Czernin. February 3, 1918 . . 262
German and Austrian Official Reports of the Peace with Ukraina. February 9, 1918 263
Russian Proclamation of the End of the War and of Demobilization. February 10-11, 1918 263
Reply of President Wilson to the Addresses of the Imperial German Chancellor, and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Address Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress. February 11, 1918 265
Reply of Prime Minister Lloyd-George to Chancellor von Hertling and Foreign Minister Czernin. February 12, 1918 271
Address of Foreign Minister Balfour on Count Czernin's Speech and the Versailles Council Decision. February 13, 1918 273
Statement of Prime Minister Lenine and Foreign Minister Trotsky on the German Infraction of the Armistice and their Readiness to Sign a Peace Treaty. February 19, 1918 278
Russian Acceptance of German Peace Terms. February 24, 1918 . 278
Reply of Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson. February 25, 1918 279
Reply of Foreign Minister Balfour to Chancellor von Hertling. February 27, 1918 285
German Official Report of the Signing of the Peace with Russia. March 3, 1918 295
Ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Congress of Soviets. March 16, 1918 296

PAGE

Statement of the London Conference of Entente Ministers in Regard to the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. March 18, 1918 296
Statement of Ambassador Francis on the Attitude of the United States toward Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 19, 1918 298
Foreign Minister Czernin's Discussion of Peace Terms, Reply to President Wilson and Revelation of French Peace Maneuvres. April 2, 1918 298
Further Austrian Explanation of the Austro-French Negotiations of February, 1918. April 5, 1918 308
Address of President Wilson on War Aims at the Opening of the Third Liberty Loan Campaign, Baltimore. April 6, 1918 . . 309
French Account of the Beginning of the Revertata-Armand Conferences. April 6, 1918 312
Statement of Ex-Premier Painlevé on Austro-French Negotiations in 1917. April 6, 1918 314
Revelation by Premier Clemenceau of the Prince Sixtus Letter. April 8, 1918 314
Official Austrian Reply to the French Defense and to M. Painlevé. April 8, 1918 316
French Official Statement Containing the Text of the Prince Sixtus Letter. April 11, 1918 318
Denial of Emperor Charles in a Telegram to Kaiser William II. April 11, 1918 320
Telegram of Kaiser William II Confirming his Faith in Emperor Charles. April 12, 1918 320
Austrian Claim that the Prince Sixtus Letter Was Falsified. April 13, 1918. 321
French Reply of April 14. April 14, 1918 322
Debate in the House of Commons: Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour on the Prince Sixtus Episode, Allied Aims and Peace Negotiations. May 16, 1918 323
Statement of Foreign Minister Burian on the Roumanian Treaty and in Reply to Mr. Lloyd-George. June 11, 1918 337
Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour on the Secret Treaties and the Unity of Allied Aims and the Peace Offensive. June 20, 1918 338
Speech of Foreign Minister von Kühlmann on German Peace Terms. June 24, 1918 342
Statement of Chancellor von Hertling on Peace Terms and the League of Nations. June 25, 1918 348
Address of President Wilson at Mount Vernon on Peace Terms. July 4, 1918 349
Statement of German Peace Policy by Chancellor von Hertling Especially as Regards the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. July 11, 1918 352
Report of Foreign Minister Burian on Austrian Foreign Policy and Her Peace Terms and Attitude to President Wilson's Mount Vernon Address. July 16, 1918 354
Statement of the Czecho-Slovak National Council at Washington on the Aims of the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia. July 27, 1918 . . 357
Declaration of Aims by the Government of the United States in Intervening in Russia. August 3, 1918 359
Declaration of the Japanese Government upon Its Aims in Intervening in Siberia. August 3, 1918 361
Establishment of Anti-Bolshevik Governments in Siberia—Their Aims. August 5, 1918 362
Establishment of Anti-Bolshevik Government in Archangel—Its Aims. August 7, 1918 363
Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour in the House of Commons on Peace Terms. August 8, 1918 365
Austrian Statement Relative to British Recognition of Czecho-Slovak Belligerency. August 17, 1918 373

PAGE
Reply of Colonial Minister Solf to Mr. Balfour. August 21, 1918 . 374
Recognition of the Belligerency of the Czecho-Slovaks by the United States. September 2, 1918 379
Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin on the Basis of Peace and the League of Nations. September 10, 1918 380
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George on War Aims. September 12, 1918 381
Address of Vice Chancellor Payer on Peace Terms. September 12, 1918 383
Austrian Peace Proposal. September 16, 1918 386
Statement of Mr. Balfour in Reply to Herr Payer and the Austrian Note. September 16, 1918 389
Reply of President Wilson to the Austrian Proposal. September 17, 1918 396
Official Italian Statement on the Austrian Proposal. September 18, 1918 397
Bulgarian Announcement of the Request for an Armistice. September 24, 1918 398
Reply of General Franchet d'Esperey to the Bulgarian Request for an Armistice. September 26, 1918 398
Address of President Wilson in Opening the Fourth Loan Campaign. September 27, 1918 399
Bulgaria Armistice Convention. September 29, 1918 405
Comment of Foreign Minister Balfour on the Program Laid down by President Wilson on September 27. October 1, 1918. 407
Chancellor Maximilian's Explanation of His Aims in Asking for Peace Negotiations. October 5, 1918 409
German Request for an Armistice. October 6, 1918 414
Austrian Explanation of the Peace Move and Its Purpose. October 6, 1918 415
Austrian Request for an Armistice. October 7, 1918 417
Inquiry from President Wilson Concerning the German Proposal. October 8, 1918 418
Request of Turkey for an Armistice and Peace Negotiations. October 14, 1918 419
German Answer to the Inquiry of President Wilson. October 14, 1918 420
Reply of President Wilson to the German Request. October 14, 1918 421
Comment of Foreign Minister Burian on the Program of President Wilson and the Austrian Peace Policy. October 16, 1918 . . 423
Text of Declaration of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation Adopted by Provisional Government at Paris. October 18, 1918 425
Reply of President Wilson to the Austrian Proposal. October 18, 1918 428
German Counter-reply to President Wilson. October 20, 1918 . . 429
Comment of Chancellor Max on the Notes of President Wilson and Germany's Position before the Allies. October 22, 1918 . . . 431
President Wilson's Consent to Propose an Armistice to the Allies. October 23, 1918 434
Address of Foreign Minister Solf on Alsace-Lorraine and Poland. October 25, 1918 436
Reply of the German Government to the Note from President Wilson Consenting to Propose an Armistice. October 27, 1918 . . . 438
Decree of Kaiser William II at the Publication of an Amendment to the German Constitution. October 28, 1918 439
Austro-Hungarian Reply to President Wilson Relative to the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs and Asking for a Separate Peace. October 29, 1918 440
Note from Foreign Minister Andrassy to Secretary Lansing. October 29, 1918 441

PAGE

Semi-official Austrian Note on the Reply to President Wilson. October 29, 1918 442
Reply of President Wilson to the Turkish Request. October 31, 1918 443
Armistice with Turkey—British Statement Made in the House of Commons. October 31, 1918 444
Official British Paraphrase of the Turkish Armistice. October 31, 1918 444
Protocol of the Conditions of an Armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary. November 3, 1918 . 446
Announcement by the Department of State of the Result of the Conferences at Paris. November 4, 1918 455
Recognition of the Autonomy and Belligerency of the Polish Army and National Council. November 4, 1918 456
Reply to Germany on the Result of the Paris Conferences. November 5, 1918 456
Manifesto of the German Government. November 5, 1918 . . . 458
Message to the Roumanian Government at Jassy: the Position of the United States on the Roumanian Problem. November 6, 1918 . 459
Conditions in Russia at the Time of the German Armistice. November 7, 1918 460
American Note to Germany Protesting against Destructions in the Course of Evacuation. November 7, 1918 461
Anglo-French Statement of Aims in Mesopotamia and Syria. November 7, 1918 462
Agreement between Serbians and Jugoslavs at Geneva—Serbian Policy in the Balkans. November 7, 1918 462
Proclamation of King Nicholas to the Montenegrins Relative to Jugoslavia. November 7, 1918 465
Proclamations of Chancellor Maximilian to Germans Abroad and at Home. November 7, 1918 466
Reorganization of the German Empire. November 9, 1918 . . . 467
British Press Bureau Statement on the Dominions and the Peace Conferences. November 9, 1918 468
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George at the Guildhall on Terms of Peace. November 9, 1918 469
Proclamation of Chancellor Ebert. November 10, 1918 471
Abdication of Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary. November 11, 1918 472
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George to Liberal Party Leaders on Peace Terms. November 12, 1918 472
Proclamation of the Armistice with Germany by President Wilson. November 11, 1918 474
Address of President Wilson to Congress giving the Terms of the Armistice granted to Germany. November 11, 1918 474
Conditions of an Armistice with Germany. November 11, 1918 . 477
Text of Military Convention between the Allies and Hungary. Signed at Belgrade, November 13, 1918 488

STATEMENT OF CHANCELLOR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG IN THE REICHSTAG[1]

December 12, 1916

. . . . . .

Our strength has not made our ears deaf to our responsibility before God, before our own nation, and before humanity. The declarations formerly made by us concerning our readiness for peace were evaded by our adversaries. Now we have advanced one step further in this direction. On August 1, 1914, the Emperor had personally to take the gravest decision which ever fell to the lot of a German—the order for mobilization—which he was compelled to give as a result of the Russian mobilization. During these long and earnest years of the war the Emperor has been moved by a single thought: how peace could be restored to safeguard Germany after the struggle in which she has fought victoriously.

Nobody can testify better to this than I who bear the responsibility for all actions of the Government. In a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward his nation and, beyond it, toward humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action toward peace. His Majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our allies, decided to propose to the hostile Powers to enter peace negotiations. This morning I transmitted a note to this effect to all the hostile Powers through the representatives of those Powers which are watching over our interests and rights in the hostile States. I asked the representatives of Spain, the United States, and Switzerland to forward that note.

The same procedure has been adopted today in Vienna, Constantinople, and Sofia. Other neutral States and his Holiness the Pope have been similarly informed.

. . . . . .

Gentlemen, in August, 1914, our enemies challenged the superiority of power in the world war. Today we raise the question of peace, which is a question of humanity. We await the answer of our enemies with that sereneness of mind which is guaranteed to us by our exterior

[1] *The New York Times,* December 13, 1916.

and interior strength, and by our clear conscience. If our enemies decline to end the war, if they wish to take upon themselves the world's heavy burden of all those terrors which hereafter will follow, then even in the least and smallest homes every German heart will burn in sacred wrath against our enemies, who are unwilling to stop human slaughter in order that their plans of conquest and annihilation may continue.

In the fateful hour we took a fateful decision. It has been saturated with the blood of hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers who gave their lives for the safety of their homes. Human wits and human understanding are unable to reach to the extreme and last questions in this struggle of nations, which has unveiled all the terrors of earthly life, but also the grandeur of human courage and human will in ways never seen before. God will be the judge. We can proceed upon our way.

PROPOSALS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MADE BY GERMANY[1]

December 12, 1916

The most formidable war known to history has been ravaging for two and a half years a great part of the world. That catastrophe, that the bonds of a common civilization more than a thousand years old could not stop, strikes mankind in its most precious patrimony; it threatens to bury under its ruins the moral and physical progress on which Europe prided itself at the dawn of the twentieth century. In that strife Germany and her allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey have given proof of their indestructible strength in winning considerable successes at war. Their unshakable lines resist ceaseless attacks of their enemies' arms. The recent diversion in the Balkans was speedily and victoriously thwarted. The latest events have demonstrated that a continuation of the war can not break their resisting power. The general situation much rather justifies their hope of fresh successes. It was for the defense of their existence and freedom of their national development that the four allied Powers were con-

[1] "Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties," No. 4, May, 1918, published by the Department of State, p. 305. Cited hereafter as "4 Dip. Corr."

strained to take up arms. The exploits of their armies have brought no change therein. Not for an instant have they swerved from the conviction that the respect of the rights of the other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests. They do not seek to crush or annihilate their adversaries. Conscious of their military and economic strength and ready to carry on to the end, if they must, the struggle that is forced upon them, but animated at the same time by the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the horrors of war to an end, the four allied Powers propose to enter even now into peace negotiations.[1] They feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward and which would aim to assure the existence, honor, and free development of their peoples, would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace.

If notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation the struggle should continue, the four allied Powers are resolved to carry it on to a victorious end, while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history.

The Imperial Government has the honor to ask through your obliging medium the Government of the United States to be pleased to transmit the present communication to the Government of the French Republic, to the Royal Government of Great Britain, to the Imperial Government of Japan, to the Royal Government of Roumania, to the Imperial Government of Russia, and to the Royal Government of Serbia.

NOTE OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE VATICAN REGARDING THE PEACE PROPOSALS[2]

December 12, 1916

According to instructions received, I have the honor to send to your Eminence a copy of the declaration of the Imperial Government today, which, by the good offices of the Powers intrusted with the protection of German interests in the countries with which the German Empire is in a state of war, transmits to these States, and in which

[1] Similar notes were sent out by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on December 12, 1918; *ibid.*, pp. 306, 307, 308.

[2] *The New York Times,* December 13, 1916.

the Imperial Government declares itself ready to enter into peace negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Bulgarian Governments also have sent similar notes.

The reasons which prompted Germany and her allies to take this step are manifest. For two years and a half a terrible war has been devastating the European Continent. Unlimited treasures of civilization have been destroyed. Extensive areas have been soaked with blood. Millions of brave soldiers have fallen in battle and millions have returned home as invalids. Grief and sorrow fill almost every house.

Not only upon the belligerent nations, but also upon neutrals, the destructive consequences of the gigantic struggle weigh heavily. Trade and commerce, carefully built up in years of peace, have been depressed. The best forces of the nation have been withdrawn from the production of useful objects. Europe, which formerly was devoted to the propagation of religion and civilization, which was trying to find solutions for social problems, and was the home of science and art and all peaceful labor, now resembles an immense war camp, in which the achievements and works of many decades are doomed to annihilation.

Germany is carrying on a war of defense against her enemies, which aim at her destruction. She fights to assure the integrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German Nation, for the right which she claims to develop freely her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing with other nations. All the efforts of their enemies are unable to shatter the heroic armies of the (Teutonic) allies, which protect the frontiers of their countries, strengthened by the certainty that the enemy shall never pierce the iron wall.

Those fighting on the front know that they are supported by the whole nation, which is inspired by love for its country and is ready for the greatest sacrifices and determined to defend to the last extremity the inherited treasure of intellectual and economic work and the social organization and sacred soil of the country.

Certain of our own strength, but realizing Europe's sad future if the war continues; seized with pity in the face of the unspeakable misery of humanity, the German Empire, in accord with her allies, solemnly repeats what the Chancellor already has declared, a year ago, that Germany is ready to give peace to the world by setting before the whole world the question whether or not it is possible to find a basis for an understanding.

Since the first day of the Pontifical reign his Holiness the Pope has unswervingly demonstrated, in the most generous fashion, his solicitude for the innumerable victims of this war. He has alleviated the sufferings and ameliorated the fate of thousands of men injured by this catastrophe. Inspired by the exalted ideas of his ministry, his Holiness has seized every opportunity in the interests of humanity to end so sanguinary a war.

The Imperial Government is firmly confident that the initiative of the four Powers will find friendly welcome on the part of his Holiness, and that the work of peace can count upon the precious support of the Holy See.

AUSTRIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENT REGARDING THE PEACE PROPOSALS[1]

December 12, 1916

When in the summer of 1914 the patience of Austria-Hungary was exhausted by a series of systematically-continued and ever-increasing provocations and menaces, and the monarchy, after almost fifty years of unbroken peace, found itself compelled to draw the sword, this weighty decision was animated neither by aggressive purposes nor by designs of conquest, but solely by the bitter necessity of self-defense, to defend its existence and safeguard itself for the future against similar treacherous plots of hostile neighbors.

That was the task and aim of the monarchy in the present war. In combination with its allies, well tried in loyal comradeship in arms, the Austro-Hungarian army and fleet, fighting, bleeding, but also assailing and conquering, gained such successes that they frustrated the intentions of the enemy. The Quadruple Alliance not only has won an immense series of victories, but also holds in its power extensive hostile territories. Unbroken is its strength, as our latest treacherous enemy has just experienced.

Can our enemies hope to conquer or shatter this alliance of Powers? They will never succeed in breaking it by blockade and starvation measures. Their war aims, to the attainment of which they have come no nearer in the third year of the war, will in the future be proved to

[1] *The New York Times,* December 13, 1916.

have been completely unattainable. Useless and unavailing, therefore, is the prosecution of the fighting on the part of the enemy.

The Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, on the other hand, have effectively pursued their aims, namely, defense against attacks on their existence and integrity, which were planned in concert long since, and the achievement of real guarantees, and they will never allow themselves to be deprived of the basis of their existence, which they have secured by advantages won.

The continuation of the murderous war, in which the enemy can destroy much, but can not—as the Quadruple Alliance is firmly confident—alter fate, is ever more seen to be an aimless destruction of human lives and property, an act of inhumanity justified by no necessity and a crime against civilization.

This conviction, and the hope that similar views may also be begun to be entertained in the enemy camp, has caused the idea to ripen in the Vienna Cabinet—in full agreement with the Governments of the allied (Teutonic) Powers—of making a candid and loyal endeavor to come to a discusssion with their enemies for the purpose of paving a way for peace.

The Governments of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria have addressed today identical notes to the diplomatic representatives in the capitals concerned who are intrusted with the promotion of enemy nationals, expressing an inclination to enter into peace negotiations and requesting them to transmit this overture to enemy States. This step was simultaneously brought to the knowledge of the representatives of the Holy See in a special note, and the active interest of the Pope for this offer of peace was solicited. Likewise the accredited representatives of the remaining neutral States in the four capitals were acquainted with this proceeding for the purpose of informing their Governments.

Austria and her allies by this step have given new and decisive proof of their love of peace. It is now for their enemies to make known their views before the world.

Whatever the result of its proposal may be, no responsibility can fall on the Quadruple Alliance, even before the judgment seat of its own peoples, if it is eventually obliged to continue the war.

SPEECH OF PREMIER BRIAND ON THE PEACE PROPOSALS IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES[1]

December 13, 1916

[TRANSLATION]

It is after proclaiming her victory on every front that Germany, feeling that she can not win, throws out to us certain phrases about which I can not refrain from making a few remarks.

You have read the speech of Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor of the German Empire. On this speech, of which I have not yet received the official text, I can not express myself officially. These so-called proposals have not yet been presented to any of the Governments, and it is rather doubtful whether, under existing conditions, those who have been asked to act as intermediaries will accept so delicate a task, which may disturb many a conscience.

On this as on all matters I can not express an official opinion until we and our allies have thoroughly considered and discussed the question, and reached a full and complete agreement. But I have the right, indeed the duty, to warn you against this possible poisoning of our country.

When I see Germany arming herself to the teeth, mobilizing her entire civil population at the risk of destroying her commerce and her industries, of breaking up her homes of which she is so proud; when I see the fires of all her factories burning red in the manufacture of war material; when I see her, in contravention of the law of nations, conscripting men in their own countries and forcing them to work for her, if I did not warn my country, I should be culpable indeed!

Observe, gentlemen, that what they are sending us from over there is an invitation to discuss peace. It is extended to us under conditions that are well known to you: Belgium invaded, Serbia invaded, Roumania invaded, ten of our Departments invaded! This invitation is in vague and obscure terms, in high-sounding words to mislead the minds, to stir the conscience, and to trouble the hearts of peoples who mourn for their countless dead. Gentlemen, this is a crucial moment. I discern in these declarations the same cry of conscience, ever striving to deceive neutrals and perhaps also to blind the eyes of those among

[1] France: *Journal Officiel du 14 décembre 1916, Chambre—Séance du 13 décembre,* p. 3638.

the German people whose vision is still unimpaired. "It was not we," say these declarations, "who let loose this horrible war."

There is one cry constantly on German lips: "We were attacked; we are defending ourselves; we are the victims!" To this cry I make answer for the hundredth time: "No; you are the aggressors; no matter what you may say, the facts are there to prove it. The blood is on your heads, not on ours."

Furthermore, the circumstances in which these proposals are made are such that I have the right to denounce them as a crafty move, a clumsy snare. When, after reading words like the following, "We wish to give to our peoples every liberty they need, every opportunity to live and to prosper that they may desire," I note in the same document that what our enemies so generously offer to other nations is a sort of charitable promise not to crush them, not to annihilate them, I exclaim: "Is that what they dare to offer, after the Marne, after the Yser, after Verdun, to France who stands before them glorious in her strength?"

We must think over a document like that; we must consider what it represents at the moment it is thrown at the world and what its aim is.

The things I am telling you are merely my personal impressions. I would not be talking thus, were it not my duty to put my country on her guard against what might bring about her demoralization. It is not that I doubt her clear-sightedness or her perspicacity. I am quite sure that she will not allow herself to be duped. But, nevertheless, even before the proposals are officially laid before us, I have the right to say to you that they are merely a ruse, an attempt to weaken the bonds of our alliance, to trouble the conscience and to undermine the courage of our people.

Therefore, gentlemen, with apologies for having spoken at such length—but you will not reproach me for having taken up this question—I conclude with the statement that the French Republic will do no less now than did the Convention, under similar circumstances, at an earlier period of our history.

SPEECH OF NICOLAS POKROVSKY, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN THE DUMA[1]

December 15, 1916

I am addressing you immediately on having been appointed to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and am, naturally, not in a position to give you a detailed statement on the political situation of the day. But I feel constrained to inform you without delay and with the supreme authorization of his Imperial Majesty of the attitude of the Russian Government with regard to the application of our enemies, of which you heard yesterday through the telegrams of the news agencies.

Words of peace coming from the side which bears the whole burden of responsibility for the world conflagration, which it started, and which is unparalleled in the annals of history, however far back one may go, were no surprise to the Allies. In the course of the two and a half years that the war has lasted Germany has more than once mentioned peace. She spoke of it to her armies and to her people each time she entered upon a military operation which was to prove "decisive." After each military success, calculated with a view to creating an impression, she put out feelers for a separate peace on one side and another and conducted an active propaganda in the neutral press. All these German efforts met with the calm and determined resistance of the Allied Powers.

Now, seeing that she is powerless to make a breach in our unshakable alliance, Germany makes an official proposal to open peace negotiations. In order properly to appreciate the meaning of this proposal one must consider its intrinsic worth and the circumstances in which it was made. In substance the German proposal contains no tangible indications regarding the nature of the peace which is desired. It repeats the antiquated legend that the war was forced upon the Central Powers, it speaks of the victorious Austro-German armies, and the irresistibility of their defense, and then, proposing the opening of peace negotiations, the Central Powers express the conviction that the offers which they have to make will guarantee the existence, honor, and free development of their own peoples, and are calculated to establish a lasting peace. That is all the communication contains, except a threat to continue the war to a victor-

[1] *The Times*, London, December 16, 1916.

ious end, and, in the case of refusal, to throw the responsibility for the further spilling of blood on our allies.

What are the circumstances in which the German proposal was made? The enemy armies devastated and occupy Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, and a part of France, Russia and Roumania. The Austro-Germans have just proclaimed the illusory independence of a part of Poland, and are by this trying to lay hands on the entire Polish nation. Who, then, with the exception of Germany, could derive any advantage under such conditions by the opening of peace negotiations?

But the motives of the German step will be shown more clearly in relief if one takes into consideration the domestic conditions of our enemies. Without speaking of the unlawful attempts of the Germans to force the population of Russian Poland to take arms against its own country, it will suffice to mention the introduction of general forced labor in Germany to understand how hard is the situation of our enemies. To attempt at the last moment to profit by their fleeting territorial conquests before their domestic weakness was revealed—that was the real meaning of the German proposal. In the event of failure they will exploit at home the refusal of the Allies to accept peace in order to rehabilitate the tottering morale of their populations.

But there is another senseless motive for the step they have taken. Failing to understand the true spirit which animates Russia, our enemies deceive themselves with the vain hope that they will find among us men cowardly enough to allow themselves to be deceived if even for a moment by lying proposals. That will not be. No Russian heart will yield. On the contrary, the whole of Russia will rally all the more closely round its august Sovereign, who declared at the very beginning of the war that he "would not make peace until the last enemy soldier had left our country."

Russia will apply herself with more energy than ever to the realization of the aims proclaimed before you on the day when you reassembled, especially to the positive and general collaboration which constitutes the only sure means of arriving at the end which we all have at heart—namely, the crushing of the enemy. The Russian Government repudiates with indignation the mere idea of suspending the struggle and thereby permitting Germany to take advantage of the last chance she will have of subjecting Europe to her hegemony. All the innumerable sacrifices already made would be in vain if a premature peace were concluded with an enemy whose forces have

been shaken, but not broken, an enemy who is seeking a breathing space by making deceitful offers of a permanent peace. In this inflexible decision, Russia is in complete agreement with all her valiant allies. We are all equally convinced of the vital necessity of carrying on the war to a victorious end, and no subterfuge by our enemies will prevent us from following this path.

RESOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN DUMA AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF THE GERMAN PEACE PROPOSALS[1]

December 15, 1916

The Duma having heard the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is unanimously in favor of a categorical refusal by the Allied Governments to enter under present conditions into any peace negotiations whatever. It considers that the German proposals are nothing more than a fresh proof of the weakness of the enemy, and are a hypocritical act from which the enemy expects no real success, but by which he seeks to throw upon others the responsibility for the war and for what has happened during it, and to exculpate itself before public opinion in Germany.

The Duma considers that a premature peace would not only be a brief period of calm, but would involve the danger of another bloody war and renewed deplorable sacrifices on the part of the people.

It considers that a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory over the military power of the enemy, and after the definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it is accompanied.

[1] *The Times,* London, December 16, 1916.

SPEECH OF BARON SONNINO, ITALIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES[1]

December 18, 1916

The Government knows absolutely nothing regarding the specific conditions of the enemy's peace proposals and regards as an enemy maneuver the rumors secretly spread about them. We must remember that none of the Allies could in any way take into consideration any condition offered to it separately. The reply of the Allies will be published as soon as it has been agreed upon.

We all desire a lasting peace, but we consider as such an ordered settlement of which the duration does not depend upon the strength of the chains binding one people to another, but on a just equilibrium between States and respect for the principle of nationality, the rights of nations, and reasons of humanity and civilization. While intensifying our efforts to beat the enemy, we do not aim at an international settlement by servitude and predominance implying the annihilation of peoples and nations. If a serious proposal was made on a solid basis for negotiations satisfying the general demands of justice and civilization, no one would oppose an *a priori* refusal to treat, but many things indicate that that is not the case now. The tone of boasting and insincerity characterizing the preamble to the enemy notes inspires no confidence in the proposals of the Central Empires. The Governments of the Allies must avoid the creation for their populations by a false mirage of vain negotiations of an enormous deception, followed by cruel disappointment.

NOTE OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE BELLIGERENT POWERS SUGGESTING A STATEMENT OF PEACE TERMS[2]

December 18, 1916

The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government to which you are accredited:

[1] *The Times*, London, December 19, 1916.

[2] 4 Dip. Corr., 321. The foregoing text is the version sent to London in the form of a note to Ambassador Page to be presented by him to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the same *mutatis mutandis* was sent to the American Diplomatic Representatives accredited to all the belligerent Governments and to all neutral Governments for their information.

The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to His Majesty's Government a course of action with regard to the present war which he hopes that the British Government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit and as coming not only from a friend but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue.

The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is in fact in no way associated with them in its origin and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.[1]

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in

[1] In the version sent to the Central Powers, this paragraph reads as follows:

"The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has in fact been in no way suggested by them in its origin and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances."

mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggression of selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to cooperate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired.

The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all desire and in which the neutral nations, as well as those at war, are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer, if resent-

ments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitively stated.

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even would bring the war to an end.

It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

The President is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.

LANSING.

SPEECH OF PREMIER LLOYD-GEORGE ON THE GERMAN PROPOSALS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS[1]

December 19, 1916

The responsibilities of the new Government have been suddenly accentuated by a declaration made by the German Chancellor, and I propose to deal with that at once. The statement made by him in the German Reichstag has been followed by a note presented to us by the United States of America without any note or comment. The answer that will be given by the Government will be given in full accord with all our brave allies. Naturally there has been an interchange of views, not upon the note, because it has only recently arrived, but upon the speech which propelled it, and, inasmuch as the note itself is practically only a reproduction or certainly a paraphrase of the speech, the subject-matter of the note itself has been discussed informally between the Allies, and I am very glad to be able to state that we have each of us, separately and independently, arrived at identical conclusions. I am very glad that the first answer that was given to the statement of the German Chancellor was given by France and by Russia. They have the unquestioned right to give the first answer to such an invitation. The enemy is still on their soil. Their sacrifices have been greater. The answer they have given has already appeared in all the papers, and I simply stand here today on behalf of the Government to give a clear and definite support to the statement which they have already made. Let us examine what the statement is and examine it calmly. Any man or set of men who wantonly or without sufficient cause prolong a terrible conflict like this would have on his soul a crime that oceans could not cleanse. Upon the other hand it is equally true that any man or set of men who from a sense of weariness or despair abandoned the struggle without achieving the high purpose for which he had entered into it would have been guilty of the costliest act of poltroonery ever perpetrated by any statesman. I should like to quote the very well-known words of Abraham Lincoln under similar conditions:—"We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time." Are we likely to achieve that object by accepting the invitation

[1] *The Times*, London, December 20, 1916.

of the German Chancellor? That is the only question we have to put to ourselves.

There has been some talk about proposals of peace. What are the proposals? There are none. To enter, on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she proposes to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of Germany. This country is not altogether without experience in these matters. This is not the first time we have fought a great military despotism that was overshadowing Europe, and it will not be the first time we shall have helped to overthrow military despotism. We have an uncomfortable historical memory of these things, and we can recall when one of the greatest of these despots had a purpose to serve in the working of his nefarious schemes. His favorite device was to appear in the garb of the Angel of Peace, and he usually appeared under two conditions. When we wished for time to assimilate his conquests or to reorganize his forces for fresh conquests, or, secondly, when his subjects showed symptoms of fatigue and war weariness the appeal was always made in the name of humanity. He demanded an end to bloodshed, at which he professed himself to be horrified, but for which he himself was mainly responsible. Our ancestors were taken in once, and bitterly they and Europe rue it. The time was devoted to reorganizing his forces for a deadlier attack than ever upon the liberties of Europe, and examples of that kind cause us to regard this note with a considerable measure of reminiscent disquietude.

We feel that we ought to know, before we can give favorable consideration to such an invitation, that Germany is prepared to accede to the only terms on which it is possible for peace to be obtained and maintained in Europe. What are those terms? They have been repeatedly stated by all the leading statesmen of the Allies. My right honorable friend has stated them repeatedly here and outside, and all I can do is to quote, as my right honorable friend the leader of the House did last week, practically the statement of the terms put forward by my right honorable friend—

"Restitution, reparation, guarantee against repetition"—so that there shall be no mistake, and it is important that there should be no mistake in a matter of life and death to millions.

Let me repeat again—complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantee. Did the German Chancellor use a single phrase to indicate that he was prepared to accept such a peace? Was there a hint of restitution, was there any suggestion of reparation, was there any

invitation of any security for the future that this outrage on civilization would not be again perpetrated at the first profitable opportunity? The very substance and style of this speech constitutes a denial of peace on the only terms on which peace is possible. He is not even conscious now that Germany has committed any offense against the rights of free nations. Listen to this from the note:—"Not for an instant have they (they being the Central Powers) swerved from the conviction that respect of the rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests." When did they discover that? Where was the respect for the rights of other nations in Belgium and Serbia? That was self-defense! Menaced, I suppose, by the overwhelming armies of Belgium, the Germans had been intimidated into invading Belgium, and the burning of Belgian cities and villages, to the massacring of thousands of inhabitants, old and young, to the carrying of the survivors into bondage. Yea, and they were carrying them into slavery at the very moment when this note was being written about the unswerving conviction as to the respect for the root of the rights of other nations. Are these outrages the legitimate interest of Germany? We must know. That is not the moment for peace. If excuses of this kind for palpable crimes can be put forward two and a half years after the exposure by grim facts of the guarantee, is there, I ask in all solemnity, any guarantee that similar subterfuges will not be used in the future to overthrow any treaty of peace you may enter into with Prussian militarism.

This note and that speech prove that not yet have they learned the very alphabet of respect for the rights of others. Without reparation, peace is impossible. Are all these outrages against humanity on land and on sea to be liquidated by a few pious phrases about humanity? Is there to be no reckoning for them? Are we to grasp the hand that perpetrated these atrocities in friendship without any reparation being tendered or given? I am told that we are to begin, Germany helping us, to exact reparation for all future violence committed after the war. We have begun already. It has already cost us so much, and we must exact it now so as not to leave such a grim inheritance to our children. As much as we all long for peace, deeply as we are horrified with war, this note and the speech which heralded it do not afford us much encouragement and hope for an honorable and lasting peace. What hope is given in that speech that the whole root and cause of this great bitterness, the arrogant spirit of the Prussian military caste, will not be as dominant as ever if we patch up peace now? Why, the very speech in which these peace suggestions are made resound to

the boast of Prussian military triumph. It is a long pæan over the victories of von Hindenburg and his legions. The very appeal for peace was delivered ostentatiously from the triumphal chariot of Prussian militarism.

We must keep a steadfast eye upon the purpose for which we entered the war, otherwise the great sacrifices we have been making will be in vain. The German note states that it was for the defense of their existence and the freedom of national development that the Central Powers were constrained to take up arms. Such phrases even deceive those who pen them. They are intended to delude the German nation into supporting the designs of the Prussian military caste. Who ever wished to put an end to their national existence or the freedom of their national development? We welcomed their development as long as it was on the paths of peace—the greater their development upon that road, the greater would all humanity be enriched by their efforts. That was not our desire, and it is not our purpose now.

The Allies entered this war to defend Europe against the aggression of Prussian military domination, and, having begun it, they must insist that the only end is the most complete and effective guarantee against the possibility of that caste ever again disturbing the peace of Europe. Prussia, since she got into the hands of that caste, has been a bad neighbor, arrogant, threatening, bullying, shifting boundaries at her will, taking one fair field after another from weaker neighbors, and adding them to her own domain. With her belt ostentatiously full of weapons of offense, and ready at a moment's notice to use them, she has always been an unpleasant, disturbing neighbor in Europe. She got thoroughly on the nerves of Europe. There was no peace near where she dwelt. It is difficult for those who are fortunate enough to live thousands of miles away to understand what it has meant to those who live near. Even here, with the protection of the broad seas between us, we know what a disturbing factor the Prussians were with their constant naval menace.

But even we can hardly realize what it has meant to France and to Russia. Several times there were threats directed to them even within the lifetime of this generation which presented the alternative of war or humiliation. There were many of us who hoped that internal influences in Germany would have been strong enough to check and ultimately to eliminate these feelings. All our hopes proved illusory, and now that this great war has been forced by the Prussian military leaders upon France, Russia, Italy, and ourselves, it would be folly, it would be a cruel folly, not to see to it that this swashbuckling through

the streets of Europe to the disturbance of all harmless and peaceful citizens shall be dealt with now as an offense against the law of nations. The mere word that led Belgium to her own destruction will not satisfy Europe any more. We all believed it. We all trusted it. It gave way at the first pressure of temptation, and Europe has been plunged into the vortex of blood.

We will therefore wait until we hear what terms and guarantees the German Government offer other than those, better than those, surer than those, which she so lightly broke. Meantime, we shall put our trust in an unbroken army rather than in a broken faith.

For the moment I do not think it would be advisable for me to add anything upon this particular invitation. A formal reply will be delivered by the Allies in the course of the next few days. I shall therefore proceed with the other part of the task which I have in front of me. What is the urgent task in front of the Government? To complete, and make even more effective, the mobilization of all our national resources—a mobilization which has been going on since the commencement of the war—so as to enable the nation to bear the strain, however prolonged, and to march through to victory, however lengthy, and however exhausting may be the task. It is a gigantic task.

Let me give this word of warning, if there be any who have given their confidence to the new Administration in expectation of a speedy victory, they will be doomed to disappointment. I am not going to paint a gloomy picture of the military situation. If I did it would not be a true picture. But I must paint a stern picture, because that accurately represents the facts.

. . . . . .

There is a time in every prolonged and fierce war when in the passion and rage of conflict men forget the high purpose with which they entered it. This is a struggle for international right, international honor, international good faith—the channel along which peace, honor, and good will must flow amongst men. The embankment laboriously built up by generations of men against barbarism has been broken, and had not the might of Britain passed into the breach, Europe would have been inundated with a flood of savagery and unbridled lust of power. The plain sense of fair play amongst nations, the growth of an international conscience, the protection of the weak against the strong by the stronger, the consciousness that justice has a more powerful backing in this world than greed, the knowledge that

any outrage upon fair dealing between nations, great or small, will meet with prompt and meritable chastisement—these constitute the causeway along which humanity was progressing slowly to higher things. The triumph of pressure would sweep it all away and leave mankind to struggle helpless in the morass. That is why since this war began I have known but one political aim; and for it I have fought with a single eye—that is the rescue of mankind from the most overwhelming catastrophe that has ever yet menaced its well-being.

SWISS RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE[1]

December 23, 1916

The President of the United States of America, with whom the Swiss Federal Council, guided by its warm desire that the hostilities may soon come to an end, has for a considerable time been in touch, had the kindness to apprise the Federal Council of the peace note sent to the Governments of the Central and Entente Powers. In that note President Wilson discusses the great desirability of international agreements for the purpose of avoiding more effectively and permanently the occurrence of catastrophes such as the one under which the peoples are suffering today. In this connection he lays particular stress on the necessity for bringing about the end of the present war. Without making peace proposals himself or offering mediation, he confines himself to sounding as to whether mankind may hope to have approached the haven of peace.

The most meritorious personal initiative of President Wilson will find a mighty echo in Switzerland. True to the obligations arising from observing the strictest neutrality, united by the same friendship with the States of both warring groups of Powers, situated like an island amidst the seething waves of the terrible world war, with its ideal and material interests most sensibly jeopardized and violated, our country is filled with a deep longing for peace, and ready to assist by its small means to stop the endless sufferings caused by the war and brought before its eyes by daily contact with the interned, the severely wounded, and those expelled, and to establish the foundations for a beneficial cooperation of the peoples.

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 330; this note was sent first to all belligerents and later to all neutrals including the United States.

The Swiss Federal Council is therefore glad to seize the opportunity to support the efforts of the President of the United States. It would consider itself happy if it could act in any, no matter how modest a way, for the *rapprochement* of the peoples now engaged in the struggle, and for reaching a lasting peace.

GERMAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

December 26, 1916

With reference to the esteemed communication of December 21, Foreign Office No. 15118, the undersigned has the honor to reply as follows: To His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. James W. Gerard.

The Imperial Government has accepted and considered in the friendly spirit which is apparent in the communication of the President, noble initiative of the President looking to the creation of bases for the foundation of a lasting peace. The President discloses the aim which lies next to his heart and leaves the choice of the way open. A direct exchange of views appears to the Imperial Government as the most suitable way of arriving at the desired result. The Imperial Government has the honor, therefore, in the sense of its declaration of the 12th instant, which offered the hand for peace negotiations, to propose the speedy assembly, on neutral ground, of delegates of the warring States.

It is also the view of the Imperial Government that the great work for the prevention of future wars can first be taken up only after the ending of the present conflict of exhaustion. The Imperial Government is ready, when this point has been reached, to cooperate with the United States at this sublime task.

The undersigned, while permitting himself to have recourse to good offices of his Excellency the Ambassador in connection with the transmission of the above reply to the President of the United States, avails himself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of his highest consideration.

ZIMMERMANN.

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 327.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE[1]

December 26, 1916

In reply to the *aide memoire* communicated on the 22d instant by his Excellency the American Ambassador, containing the proposals of the President of the United States of America for an exchange of views among the Powers at present at war for the eventual establishment of peace, the Imperial and Royal Government desires particularly to point out that in considering the noble proposal of the President it is guided by the same spirit of amity and complaisance as finds expression therein.

The President desires to establish a basis for a lasting peace without wishing to indicate the ways and means. The Imperial and Royal Government considers a direct exchange of views among the belligerents to be the most suitable way of attaining this end. Adverting to its declaration of the 12th instant, in which it announced its readiness to enter into peace negotiations, it now has the honor to propose that representatives of the belligerent Powers convene at an early date at some place on neutral ground.

The Imperial and Royal Government likewise concurs in the opinion of the President that only after the termination of the present war will it be possible to undertake the great and desirable work of the prevention of future wars. At an appropriate time it will be willing to cooperate with the United States of America for the realization of this noble aim.

TURKISH REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[2]

December 26, 1916

MR. AMBASSADOR: In reply to the note which your Excellency was pleased to deliver to me under date of the twenty-third instant, number 2107, containing certain suggestions of the President of the United States, I have the honor to communicate to your Excellency the following:

The generous initiative of the President, tending to create bases

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 328.

[2] 4 Dip. Corr., 327.

for the reestablishment of peace, has been received and taken into consideration by the Imperial Ottoman Government in the same friendly obliging (?) which manifests itself in the President's communication. The President indicates the object which he has at heart and leaves open the choice of that path leading to this object. The Imperial Government considers a direct exchange of ideas as the most efficacious means of attaining the desired result.

In conformity with its declaration of the twelfth of this month, in which it stretched forth its hand for peace negotiations, the Imperial Government has the honor of proposing the immediate meeting, in a neutral country, of delegates of the belligerent Powers.

The Imperial Government is likewise of opinion that the great work of preventing future wars can only be commenced after the end of the present struggle between the nations. When this moment shall have arrived the Imperial Government will be pleased to collaborate with the United States of America and with the other neutral Powers in this sublime task.

(Signed) HALIL.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN REPLY TO THE SWISS PEACE NOTE[1]

December 27, 1916

[TRANSLATION]

The undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has had the honor to receive the esteemed note of December 23d, in which the Minister Plenipotentiary of Switzerland, Dr. Burckhardt, was good enough to communicate to us, under instructions, the desire of the Swiss Federal Council to endorse the initiative taken by the President of the United States with the belligerent Governments for the purpose of ending the present war and of effectively providing against all war in the future.

The noble efforts of President Wilson received a most cordial welcome from the Imperial and Royal Government, to which it gave expression in the note delivered yesterday to the American Ambassador at Vienna, a copy of which is attached hereto with the request

[1] *Le Figaro,* Paris, December 28, 1916.

that the Minister of Switzerland be good enough to bring this document to the attention of the Swiss Federal Council.

The undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, permits himself to add that the Imperial and Royal Government views the endorsement by the Federal Government of the efforts of President Wilson as the expression of the noble and humanitarian sentiments which Switzerland has manifested since the beginning of the war with regard to all the belligerent Powers and which it has put in practice in so generous and friendly a manner.

GERMAN REPLY TO THE SWISS PEACE NOTE[1]

December 28, 1916

The Imperial Government has taken note of the fact that the Swiss Federal Council, as a result of its having placed itself in communication some time ago with the President of the United States of America, is also ready to take action side by side with them towards bringing about an understanding between the belligerent nations and towards the attainment of a lasting peace. The spirit of true humanity by which the step of the Swiss Federal Council is inspired is fully appreciated and esteemed by the Imperial Government.

The Imperial Government has informed the President of the United States that a direct exchange of views seems to them to be the most suitable means of obtaining the desired result. Led by the same considerations which caused Germany on December 12 to offer her hand for peace negotiations, the German Government has proposed an immediate meeting of delegates of all the belligerents at á neutral place. In agreement with the President of the United States the Imperial Government is of opinion that the great work of preventing future wars can only be taken in hand after the present world war has terminated. As soon as that moment has come they will be joyfully ready to cooperate in this sublime task.

If Switzerland, which, faithful to the country's noble traditions in mitigating the sufferings caused by the present war, has deserved imperishable merit, will also contribute to safeguarding the world's peace, the German nation and Government will highly welcome that.

[1] *The Times,* London, December 29, 1916.

ENTENTE REPLY TO GERMAN PROPOSALS[1]

December 29, 1916

The Allied Governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, and Serbia, unitedly in the defense of the liberty of nations and faithful to the engagement they have taken not to lay down arms separately, have resolved to answer collectively the so-called proposals of peace which have been addressed them on behalf of the enemy Governments, through the intermediary of the United States, of Spain, of Switzerland, and of the Netherlands.

The Allied Powers are constrained to preface their answer by protesting strongly against the two essential assertions in the note of the enemy Powers, which attempts to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of the war and which proclaims the victory of the Central Powers.

The Allies can not admit an assertion which is doubly inexact and which is sufficient to render barren any attempt at negotiation.

For thirty months the Allied Powers have suffered a war which they had tried by every means to avoid. They have demonstrated their attachment to peace by their acts. This attachment is as strong today as it was in 1914; after the violation of her engagements, it is not upon the word of Germany that peace, broken by her, can be based.

A suggestion without any conditions for initiating negotiations is not an offer of peace. The so-called proposal, devoid of substance and of precision, circulated abroad by the Imperial Government, appears less as an offer of peace than as a maneuver of war.

It is based upon a systematic disregard of the nature of the struggle of the past, present, and future.

As to the past, the German note ignoring all the facts, dates, and figures which prove that the war was desired, incited, and declared by Germany and Austria-Hungary. At The Hague it was the German delegate who rejected all suggestion of disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary who, after having addressed to Serbia an ultimatum, of which there exists no precedent, declared war on her despite the satisfaction immediately obtained. The Central Empires thereafter repulsed every attempt made by the Entente to bring about a pacific solution to what was a local conflict. England's offer of a conference, the French proposal of an international commission, the

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 311.

Austria-Hungary on the eve of hostilities; all these endeavors were left by Germany without answer and without issue. Belgium was invaded by an empire which had guaranteed her neutrality and which itself unhesitatingly proclaimed that treaties are "mere scraps of paper" and that "necessity knows no law."

As regards the present, the so-styled offers of Germany are based upon a "war map" which covers Europe alone; which expresses only the exterior and transitory aspect of the situation, but not the real strength of the adversaries. To conclude a peace based on the above would be to the sole advantage of the aggressors, who, having believed they could attain their object in two months perceive after two years that it will never be attained.

For the future, the ruins caused by the German declaration of war, the innumerable aggressions committed by Germany and her allies against the belligerents and against neutrals demand penalties, reparations, and guarantees; Germany eludes one and all.

In reality, the overture made by the Central Powers is but an attempt calculated to work upon the evolution of the war and of finally imposing a German peace.

It has for its object the troubling of opinion in the Allied countries; this opinion, in spite of all the sacrifices endured, has already replied with an admirable firmness and has denounced the hollowness of the enemy declaration.

It desires to strengthen public opinion in Germany and amongst her allies already so gravely shaken by their losses, fatigued by the economic encirclement, and crushed by the supreme effort which is exacted from their peoples.

It seeks to deceive, to intimidate public opinion of neutral countries long ago satisfied as to the original responsibilities, enlightened as to the present responsibilities, and too farseeing to favor the designs of Germany by abandoning the defense of human liberties.

It strives finally to justify new crimes in advance before the eyes of the world: submarine warfare, deportations, forced labor, and enlistment of nationals against their own country, violation of neutrality.

It is with a full realization of the gravity, but also of the necessities of this hour that the Allied Governments closely united and in perfect communion with their peoples refuse to entertain a proposal without sincerity and without import.

They affirm, once again, that no peace is possible as long as the reparation of violated rights and liberties, the acknowledgment of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small States shall not be assured; as long as there is no assurance of a settlement to suppress definitely the causes which for so long a time have menaced nations and to give the only efficacious guarantees for the security of the world.

The Allied Powers, in termination, are constrained to expose the following considerations which bring into relief the particular situation in which Belgium finds herself after two and a half years of war. By virtue of international treaties signed by five of the great Powers of Europe, amongst which figured Germany, Belgium profited by a special statute which rendered her territory inviolate, and placed the country itself under the guarantee of these Powers, sheltered from European conflicts. Nevertheless Belgium, despite these treaties, was the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. It is why the Belgian Government deems it necessary to specify the purpose which Belgium has never ceased to pursue in fighting beside the Powers of the Entente for the cause of right and justice.

Belgium has always scrupulously observed the duties imposed upon her by neutrality. She took arms to defend her independence and her neutrality violated by Germany and to remain faithful to her international obligations. On the fourth of August at the Reichstag the Chancellor acknowledged that this aggression constituted an injustice contrary to the right of nations and agreed in the name of Germany to repair it.

After two and a half years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by the practice of war and occupation which have exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its cities and villages, multiplied the massacres, the executions, and imprisonments. And at the moment that Germany speaks to the world of peace and humanity she deports and reduces to servitude. Belgium before the war had no other wish than to live in concord with all her neighbors. Her King and her Government have only one purpose: the reestablishment of peace and of right. But they will only consider a peace which Belgian citizens by the thousand (demand?) assures to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees, and security for the future.

SCANDINAVIAN PEACE NOTE[1]

December 29, 1916

It is with the keenest interest that the Government of the King learned the proposition just made by the President of the United States with a view to facilitating measures tending to the establishment of lasting peace while desiring to avoid any interference that might hurt legitimate feelings. The Government of the King would consider itself remiss in its duty to its own people and the whole of mankind if it should fail to express its most profound sympathy with every effort that might contribute to bringing to an end the progressive accumulation of suffering and moral and physical losses. It indulges the hope that the initiative of President Wilson will end in a result worthy of the lofty spirit by which he was inspired.[2]

BULGARIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[3]

December 30, 1916

. . . . . .

The generous initiative of the President of the United States tending to create bases for the restoration of peace, was cordially received and taken into consideration by the Royal Government in the same friendly spirit which is evidenced by the presidential communication. The President indicates the object he has at heart and leaves open the choice of the way leading to that object. The Royal Government considers a direct exchange of views to be the most efficacious way to attain the desired end. In accordance with its declaration of the 12th of December inst., which extends a hand for peace negotiations, it has the honor to propose an immediate meeting at one place of delegates of the belligerent Powers. The Royal Government shares the view that the great undertaking which consists in preventing future war

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 331.

[2] The Entente Governments replied to this note on January 17, referring to their replies to the German note and to President Wilson; *cf. The Times*, London, January 18, 1917, p. 9.

[3] 4 Dip. Corr., 333; also presented as a reply to the note of President Wilson.

can only be initiated after the close of present conflict of nations. When that time comes, the Royal Government will be glad to cooperate with the United States of America and other neutral nations in that sublime endeavor.

DECLARATION OF PREMIER RADOSLAVOFF IN THE BULGARIAN SOBRANJE[1]

December 30, 1916

I can assure you that Bulgaria's work has been brought to a successful conclusion. To those who assert that we are asking too much I reply that we are no chauvinists, but that we are aware of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people. You know from the Royal manifesto issued when war was declared what Bulgarian aspirations are. I am not obliged to reply to each speaker individually.

. . . . . .

SPANISH REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE[2]

December 30, 1916

His Majesty's Government has received through your embassy a copy of the note which the President of the United States has presented to the belligerent Powers, expressing the desire that an early opportunity should be sought for obtaining from all the nations now at war a declaration as to their intentions so far as regards the bases upon which the conflict might be terminated. This copy is accompanied by another note, signed by yourself, and dated December 22, in which your embassy, in accordance with the instructions of your Government, says, in the name of the President, that the moment seems to be opportune for action on the part of his Majesty's Government, and that it should, if it thinks fit, support the attitude adopted by the Government of the United States.

With regard to the reasonable desire manifested by the latter Gov-

[1] *The Times*, London, January 2, 1917.
[2] *The New York Times Current History* magazine, February, 1917, p. 792.

ernment to be supported in its proposition in favor of peace, the Government of his Majesty, considering that the initiative has been taken by the President of the North American Republic, and that the diverse impressions which it has caused are already known, is of opinion that the action to which the United States invites Spain would not have efficacy, and the more so because the Central Empires have already expressed their firm intention to discuss the conditions of peace solely with the belligerent Powers.

Fully appreciating that the noble desire of the President of the United States will always merit the gratitude of all nations, the Government of his Majesty is decided not to dissociate itself from any negotiation or agreement destined to facilitate the humanitarian work which will put an end to the present war, but it suspends its action, reserving it for the moment when the efforts of all those who desire peace will be more useful and efficacious than is now the case, if there should then be reasons to consider that its initiative or its intervention would be profitable.

Until that moment arrives the Government of his Majesty regards it as opportune to declare that in all that concerns an understanding between the neutral Powers for the defense of their material interests affected by the war, it is disposed now, as it has been since the beginning of the present conflict, to enter into negotiations which may tend toward an agreement capable of uniting all the non-belligerent Powers which may consider themselves injured or may regard it as necessary to remedy or diminish such injuries.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN REPLY TO THE SCANDINAVIAN PEACE NOTE[1]

January 1, 1917

The Austro-Hungarian Government is glad to state that its views in this matter agree with yours. It has sympathetically accepted President Wilson's suggestions, and therefore with satisfaction sees Sweden, Denmark, and Norway support President Wilson's initiative.[2]

[1] *The New York Times*, January 2, 1917.

[2] Germany replied to the Scandinavian note on the same day, merely referring to her offer of December 12 and declaring that peace or war depended on the Entente attitude in the matter; *ibid.*, January 4.

REPLY OF BRAZIL TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE[1]

January 6, 1917

I am in possession of note No. 332, received at this Ministry on December 26, dated December 22 last, in which in pursuance of instructions received, you transcribe a note which the Government of the United States of America addressed to each one of the Powers now at war, relative to the desirability of the reestablishment of peace.

I did not fail to bring the text of the said note to the high attention of the President of the Republic, and I am authorized to say that the Government of Brazil, a hearty advocate of international peace and concord, is not indifferent to steps looking toward the reestablishment and stability of such peace and concord. These pacific sentiments, in which the whole Brazilian nation participates, place the Government in the happy situation of being able, without embarrassment to itself, and without lack of consideration toward others, to reserve the right to await the opportunity to cooperate or act in that sense in each instance, which may come under its examination, or which may involve its sovereign rights.

In these terms, the Brazilian Government has taken cognizance of the said note, and is thankful for the kind communication of its full text.

GREEK REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[2]

January 8, 1917

The Royal Government acquainted itself with the most lively interest with the step which the President of the United States of America has just taken with a view to the termination of a long and cruel war that is raging among men. Very sensible to the communication that has been made to it, the Royal Government highly appreciates the generous impulse as well as the thoroughly humane and profoundly politic spirit which prompted the suggestion.

Coming from the learned statesman who presides over the destinies

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 334. For replies of other States see, *ibid.*, pp. 326 (Gautemala), 329 (Panama), 339 (Uruguay), 343 (Honduras), 344 (Persia), 345 (Peru).

[2] 4 Dip. Corr., 342.

of the great American Republic and looking to a peace honorable for all as well as to the strengthening of beneficent stability in international relations, it constitutes a memorable page in history. The remarks therein made about the sufferings of neutral nations by reason of the colossal conflict and also about the guarantees which would be equally desired by the two belligerent parties for the rights and privileges of every State have particularly struck a sympathetic echo in the Greek soul. Indeed there is no country that has had so much to suffer from that war as Greece, although it kept aloof from it.

Owing to exceptionally tragic circumstances it has been less able than the other neutral countries to escape a direct and pernicious action of the hostilities between the belligerents. Its geographical situation contributed to weakening its power to resist violations of its neutrality and sovereignty to which it had to submit for the sake of self-conservation.

At this very moment deprived of its fleet and nearly disarmed, our country, pestered by a sham revolt which is taking advantage of foreign occupation, is hemmed in through a strict blockade which cuts off all communication with neutrals and exposes to starvation the whole population, including absolutely harmless persons, old men, women, who under the elemental principles of the law of nations should be spared, even though Greece were a belligerent. Yet Greece is still endeavoring to remain neutral by every possible means. Nothing more need be said to show how any initiative conducive to peace, apart from humane considerations of a general character, is apt to serve Greece's vital interests.

The Royal Government would certainly have hastened to the front rank of those who acceded to the noble motion of the President of the United States of America in order to endeavor as far as it lay in its power to have it crowned with success. If it had not been excluded from communication with one of the belligerents while with the others it had to wait for a settlement of the grievous difficulties which now bear upon the situation of Greece.

But the Royal Government with the full intensity of its soul watches the invaluable effort of the President of the United States of America, desiring its earliest possible success, and forms the most sincere wishes that it will succeed. Having from the very first days of the European War had in mind the establishment of a contact among the neutrals for the safeguard of their common interests, it is glad of the opportunity now offered to have an early exchange of views should it be deemed opportune and declare itself ready to join when the

time comes in any action aiming at the consolidation of a stable state of peace by which the rights of all the States will be secured and their sovereignty and independence guaranteed.

CHINESE REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE[1]

January 9, 1917

I have examined, with the care which the gravity of the questions raised demands, the note concerning peace which President Wilson has addressed to the Governments of the Allies and the Central Powers now at war and the text of which your Excellency has been good enough to transmit to me under instructions of your Government.

China, a nation traditionally pacific, has recently again manifested her sentiments in concluding treaties concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, responding thus to the (. . . .)[2] of the peace conferences held at The Hague.

On the other hand the present war, by its prolongation, has seriously affected the interests of China, more so perhaps than those of other Powers which have remained neutral. She is at present at a time of reorganization which demands economically and industrially the cooperation of foreign countries, cooperation which a large number of them are unable to accord on account of the war in which they are engaged.

In manifesting her sympathy for the spirit of the President's note, having in view the ending as soon as possible of the hostilities, China is but acting in conformity with not only her interest but also with her profound sentiments.

On account of the extent which modern wars are apt to assume and the repercussion which they bring about, their effects are no longer limited to belligerent States. All countries are interested in seeing wars becoming as rare as possible. Consequently China can not but show satisfaction with the views of the Government and people of the United States of America who declare themselves ready and even eager to cooperate when the war is over by all proper means to assure the respect of the principle of the equality of nations

[1] 4 Dip. Corr.. 334.

[2] Apparent omission.

whatever their power may be and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence. China is ready to join her efforts with theirs for the attainment of such results which can only be obtained through the help of all.

ENTENTE REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

January 10, 1917

The Allied Governments have received the note which was delivered to them in the name of the Government of the United States on the nineteenth of December, 1916. They have studied it with the care imposed upon them both by the exact realization which they have of the gravity of the hour and by the sincere friendship which attaches them to the American people.

In general way they wish to declare that they pay tribute to the elevation of the sentiment with which the American note is inspired and that they associate themselves with all their hopes with the project for the creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognize all the advantages for the cause of humanity and civilization which the institution of international agreements, destined to avoid violent conflicts between nations would prevent; agreements which must imply the sanctions necessary to insure their execution and thus to prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new aggressions. But a discussion of future arrangements destined to insure an enduring peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the actual conflict; the Allies have as profound a desire as the Government of the United States to terminate as soon as possible a war for which the Central Empires are responsible and which inflicts such cruel sufferings upon humanity. But they believe that it is impossible at the present moment to attain a peace which will assure them reparation, restitution, and such guarantees to which they are entitled by the aggression for which the responsibility rests with the Central Powers and of which the principle itself tended to ruin the security of Europe; a peace which would on the other hand permit the establishment of the future of European nations on a solid basis. The Allied nations are conscious that they are not fighting for selfish interests, but above all to safeguard the independence of peoples, of right, and of humanity.

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 336.

The Allies are fully aware of the losses and suffering which the war causes to neutrals as well as to belligerents and they deplore them; but they do not hold themselves responsible for them, having in no way either willed or provoked this war, and they strive to reduce these damages in the measure compatible with the inexorable exigencies of their defense against the violence and the wiles of the enemy.

It is with satisfaction therefore that they take note of the declaration that the American communication is in nowise associated in its origin with that of the Central Powers transmitted on the eighteenth of December by the Government of the United States. They did not doubt moreover the resolution of that Government to avoid even the appearance of a support, even moral, of the authors responsible for the war.

The Allied Governments believe that they must protest in the most friendly but in the most specific manner against the assimilation established in the American note between the two groups of belligerents; this assimilation, based upon public declarations by the Central Powers, is in direct opposition to the evidence, both as regards responsibility for the past and as concerns guarantees for the future; President Wilson in mentioning it certainly had no intention of associating himself with it.

If there is an historical fact established at the present date, it is the wilful aggression of Germany and Austria-Hungary to insure their hegemony over Europe and their economic domination over the world. Germany proved by her declaration of war, by the immediate violation of Belgium and Luxemburg and by her manner of conducting the war, her simulating contempt for all principles of humanity and all respect for small States; as the conflict developed, the attitude of the Central Powers and their allies has been a continual defiance of humanity and civilization. Is it necessary to recall the horrors which accompanied the invasion of Belgium and of Serbia, the atrocious régime imposed upon the invaded countries, the massacre of hundreds of thousands of inoffensive Armenians, the barbarities perpetrated against the populations of Syria, the raids of Zeppelins on open towns, the destruction by submarines of passenger steamers and of merchantmen even under neutral flags, the cruel treatment inflicted upon prisoners of war, the juridical murders of Miss Cavell, of Captain Fryatt, the deportation and the reduction to slavery of civil populations, et cetera? The execution of such a series of crimes perpetrated without any regard for universal reprobation fully explains to President Wilson the protest of the Allies.

They consider that the note which they sent to the United States in reply to the German note will be a response to the questions put by the American Government, and according to the exact words of the latter, constitute "a public declaration as to the conditions upon which the war could be terminated."

President Wilson desires more: he desires that the belligerent Powers openly affirm the objects which they seek by continuing the war; the Allies experience no difficulty in replying to this request. Their objects in the war are well known; they have been formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers Governments. Their objects in the war will not be made known in detail with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply in all necessity and in the first instance the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia and of Roumania with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable régime and founded as much upon respect of nationalities and full security and liberty, economic development, which all nations, great or small, possess, as upon territorial conventions and international agreements suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations, the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire decidedly (. . .)[1] to western civilization. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire above all is to insure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligation, with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.

United in the pursuits of this supreme object the Allies are determined, individually and collectively, to act with all their power and to consent to all sacrifices to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon

[1] Apparent omission.

which they are convinced not only their own safety and prosperity depends but also the future of civilization itself.

BELGIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

January 10, 1917

The Government of the King, which has associated itself with the answer handed by the President of the French Council to the American Ambassador on behalf of all, is particularly desirous of paying tribute to the sentiment of humanity which prompted the President of the United States to send his note to the belligerent Powers and it highly esteems the friendship expressed for Belgium through his kindly intermediation. It desires as much as Mr. Woodrow Wilson to see the present war ended as early as possible.

But the President seems to believe that the statesmen of the two opposing camps pursue the same objects of war. The example of Belgium unfortunately demonstrates that this is in no wise the fact. Belgium has never, like the Central Powers, aimed at conquests. The barbarous fashion in which the German Government has treated, and is still treating, the Belgian nation, does not permit the supposition that Germany will preoccupy herself with guaranteeing in the future the rights of the weak nations which she has not ceased to trample under foot since the war, let loose by her, began to desolate Europe. On the other hand, the Government of the King has noted with pleasure and with confidence the assurances that the United States is impatient to cooperate in the measures which will be taken after the conclusion of peace, to protect and guarantee the small nations against violence and oppression.

Previous to the German ultimatum, Belgium only aspired to live upon good terms with all her neighbors; she practised with scrupulous loyalty towards each one of them the duties imposed by her neutrality. In the same manner she has been rewarded by Germany for the confidence she placed in her, through which, from one day to the other, without any plausible reason, her neutrality was violated, and the Chancellor of the Empire, when announcing to the Reichstag this

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 335.

violation of right and of treaties, was obliged to recognize the iniquity of such an act and predetermine that it would be repaired. But the Germans, after the occupation of Belgian territory, have displayed no better observance of the rules of international law or the stipulations of the Hague conventions. They have, by taxation, as heavy as it is arbitrary, drained the resources of the country; they have intentionally ruined its industries, destroyed whole cities, put to death and imprisoned a considerable number of inhabitants. Even now, while they are loudly proclaiming their desire to put an end to the horrors of war, they increase the rigors of the occupation by deporting into servitude Belgian workers by the thousands.

If there is a country which has the right to say that it has taken up arms to defend its existence, it is assuredly Belgium. Compelled to fight or to submit to shame, she passionately desires that an end be brought to the unprecedented sufferings of her population. But she could only accept a peace which would assure her, as well as equitable reparation, security and guarantees for the future.

The American people, since the beginning of the war, has manifested for the oppressed Belgian nation, its most ardent sympathy. It is an American committee, the Commission for Relief in Belgium which, in close union with the Government of the King and the National Committee, displays an untiring devotion and marvelous activity in revictualing Belgium. The Government of the King is happy to avail itself of this opportunity to express its profound gratitude to the Commission for Relief as well as to the generous Americans eager to relieve the misery of the Belgian population. Finally, nowhere more than in the United States have the abductions and deportations of Belgian civilians provoked such a spontaneous movement of protestation and indignant reproof.

These facts, entirely to the honor of the American nation, allow the Government of the King to entertain the legitimate hope that at the time of the definitive settlement of this long war, the voice of the Entente Powers will find in the United States a unanimous echo to claim in favor of the Belgian nation, innocent victim of German ambition and covetousness, the rank and the place which its irreproachable past, the valor of its soldiers, its fidelity to honor and its remarkable faculties for work assign to it among the civilized nations.

GERMAN COMMENT UPON ENTENTE REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

January 12, 1917

Through the medium of the Government of the United States, the Royal Government of Spain, and the Swiss Federal Government, the Imperial and Royal Government has received its adversaries' reply to the note of December 12 in which Germany, in accord with its allies, proposed an early opening of peace negotiations. The adversaries reject the proposal under pretense that it is insincere and meaningless. The form in which they put their refusal excludes any idea of a reply.

The Imperial Government nevertheless wishes to make known to the Governments of the neutral Powers its view of the situation. The Central Powers have no occasion to revert to the discussions as to the origin of the world war. It is for history to pass judgment on the monstrous responsibility for the conflict. Its verdict will not any more leave out of consideration the encircling policy of Great Britain, the revengeful policy of France, the yearning of Russia for Constantinople than the provocation from Serbia, the Serajevo assassination, and the general Russian mobilization which meant war with Germany.

Germany and its allies having been compelled to take up arms in the defense of their freedom and existence consider they have accomplished that end of their efforts. On the other hand, the enemy Powers have drifted farther and farther away from the achievement of their plans, which, according to the statements of their responsible statesmen, aimed, among other things, at the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and of several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and curtailment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the partition of Turkey, and the mutilation of Bulgaria. Such demands give at least a strange sound to the pretension of sanction, repatriation, and guaranty in the mouths of our adversaries.

Our adversaries call the peace proposal of the four allied Powers a war maneuver. Germany and its allies must enter the most emphatic protest against so false an interpretation of the motives for their step which they have openly disclosed. They were convinced that a just peace, acceptable to all the belligerents, is feasible; that it can be attained through an immediate oral exchange of views and that therefore further bloodshed is indefensible. The fact that they have unre-

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 314.

servedly shown their readiness to make known their peace proposals as soon as the negotiations were opened disposes of any doubt as to their sincerity. The adversaries who were given the opportunity to examine the value of that offer neither attempted to do so nor offered counter proposals. Instead, they declare any peace to be impossible as long as they are not assured reparation for invaded rights and freedoms, acknowledgment of the principle of nationalities and the free existence of small States. The sincerity which our adversaries will not acknowledge in the four allied Powers' proposal can hardly be conceded to those demands by the world when it recalls the fate of the Irish people, the obliteration of the freedom and independence of the South African Republics, the conquest of North Africa by Great Britain, France and Italy, the oppression of foreign nationalities by Russia, and, lastly, the act unprecedented in history which is constituted by the violence brought to bear on Greece.

Likewise it ill becomes those Powers to complain of alleged violations of international law by the four allied Powers, as they themselves have since the beginning of the war trampled the law under foot and torn the treaties upon which the law rests. In the early weeks following the opening of hostilities Grent Britain disowned its adhesion to the Declaration of London and yet the text had been acknowledged by its own delegates to be conformable to the law of nations, and, as such, valid. In the course of the war it also violated in the most grave manner the Declaration of Paris, so that its arbitrary measures have created in the conduct of maritime warfare the state of illegality that now exists. The attempt to overcome Germany by starvation and the pressure exercised on the neutrals in the interest of Great Britain are at equally flagrant variance with the rules of international laws and the laws of humanity. Another infringement of the law of nations that can not be reconciled with the principles of civilization is the use of colored troops as also is the transfer of war materials in violation of existing treaties the effect of which can not but destroy the prestige of the white race in those countries. The inhuman treatment of prisoners, especially in Africa and Russia, the deportation of the civilian population of East Prussia, of Alsace-Lorraine, Galicia, and Bukowina are as many further proofs of the manner in which our adversaries understand the respect of law and civilization.

Our adversaries close their note of December 30 with a statement laying stress on the peculiar situation in Belgium. The Imperial Government is unable to admit that the Belgian Government always observed the duties imposed upon it by its neutrality toward Great

Britain. Belgium applied in a military sense to that power and to France thus violating the spirit of the treaties intended to guarantee its independence and neutrality. Twice did the Imperial Government declare to the Belgian Government that it was not coming to Belgium as an enemy, and begged it to spare its country the horrors of war. It offered in that case to guarantee in their entirety the territory and independence of the kingdom of Belgium and to make good all damage that the passing of German troops might cause. It is known that in 1887 the British Royal Government had resolved not to oppose a claim to the right of way in Belgium under those conditions. The Belgian Government refused the reiterated offer of the Imperial Government. The responsibility for the fate that befell Belgium rests upon its Government and the Powers which drew it into that attitude. The Imperial Government repeatedly repelled as groundless the charges brought against the conduct of the war in Belgium and against the measures there taken in the interest of military safety. It again enters an energetic protest against those calumnies.

Germany and its allies have made a genuine attempt with a view to bringing the war to an end and opening the way for an understanding among the belligerents. The Imperial Government lays down as a fact that the question as to whether or not that way would be entered, leading to peace, solely depended on the decision of its adversary. The enemy Governments declined to do so, upon them rests the whole responsibility for further bloodshed. The four allied Powers in their calm conviction that they are in the right will carry on the struggle until they win a peace that will guarantee to their peoples honor, existence, and free development, and at the same time insure for all the States in the European Continent the beneficent possibility of cooperating in mutual esteem and on a perfectly equal footing toward the solution of the great problems of civilization.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN COMMENT UPON THE ENTENTE REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

January 12, 1917

The Imperial and Royal Government had on the fifth instant the honor to receive through the obliging medium of the Government of

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 316.

the United States of America the reply of the States at war with it to its note of December twelfth, in which the Imperial and Royal Government in concert with its allies declared its readiness to enter upon peace negotiations. Jointly with the allied Powers the Imperial and Royal Government did not fail to subject the reply of the enemy Governments to a thorough examination which brought the following result.

Under pretense that the proposal of the four allied Powers lacked sincerity and importance the enemy Governments decline to accede to the proposal. The form they gave to their communication makes it impossible to return an answer addressed to them. The Imperial and Royal Government nevertheless wishes to disclose its views to the neutral Powers.

The reply of the enemy Governments shuns every discussion of the means to bring the war to an end. It confines itself to reverting to the facts anterior to the war, to the alleged strength of their military situation, and to the motives for the peace proposal as supposed by them.

The Imperial and Royal Government has no present intention to launch into a renewed discussion of the antecedents of the war, for it is convinced that a straight-forward, impartial judgment has already and irrefutably established, in the eye of all mankind, on which side lies the responsibility for the war. With particular reference to Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, the Monarchy has given in the years that preceded that step sufficient evidence of her forbearance in the face of the tendencies and hostile and aggressive doings of Serbia which were growing worse and worse up to the time when the infamous Serajevo assassination put any further leniency out of the question.

Likewise any discussion of the point of determining which side the advantage lay in regard to the military situation seems idle, as the answer to that question may unhesitatingly be left with public opinion throughout the world. Besides a comparison of the ends sought by the two groups in the present conflagration implies the solution of that question. While Austria-Hungary and its allies from the beginning of the war never aimed at territorial conquest but rather at their defense, the contrary stands true for the enemy States which, to mention but a few of the objects they harbor in this war, crave the annihilation and spoliation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine as also the partition of Turkey and the curtailment of Bulgaria. The four allied Powers therefore

may consider they have achieved the purely defensive ends they seek in that war while their adversaries are more and more removed from the accomplishment of their designs.

If the enemy Governments term "strategem" the proposal of the four allied Powers which is said to lack sincerity and importance, it is clear that we have here but an absolutely arbitrary assertion of a biased judgment incapable of proof as long as the peace negotiations have not begun and consequently our peace terms are not known.

The Imperial and Royal Government and the Governments of the allied Powers acted in perfect sincerity and good faith when they proposed peace negotiations for they had to reckon with the contingency of their explicit proposal to make their terms known immediately upon the opening of the negotiations being accepted. On the contrary the adversaries were those who, without offering any counter proposal, declined to acquaint themselves with the contents of the proposal of the four allied Powers. If the adversaries demand above all the restoration of invaded rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small States, it will suffice to call to mind the tragic fate of the Irish and Finnish peoples, the obliteration of the freedom and independence of the Boer Republics, the subjection of North Africa by Great Britain, France and Italy and, lastly, the violence brought to bear on Greece for which there is no precedent in history.

The Imperial and Royal Government lays down as a fact that in concert with the allied Powers it had declared its readiness to bring the war to an end by means of an oral exchange of views with the enemy Governments and that on the decision of the adversaries alone depended the opening of the way to peace. Before God and mankind it disclaims responsibility for a continuance of the war. Calm, strong, and confident of their right, Austro-Hungary and its allies will carry on the struggle until they gain a peace that will secure the existence, honor, and free development of the peoples and at the same time enable the States of Europe to cooperate in the grand work of civilization on the basis of wholly equal rights.

The Imperial and Royal Government has the honor to apply for your Excellency's obliging good offices with a request that you will kindly forward the foregoing to the Government of the United States of America.

Be pleased to accept et cetera.

(Signed) CZERNIN.

PROCLAMATION BY KAISER WILHELM II TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE[1]

January 13, 1917

Our enemies have dropped the mask. After refusing with scorn and hypocritical words of love for peace and humanity our honest peace offer, they now, in their reply to the United States, have gone beyond that and admitted their lust for conquest, the baseness of which is further enhanced by their calumnious assertions. Their aim is the crushing of Germany, the dismemberment of the Powers allied with us, and the enslavement of the freedom of Europe and the seas, under the same yoke that Greece, with gnashing of teeth, is now enduring. But what they, in thirty months of the bloodiest fighting and unscrupulous economic war could not achieve, they will also in all the future not accomplish.

Our glorious victories and our iron strength of will, with which our fighting people at the front and at home have borne all hardships and distress, guarantee that also in the future our beloved fatherland has nothing to fear. Burning indignation and holy wrath will redouble the strength of every German man and woman, whether it is devoted to fighting, work, or suffering. We are ready for all sacrifices. The God who planted His glorious spirit of freedom in our brave people's heart will also give us and our loyal allies, tested in battle, full victory over all the enemy lust for power and rage for destruction.

WILHELM, I. R.

BRITISH SUPPLEMENT TO ENTENTE REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON[2]

January 13, 1917

SIR: In sending you a translation of the Allied note I desire to make the following observations, which you should bring to the notice of the United States Government.

I gather from the general tenor of the President's note that while

[1] *The Times*, London, January 15, 1917.
[2] 4 Dip. Corr., 339; in the form of a communication from the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Washington.

he is animated by an intense desire that peace should come soon and that when it comes it should be lasting, he does not for the moment at least concern himself with the terms on which it should be arranged. His Majesty's Government entirely share the President's ideas, but they feel strongly that the durability of peace must largely depend on its character and that no stable system of international relations can be built on foundations which are essentially and hopelessly defective.

This becomes clearly apparent if we consider the main conditions which rendered possible the calamities from which the world is now suffering. These were the existence of great Powers consumed with the lust of domination in the midst of a community of nations ill prepared for defense, plentifully supplied indeed with international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them and weakened by the fact that neither the boundaries of the various States nor their internal constitution harmonized with the aspirations of their constituent races or secured to them just and equal treatment.

That this last evil would be greatly mitigated if the Allies secured the changes in the map of Europe outlined in their joint note is manifest, and I need not labor the point.

It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe forms no proper or logical part of this general scheme. The maintenance of the Turkish Empire was, during many generations, regarded by statesmen of worldwide authority as essential to the maintenance of European peace. Why, it is asked, should the cause of peace be now associated with a complete reversal of this traditional policy?

The answer is that circumstances have completely changed. It is unnecessary to consider now whether the creation of a reformed Turkey, mediating between hostile races in the Near East, was a scheme which, had the Sultan been sincere and the Powers united, could ever have been realized. It certainly can not be realized now. The Turkey of "Union and Progress" is at least as barbarous and is far more aggressive than the Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the hands of Germany it has ceased even in appearance to be a bulwark of peace and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under German officers Turkish soldiers are now fighting in lands from which they had long been expelled, and a Turkish Government, controlled, subsidized and supported by Germany, has been guilty of massacres in Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in the history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien

races shall if possible be brought to an end; and we may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy, or of any of the other territorial changes indicated in the Allied note.

Evidently, however, such territorial rearrangements, though they may diminish the occasions of war, provide no sufficient security against its recurrence. If Germany, or rather those in Germany who mold its opinions and control its destinies, again set out to domineer the world, they may find that by the new order of things the adventure is made more difficult, but hardly that it is made impossible. They may still have ready to their hand a political system organized through and through on a military basis; they may still accumulate vast stores of military equipment; they may still persist in their methods of attack, so that their more pacific neighbors will be struck down before they can prepare themselves for defense. If so, Europe when the war is over will be far poorer in men, in money, and in mutual good will than it was when the war began, but it will not be safer; and the hopes for the future of the world entertained by the President will be as far as ever from fulfilment.

There are those who think that for this disease international treaties and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. But such persons have ill learned the lessons so clearly taught by recent history. While other nations, notably the United States of America and Britain, were striving by treaties of arbitration to make sure that no chance quarrel should mar the peace they desired to make perpetual, Germany stood aloof. Her historians and philosophers preached the splendors of war, power was proclaimed as the true end of the State, and the General Staff forged with untiring industry the weapons by which at the appointed moment power might be achieved. These facts proved clearly enough that treaty arrangements for maintaining peace were not likely to find much favor at Berlin; they did not prove that such treaties once made would be utterly ineffectual. This became evident only when war had broken out, though the demonstration, when it came, was overwhelming. So long as Germany remains the Germany which without a shadow of justification overran and barbarously ill-treated a country it was pledged to defend, no State can regard its rights as secure if they have no better protection than a solemn treaty.

The case is made worse by the reflection that these methods of calculated brutality were designed by the Central Powers not merely to crush to the dust those with whom they were at war but to intimi-

date those with whom they were still at peace. Belgium was not only a victim, it was an example. Neutrals were intended to note the outrages which accompanied its conquest, the reign of terror which followed on its occupation, the deportation of a portion of its population, the cruel oppression of the remainder. And lest the nations happily protected either by British fleets or by their own from German armies should suppose themselves safe from German methods, the submarine has (within its limits) assiduously imitated the barbarous practices of the sister service. The war staffs of the Central Powers are well content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorize it.

If then the Central Powers succeed, it will be to methods like these that they will owe their success. How can any reform of international relations be based on a peace thus obtained? Such a peace would represent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and make it brutal. It would advertise the futility of all the methods on which civilization relies to eliminate the occasions of international dispute and to mitigate their ferocity. Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable by attacking the rights of one small State, and they gained their initial triumphs by violating the treaty guarantees of the territories of another. Are small States going to find in them their future protectors or in treaties made by them a bulwark against aggression? Terrorism by land and sea will have proved itself the instrument of victory. Are the victors likely to abandon it on the appeal of neutrals? If existing treaties are no more than scraps of paper, can fresh treaties help us? If the violation of the most fundamental canons of international law be crowned with success, will it not be in vain that the assembled nations labor to improve their code? None will profit by their rules but Powers who break them. It is those who keep them that will suffer.

Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the desire of the President for peace, they do not believe peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the Allied cause. For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled. The first is that existing causes of international unrest should be, as far as possible, removed or weakened. The second is that the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples. The third is that behind international law and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor. These conditions may be difficult of fulfilment. But we believe them to be in general harmony with the President's ideas and we are confi-

dent that none of them can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless peace be secured on the general lines indicated (so far as Europe is concerned) in the joint note. Therefore it is that this country has made, is making, and is prepared to make sacrifices of blood and treasure unparalleled in its history. It bears these heavy burdens not merely that it may thus fulfil its treaty obligations nor yet that it may secure a barren triumph of one group of nations over another. It bears them because it firmly believes that on the success of the Allies depend the prospects of peaceful civilization and of those international reforms which the best thinkers of the New World, as of the Old, dare to hope may follow on the cessation of our present calamities.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE SENATE[1]

January 22, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE: On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identic note to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 381.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way tc liberty. They can not in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement can not now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.

No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples

of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities

and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course can not be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the con-

victions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this can not be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and cooperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe, and the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace can not be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately

and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation

of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT MOTONO, JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON JAPAN'S AIMS[1]

January 23, 1917

The great war which has been ravaging Europe for two years and a half is an event without precedent in the history of humanity. Without doubt it will have incalculable effect upon the destiny of nations in the future; on the issue of this war will hang the liberty of nations. The question is whether the small and the great nations of Europe will be subjugated by Germany or not.

You all know the origin of the present war. The impossible demands of Austria-Hungary upon Serbia were apparently the cause of the taking up of arms by European nations, but the real cause was Germany's ambition for world domination for which preparations were being made for many years past. Germany cherishing great ambitions for the distant future, had seized upon Tsingtau in 1898 with the view of gobbling up the whole of China in time. That this has been so nobody will contend today. The great Pan-Germanist propaganda, the elaborate and marvelous military preparations, these are no longer a secret.

In the summer of 1914 Germany thought that the time had come for imposing upon the world a powerful German domination; she thought that in a couple of months there would be an end of her enemies' resistance. All calculations were baffled and now at the end of two years and a half she finds herself forced to pursue the struggle anew.

. . . . . .

It is necessary that righteousness and justice should emerge victorious out of this merciless struggle; it is necessary that the world

[1] Furnished by the Imperial Japanese Embassy at Washington.

should be given to live in all tranquillity after this cataclysm. In order to attain this noble end there must be before everything a victory complete and definitive for our Allied Powers. Without a complete victory it need scarcely be remarked that the peace of the Far East for which we have made all manner of sacrifices will remain in real danger.

. . . . . .

It was further for the purpose of keeping in more complete accord with our allies that the Imperial Government gave a prompt assent to the project of the response proposed by the French Government in the name of the Allies, to the German and American notes. The reasons that caused our refusal toward the German proposal have been clearly stated in the identic note. The Imperial Government consider with the Allied Governments that the pretensions of the hostile Governments are inadmissible and that the time has not yet come for entering upon peace negotiations. With your permission I will next say a few words in regard to our reply to the American note. While highly approving the elevated sentiments which inspired this *démarche* of the American Government, the Allied Governments did not feel bound to accede to the desire of peace expressed by that Government. The reasons for this decision on their part were set forth in the note forwarded in Paris to the American Ambassador by the French Government in the name of the Allied Powers. In the reply to the American Government, the Allied Powers state a certain number of conditions which they consider it indispensable to impose on the hostile Governments on the occasion of the conclusion of peace. The absence of all reference to the future disposition of the German colonies has justly attracted the attention of the Japanese public, neither has it escaped the notice of the Imperial Government. The reply to the American note by no means contains all the conditions of peace. The Allied Powers have reserved the right to present the conditions in detail at the time of the peace negotiations. This last point is indicated in the note to America. The Imperial Government, when they adhered to the project of the response to the American note, knew that the Allied Powers had not neglected to take into proper consideration the just claims which Japan would present at the peace negotiations. Nevertheless to clear away all misunderstanding on this point, we took the necessary measures, in sending our reply of adhesion to the French Government, for safeguarding our rights, and I am happy to be able to

assure you that a most satisfactory understanding exists on this subject among all the Allies at a moment when the Allied Powers have taken the decision of continuing the war until the victory of justice and righteousness as well as true peace of the world has been realized. I would most eagerly express our sentiments of the most sincere appreciation for the efforts displayed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania. At the same time I would express our most profound admiration for their brave armies and navies. I also wish to testify to our hearty sympathy for the inhabitants of the regions fouled by the foot of the cruel and barbarous invaders and I am firmly persuaded that a future more glorious is in store for these unfortunate peoples.

COMMENT OF BONAR LAW, CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, ON THE ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

January 24, 1917

We are working for, looking forward to peace. The Germans the other day made us what they call an offer of peace. It received from the Allied Governments the only reply which was possible. You have read the speech made by President Wilson. It was a frank speech, and it is right that any member of an Allied Government who refers to it should speak frankly too. It is impossible that he and we can look on this question from the same point of view. Whatever his private feeling may be, the head of a great neutral State must take a neutral attitude. America is very far removed from the horrors of this war; we are in the midst of it. America is neutral; we are not neutral. We believe that the essence of this conflict is the question, which is as old as time, of the difference between right and wrong. We know that this is a war of naked aggression. We know that the crimes which have accompanied the conduct of the war—crimes almost incredible after two thousand years of Christianity—are small in comparison with the initial crime by which the men responsible for the policy of Germany with cold-blooded calculation, because they thought it would pay, plunged the world into the horrors we are enduring.

[1] *The Times,* London, January 25, 1917.

President Wilson's aim is to have peace now and security for peace in the future. That is our aim also, and it is our only aim. He hopes to secure it by means of a league of peace among the nations, and he is trying to get the American Senate to do something to make this possible. It would not be right, in my opinion, for us to look upon that suggestion as altogether Utopian. You know that until quite recently duelling was common. Now the idea that private quarrels should be settled by the sword is unthinkable. But, after all, it is for us not an abstract question for the future. It is a question of life or death now; and whether we consider that the aim which he and we have in common can be secured by his methods, we can not forget the past. For generations humane men, men of good-will among all nations have striven, by Hague conventions, by peace conferences, by every means, to make war impossible. I said humane men. They have striven, if not to make it impossible, to mitigate its horrors and to see how the barriers against barbarism could be maintained.

At the outbreak of war Germany swept aside every one of those barriers and tore up the scraps of paper which she had solemnly signed. She spread mines in the open sea; on sea and land she committed atrocities, incredible atrocities, contrary to conventions which she had herself signed. At this moment she is driving the populations of enemy territory into slavery, and, worse than that, in some cases she is making the subjects of the Allies take up arms against their own country. All that has happened and no neutral country has been able to stop it, and, more than that, no neutral country has made any protest, at least no effective protest. It is for us a question of life or death. We must have stronger guarantees for the future peace of the world.

We have rejected the proposal to enter into peace negotiations not from any lust of conquest, not from any longing for shining victories; we have rejected it not from any feeling of vindictiveness or even a desire for revenge; we have rejected it because peace now would mean peace based upon a German victory. It would mean a military machine which is still unbroken, it would mean also that that machine would be in the hands of a nation prepared for war, who would set about preparing for it again, and, at their own time, plunge us again into the miseries which we are enduring today. What President Wilson is longing for we are fighting for. . . .

Our sons and brothers are dying for it, and we mean to secure it. The heart of the people of our country is longing for peace. We are praying for peace, a peace that will bring back in safety those who are

dear to us, but a peace which will mean this—that those who will never come back shall not have laid down their lives in vain.

SPEECH OF PREMIER TISZA IN THE HUNGARIAN PARLIAMENT ON THE ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON[1]

January 25, 1917

Pursuant to our peaceful policy before the war and our attitude during the war, as well as our recent peace action, we can only greet with sympathy every effort aiming at the restoration of peace. We are, therefore, inclined to continue a further exchange of views regarding peace with the United States Government. This exchange must naturally occur in agreement with our allies.

In view of the fact that President Wilson in his address makes certain distinctions between our reply and our enemies' reply, I must especially state that the Quadruple Alliance declares that it is inclined to enter into peace negotiations, but that at the same time it will propose terms which, in its opinion, are acceptable for the enemy and calculated to serve as a basis for a lasting peace.

On the other hand, the conditions of peace contained in our enemies' reply to the United States are equivalent at least to the disintegration of our monarchy and of the Ottoman Empire. This amounts to an official announcement that the war aims at our destruction, and we are, therefore, forced to resist with our utmost strength as long as this is the war aim of our enemies.

In such circumstances it can not be doubted which group of Powers by its attitude is the obstacle to peace, and this group approximates to President Wilson's conception. The President opposes a peace imposed by a conqueror, which one party would regard as a humiliation and an intolerable sacrifice. From this it follows clearly that so long as the Powers opposed to us do not substantially change their war aims an antagonism that can not be bridged stands between their viewpoint and the President's peace aims.

My second observation has to do with the principle of nationalities. I desire to be brief; therefore, I will not dilate on the question of

[1] *The New York Times*, January 26, 1917.

what moral justification England and Russia have to lay stress on the principle of nationalities in a peace program which would destroy the Hungarian nation and deliver the Mohammedan population of the Bosphorus region into Russian domination. But I say that the whole public opinion in Hungary holds to the principle of nationalities in honor.

The principle of nationalities in the formation of national States, however, can only prevail unrestrictedly where single nations live within sharply marked ethnographical boundaries in compact masses and in regions suited to the organization of a State. In territories where various races live intermingled it is impossible that every single race can form a national State. In such territories it would only be possible to create a State without national character, or one in which a race by its numbers and importance predominates, thus imprinting its national character.

In such circumstances, therefore, only that limited realization of the principle of nationalities is possible which the President of the United States rightfully expresses in demanding that security of life and religion and individual and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples. I believe that nowhere is this demand realized to such a degree as in both States of the monarchy. I believe that in the regions of Southeastern Europe, which are inhabited by a varied mixture of peoples and nations, the demand for free development of nations can not be more completely realized than it is by the existence and domination of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

We feel ourselves, therefore, completely in agreement with the President's demands. We shall strive for the realization as far as possible of this principle in the regions lying in our immediate neighborhood. I can only repeat that, true to our traditional foreign policy and true to the standpoint we took in our peace action in conjunction with our allies, we are ready to do everything that will guarantee to the peoples of Europe the blessings of a lasting peace.

I beg you to take cognizance of my reply.

GERMAN NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES ANNOUNCING THE OPENING OF UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WAR[1]

January 31, 1917

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Your Excellency was good enough to transmit to the Imperial Government a copy of the message which the President of the United States of America addressed to the Senate on the 22 inst. The Imperial Government has given it the earnest consideration which the President's statements deserve, inspired as they are by a deep sentiment of responsibility. It is highly gratifying to the Imperial Government to ascertain that the main tendencies of this important statement correspond largely to the desires and principles professed by Germany. These principles especially include self-government and equality of rights for all nations. Germany would be sincerely glad if in recognition of this principle countries like Ireland and India, which do not enjoy the benefits of political independence, should now obtain their freedom. The German people also repudiate all alliances which serve to force the countries into a competition for might and to involve them in a net of selfish intrigues. On the other hand Germany will gladly cooperate in all efforts to prevent future wars. The freedom of the seas, being a preliminary condition of the free existence of nations and the peaceful intercourse between them, as well as the open door for the commerce of all nations, has always formed part of the leading principles of Germany's political program. All the more the Imperial Government regrets that the attitude of her enemies who are so entirely opposed to peace makes it impossible for the world at present to bring about the realization of these lofty ideals. Germany and her allies were ready to enter now into a discussion of peace and had set down as basis the guaranty of existence, honor and free development of their peoples. Their aims, as has been expressly stated in the note of December 12, 1916, were not directed towards the destruction or annihilation of their enemies and were according to their conviction perfectly compatible with the rights of the other nations. As to Belgium for which such warm and cordial sympathy is felt in the United States, the Chancellor had declared only a few weeks previously that its annexation had never formed part of Germany's intentions. The peace to be signed with Belgium was to provide for such conditions in that country, with which Germany desires to main-

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 403. From Ambassador Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing.

tain friendly neighborly relations, that Belgium should not be used again by Germany's enemies for the purpose of instigating continuous hostile intrigues. Such precautionary measures are all the more necessary, as Germany's enemies have repeatedly stated not only in speeches delivered by their leading men but also in the statutes of the economical conference in Paris that it is their intention not to treat Germany as an equal, even after peace has been restored, but to continue their hostile attitude and especially to wage a systematical economical war against her.

The attempt of the four allied Powers to bring about peace has failed owing to the lust of conquest of their enemies, who desired to dictate the conditions of peace. Under the pretense of following the principle of nationality our enemies have disclosed their real aims in this war, viz., to dismember and dishonor Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. To the wish of reconciliation they oppose the will of destruction. They desire a fight to the bitter end.

A new situation has thus been created which forces Germany to new decisions. Since two years and a half England is using her naval power for a criminal attempt to force Germany into submission by starvation. In brutal contempt of international law the group of Powers led by England does not only curtail the legitimate trade of their opponents, but they also by ruthless pressure compel neutral countries either to altogether forego every trade not agreeable to the Entente Powers or to limit it according to their arbitrary decrees. The American Government knows the steps which have been taken to cause England and her allies to return to the rules of international law and to respect the freedom of the seas. The English Government, however, insists upon continuing its war of starvation, which does not at all affect the military power of its opponents, but compels women and children, the sick and the aged to suffer for their country pains and privations which endanger the vitality of the nation. Thus British tyranny mercilessly increases the sufferings of the world indifferent to the laws of humanity, indifferent to the protests of the neutrals whom they severely harm, indifferent even to the silent longing for peace among England's own allies. Each day of the terrible struggle causes new destruction, new sufferings. Each day shortening the war will, on both sides, preserve the life of thousands of brave soldiers and be a benefit to mankind.

The Imperial Government could not justify before its own conscience, before the German people and before history the neglect of any means destined to bring about the end of the war. Like the Presi-

dent of the United States, the Imperial Government had hoped to reach this goal by negotiations. After the attempts to come to an understanding with the Entente Powers have been answered by the latter with the announcement of an intensified continuation of the war, the Imperial Government—in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people—is now compelled to continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal.

Sincerely trusting that the people and Government of the United States will understand the motives for this decision and its necessity, the Imperial Government hopes that the United States may view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality and assist, on their part, to prevent further misery and avoidable sacrifice of human life.

Enclosing two memoranda regarding the details of the contemplated military measures at sea, I remain, etc.,

(Signed) J. Bernstorff.

[Inclosure 1]

MEMORANDUM

After bluntly refusing Germany's peace offer, the Entente Powers stated in their note addressed to the American Government that they are determined to continue the war in order to deprive Germany of German provinces in the West and the East, to destroy Austria-Hungary and to annihilate Turkey. In waging war with such aims, the Entente Allies are violating all rules of international law, as they prevent the legitimate trade of neutrals with the Central Powers, and of the neutrals among themselves. Germany has, so far, not made unrestricted use of the weapon which she possesses in her submarines. Since the Entente Powers, however, have made it impossible to come to an understanding based upon equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by the Central Powers, and have instead declared only such a peace to be possible which shall be dictated by the Entente Allies and shall result in the destruction and humiliation of the Central Powers, Germany is unable further to forego the full use of her submarines. The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente Allies' brutal methods of war and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now

openly disclosed intentions of the Entente Allies give back to Germany the freedom of the action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to France, etc., etc. All ships met within that zone will be sunk.

The Imperial Government is confident that this measure will result in a speedy termination of the war and in the restoration of peace which the Government of the United States has so much at heart. Like the Government of the United States, Germany and her allies had hoped to reach this goal by negotiations. Now that the war, through the fault of Germany's enemies, has to be continued, the Imperial Government feels sure that the Government of the United States will understand the necessity of adopting such measures as are destined to bring about a speedy end of the horrible and useless bloodshed. The Imperial Government hopes all the more for such an understanding of her position, as the neutrals have, under the pressure of the Entente Powers, suffered great losses, being forced by them either to give up their entire trade or to limit it according to conditions arbitrarily determined by Germany's enemies in violation of international law.

[Inclosure 2]

MEMORANDUM

From February 1, 1917, all sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice in the following blockade zones around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the North: The zone is confined by a line at a distance of 20 seamiles along the Dutch coast to Terschelling fire ship, the degree of longitude from Terschelling fire ship to Udsire, a line from there across the point 62 degrees north 0 degrees longitude to 62 degrees north 5 degrees west, further to a point 3 seamiles south of the southern point of the Faroe Islands, from there across point 62 degrees north 10 degrees west to 61 degrees north 15 degrees west, then 57 degrees north 20 degrees west to 47 degrees north 20 degrees west, further to 43 degrees north, 15 degrees west, then along the degree of latitude 43 degrees north to 20 seamiles from Cape Finisterre

and at a distance of 20 seamiles along the north coast of Spain to the French boundary.

In the South: The Mediterranean.

For neutral ships remains open: The sea west of the line Pt. del' Espiquette to 38 degrees 20 minutes north and 6 degrees east, also north and west of a zone 61 seamiles wide along the North African coast, beginning at 2 degrees longitude west. For the connection of this sea zone with Greece there is provided a zone of a width of 20 seamiles north and east of the following line: 38 degrees north and 6 degrees east to 38 degrees north and 10 degrees east to 37 degrees north and 11 degrees 30 minutes east to 34 degrees north and 11 degrees 30 minutes east to 34 degrees north and 22 degrees 30 minutes east.

From there leads a zone 20 seamiles wide west of 22 degrees 30 minutes eastern longitude into Greek territorial waters.

Neutral ships navigating these blockade zones do so at their own risk. Although care has been taken, that neutral ships which are on their way toward ports of the blockade zones on February 1, 1917, and have come in the vicinity of the latter, will be spared during a sufficiently long period it is strongly advised to warn them with all available means in order to cause their return.

Neutral ships which on February 1 are in ports of the blockaded zones, can, with the same safety, leave them if they sail before February 5, 1917, and take the shortest route into safe waters.

The instructions given to the commanders of German submarines provide for a sufficiently long period during which the safety of passengers on unarmed enemy passenger ships is guaranteed.

Americans, en route to the blockade zone on enemy freight steamers, are not endangered, as the enemy shipping firms can prevent such ships in time from entering the zone.

Sailing of regular American passenger steamers may continue undisturbed after February 1, 1917, if

(a) the port of destination is Falmouth;

(b) sailing to or coming from that port course is taken via the Scilly Islands and a point 50 degrees north 20 degrees west;

(c) the steamers are marked in the following way which must not be allowed to other vessels in American ports: On ships' hull and superstructure 3 vertical stripes 1 meter wide each to be painted alternately white and red. Each mast should show a large flag checkered white and red, and the stern the American national flag.

Care should be taken that, during dark, national flag and painted marks are easily recognizable from a distance and that the boats are well lighted throughout;

(d) one steamer a week sails in each direction with arrival at Falmouth on Sunday and departure from Falmouth on Wednesday.

(e) The United States Government guarantees that no contraband (according to German contraband list) is carried by those steamers.

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GERMANY[1]

February 3, 1917

EXCELLENCY: In acknowledging the note with accompanying memoranda, which you delivered into my hands on the afternoon of January 31, and which announced the purpose of your Government as to the future conduct of submarine warfare, I would direct your attention to the following statements appearing in the correspondence which has passed between the Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government in regard to submarine warfare.

This Government on April 18, 1916, in presenting the case of the *Sussex,* declared—

"If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

In reply to the note from which the above declaration is quoted your Excellency's Government stated in a note dated May 4, 1916—

[1] 4 Dip. Corr.. 407. Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Bernstorff.

" The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

" But neutrals can not expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated."

To this reply this Government made answer on May 8, 1916, in the following language:

" The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it can not for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

To this Government's note of May 8th no reply was made by the Imperial Government.

In one of the memoranda accompanying the note under acknowledgment, after reciting certain alleged illegal measures adopted by Germany's enemies, this statement appears:

"The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente Allies' brutal methods of war and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intentions of the Entente Allies give back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

"Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing, after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to France, etc., etc. All ships met within the zone will be sunk."

In view of this declaration, which withdraws suddenly and without prior intimation the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of May 4, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which it explicitly announced in its note of April 18, 1916, it would take in the event that the Imperial Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare then employed and to which the Imperial Government now purpose again to resort.

The President has, therefore, directed me to announce to your Excellency that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will be immediately withdrawn, and in accordance with such announcement to deliver to your Excellency your passports.

I have, etc.,

ROBERT LANSING.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO CONGRESS[1]

February 3, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: The Imperial German Government on the thirty-first of January announced to this Government and to the Governments of the other neutral nations that on and after the

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 410.

first day of February, the present month, it would adopt a policy with regard to the use of submarines against all shipping seeking to pass through certain designated areas of the high seas to which it is clearly my duty to call your attention.

Let me remind the Congress that on the eighteenth of April last, in view of the sinking on the twenty-fourth of March of the cross-channel passenger steamer *Sussex* by a German submarine, without summons or warning, and the consequent loss of the lives of several citizens of the United States who were passengers aboard her, this Government addressed a note to the Imperial German Government in which it made the following declaration:

"If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

In reply to this declaration the Imperial German Government gave this Government the following assurance:

"The German Government is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, to be in agreement with the Government of the United States.

"The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

"But," it added, "neutrals can not expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interest, restrict

the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated."

To this the Government of the United States replied on the eighth of May, accepting, of course, the assurances given, but adding,

"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it can not for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

To this note of the eighth of May the Imperial German Government made no reply.

On the thirty-first of January, the Wednesday of the present week, the German Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State, along with a formal note, a memorandum which contains the following statement:

"The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente Allies' brutal methods of war and by their determination to destoy the Central Powers and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intentions of the Entente Allies give back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

"Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures

of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to France, etc., etc. All ships met within the zone will be sunk."

I think that you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration, which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the eighteenth of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes again to resort.

I have, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will immediately be withdrawn; and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to his Excellency his passports.

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renunciation of its assurances, given this Government at one of the most critical moments of tension in the relations of the two Governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I can not bring myself to believe that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval program they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded; if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be

necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral Governments will take the same course.

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it; and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people which I sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of wilful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RELATIVE TO A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY[1]

February 12, 1917

In view of the appearance in the newspapers of February 11 of a report that Germany was initiating negotiations with the United States in regard to submarine warfare, the Department of State makes the following statement:

A suggestion was made orally to the Department of State last Saturday afternoon by the Minister of Switzerland that the German Government is willing to negotiate with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England would not be interfered with. At the request of the Secretary of State, this suggestion was made in writing and presented to him by the Swiss Minister Sunday night. The communication is as follows:

" MEMORANDUM

" The Swiss Government has been requested by the German Government to say that the latter is, now as before, willing to negotiate,

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 414.

formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby.

"P. RITTER."

This memorandum was given immediate consideration and the following reply was dispatched today:

"MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I am requested by the President to say to you, in acknowledging the memorandum which you were kind enough to send me on the 11th instant, that the Government of the United States would gladly discuss with the German Government any questions it might propose for discussion were it to withdraw its proclamation of the 31st of January in which, suddenly and without previous intimation of any kind, it canceled the assurances which it had given this Government on the 4th of last May, but that it does not feel that it can enter into any discussion with the German Government concerning the policy of submarine warfare against neutrals which it is now pursuing unless and until the German Government renews its assurances of the 4th of May and acts upon the assurance.

"I am, my dear Mr. Minister, etc.,

"ROBERT LANSING.

"HIS EXCELLENCY DR. PAUL RITTER,
"Minister of Switzerland."

No other interchange on this subject had taken place between this Government and any other Government or person.

PROPOSALS OF THE *DE FACTO* GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO FOR TERMINATING THE EUROPEAN WAR[1]

February 12, 1917

By direction of Citizen Venustiano Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, in charge of the executive power of the Mexican Nation, I have the honor of addressing to your Excellency the following note, which the above named high mandatory has seen fit to send to the neutral countries:

[1] 4 Dip. Corr., 349. The Mexican Consul General at San Francisco to Secretary Lansing.

It is more than two years since the most gigantic armed conflict recorded in history broke out in the old continent, sowing death, desolation, and destitution in the belligerent nations. The tragic contest has deeply wounded the sentiments of humanity of all the peoples that are not engaged in the struggle, and their standing unmoved before so great a disaster would be contrary to both justice and humaneness. A deep-seated sentiment of human solidarity then constrains the Mexican Government to tender its modest cooperation in endeavoring to bring the strife to an end. On the other hand, the conflagration in Europe has reached such proportions and the situation of the countries which remained neutral has grown more and more trying, bringing them, as it has, to the verge of being involved in that war; and several nations which at the outset took no part in the conflict have found themselves irresistibly drawn into it.

Those countries which at present are still preserving their neutrality in the world and truly desire to keep out of the conflict must combine their efforts toward bringing about the earliest possible termination of the European War, or at least so circumscribing it as to remove the possibility of further complications and thus bring into sight an early ending.

The present European conflict affects the whole world, like a great conflagration, a severe plague which ought to have been isolated and confined some time ago so as to shorten its life and prevent its spreading. Far from doing this, the trade of all the neutral countries in the world, and that of America in particular, bears a heavy responsibility before history, because all the neutral nations—some more, some less—have lent their quota of money, provisions, ammunition, or fuel, and in this way have kept up and prolonged the great conflagration.

Reasons of high human morality and of national self-conservation place the neutral peoples under the obligation of desisting from that course and of refusing to lend any longer that quota which made it possible to carry on the war for two years and more.

To that end the Government of Mexico, within the bounds of the strictest respect due to the sovereignty of the warring countries, inspired by the highest humanitarian sentiments, and also actuated by the sentiment of self-conservation and defense, takes the liberty of proposing to your Excellency's Government, as it is proposing to all the other neutral Governments, that the groups of contending Powers be invited, in common accord and on the basis of absolutely perfect equality on either side to bring this war to an end, either by their own

effort or by availing themselves of the good offices of friendly mediation of all the countries which would jointly extend that invitation. If within a reasonable term peace could not be restored by this means, the neutral countries would then take the necessary measures to reduce the conflagration to its narrowest limit by refusing any kind of implements to the belligerents and suspending commercial relations with the warring nations until the said conflagration shall have been smothered.

The Mexican Government is not unconscious of its somewhat departing from the principles of international law which have heretofore regulated the relations between neutrals and belligerents when it offers its propositions; but it must be admitted that the present war is a conflict without a precedent in the history of mankind that demands supreme efforts and novel remedies that are not to be found among the narrow and somewhat selfish rules of international law as accepted until now. Mexico believes that, confronted by a catastrophe of such large proportions the like of which never was seen, by a war in which political, social, military, and economic factors that could never be foreseen have been brought into play, it can not go astray in proposing that the remedies to be applied to the conflict be also new, extraordinary, and commensurate with the circumstances.

The Government of Mexico understands that no neutral nation, no matter how mighty, could singly take a step of this character, and that the measure can only be brought to a successful issue through the cooperation of the neutral Governments wielding the greatest international influence with the belligerent nations.

It is specially incumbent on the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in America; Spain, Sweden, and Norway in Europe, as being more influential and freer to arrive at a decision toward the belligerents, to father an initiative which is none the less worthy of thorough study and earnest consideration than for its coming from a nation which is supposed to be weakened at present and therefore incapable of any effective international effort.

The Government of Mexico cherishes the hope that if this idea is accepted and put into practice it may serve as a precedent and basis for a new shaping of international law that would give neutrals the opportunity to assist in preventing and mending future international wars while most strictly [respecting] the sovereignty of the belligerents.

Countries thereafter finding themselves on the brink of war, would earnestly ponder before launching into a conflict in which they would be entirely thrown on their own resources, and so would exhaust

every means in which to avoid it or shorten its duration if it proved unavoidable.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON ARMED NEUTRALITY, DELIVERED AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS[1]

February 26, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: I have again asked the privilege of addressing you because we are moving through critical times during which it seems to me to be my duty to keep in close touch with the Houses of Congress, so that neither counsel nor action shall run at cross purposes between us.

On the third of February I officially informed you of the sudden and unexpected action of the Imperial German Government in declaring its intention to disregard the promises it had made to this Government in April last and undertake immediate submarine operations against all commerce, whether of belligerents or of neutrals, that should seek to approach Great Britain and Ireland, the Atlantic coasts of Europe, or the harbors of the eastern Mediterranean, and to conduct those operations without regard to the established restrictions of international practice, without regard to any considerations of humanity even which might interfere with their object. That policy was forthwith put into practice. It has now been in active execution for nearly four weeks.

Its practical results are not yet fully disclosed. The commerce of other neutral nations is suffering severely, but not, perhaps, very much more severely than it was already suffering before the first of February, when the new policy of the Imperial Government was put into operation. We have asked the cooperation of the other neutral Governments to prevent these depredations, but so far none of them has thought it wise to join us in any common course of action. Our own commerce has suffered, is suffering, rather in apprehension than in fact, rather because so many of our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports than because American ships have been sunk.

[1] Text in "President Wilson's Foreign Policy," by James Brown Scott, New York, 1918, p. 261.

Two American vessels have been sunk, the *Housatonic* and the *Lyman M. Law.* The case of the *Housatonic,* which was carrying foodstuffs consigned to a London firm, was essentially like the case of the *Frye,* in which, it will be recalled, the German Government admitted its liability for damages, and the lives of the crew, as in the case of the *Frye,* were safeguarded with reasonable care. The case of the *Law,* which was carrying lemon-box staves to Palermo, disclosed a ruthlessness of method which deserves grave condemnation, but was accompanied by no circumstances which might not have been expected at any time in connection with the use of the submarine against merchantmen as the German Government has used it.

In sum, therefore, the situation we find ourselves in with regard to the actual conduct of the German submarine warfare against commerce and its effects upon our own ships and people is substantially the same that it was when I addressed you on the third of February, except for the tying up of our shipping in our own ports because of the unwillingness of our shipowners to risk their vessels at sea without insurance or adequate protection, and the very serious congestion of our commerce which has resulted, a congestion which is growing rapidly more and more serious every day. This in itself might presently accomplish, in effect, what the new German submarine orders were meant to accomplish, so far as we are concerned. We can only say, therefore, that the overt act which I have ventured to hope the German commanders would in fact avoid has not occurred.

But, while this is happily true, it must be admitted that there have been certain additional indications and expressions of purpose on the part of the German press and the German authorities which have increased rather than lessened the impression that, if our ships and our people are spared, it will be because of fortunate circumstances, or because the commanders of the German submarines which they may happen to encounter exercise an unexpected discretion and restraint rather than because of the instructions under which those commanders are acting. It would be foolish to deny that the situation is fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers. No thoughtful man can fail to see that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our elementary rights as a neutral nation. It would be most imprudent to be unprepared.

I can not in such circumstances be unmindful of the fact that the expiration of the term of the present Congress is immediately at hand, by constitutional limitation; and that it would in all likelihood

require an unusual length of time to assemble and organize the Congress which is to succeed it. I feel that I ought, in view of that fact, to obtain from you full and immediate assurance of the authority which I may need at any moment to exercise. No doubt I already possess that authority without special warrant of law, by the plain implication of my constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in the present circumstances, not to act upon general implication. I wish to feel that the authority and the power of the Congress are behind me in whatever it may become necessary for me to do. We are jointly the servants of the people and must act together and in their spirit, so far as we can divine and interpret it.

No one doubts what it is our duty to do. We must defend our commerce and the lives of our people in the midst of the present trying circumstances, with discretion but with clear and steadfast purpose. Only the method and the extent remain to be chosen, upon the occasion, if occasion should indeed arise. Since it has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard our neutral rights by diplomatic means against the unwarranted infringements they are suffering at the hands of Germany, there may be no recourse but to *armed* neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain and for which there is abundant American precedent.

It is devoutly to be hoped that it will not be necessary to put armed force anywhere into action. The American people do not desire it, and our desire is not different from theirs. I am sure that they will understand the spirit in which I am now acting, the purpose I hold nearest my heart and would wish to exhibit in everything I do. I am anxious that the people of the nations at war also should understand and not mistrust us. I hope that I need give no further proofs and assurances than I have already given throughout nearly three years of anxious patience that I am the friend of peace and mean to preserve it for America so long as I am able. I am not now proposing or contemplating war or any steps that need lead to it. I merely request that you will accord me by your own vote and definite bestowal the means and the authority to safeguard in practice the right of a great people who are at peace and who are desirous of exercising none but the rights of peace to follow the pursuits of peace in quietness and good will—rights recognized time out of mind by all the civilized nations of the world. No course of my choosing or of theirs will lead to war. War can come only by the wilful acts and aggressions of others.

You will understand why I can make no definite proposals or forecasts of action now and must ask for your supporting authority in the

most general terms. The form in which action may become necessary can not yet be foreseen. I believe that the people will be willing to trust me to act with restraint, with prudence, and in the true spirit of amity and good faith that they have themselves displayed throughout these trying months; and it is in that belief that I request that you will authorize me to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas. I request also that you will grant me at the same time, along with the powers I ask, a sufficient credit to enable me to provide adequate means of protection where they are lacking, including adequate insurance against the present war risks.

I have spoken of our commerce and of the legitimate errands of our people on the seas, but you will not be misled as to my main thought, the thought that lies beneath these phrases and gives them dignity and weight. It is not of material interests merely that we are thinking. It is, rather, of fundamental human rights, chief of all the right of life itself. I am thinking, not only of the rights of Americans to go and come about their proper business by way of the sea, but also of something much deeper, much more fundamental than that. I am thinking of those rights of humanity without which there is no civilization. My theme is of those great principles of compassion and of protection which mankind has sought to throw about human lives, the lives of noncombatants, the lives of men who are peacefully at work keeping the industrial processes of the world quick and vital, the lives of women and children and of those who supply the labor which ministers to their sustenance. We are speaking of no selfish material rights but of rights which our hearts support and whose foundation is that righteous passion for justice upon which all law, all structures alike of family, of state, and of mankind must rest, as upon the ultimate base of our existence and our liberty. I can not imagine any man with American principles at his heart hesitating to defend these things.

CHANCELLOR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG'S ADDRESS TO THE REICHSTAG ON THE AIMS OF THE SUBMARINE WAR[1]

February 27, 1917

While our soldiers on the front stand in the drumfire of the trenches, and our submarines, defying death, hasten through the seas, while we at home have no other—absolutely no other—task but to produce cannon, ammunition and food, and to distribute victuals with justice; in the midst of this struggle for life and for the future of our empire, intensified to the extreme, there is only one necessity of the day which dominates all questions of policy, both foreign and domestic—to fight and gain victory.

. . . . . .

We by no means underestimate the difficulties caused to neutral shipping, and we therefore try to alleviate them as much as possible. For this purpose we made an attempt to supply raw materials, such as coal and iron, needed by them, to neutral States within the boundaries of our sea forces. But we also know that all these difficulties, after all, are caused by England's tyranny of the seas. We will and shall break this enslavement of all the non-English trade. We meet half way all wishes of neutrals that can be complied with. But in the endeavor to do so we can never go beyond the limits imposed upon us by the irrevocable decision to reach the aim of the establishment of the barred zone.

I am sure that later the moment will come when neutrals themselves will thank us for our firmness, for the freedom of the seas, which we gain by fighting, is of advantage to them also.

. . . . . .

We regret the rupture with a nation which by her history seemed to be predestined surely to work with us, not against us. But since our honest will for peace has encountered only jeering on the part of our enemies there is no more "going backwards." There is only "going ahead" possible for us.

. . . . . .

[1] *The New York Times*, February 28, 1917, p. 1.

It was England who from the beginning wanted to make this war not a war of army against army, but a war of nation against nation; after it did so, and after its leaders announced, in the face of our will for peace, their will for destruction, then for the German will for defense nothing was left other than Goethe's words, according to which rudeness must be met with rudeness.

. . . . . .

To make promises of formulated and detailed conditions in my position would be unproductive and precarious. Hostile leaders did this repeatedly. They gave extravagant assurances to each other, but they merely brought it about by this that they themselves and their nation were always more deeply involved in the war.

Their example does not tempt me. What I could say about the tendency and aim of our conditions I have said repeatedly. To terminate the war by a lasting peace which will grant us reparation for all wrongs suffered and guarantee the existence and future of a strong Germany—that is our aim, nothing less and nothing more.

. . . . . .

Their answer to our recent offer was more rude and more presumptuous than any sensible person in our country or in neutral countries could have imagined. The effect produced by this document of barbarian hatred and insolence is manifest to the whole world. Our alliances and our front stand firmer, and the German nation is more united and no less resolute than ever.

. . . . . .

Gentlemen, since my last speech the military situation has hardly been changed. Everywhere our fronts are made stronger, and our brave soldiers look with full confidence to their leaders, who are accustomed to victory. Morally strengthened by the scornful refusal of our readiness for peace, on our land fronts safely protected by the genius of our supreme army commander, on our water front victorious and many times more prepared than a year ago for submarine war, we look confidently toward the coming months, which—as we hope—will be followed by a happy termination of the war.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY SECRETARY LANSING EMBODYING THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MATTER OF ARMING AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIPS [1]

March 12, 1917

The Department of State has today sent the following statement to all foreign missions in Washington for their information:

In view of the announcement of the Imperial German Government on January 31, 1917, that all ships, those of neutrals included, met within certain zones of the high seas, would be sunk without any precautions being taken for the safety of the persons on board, and without the exercise of visit and search, the Government of the United States has determined to place upon all American merchant vessels sailing through the barred areas an armed guard for the protection of the vessels and the lives of the persons on board.

AMERICAN REPLY TO THE MEXICAN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 12 [2]

March 16, 1917

SIR: I have to request that you will have the kindness to transmit to the President-elect of the Mexican Republic the following reply to the communication of February 11, 1917, addressed by him to you with instructions to deliver it to the Government of the United States.

In his note of February 11, 1917, the President-elect proposes to all the neutral Governments that the "groups of contending Powers [in the present European conflict] be invited, in common accord and on the basis of absolutely perfect equality on either side, to bring this war to an end either by their own effort or by availing themselves of the good offices or friendly mediation of all the countries which would jointly extend that invitation. If within a reasonable time peace could

[1] Statement issued by Secretary Lansing for the use of the press.
[2] 4 Dip. Corr., 351. Secretary Lansing to the Mexican Consul General at San Francisco.

not be restored by these means, the neutral countries would then take the necessary measures to reduce the conflagration to its narrowest limit, by refusing any kind of implements to the belligerents and suspending commercial relations with the warring nations until the said conflagration shall have been smothered."

The Government of the United States has given careful and sympathetic consideration to the proposals of the *de facto* Government, not only because they come from a neighboring republic in whose welfare and friendship the United States has a peculiar and permanent interest, but because these proposals have for their end the object which the President had hoped to attain from his discussion a few months ago of the aims of the belligerents and their purposes in the war. Of the futile results of the President's efforts at that time General Carranza is no doubt aware. Instead of the conflict being resolved into a discussion of terms of peace, the struggle, both on land and on sea, has been renewed with intensified vigor and bitterness. To such an extent has one group of belligerents carried warfare on the high seas involving the destruction of American ships and the lives of American citizens, in contravention of the pledges heretofore solemnly given the Government of the United States, that it was deemed necessary within the past few weeks to sever relations with one of the Governments of the Allied Central Powers. To render the situation still more acute, the Government of the United States has unearthed a plot laid by the Government dominating the Central Powers to embroil not only the Government and people of Mexico, but also the Government and people of Japan in war with the United States. At the time this plot was conceived, the United States was at peace with the Government and people of the German Empire, and German officials and German subjects were not only enjoying but abusing the liberties and privileges freely accorded to them on American soil and under American protection.

In these circumstances, all of which were existent when the note under acknowledgment was received, the Government of the United States finds itself, greatly to its regret and contrary to its desires, in a position which precludes it from participating at the present time in the proposal of General Carranza that the neutral Governments jointly extend an invitation to the belligerent countries to bring the war to an end either by their own effort or by availing themselves of the good offices or friendly mediation of neutral countries.

At the present stage of the European struggle, the superiority of the Entente Powers on the seas has prevented supplies from reaching the

Central Powers from the Western Hemisphere. To such a degree has this restriction of maritime commerce extended that all routes of trade between the Americas and the continent of Europe are either entirely cut off or seriously interrupted. This condition is not new. In 1915 the Central Governments complained of their inability to obtain arms and ammunition from the United States while these supplies were being shipped freely to the ports of their enemies. The discussion of the subject culminated in the American note of August 12, 1915 (a copy of which is enclosed)[1] to the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, upholding the contention of the United States that its inability to ship munitions of war to the Central Powers was not of its own desire or making, but was due wholly to the naval superiority of the Entente Powers. Believing that this position of the United States is based upon sound principles of international law and is consonant with the established practice of nations, the President directs me to say that he can not bring himself to consider such a modification of these principles or of this practice as compliance with General Carranza's proposal to suspend commercial relations with the warring nations would entail.

The President regrets, therefore, that, however desirous he may be of cooperating with General Carranza in finding a solution of the world problem that is intruding itself upon all countries, he is, for the reasons set forth, unable at the present time to direct his energies toward the accomplishment of the lofty purposes of the President-elect in the way suggested by his proposals. The President would not be understood, however, as desiring to impede the progress of a movement leading to the resumption of peaceful relations between all of the belligerents, and would not, therefore, wish the Mexican Government to feel that his inability to act in the present stage of affairs should in any way militate against the attainment of the high ideals of General Carranza by the cooperation of other neutral Governments in the use of their good offices and friendly mediation to bring about the end of the terrible war which is being waged between the great Powers of Europe.

I am, etc.,

ROBERT LANSING.

[1] Not printed.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON RECOMMENDING THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT, DELIVERED AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS[1]

April 2, 1917

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meager and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself

[1] Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meager enough results, indeed after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of noncombatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people can not be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neu-

trality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual: it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we can not make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable cooperation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the

country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least five hundred thousand men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation.

I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty—for it will be a very practical duty—of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon which the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind

now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized States.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its

vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naïve majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor.

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it

means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the Governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified indorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are

clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early reestablishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us—however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship—exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that

the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES [1]

April 6, 1917

SIXTY-FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

At the First Session,

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the second day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventeen.

Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the people of the United States and making provision to prosecute the same.

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

CHAMP CLARK,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
THOS. R. MARSHALL,
Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

Approved, April 6, 1917,
WOODROW WILSON.

[1] Statutes of the United States of America, 1st Session of the 65th Congress, 1917, p. 1.

TELEGRAM FROM THE AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT VIENNA ANNOUNCING THE BREAKING OFF OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE UNITED STATES [1]

April 9, 1917

Chargé Grew to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Vienna, April 8, 1917.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that the diplomatic relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary are broken and has handed me passports for myself and the members of the Embassy. He states that we may leave the monarchy at your convenience and that every possible courtesy will be extended. Am telegraphing consuls to arrange their affairs and proceed to Vienna with a view to leaving for Switzerland if possible at end of week.

Following is translation of text of note handed me by Minister:

"IMPERIAL AND ROYAL MINISTRY OF THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL HOUSE AND OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Vienna, April 8, 1917.

"Since the United States of America has declared that a state of war exists between it and the Imperial German Government, Austria-Hungary, as ally of the German Empire, has decided to break off the diplomatic relations with the United States, and the Imperial and Royal Embassy in Washington has been instructed to inform the Department of State to that effect.

"While regretting under these circumstances to see a termination of the personal relations which he has had the honor to hold with Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America, the undersigned does not fail to place at the former's disposal herewith the passport for the departure from Austria-Hungary of himself and the other members of the Embassy.

"At the same time the undersigned avails himself of the oppor-

[1] Text as issued by the State Department for the press.

tunity to renew to the Chargé d'Affaires the expression of his most perfect consideration.

" CZERNIN.

" To
Mr. Joseph Clark Grew,
Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America."

GREW.

PROCLAMATION OF THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN REFERENCE TO ITS WAR AIMS[1]

April 10, 1917

Having examined the military situation, the Russian Government in the name of duty and country, has decided to tell the people directly and openly the whole truth.

The régime which has now been overthrown left the defense of the country in a badly disorganized condition. By its culpable inaction and its inept measures it introduced disorganization into our finances, into provisioning and the transport and supply of munitions to the army. It weakened the whole of our economic organization.

The Provisional Government with the active cooperation of the whole nation will devote all its energy to repair the serious consequences of the old régime. The blood of many sons of the fatherland has been shed freely in the course of these two and a half long years of war, but the country still is capable of a powerful blow at the enemy, who occupies whole territories of our State and is now—in the days of the birth of Russian liberty—threatening us with a new and decisive thrust.

The defense, cost what it may, of our national patrimony, and the deliverance of the country from the enemy who invades our borders constitute the capital and the vital problems before our warriors who are defending the liberty of the people in close union with our allies.

The Government deems it to be its right duty to declare now that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territory, but that its object is to establish a durable peace on a basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, April 11, 1917, p. 4.

The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to subjugate or humiliate anyone. In the name of the higher principles of equity it has removed the chains which weighed upon the Polish people. But the Russian nation will not allow its fatherland to come out of the great struggle humiliated and weakened in its vital forces. These principles will constitute the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which will carry out unfailingly the popular will and safeguard the rights of our fatherland while observing the engagements entered into with our allies.

The Provisional Government of free Russia has no right to hide the truth. The State is in danger. Every effort must be made to let the country respond to the truth when it is told, not by a sterile depression and not by discouragement, but by unanimous vigor, with a view to creating a united national will.

This will give us new strength for the struggle and will procure our salvation. In this hour of rude trial let the whole country find in itself strength to consolidate the liberty won and to devote itself to untiring labor for the welfare of free Russia.

The Provisional Government, which has given its solemn oath to serve the people, is firmly confident that with the general and unanimous support of each one and all, it will itself be able to do its duty to the country to the end.

LVOFF,
President of the Council.

OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF SECRETARY LANSING ON THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES[1]

April 23, 1917

The Department of State is advised by a telegram from the American Embassy in Constantinople, dated April 20, forwarded through the Legation in Berne, that the Imperial Turkish Government on April 20 informed the Embassy that, as the Government of the United States had declared itself to be in a state of war with Germany, the Ottoman

[1] Text as issued to the press.

Government's ally, it found it necessary to sever its diplomatic relations with the United States as from that date.

American interests in Turkey have been confided to the Swedish Minister.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY SECRETRRY LANSING IN RESPECT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF RUSSIA CONCLUDING A SEPARATE PEACE[1]

April 23, 1917

The Department of State has received a telegraphed report on conditions in Russia. Concern is shown over reports of the possibility of a "separate peace" which have appeared in the press, evidently inspired by Germany. The telegram says that Russia is no more likely to abandon the war without achieving her object than is the United States. It is pointed out that the charge that the Imperial Administration was planning a separate peace caused its overthrow and hastened the revolution, which was brief and bloodless.

It is stated that the revolution will expedite the defeat of Germany and establishment of a general peace, permanent and universal.

The prompt recognition accorded Russia by the United States, the dispatch says, could not have come at a more opportune moment, and gave encouragement and help to the Council of Ministers and their supporters.

President Wilson's thrilling allusion to the Russian revolution in his address to Congress has made a deep and lasting impression on the Russian people. It has been translated, together with other of the President's utterances concerning American participation, into Russian, and broadcast circulation is being given to them in a pamphlet for free distribution.

No people, it is stated, so circumstanced, have ever made greater sacrifices for freedom than the Russians, and they fully realize that a separate peace would jeopardize all they have gained.

The American form of government, says the report, is the model of the Russian people, and the participation of the United States has infused in them a confident spirit and imbued them with a firm deter-

[1] Text as issued by the State Department for the press.

mination. They have an army adequate in numbers, unexcelled in courage, and led by commanders of ability and patriotism. They have resources inestimable and unapproachable.

If Americans are incensed at the intrigue and underhanded machinations of Germany in their midst and on their border Russians have fourfold cause for like resentment, and will make any further sacrifice rather than conclude a separate peace.[1]

ADDRESS OF CHANCELLOR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG TO THE REICHSTAG ON GERMANY'S WAR AIMS AND HER ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE WITH RUSSIA[2]

May 15, 1917

These interpellations demand from me a definite statement on the question of our war aims.

To make such a statement at the present moment would not serve the country's interests. I must therefore decline to make it.

Since the winter of 1914-15 I have been pressed now from one side, now from the other, publicly to state our war aims, if possible with detail. Every day they were demanded from me. To force me to speak an attempt was made to construe my silence regarding the program of war aims of individual parties as agreement. Against that I must resolutely protest. On giving liberty for the free discussion of war aims I had it expressly declared that the Government could not and would not participate in the conflict of views. I also protested against any positive conclusion whatever regarding the Government's attitude being drawn from the Government's silence.

I now repeat this protest in the most conclusive form. Whatever I was able to say about our war aims I said here in the Reichstag

[1] On April 27, 1917, the Provisional Government published a manifesto embodying a statement of its war aims similar to that contained in the proclamation of April 10 (above); on May 3 there was sent to the Russian embassies in the Entente Allied capitals and in Washington a note referring to that manifesto and repeating the assurances of the report here described by Secretary Lansing. The note affirmed the harmony between the war aims of the Russian state as outlined in the manifesto and the enunciations of war aims made by Entente statesmen and by President Wilson. It was added that the Provisional Government would "maintain a strict regard for its engagements with the allies of Russia." See *The New York Times*, May 4, 1917, p. 7.

[2] *The New York Times*, May 16, 1917, p. 2.

publicly. They were general principles—they could not be more—but they were clear enough to exclude their identification with other programs such as was attempted. These fundamental lines have been adhered to up to today. They found further solemn expression in the peace offer made conjointly with our allies on December 12, 1916.

The supposition which has recently arisen that some differences of opinion existed on the peace question between us and our allies belongs to the realm of fable. I expressly affirm this now with certainty. I at the same time express the conviction also that the leading statesmen of the Powers which are our allies are with us.

I thoroughly and fully understand the passionate interest of the people in the war aims and peace conditions. I understand the call for clearness which today is addressed to me from the Right and Left. But in the discussion of our war aims the only guiding line for me is the early and satisfactory conclusion of the war. Beyond that I can not contemplate or say anything.

If the general situation forces me to speak, as is the case now, I shall keep this reserve, and no pressure either from Herr Scheidemann or Herr Roesicke will force me from my path. I shall not allow myself to be led astray by utterances with which Scheidemann, at a time when drumfire sounded on the Aisne and at Arras, believed he could spread among the people the possibility of a revolution. The German people will be with me in condemning such utterances, and also Roesicke's attempt to represent me as being under the influence of the Social Democrats.

I am reproached for being in the hands of one party, but I am not in the hands of any party, either the Right or the Left. I am glad I can state that definitely. If I am in the hands of any one, I am in the hands of my people, whom alone I have to serve, and all of whose sons, fighting for the existence of the nation, are firmly ranged round the Kaiser, whom they trust and who trusts them. The Kaiser's word of August lives unaltered. Roesicke, who sets himself forward as a particular protector of this word, has received in the Kaiser's Easter message the assurance of the unaltered existence of the Kaiser's word.

I trust that the reserve which I must exercise—it would be unscrupulous on my part not to exercise it—will find support from the majority of the Reichstag and also among the people. For a month past unparalleled battles have been waging on the west front. The entire people, with all its thoughts, and sorrows and feelings, is

with its sons up there, who with unexampled tenacity and defiance of death, resist the daily renewed attacks of the English and French.

Even today I see no readiness for peace on the part of England or France, nothing of the abandonment of their excessive aims of conquest and economic destruction. Where, indeed, were the Governments who last winter openly stood up before the world in order to terminate this insane slaughter of peoples? Were they in London or in Paris? The most recent utterances which I have heard from London declare that the war aims which were announced two years ago remain unaltered.

Even Herr Scheidemann will not believe that I could meet this declaration with a *beau geste*. Does anyone believe, in view of the state of mind of our western enemies, that they could be induced to conclude peace by a program of renunciation?

It comes to this. Shall I immediately give our western enemies an assurance which will enable them to prolong the war indefinitely without danger of losses to themselves? Shall I tell these enemies: "Come what may, we shall under all circumstances be people who renounce; we shall not touch a hair of your head. But you want our lives—you can, without any risks, continue to try your luck?"

Shall I nail down the German Empire in all directions by a one-sided formula which only comprises one part of the total peace conditions and which renounces successes won by the blood of our sons and brothers and leaves all other matters in suspense?

No, I will not pursue such a policy. That would be the basest ingratitude toward the heroic deeds of our people at the front and at home. It would permanently press down our people to the smallest worker, in their entire conditions of life. It would be equivalent to surrendering the future of the fatherland.

Or ought I, conversely, to set forth a program of conquest? I decline to do that.

. . . . . .

We did not go forth to war, and we do not stand in battle against almost the whole world, in order to make conquests, but exclusively to secure our existence and to establish firmly the future of the nation. A program of conquest helps as little as a program of reconciliation to win victory and the war.

On the contrary, I should thereby merely play the game of hostile rulers or make it easier for them further to delude their war-weary

peoples into prolonging the war immeasurably. That, too, would be base ingratitude toward our warriors near Arras and the Aisne.

As regards our eastern neighbor, Russia, I have already recently spoken. It appears as if new Russia had declined for herself these violent plans of conquest. Whether Russia will or can act in the same sense upon her allies I am unable to estimate. Doubtless England, with the assistance of her allies, is employing all her efforts to keep Russia harnessed to England's war-chariot and to frustrate Russian wishes for the speedy restoration of the world's peace.

If, however, Russia wants to prevent further bloodshed and renounces all violent plans of conquest for herself, if she wishes to restore durable relations of peaceful life side by side with us, then surely it is a matter of course that we, as we share this wish, will not disturb the permanent relationship in the future and will not render its development impossible by demands which, indeed, do not accord with the freedom of nations and would deposit in the Russian nation the germ of enmity.

I doubt not that an agreement aiming exclusively at a mutual understanding could be attained which excludes every thought of oppression and which would leave behind no sting and no discord.

Our military position has never been so good since the beginning of the war. The enemy in the west, despite his terrible losses, can not break through. Our U-boats are operating with increasing success. I won't use any fine words about them—the deeds of our U-boat men speak for themselves. I think even the neutrals will recognize that.

So far as compatible with our duty toward our own people, who come first, we take into account the interests of the neutral States. The concessions which we have made to them are not empty promises. That is the case in regard to our frontier neighbors, Holland and Scandinavia, as well as those States, which, on account of their geographical position, are especially exposed to enemy pressure. I am thinking in this connection especially of Spain, which, loyal to her noble traditions, is endeavoring under great difficulty to preserve her independent policy of neutrality. We thankfully recognize this attitude and have only one wish—that the Spanish people reap the reward of their strong, independent policy by further developing their power.

Thus, time is on our side. With full confidence we can trust that we are approaching a satisfactory end. Then the time will come when we can negotiate with our enemies about our war aims regarding which I am in full harmony with the supreme army command. Then we will attain a peace which will bring us liberty to rebuild what the

future has before us in the unhampered development of our strength, so that from all the blood and all the sacrifices, the empire and the people will rise again strong, independent, and unthreatened by enemies, a bulwark of peace and labor.

STATEMENT OF THE REORGANIZED RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT ON ITS POLICY WITH RESPECT TO WAR AIMS, THE ALLIANCE, AND A SEPARATE PEACE[1]

May 19, 1917

The Provisional Government, reorganized and reinforced by representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, declares that it will energetically carry into effect the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, beneath the standards by which the great Russian Revolution came to birth. The Provisional Government is united as to the fundamental lines of its future action as follows:

First—In foreign policy the Provisional Government, rejecting, in concert with the entire people, all sorts of a separate peace, adopts openly as its aim the reestablishment of a general peace which shall not tend toward either dominion over other nations, the seizure of their national possessions, or violent usurpation of their territories—a peace with annexation or indemnity and based on the right of nations to decide their own affairs. In the firm conviction that the fall of the régime of czardom in Russia and the consolidation of the democratic principles of our internal and external policy will create in the Allied democracies new aspirations toward a stable peace and a brotherhood of nations, the Provisional Government will take steps toward bringing about an agreement with the Allies on a basis of the declaration of April 9.

Second—Convinced that the defeat of Russia and her allies would not only be a source of the greatest calamity to the people, but would postpone or make impossible the conclusion of a worldwide peace on the basis indicated above, the Provisional Government believes that the Russian revolutionary army will not suffer the German troops to destroy our western Allies and then throw themselves upon us with the full force of their arms. The development of the principles of

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, May 20, 1917, p. 1.

democratization in the army and the development of its military power, both offensive and defensive, will constitute the most important task of the Provisional Government.

. . . . . .

The Provisional Government believes that in this way alone can it conserve all that which is dear to free Russia.

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IN PARIS ON PEACE TERMS, ALSACE-LORRAINE AND INDEMNITIES[1]

June 5, 1917

The Chamber of Deputies, the direct expression of the sovereignty of the French people, salutes the Russian and other allied democracies, and indorses the unanimous protest which the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine, torn from France against their will, have made to the National Assembly. It declares that it expects from the war imposed upon Europe by the aggression of imperialist Germany the return of Alsace-Lorraine to the mother country, together with liberation of invaded territories and just reparation for damage.

Far removed from all thoughts of conquest and enslavement, it expects that the efforts of the armies of the republic and her allies will secure, once Prussian militarism is destroyed, durable guarantees for peace and independence for peoples great and small, in a league of nations such as has already been foreshadowed.

Confident that the Government will bring this about by the coordinated military and diplomatic action of all the Allies and rejecting all amendments, the Chamber passes to the order of the day.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, June 6, 1917, p. 1.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT WILSON TO RUSSIA ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT OF THE AMERICAN MISSION[1]

June 9, 1917

In view of the approaching visit of the American delegation to Russia to express the deep friendship of the American people for the people of Russia and to discuss the best and most practical means of cooperation between the two peoples in carrying the present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful consummation, it seems opportune and appropriate that I should state again, in the light of this new partnership, the objects the United States has had in mind in entering the war. Those objects have been very much beclouded during the past few weeks by mistaken and misleading statements, and the issues at stake are too momentous, too tremendous, too significant, for the whole human race to permit any misinterpretations or misunderstandings, however slight, to remain uncorrected for a moment.

The war has begun to go against Germany, and in their desperate desire to escape the inevitable ultimate defeat, those who are in authority in Germany are using every possible instrumentality, are making use even of the influence of groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just or fair, or even tolerant, to promote a propaganda on both sides of the sea which will preserve for them their influence at home and their power abroad, to the undoing of the very men they are using.

The position of America in this war is so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force.

The ruling classes in Germany have begun of late to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only to preserve the power they have set up in Germany and the selfish advantages which they have wrongly gained for themselves and their private projects of power all the way from Berlin to Bagdad and beyond. Government after government has by their influence, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but can not be broken unless wrongs already

[1] Text in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the *status quo ante*. It was the *status quo ante* out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the Empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that Empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again.

We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjustments will, and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.

But they must follow a principle and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase: it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we

stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we can not afford then or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

REPLY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO A RUSSIAN NOTE IN REGARD TO ALLIED WAR AIMS AND THEIR REVISION[1]

June 11, 1917

On May 3, his Majesty's Government received through the Russian Chargé d'Affaires a note from the Russian Government declaratory of their war policy.

In the proclamation to the Russian people enclosed in the note it is said "that Free Russia does not propose to dominate other people or to take from them their national patrimony, or forcibly to occupy foreign territory." In this sentiment the British Government heartily concur. They did not enter upon this war as a war of conquest, and they are not continuing it for any such object. Their purpose at the outset was to defend the existence of their country and to enforce respect for international engagements. To those objects has now been added that of liberating populations oppressed by alien tyranny. They heartily rejoice, therefore, that free Russia has announced her intention of liberating Poland, not only the Poland ruled by the old Russian autocracy, but equally that within the dominion of the Germanic Empires. In this enterprise the British Democracy wishes Russia God-speed. Beyond everything we must seek for such a settlement as will secure the happiness and contentment of the peoples and take away all legitimate causes of future war.

The British Government heartily join their Russian ally in their acceptance and approval of the principles laid down by President Wilson in his historic message to the American Congress. These are the aims for which the British people are fighting. These are the principles by which their war policy is and will be guided. The British Government believe that, broadly speaking, the agreements which they have from time to time made with their allies are conformable to these standards. But if the Russian Government so desire they are quite

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, June 12, 1917, p. 6.

willing with their allies to examine, and, if need be, to revise, these agreements.

ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE AT GLASGOW ON PEACE TERMS[1]

June 29, 1917

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Revolution is a fever brought about by the constant and reckless disregard of the laws of health in the government of their country; while it is on the strength of a country is diverted to the internal conflict which is raging in its blood, and it is naturally not so effective for external use during that period. The patient takes some time to recover his normal temperature, but when he begins to recover—if his constitution is good and the Russian nation has as fine a constitution as any nation ever possessed—then he will regain its strength at a bound, and be mightier and more formidable than ever. That is the case in Russia. Although this distraction has had the effect of postponing complete victory, it has made victory more sure, more complete than ever. What is more important, it has made surer than ever the quality of the victory we shall gain.

What do I mean when I say it has ensured a better quality of victory? Because that is important. I will tell you. There were many of us whose hearts were filled with gloomy anxiety when we contemplated all the prospects of a great peace conference summoned to settle the future of democracy with one of the most powerful partners at that table the most reactionary autocracy in the world. I remember very well discussing the very point with one of the greatest of French statesmen, and he had great misgivings about what would happen. Now Russia is unshackled, Russia is free, and the representatives at the Peace Congress will be representatives of a free people fighting for freedom, arranging the future of democracy on the lines of freedom. That is what I mean when I say that, not merely will the Russian revolution ensure more complete victory, it will ensure victory more exalted than any one could have contemplated before.

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[1] Text in *The Times*, London, June 30, 1917, p. 8. Only portions of the address are here printed.

And America—always the mainstay and the hope of freedom, America who never engaged in a war yet except for freedom,—America is beginning to send her gallant sons to the battlefield of Europe to fight around the standard of liberty. That is why I say that although victory may have been postponed by the events of the last few months in Russia, victory is more complete, victory on higher lines than ever we could have hoped.

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Well, I wanted to say something about the terms of peace. When you get your victory what use are you going to make of it? There are people asking when are you going to bring this war to an end, how are you going to bring it to an end, and when you have brought it to an end what end do you want it for? All of them are justifiable questions, and all of them demand reasonable answers, and I propose to make my contribution to the solution of these direct and searching questions.

In my judgment this war will come to an end when the Allied Powers have reached the aims which they set out to attain when they accepted the challenge thrown down by Germany to civilization. These aims were set out recently by President Wilson with his unrivaled gift of succinct and trenchant speech. As soon as these objectives are reached and guaranteed this war ought to come to an end, but if it comes to an end a single hour before, it will be the greatest disaster that has ever befallen mankind. I hear there are people going about the country saying Germany is prepared to give you peace now, an honorable peace and a satisfactory peace. Well, let us examine that. If it is true, then it would be criminal if we sacrificed more precious life and treasure, and prolonged the wretchedness, and anxiety, and suffering associated with the war. No doubt you can have peace, you can have peace now. Germany would give us peace now—at a price. Germany wants peace; even Prussia ardently desires it.

They don't enjoy seeing their veteran soldiers hurled back time after time by what they regard as an amateur army. It does not give them pleasure; it does not rouse their enthusiasm; it does not make them eager to get more of it. They don't like to see their crack—somebody said cracked—regiments prisoners of war, and hundreds of their cannon captured. It is humiliating constantly to fall back. A little territory here and a little land there and just a few privileges in the other direction, and we will clear out.

Well, you can have peace at that price, but do you know what it would be? The old policy of buying out the Goth, which eventually destroyed the Roman Empire, and threw Europe into the ages of barbarous cruelty. Believe me, that policy has its undoubted advantages. I can hear the echoes of the pacifists of the day in the Roman Forum dwelling on the fact that if they could only buy out the Goths at a small price compared with the war, a little territory and a little cash the Roman youth would be spared the terrors of war and their parents the anxiety of war, people of all ranks and classes would avoid the hardships of war, and be able to continue their lives of comfort and luxury and ease. The pacifists of the day, when they made the bargain that avoided bloodshed, had only transmitted it to the children. You remember what the Roman Senator said of one of these bargains which gave peace for the moment to the Roman Empire. He said: "This is not a peace, it is a pact of servitude." So it was; if they had bravely and wisely faced their responsibilities what would have happened? Rome would have thrown off its sloth as Britain did in 1914, its blood cleansed by sacrifice, the old vitality, the old virility of the race would have been restored, Rome would have been grander than ever, its rule would have been more beneficent, and the world would have been spared centuries of cruelty and chaos.

You can have peace today, but it would be on a basis that history has demonstrated to be fatal to the lives of any great commonwealth that purchased tranquillity upon it. I am told that if you are prepared to make peace now, Germany, for instance, would restore the independence of Belgium, but who says so? There are men in this country who profess to know a good deal about the intentions of German statesmen. No German statesman has ever said they would restore the independence of Belgium. The German Chancellor came very near it, but the Junkers forthwith fell upon him, and he was boxed soundly on the ear by the mailed fists and he has never repeated the offense. He said: "We will restore Belgium to its people, but it must form part of the economic system of the military and naval defense of Germany. We must have some control over its ports." That is the sort of independence Edward I offered to Scotland, and after a good many years Scotland gave its final answer at Bannockburn. That is not independence—that is vassalage. Then there comes the doctrine of the *status quo*—no annexation, no indemnity. No German speeches are explicit on that. But what does indemnity mean? A man breaks into your house, turns you out for three years, murders some of the inmates and is guilty of every infamy that barbarism can suggest,

occupies your premises for three years, and turns around and says when the law is beginning to go against him, "Take your house; I am willing to give you the *status quo*. I will not even charge you any indemnity." But even a pacifist, if it were done in his house, would turn round and say, "You have wronged me. You have occupied these premises for three years. You have done me an injury. You must pay compensation. There is not a law in the civilized world that does not make it an essential part of justice that you should do so." And he says in a lofty way, "My principle is 'No indemnity.'" It is not a question of being vindictive, it is not a question of pursuing revenge; indemnity is an essential part of the mechanism of civilization in every land and clime; otherwise what guarantee have you against a repetition, against the man remaining there for three years and when it has got rather too hot for him, clearing out and paying neither rent nor compensation. Why, every man in this land would be at the mercy of every stronghanded villain.

There is no law, there is no civilization in that. You could not keep the community together. We are fighting for the essential principles of civilization, and unless we insist upon it we shall not have vindicated what is the basis of right in every land. The same thing applies to Serbia.

But they say, "That is not what you are after. You are after our colonies and Mesopotamia and perhaps Palestine." If we had entered into this war purely for German colonies we would not have raised an army of three or four millions. We could have got them all without adding a single battalion to the army we had and if Germany had won elsewhere we should have defied the whole of her victorious legions to take one of them back. If we engaged in the gigantic enterprise, it was not for German colonies. Our greatest army is in France. Which territory are we after there? We have an army in Salonika. What land are we coveting there? We are there to recover for people who have been driven out of their patrimony the land which belonged to them and to their fathers. But they say, "What is going to happen to those colonies? What is going to happen to Mesopotamia?"

Well, if you like, take Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia is not Turkish, never has been Turkish; the Turk is as much an alien in Mesopotamia as the German, and every one knows how he rules it. This was the Garden of Eden. What a land it is now! You have only to read that terrible report to see what a country the Turk has made of the Garden of Eden. This land, the cradle of civilization, once the granary of

civilization, the shrine and the temple of civilization, is a wilderness under the rule of the Turk.

What will happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the peace conference when it meets, but there is one thing that will never happen to it—it will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk. At best he was the trustee of this far-famed land on behalf of civilization. He has been false to his trust and the trusteeship must be given over to more competent and more equitable hands, chosen by the congress which will settle the affairs of the world. That same observation applies to Armenia, a land soaked with the blood of the innocent massacred by the people who were bound to protect them.

As to the German colonies that is a matter which must be settled by the great international peace conference. Let me point out that critics talk as if we had annexed lands peopled by Germans, as if we had subjected the Teutonic people to British rule. When you come to settle who shall be the future trustees of these uncivilized lands, you must take into account the sentiment of the people themselves, what confidence has been inspired in their untutored minds by the German rule of which they have had an experience, whether they are anxious to secure the return of their former masters or whether they would rather trust their destiny to others and juster and—may I confidently say—gentler hands than those who have had the governing of them, up to the present time. The wishes, the desires, and the interests of the people of these countries themselves must be the dominant factor in settling their future government. That is the principle upon which we are proceeding.

Is there any trace of any desire on the part of Germany, any indication of a desire on the part of Germany, to settle upon the essential terms? Where are the negotiations? In a speech, which appeared in the Glasgow papers this morning, delivered, I think yesterday, by the Austrian premier, he emphatically repudiated the principle that nations must have their destiny controlled according to their desires. Where is the common ground for peace there? Unless both principles are accepted, not merely will there be no peace, but if you had a peace there would be no guarantee of its continuance, and it is important that we should never have this happen again.

What will have to be guaranteed, first of all, by the conditions of peace? That they should be framed upon so equitable a basis that nations will not wish to disturb them. They must be guaranteed by the destruction of the Prussian military power; that the confidence of the German people shall be in the equity of their cause and not in the

might of their arms. May I say that a better guarantee than either would have been the democratization of the German Government?

One of the outstanding features of the war has been the reluctance with which democratic countries entered it, and the historian will conclude, in reviewing the facts of these last few years, that if all the belligerent nations had been ruled by Governments directly responsible to their peoples there would have been no war, and if the German Government's constitution becomes as democratic as either the French, the Italian, American, Russian, or British Government's constitutions are that in itself would constitute the best guarantee in Europe and the world that we can hope to secure.

No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form of government under which they choose to live. That is a matter entirely for themselves; but it is right we should say we could enter into negotiations with a free government in Germany with a different attitude of mind, a different temper, a different spirit, with less suspicion, with more confidence, than we could with a government we knew to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism and the Allied Governments would, in my judgment be acting wisely if they drew that distinction in their general attitude in a discussion of the terms of peace. The fatal error committed by Prussia in 1870—the error which undoubtedly proves her bad faith at that time—was that when she entered the war she was fighting against a restless military Empire dominated largely by military ideals with military traditions behind them. When that Empire fell it would have been wisdom for Germany to recognize the change immediately. Democratic France was a more sure guarantee for the peace of Germany than the fortress of Metz or the walled ramparts of Strassburg. If Prussia had taken that view European history would have taken a different course. It would have acted on the generous spirit of the great people who dwell in France; it would have reacted on the spirit and policy of Germany herself. Europe would have reaped a harvest of peace and good will amongst men instead of garnering, as she does now, a whirlwind of hate, rage, and human savagery. I trust that the Allied Governments will take that as an element in their whole discussion of the terms and prospects of peace.

I have one thing to say in conclusion. In pursuing this conflict we must think not merely of the present but of the future of the world. We are settling questions which will affect the lives of people, not merely in this generation but for countless generations to come. In France last year I went along the French front and I met one of

the finest generals in the French army—General Gouraud, and he said: "One of my soldiers a few days ago did one of the most gallant and daring things any soldier ever did. He was reckless, but he managed to come back alive, and some one said to him, 'Why did you do that? You have got four children and you might have left it to one of the young fellows in the army. What would have happened to your children?' And his answer: 'It was for them I did it.'"

This war involves issues upon which will depend the lives of our children and our children's children. Some time in the course of human events great challenges are hurled from the unknown amongst the sons and daughters of men. Upon the answer which is given to these challenges, and upon the heroism with which the answer is sustained, depends the question whether the world would be better or whether the world would be worse for ages to come. These challenges end in terrible conflicts, which bring wretchedness, misery, bloodshed, martyrdom in all its myriad forms to the world, and if you look at the pages of history these conflicts stand out like great mountain ranges such as you have in Scotland—scenes of destruction, of vast conflicts, scarred by the volcanoes which threw them up and drawing blessings from the heavens, which fertilize the valleys and the plains perennially far beyond the horizon of the highest peaks. You had such a conflict in Scotland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a great fight for the right of men to worship God according to their consciences. The Scottish Covenanters might have given this answer to the challenge; they might have said, "Let there be peace in our time, O Lord." They might have said, "Why should we suffer for privileges that even our fathers never enjoyed? If we win we may never live to enjoy the fruits of it, but we have got to face privation, unspeakable torture, the destruction of our homes, the scattering of our family and shameful death. Let there be peace." Scotland would have been a thing of no account among the nations. Its hills would have bowed their heads in shame for the people they sheltered. But the answer of the old Scottish Covenanter, the old, dying Covenanter Cargill, rings down the ages even to us at this fateful hour.

"Satisfy your conscience and go forward." That was the answer. That conflict was fought in the valleys of Scotland and the rich plain and market places of England, where candles were lighted which will never be put out; and on the plain, too, of Bohemia and on the fields and walled cities of Germany, there Europe suffered unendurable agony and misery; but at the end of it humanity took a great leap forward toward the dawn. Then came a conflict of the eighteenth

century, the great fight for the rights of men as men, and Europe again was drenched with blood, but at the end of it the peasantry were free and democracy became a reality.

Now we are faced with the greatest and grimmest struggle of all. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, not amongst men but amongst nations—great and small, powerful and weak, exalted and humble, Germany and Belgium, Austria and Serbia—equality and fraternity amongst peoples as well as amongst men—that is the challenge which has been thrown to us. Europe is again drenched with the blood of its bravest and best, but do not forget, these are the great successions of hallowed causes; they are the Stations of the Cross on the road to the emancipation of mankind. Let us endure as our fathers did. Every birth is an agony, and a new world is born out of the agony of the old world. My appeal to the people of this country and, if my appeal can reach beyond it, is this, that we should continue to fight for the great goal of international right and international justice, so that never again shall brute force sit on the throne of justice nor barbaric strength wield the sceptre of right.

RESOLUTION ON PEACE TERMS PASSED BY THE REICHSTAG[1]

July 19, 1917

As on Aug. 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of the war, the German people stand upon the assurance of the speech from the throne—" we are driven by no lust of conquest." Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and independence and for the integrity of its territories. The Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic, and financial violations are incompatible with such a peace.

The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples.

The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international political organizations. So long, however, as the enemy

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, July 21, 1917, p. 2.

Governments do not accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, the German people will stand together as one man, hold out unshaken, and fight until the rights of Germany and its allies to life and development are secured. The German nation united is unconquerable.

The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at one with the men who are defending the fatherland; in the heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the whole people.

ADDRESS OF CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS TO THE REICHSTAG ON PEACE TERMS AND THE REICHSTAG RESOLUTION[1]

July 19, 1917

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What we wish is, first, to conclude peace as those would who have successfully carried through their purpose. The present generation and the coming generations should retain this time of war and trial as a vivid memory, as a time of unprecedented sorrow, of execution and willing sacrifices by our people and of our army for the centuries to come. A nation of not even seventy millions, which, side by side with its loyal allies, has held its place, weapon in hand, before the frontiers of its country against the manifold superiority of masses of nations, has proved itself unconquerable. To me our aims are clear from this situation.

First of all, the territory of the fatherland is inviolable. With an enemy who demands parts of our Empire we can not parley. If we make peace we must in the first line make sure that the frontiers of the German Empire are made secure for all time.

We must by means of an understanding and give and take (Ausgleich) guarantee the conditions of existence of the German Empire upon the continent and overseas. Peace must build the foundation of a lasting reconciliation of the nations. It must, as is expressed in your resolution, prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through economic blockades, and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of our opponents does not develop into an economic

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, July 21, 1917, p. 7. Only portions of the address are printed here.

offensive alliance against us. These aims may be attained within the limits of your resolution as I interpret it.

We can not again offer peace. We have loyally stretched out our hand once and met with no response, but with the entire nation, with the German army and its leaders in accord with this declaration, the Government feels that if our enemies abandon their lust for conquest and their aims of subjugation and wish to enter into negotiations we shall listen honestly, ready for peace, to what they have to say to us. Until then we must hold out calmly, patiently and courageously.

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You can not expect me, who have been only five days in office, to express my views today exhaustively and finally on pending questions of internal policy. It goes without saying that I stand upon the ground of the Imperial rescript of July 11 concerning the franchise of Prussia. I consider it advantageous and necessary that closer touch should be established between the great parties and the government. I am ready, so far as this is possible without impairing the federal character and the constitutional basis of the Empire, to do everything possible to impart to this cooperation more life and efficiency. I also consider it desirable that relations of confidence between Parliament and government should be made closer by calling to the leading executive positions men who, in addition to their conciliatory character, possess the confidence of the great parties in the popular representative body.

All this is possible, of course, only on the assumption that the other side recognizes that the constitutional right of the Imperial Administration to conduct our policy must not be narrowed. I am not willing to permit the conduct of affairs to be taken from my hands. We are sailing through a wildly tossing sea in a dangerous channel, but our destination shines out before our eyes. What we long to attain is a new and splendid Germany, not a Germany which wishes, as our enemies believe, to terrorize the world with her armed might. No, the morally purified, God-fearing, loyal, peaceful, and mighty Germany which we all love. For this Germany we will fight and endure; for this Germany we and our brothers out there will bleed and die; for this Germany we will fight our way through, despite all force.

ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE IN LONDON IN REPLY TO CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS[1]

July 21, 1917

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Three years—even of agony—are not long in the life of a nation, and the deliverance of Belgium is assuredly coming, and when it comes that deliverance must be complete. France owes it, Britain owes it, Europe owes it, the civilization of the world owes it to Belgium that her deliverance shall be complete.

What have we got in the way? There is a new Chancellor. The Junker has thrown the old Chancellor into the waste-paper basket with his scrap of paper and they are lying there side by side. You will not have to wait long before Junkerdom will follow. What hope is there in his speech of peace—I mean an honorable peace, which is the only possible peace? It is a dexterous speech. A facing-all-ways speech. There are phrases for those who earnestly desire peace—many. But there are phrases which the military powers of Germany will understand—phrases about making the frontiers of Germany secure. That is the phrase which annexed Alsace-Lorraine; that is the phrase which has drenched Europe with blood from 1914: that is the phrase which, if they dare, will annex Belgium; and that is the phrase which will once more precipitate Europe into a welter of blood within a generation unless that phrase is wiped out of the statemanship of Europe.

There are phrases for men of democratic mind in that speech—many. He was calling men from the Reichstag to cooperate with the Government; they were even to get office, men of all parties and men of democratic sentiment. But there were phrases to satisfy the Junkers—to other men nothing. There was to be no parting with imperialistic rights. Ah! They will call men from the Reichstag to office, but they will not be Ministers, but clerks. It is the speech of a man waiting on the military situation, and let the Allies—Russia, Britain, France, Italy, all of them—bear that in mind. It is a speech that can be made better by improving the military situation. If the Germans win in the West, if they destroy the Russian army in the East, if their friends the Turks drive Britain out of Mesopotamia, if the U-boats sink more merchant ships, then that speech, believe me,

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, July 23, 1917, p. 4.

means annexation all round and military autocracy more firmly established than ever. But, on the other hand, should the German army be driven back in the West, be beaten in the East, and should their friends the Turks fail in Bagdad, and the submarines be a failure on the high seas, that speech is all right. We must all help to make that a good speech. There are possibilities in it of excellence. Let us help Dr. Michaelis; let us give our assistance to the new Chancellor to make his first speech a real success. But for the moment it means that the military party have won.

I want to repeat in another form a statement which I made before. What manner of government they choose to rule over them is entirely the business of the German people themselves; but what manner of government we can trust to make peace with is our business. Democracy is in itself a guarantee of peace, and if you can not get it in Germany then we must secure other guarantees as a substitute. The German Chancellor's speech shows, in my judgment, that those who are in charge of affairs in Germany have for the moment elected for war.

There is no hope for Belgium in that speech. It is not even mentioned. The phraseology is full of menace to Belgium. All that about making their frontiers secure—which took Metz and Strassburg away, and will take Liége and the control over Antwerp again—that is not a phrase of good omen for Belgium. All that about the necessity of seeing that the economic interests of Germany are secure means that, even if they restore Belgium, their restoration will be a sham. The determination of the Allies is this, that Belgium must be restored as a free and independent people. Belgium must be a people and not a Protectorate. We must not have a Belgian scabbard for the Prussian sword. The sceptre must be Belgian, the sword must be Belgian, the scabbard must be Belgian, the soul must be Belgian.

I read that speech as it was my duty to read it, once, twice, thrice, to seek anything in it which would give hope for an end of this bloodshed, and I see a sham independence for Belgium, a sham democracy for Germany, a sham peace for Europe; and I say Europe has not sacrificed millions of her gallant sons to set up on soil consecrated by their blood a mere sanctuary for shams.

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It is a dangerous thing even in peace to indulge in prediction, and in war when changes are so cyclonic it is much more dangerous, but I am going to predict that it will not be long before Dr. Michaelis, if he

survives, will deliver a different speech. And that is the one we are waiting for; that is the one we are fighting for. The issues are becoming clearer day by day. Belgium, with a sure instinct, understood them the first hour of the contest. You made no mistake as to what this great conflict meant for you, for France, for Britain, for Europe, for the world, for humanity, for all generations. It is to your glory that you have jumped to the right conclusion. A great German newspaper said the other day that the Germans were fighting for the freedom and independence of the fatherland. It was never true. It is less true today than it ever was. The freer Germany is, the more independent Germany is, the better we like it. Those who are the enemies of the freedom and independence of Germany are her own rulers and not the Allied Powers.

We prefer a free Germany. We can make peace with a free Germany. It is with a Germany dominated by an autocracy that we can not make any terms of peace. When they were fighting perhaps a corrupt and narrow autocracy in the East they had some specious pretext for appeals of that kind to their own people. They have none now. For what has happened? Russia has not merely become a great democracy which is not fighting to extend its own territories. It has actually declared that it is prepared to concede independence to a nation which was once under the Russian flag. Since then the last shadow of a pretext on the part of Germany that she is fighting for freedom and independence has completely vanished, even if she ever had one.

It has now become a struggle between two definite groups: one a democratic group—a group of democratic, free nations—another a group of nations governed by military autocracy—Germany, Austria, Turkey, and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria—fit associates. That is the grouping.

There has been a change, a more significant change than that of the substitution of Dr. Michaelis for Bethmann-Hollweg, and that is the change which has been announced just a few hours ago. That brilliant young Russian statesman, the outstanding figure of the Russian Revolution, the man whose inspiration has regenerated and revived Russian military forces, has succeeded to the leadership of the Russian democracy. In the great coming struggles in the East and in the West, every German soldier must know in his heart that if he falls he will be dying for military autocracy in fighting against the federation of free peoples. On the other hand, every Belgian soldier, every French soldier, every Russian soldier, knows that he is risking

his life for the freedom and independence of his native land. Every British, every American, every Portuguese soldier knows, that he will be fighting side by side with the others for international right and justice throughout the world, and it is that growing conviction more even than the knowledge of vast unexhausted resources which gives them all heart—it gives us heart—to go on fighting to the end, knowing full well that the future of mankind is our trust to maintain and to defend.

ALLIED DECLARATION ON BALKAN POLICY AND PEACE TERMS[1]

July 26, 1917

The Allied Powers more closely united than ever for the defense of the peoples' rights, particularly in the Balkan Peninsula, are resolved not to lay down arms until they have attained the end which in their eyes dominates all others—to render impossible a return of the criminal aggression such as that for which the Central Empires bear the responsibility.

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STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN ON PEACE TERMS IN REPLY TO MR. LLOYD-GEORGE[2]

July 28, 1917

In his speech on the occasion of the Belgian National Festival of Independence in London, Mr. Lloyd-George represented the statements made by the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag as equivocal. This reproach seems to me incomprehensible. The Chancellor's statement was absolutely clear, and the British statesman's comment becomes even more incomprehensible when it is considered that Mr. Lloyd-George in his speech put the Reichstag's peace resolution altogether on one side, although this resolution is inseparably bound up

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, July 28, 1917, p. 1.
[2] Text in *The Times*, London, July 30, 1917, p. 7.

with the speech of Herr Michaelis. These two manifestations were also the expression of the united will of the German people on the question of peace. Above all, Mr. Lloyd-George ought not to have represented this resolution as a piece of bluff. The Chancellor and the Reichstag declared in the agreement that Germany was conducting a defensive war and that the German people only asked for an honorable peace by means of an understanding and an agreement offering a basis for the lasting reconciliation of the nations. The Chancellor and the Reichstag solemnly declared that the German people desired no forced conquests and abhorred economic isolations and incitements to enmity between the nations after the war.

In any case I think I must reply to Mr. Lloyd-George by a question. What are we finally to expect from the Entente? What we desire is quite evident from the well known declarations made in Vienna and the demonstrations made by the German people, showing complete agreement, to the very last details, between Vienna and Berlin. What the Chancellor and the Reichstag declare is the same as what I described months ago as the honorable peace which the Government at Vienna is ready to accept and by which it seeks the lasting reconciliation of the nations, but there also exists complete agreement on this point, that we shall never accept a peace which is not honorable for us. If the Entente does not wish to enter into negotiations on the basis which we have clearly indicated we shall continue the war and shall fight to the last extremity.

I do not care whether this admission is regarded as a sign of weakness or of strength. To me it seems only a sign of common sense and morality, which revolts against the idea of prolonging a war the continuation of which is already absurd. I am absolutely convinced that the Entente will never succeed in crushing us, and, since in our position of defense we have no intention of crushing the enemy, the war will end sooner or later in a peace by understanding; but to my way of thinking the natural conclusion is that further sacrifices and suffering imposed on all humanity are useless, and that it is necessary in the interests of humanity to reach this peace by understanding as soon as possible. That is what we wish, but I repeat that no one must doubt that our wish is strictly limited and can only be realized within these limits.

As we have fought in conjunction with our faithful allies, we shall make peace in conjunction with them now or later, and shall fight in conjunction with them to the last extremity, unless the enemy shows his willingness to understand our point of view.

I shall not put the question who was responsible for this war, because it is useless to discuss the past in this connection, but I shall speak of the future, and I wish to express my desire that the world may succeed after the conclusion of peace in finding adequate means and expedients to prevent forever the recurrence of such a frightful war. Every man with any moral feeling must cooperate in this gigantic work, and all the States of the world must unite in their efforts to procure guarantees which will make impossible in the future such a frightful disaster as the present world war. The road may be difficult, but it is not impossible.

The democratization of constitutions is the great demand of the time. Both in Austria and in Hungary the governments are putting their hands to this great work, but they protest against intervention from outside. We do not intervene in the internal affairs of other States, and we demand complete reciprocity in this matter.

I will not conclude this short explanation, the object of which is to give the public an idea of the situation as I see it, without uttering a warning. We must no more lose courage in the trying time of which we have had so much in the past than we must become too proud of the great victories which we are now gaining. We wish to win an honorable peace, and we shall win it and contribute to create a new world with the guarantee that the terrible disaster of a world war shall not be repeated. These are the aims for which we are fighting and for which we stand upright or fall.

REPLY OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR IN DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON BRITISH PEACE TERMS[1]

July 30, 1917

I do not wish to shorten the debate, which, I admit, is of great importance; still less do I desire to make myself a contributor on any large scale to the discussion. We have just listened to a very able speech from my honorable friend the member for Perth. I think from his point of view nothing could show how much thought he has devoted to the great topic on which he spoke to us. I find myself in great sympathy with him: the whole spirit which animated his speech

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, July 31, 1917, p. 8.

appeals to me. But when he turns to the Government and says—you should go into the arena, you should discuss matters which are not our own alone, but those of the Allies side by side with whom we are fighting—when he asks us to make elaborate declarations of policy in excess of those which have been already made, I am not sure that he is giving us advice which it would be judicious for us to follow. The broad policy which ought, I think, to animate the British Government has been expounded by the late Prime Minister, the present Prime Minister, the late Foreign Secretary, and by others who have held high office during the three years which the war has lasted, and I do not believe there is very much doubt on the broad principles which animated all those since August, 1914.

Of course, how we are going to apply those broad principles depends upon endless circumstances of great complexity—circumstances that turn upon what goes on in Allied countries and in enemy countries. It may depend on the fortunes of war; upon the changing circumstances of the military and naval conditions in the world. How can we go into details and anticipate now the work that will have to be done by the final Peace Congress? I do not believe it is possible. Every statement made by a responsible Minister is treated as a kind of pledge as to the precise and detailed course which is to be pursued by the Government of which he is a member, when the time for the final settlement arrives. That is a very dangerous way of treating things of this kind. My honorable friend who has just sat down and the newspapers all call for precise statements as to what we are going to do in this or that part of Europe—what is the proper method of treating the Jugoslav question, and what is the proper method of treating Austria. You can not deal with these problems in the precise spirit in which you can deal with an historic problem in the past. None of us have the power of foreseeing the circumstances in which the world will find itself when these problems are finally decided, unless you can arrogate to yourself the gift of prophecy. How can anybody commit himself and his country—and perhaps in a certain sense the Allied countries—to precise statements upon these immensely important questions? You can not do it, and I feel I should be doing a very ill service to the country were I to attempt to do it now. The debate began by a dispute as to the precise method in which the Austrian Empire was to be treated. What we desire, of course, is that the nationalities composing that heterogeneous State should be allowed to develop on their own lines, carrying out their own civilization and determining the course in which their development should take place.

But some of my friends are not content with that statement. They ask: Do you mean to do that by joining Serbia with Croatia, by separating Bohemia from Hungary? Surely a Foreign Minister dealing with events which are still distant, I fear—I mean peace discussions—would be foolish to discuss that today. In any event as everybody knows, we entered into this war in those early days with little in our mind besides the necessity of defending Belgium and the necessity of preventing France being crushed before our eyes. Those were the two motives that brought us into the war. Nobody with the smallest knowledge of the facts supposes that when Sir E. Grey and the Government of which he was a member made that fateful declaration on Monday, August 3, there was in the mind of either the people who made the declaration or those who listened to it the smallest thought of those great problems which in the course of the war have opened upon us.

Only this is clear: we did not enter the war with any selfish purpose. We hear the phrase now echoed and reechoed—No imperialist policy—No war indemnities. We did not go into this war for an imperialist policy, and certainly not to get indemnities. We entered into it and we have remained in it for purposes which—nobody who understands public opinion in this country will doubt it for a moment—are really unselfish. I do not think, therefore, that we have got anything from that point of view to give up. We stand necessarily in a different position from many of our allies, simply because it never entered into the thoughts, and never could enter into the thoughts, of any British statesman, from whatever party he would be drawn, that he was entering into this war to increase British possessions on the Continent of Europe. We are free from any taint or suspicion of such a policy, even in the mind of our most dangerous enemy. That gives to both America and ourselves a position which can hardly be arrogated to themselves by any other of the combatants in the war.

I do not think really it would be wise were I to follow the course of my honorable friends and enter into these forecasts of what might be done, should be done, or could be done. We all wish the same thing. We all wish to see Europe come out of this struggle not only freer, but more safe. We want to see it out of this struggle with fewer of those causes which divide mankind and act as a perpetual irritant acting as national pride, national ambition, or national vanity. We want to diminish the future prospects of war by diminishing the number of reasons which drive nations into war. And we are all agreed that by sacrificing legitimate natural aspirations you will go a

very long way to carry out that idea. Is it wise to do more than lay down those broad general principles of policy? I greatly doubt whether it is. I believe that we who for the moment, at all events, are responsible for conducting the international affairs of this country will only hamper ourselves and our successors by precise statements upon this or upon that point.

Some of the things that have been called in question tonight seem to me to be very clear. I do not see how anybody who has supported France, believed in France, can doubt that we must go on supporting, believing in, and helping France to restore herself to what she was before the attack engineered against her by Bismarck in 1870. Alsace and Lorraine were reft from France by force, and at no moment since 1871 has the passionate desire of those who were taken from France for reunion diminished. If the result of this war is to be, as I hope it will be, that the map of Europe will be a far more stable map than any congress has yet left it, can anybody doubt that one of the arrangements of territory that must take place is the restoration to France of that of which France was violently robbed forty years ago?

I shall perhaps be accused of having violated my own convictions in going thus far. But I do think that stands in a different category from these interesting, important, even vital speculations in which my honorable friends have indulged in regard to the more eastern portion of the European continent. At any rate, that is more obviously connected with recent historical events. It comes more immediately and directly under our notice. It seems to me to raise a question of which the solution is quite obvious, and I therefore do not think that I have done any harm in expressing, at all events, my own opinion, which is that, while France fights for Alsace and Lorraine, we should support her.

France, of course, is not fighting for Alsace-Lorraine alone. She is fighting for her very existence. But the struggle which has been forced upon her includes, and could not help including, this other problem so intimately connected with her recent history. Therefore I say, while we are determined to see that as far as in us lies France shall not be crushed, that carries with it the corollary that if, as I believe, the war is a successful war, the legitimate aspirations of France to a restoration of that which was hers is a matter in which we are closely and nearly concerned, although of course, we have not, so to speak, selfish or self-concentrated interest in such a happy consummation. It is disinterested and I do not think on that account it is less worthy of the attention of this House. Nobody can doubt

that the questions raised in the debate are at this moment in one form or another weighing upon the minds of every statesman in Europe and in America, and indeed occupy the thoughts of the whole civilized world to the exclusion almost of every other subject of interest. It is, therefore, folly to ask an assembly like this to be silent on these great themes. I should never ask my honorable friends to abstain from expressing, with due caution and reserve, their hope and their beliefs in regard to these all-important topics. But I must repeat the hope that the interest which we all feel, to an almost oppressive extent, in the solution of the problems of the war will never take the form of asking the Government to go into details about future arrangements which, let it be remembered, do not depend, and can not depend, on our Government alone. That is the essence of the matter.

When peace comes to be seriously discussed, not by those who mean to talk about it solely for the purpose of disintegrating the alliance of the Allies, but for the more legitimate purpose of bringing to an end the horrors under which the world is groaning, when that time comes the result will depend not merely on our speculations or wishes or on what this nation or that nation particularly desires, but upon the great forces which the war has let loose. It is impossible for any man to prophesy with clearness in what form the play of these forces will ultimately mold the destinies of mankind, and to ask us to lay down precisely that upon which we shall insist or press for or without pressing for which we would like to see, or that which we would view with perfect indifference, or to ask us what amount of sacrifice we are prepared to make to gain each of those ends, is to ask the Government to play a rôle which no Government could play with success. We are dealing with forces of too great a complexity to be dealt with in that manner.

What we have got to do is to make clear to the world that we are not fighting for fighting's sake, that we desire peace as earnestly as any community of those who are now suffering under the losses, the burdens, the calamities of war. The peace we desire is one which shall descend, which shall not last merely till people have half forgotten the horrors and exhaustion of this war, but a peace which shall be based, partly, we may trust, upon the growth of international morality, partly, we may hope, on an improvement of international relations, which will make the gratuitous breaking of the world's peace a crime for which the criminal is punished, but also and beyond all that, which shall involve such a rearrangement, such a modification of political forces in Europe that there will not be a balance of power in

precisely the old eighteenth century sense of the word, but such an arrangement among the communities of Europe as will make it far more difficult for the disturbers of peace to find a soil in which to sow their bitter and fatal seed, and will make that seed itself much less productive of disastrous crops than has been the case in our own lifetime and again in the lifetime of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. How that end is to be pursued exactly, how you are going to deal with such a great and ancient monarchy as Austria; how Austria and Germany are going to deal with their own internal problems—which they must settle, not anybody else—nobody can effectively discuss these questions across the floor of the House at the present stage of the war.

One word let me say as to the democratization of Germany. We all hope that autocracy in Germany will give place to free government as we understand it and to parliamentary institutions as we understand them. As has been said by high authorities, it is hard to see how you can negotiate a stable peace except you find a community to deal with based upon a popular will, and a popular will not corrupted by sinister designs of universal domination. But that does not mean that anybody is fool enough to suppose that he can impose upon Germany a constitution made outside Germany. Germany must work out her own salvation. You do not mend matters by imposing a constitution even if you have the power to impose it.

Even if tomorrow some great military catastrophe to Germany were to put the Allied Powers in a position to say to her, "You may like it or dislike it, but you shall adopt a constitution which meets our views of freedom, our views of what the Government of a civilized State ought to accept," that has never succeeded, and it will never succeed. Nations work out their own schemes of liberty for themselves according to their own ideals and on the basis of their own history and character, what has actually occurred to them in the past, what their hopes suggest to them for the future. But if it be true that the great power of German Imperialism depends upon the belief, driven into the German nation by the wars of 1866 and 1870, that only by that can Germany be great, powerful, and rich, then it may well be that, if experience shows that imperialistic system will not only produce triumph at one time, but also will inevitably lead to the corresponding disaster at another, those views which found such powerful expression in Germany in 1848, which animated the best of the German thinkers for more than a generation before the Bismarckian domination, will revive with a new lustre and a new strength, and that Germany, with

all her powers of organization and all her inherited cultivation will be added to those nations who before this war broke out hardly conceived that universal war of this sort could be deliberately provoked in order to further the commercial or political interests of any single community. When Germany comes on a level with countries like the United States and Great Britain in that respect we may hope that at all events one of the great causes of disturbances of peace will forever be eliminated from the history of Europe. Who will venture to say for a moment that, looking at the internal condition of Germany, so far as we are allowed to see it at present, the ideas of which I have been speaking are really moving in such a fashion as to raise legitimate hopes that in our lifetime we shall see them established? I am sure if they are not established the security of Europe will not be established until Germany is powerless or is made free.

Nothing is clearer to me, if our object be to carry out that policy, than that the immediate duty before us is not to discuss in detail what kind of terms of peace we would like when the war comes to an end, but to continue the war with all the strenuous vigor which we can command. What is the corollary, the conclusion of this part of the argument I have laid before the House? That if this war ends with a German peace, peace will only be a prelude to a new European war. If it does not end with a German peace, but with a peace which commends itself to the conscience of America and Great Britain—I mention these two countries because they are the only two which have no selfish European interests to serve—but let us say, if it commends itself to the conscience of America, Great Britain, neutral countries, and all those of our allies who are fighting, as they are, for their existence—then it will not be a German peace, but it will be a peace which will probably be in the end a blessing to Germany as well as to the rest of mankind. In any case it will be a peace which may have some probability that it will last not merely beyond the memory of the generation which has waged this horrible war, but until we have reached a stage of international development which will make any recurrence of these horrors unthinkable to our children.

PEACE PROPOSAL OF POPE BENEDICT XV[1]

August 1, 1917

To the Rulers of the Belligerent Peoples: From the beginning of our Pontificate, in the midst of the horror of the awful war let loose on Europe, we have had of all things three in mind: To maintain perfect impartiality toward all the belligerents, as becomes him who is the common father and loves all his children with equal affection; continually to endeavor to do them all as much good as possible, without exception of person, without distinction of nationality or religion as is dictated to us by the universal law of charity as well as by the supreme spiritual charge with which we have been entrusted by Christ; finally, as also required by our mission of peace, to omit nothing, as far as it lay in our power that could contribute to expedite the end of these calamities by endeavoring to bring the people and their rulers to more moderate resolution, to the serene deliberation of peace, of a "just and lasting" peace.

Whoever has watched our endeavors in these three grievous years that have just elapsed could easily see that, while we remain ever true to our resolution of absolute impartiality and beneficent action we never cease to urge the belligerent peoples and governments again to be brothers, although all that we did to reach this very noble goal was not made public.

About the end of the first year of the war we addressed to the contending nations the most earnest exhortations, and in addition pointed to the path that would lead to a stable peace honorable to all. Unfortunately our appeal was not heeded, and the war was fiercely carried on for two years more, with all its horrors. It became even more cruel and spread over land and sea and even to the air and desolation and death were seen to fall upon defenseless cities, peaceful villages and their innocent people.

And now no one can imagine how much the general suffering would increase if other months or, still worse, other years, were added to this sanguinary triennium. Is this civilized world to be turned into a field of death and is Europe, so glorious and flourishing, to rush as though carried by a universal folly, to the abyss and take a hand in its own suicide?

In so distressing a situation, in the presence of so grave a menace,

[1] Text as issued to the press by the U. S. State Department.

we, who have no personal political aim, who listen to the suggestions or interests of none of the belligerents, but are solely actuated by a sense of our supreme duty as the common father of the faithful, by the solicitation of our children who implore our intervention and peace-bearing words uttering the very voice of humanity and reason—we again call for peace, and we renew a pressing appeal to those who have in their hands the destiny of the nations. But no longer confining ourselves to general terms, as we were led to do by circumstances in the past, we will now come to more concrete and practical proposals and invite the government of both belligerent peoples to arrive at an agreement on the following points, which seem to offer the base of a just and lasting peace, leaving it with them to make them more precise and complete.

First, the fundamental point must be that the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right, whence shall proceed a just agreement of all upon the simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armament according to rule and guarantees to be established in necessary and sufficient measure for the maintenance of public order in every State; then, taking the place of arms, the institution of arbitration, with its high pacifying function, according to rules to be drawn in concert and under sanctions to be determined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards.

When supremacy of right is thus established, that every obstacle to ways of communication of the people be removed by insuring, through rules to be also determined, the true freedom and community of the seas, which, on the one hand, would eliminate any causes of conflict, and, on the other hand, would open to all new sources of prosperity and progress.

As for the damages to be repaid and the cost of the war, we see no other way of solving the question than by setting up the general principle of entire and reciprocal condonations, which would be justified by the immense benefit to be derived from disarmament, all the more as one could not understand that such carnage could go on for mere economic reasons. If certain particular reasons stand against this in certain cases, they should be weighed in justice and equity.

But these specific agreements, with the immense advantages that flow from them, are not possible unless territory now occupied is reciprocally restituted. Therefore, on the part of Germany, there should be total evacuation of Belgium, with guarantees of its entire political, military, and economic independence toward any Power what-

ever, evacuation also of the French territory, on the part of the other belligerents similar restitution of the German colonies.

As regards territorial questions, as, for instance, those that are disputed by Italy and Austria, by Germany and France, there is reason to hope that, in consideration of the immense advantages of durable peace with disarmament, the contending parties will examine them in a conciliatory spirit, taking into account, as far as is just and possible, as we have said formerly, the aspirations of the population and, if occasion arises, adjusting private interests to the general good of the great human society. The same spirit of equity and justice must guide the examination of the other territorial and political questions, notably those relative to Armenia, the Balkan States, and the territories forming part of the old kingdom of Poland, for which, in particular, its noble historical traditions and sufferings, particularly undergone in the present war, must win, with justice, the sympathy of the nations.

These we believe are the main bases upon which must rest future reorganization of the peoples. They are such as to make the recurrence of such conflicts impossible and open the way for the solution of the economic questions which is so important for the future and the material welfare of all of the belligerent States. And so, in presenting them to you, who at this tragic hour decide the destiny of the belligerent nations, we indulge a gratifying hope, that they will be accepted and that we shall thus see an early termination of the terrible struggle which has more and more the appearance of a useless massacre.

Everybody acknowledges, on the other hand, that on both sides, the honor of arms is safe. Do not, then, turn a deaf ear to our prayer, accepting the invitation which we extend to you in the name of the Divine Redeemer, Prince of Peace. Bear in mind your very grave responsibility to God and man. On your decision depends the quiet and joy of numberless families, the lives of thousands of young men, the happiness, in a word, of the peoples for whom it is your imperative duty to secure this boon.

May the Lord inspire you with decision conformable to His very Holy Will. May Heaven grant that in winning the applause of your contemporaries you will also earn from the future generations the great title of Pacificator.

As for us, closely united in prayer and penitence, with all the faithful souls who yearn for peace, we implore for you the divine enlightenment, and guidance.

Given at the Vatican, August 1, 1917.

BENEDICTUS P. M. XV

STATEMENT OF WAR POLICY BY THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE JULY REVOLUTION [1]

August 2, 1917

At a moment when new and grave misfortunes are threatening Russia we consider it our duty to give to our allies who have shared with us the burden of trial in the past a firm and definite explanation of our point of view regarding the conduct of the war. The greatness of the past of the Russian Revolution corresponds to the magnitude of the change which it caused in the life of the State. Reorganization in the face of the enemy of the entire governmental system could not be effected without serious disorders. Nevertheless, Russia, convinced that there is no other means of safety, has continued in accord with the Allies' common action on the front.

Fully conscious of the difficulty of the task, Russia has taken up the burden of conducting active military operations during the reconstitution of the army and the government. The offensive of our army, which was necessitated by a strategical situation, encountered unsurmountable obstacles on both fronts and in the interior of the country. The criminal propaganda of irresponsible elements was used by enemy agents and provoked a revolution in Petrograd. At the same time part of the troops on the front were seduced by the same propaganda, forgot their duty to the country and facilitated the enemy piercing our front.

The Russian people have been stirred by these events. Through the government created by the revolution and an unshakable will the revolt was crushed and its originators were brought to justice. All necessary steps have been taken at the front for restoring the combative strength of the armies.

The Government intends bringing to a successful end the task of establishing an administration capable of meeting all danger and guiding the country in the path of revolutionary regeneration. Russia will not suffer herself to be deterred by any difficulty in carrying out the irrevocable decision to continue the war to a final triumph of the principles proclaimed by the Russian Revolution.

In the presence of an enemy menace the country and the army will continue with renewed courage the great work of restoration as well as the preparation on the threshold of the fourth year of the

[1] Text in *The New York Times,* August 3, 1917, p. 1. The statement was made in a telegram to Russian representatives in Allied capitals and Washington.

war for the coming campaign. We firmly believe that Russian citizens will combine all effort to fulfil the sacred task of defending their beloved country, and that the enthusiasm which lighted in their breasts a flame of faith in the triumph of liberty will direct the whole invincible force of revolution against the enemy who threatens the country.

REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE PEACE APPEAL OF THE POPE[1]

August 27, 1917

To His Holiness Benedictus XV, Pope: In acknowledgment of the communication of your Holiness to the belligerent peoples, dated August 1, 1917, the President of the United States requests me to transmit the following reply:

"Every heart that has not been blinded and hardened by this terrible war must be touched by this moving appeal of his Holiness the Pope, must feel the dignity and force of the humane and generous motives which prompted it, and must fervently wish that we might take the path of peace he so persuasively points out. But it would be folly to take it if it does not in fact lead to the goal he proposes. Our response must be based upon the stern facts and upon nothing else. It is not a mere cessation of arms he desires; it is a stable and enduring peace. This agony must not be gone through with again, and it must be a matter of very sober judgment what will insure us against it.

"His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the *status quo ante bellum,* and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that by a similar concert freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan States, and the restitution of Poland be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

"It is manifest that no part of this program can be successfully

[1] Text in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

carried out unless the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it. The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.

"To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

"Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments—the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic

opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

"The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on the one hand and of a group of free peoples on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.

"The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

"We can not take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace."

ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.

STATEMENT OF PREMIER PAINLEVÉ IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES IN PARIS ON PEACE TERMS: ALSACE-LORRAINE[1]

September 18, 1917

No enemy maneuver, no internal weakness can turn France from her unshakable determination. That determination she draws from the purest traditions of our race—those generous principles of liberty which the Revolution sowed among the peoples and which today bring together the civilized universe against German imperialism. If France pursues this war it is neither for conquest nor for vengeance. It is to defend her own liberty, her independence, and at the same time the liberty and independence of the world. Her claims are those of right; they are even independent of the issue of battles. She proclaimed them solemnly in 1871 when she was beaten. She proclaims them today when she is making the aggressor feel the weight of her arms.

The disannexation of Alsace-Lorraine, reparation for the damage and ruin wrought by the enemy, and a peace which shall not be a peace of constraint or violence, containing in itself the germ of future wars, but a just peace, in which no people, whether strong or weak, shall be oppressed, a peace in which effective guarantees shall protect the society of nations against all aggression on the part of one of them—these are the noble war aims of France, if one can speak of war aims when it is a question of a nation which, during forty-four years, despite her open wounds, has done everything in order to spare humanity the horrors of war.

As long as these aims are not reached France will continue to fight. To prolong the war one day more than necessary would indeed be to commit the greatest crime in history, but to stop it a day too soon would be to deliver France into the most degrading servitude, to a moral and material misery from which nothing would ever deliver her.

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[1] Text in *The New York Times Current History* magazine for November, 1917, p. 294.

REPLY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO THE PAPAL PEACE PROPOSAL[1]

September 21, 1917

HOLY FATHER: With due veneration and deep emotion we take cognizance of the new representations which your Holiness, in fulfilment of the holy office intrusted to you by God, make to us and the heads of the other belligerent States with the noble intention of leading the heavily tried nations to a unity that will restore peace to them.

With a thankful heart we receive this fresh gift of fatherly care which you, Holy Father to us, always bestow on all peoples without distinction and from the depth of our heart we greet the moving exhortation which your Holiness has addressed to the governments of the belligerent peoples.

During this cruel war we have always looked up to your Holiness as to the highest personage, who, in virtue of his mission, which reaches beyond earthly things, and thanks to the high conception of his duties laid upon him, stands high above the belligerent peoples and who, inaccessible to all influence, was able to find a way which may lead to the realization of our own desire for peace, lasting and honorable for all parties.

Since ascending the throne of our ancestors and fully conscious of the responsibility which we bear before God and men for the fate of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, we have never lost sight of the high aim of restoring to our peoples, as speedily as possible, the blessings of peace. Soon after our accession to the throne it was vouchsafed to us, in common with our allies, to undertake a step which had been considered and prepared by our exalted predecessor, Francis Joseph, to pave the way for a lasting and honorable peace.

We gave expression to this desire in a speech from the Throne delivered at the opening of the Austrian Reichstag, thereby showing that we are striving after a peace that shall free the future life of the nation from rancor and a thirst for revenge, and that shall secure them for generations to come from the employment of armed forces. Our joint government has not failed in the meantime in repeated and emphatic declarations, which could be heard by all the world to give expression to our will and that of the Austro-Hungarian peoples to

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, September 22, 1917, p. 1.

prepare an end to bloodshed by a peace such as your Holiness has in mind.

Happy is the thought that our desires from the first were directed toward the same object which your Holiness today characterizes as one we should strive for, we have taken into close consideration the concrete and practical suggestions of your Holiness and have come to the following conclusions:

With deep-rooted conviction we agreed to the leading idea of your Holiness that the future arrangement of the world must be based on the elimination of armed forces and on the moral force of right and on the rule of international justice and legality.

We, too, are imbued with the hope that a strengthening of the sense of right would morally regenerate humanity. We support, therefore, your Holiness' view that the negotiations between the belligerents should and could lead to an understanding by which, with the creation of appropriate guarantees, armaments on land and sea and in the air might be reduced simultaneously, reciprocally and gradually to a fixed limit and whereby the high seas which rightly belong to all the nations of the earth may be freed from domination or paramountcy, and be opened equally for the use of all.

Fully conscious of the importance of the promotion of peace on the method proposed by your Holiness, namely, to submit international disputes to compulsory arbitration, we are also prepared to enter into negotiations regarding this proposal.

If, as we most heartily desire, agreements should be arrived at between the belligerents which would realize this sublime idea and thereby give security to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy for its unhampered future development, it can then not be difficult to find a satisfactory solution of the other questions which still remain to be settled between the belligerents in a spirit of justice and of a reasonable consideration of the conditions for existence of both parties.

If the nations of the earth were to enter, with a desirable peace, into negotiations with one another in the sense of your Holiness' proposal, then peace could blossom forth from them. The nations could attain complete freedom of movement on the high seas, heavy material burden could be taken from them, and new sources of prosperity opened to them.

Guided by a spirit of moderation and consideration, we see in the proposals of your Holiness a suitable basis for initiating negotiations with a view to preparing a peace, just to all and lasting, and we earnestly hope our present enemies may be animated by the same ideals.

In this spirit we beg that the Almighty may bless the work of peace begun by your Holiness.

REPLY OF GERMANY TO THE PAPAL PEACE PROPOSAL[1]

September 21, 1917

HERR CARDINAL: Your Eminence has been good enough together with your letter of August 2, to transmit to the Emperor and King, my Most Gracious Master, the note of his Holiness the Pope in which his Holiness, filled with grief at the devastation of the world war, makes an emphatic peace appeal to the heads of the belligerent peoples. The Emperor has deigned to acquaint me with your Eminence's letter and to entrust the reply to me.

His Majesty has been following for a considerable time with high respect and sincere gratitude his Holiness' efforts in a spirit of true impartiality to alleviate as far as possible the sufferings of the war and to hasten the end of hostilities. The Emperor sees in the latest step of his Holiness fresh proof of his noble and humane feelings, and cherishes a lively desire that, for the benefit of the entire world, the Papal appeal may meet with success.

The effort of Pope Benedict is to pave the way to an understanding among all peoples and might more surely reckon on a sympathetic reception and the whole-hearted support from his Majesty, seeing that the Emperor since taking over the government has regarded it as his principal and most sacred task to preserve the blessings of peace for the German people and the world.

In his first speech from the Throne at the opening of the German Reichstag on June 25, 1888, the Emperor promised that his love of the German army and his position toward it should never lead him into temptation to cut short the benefits of peace unless war were a necessity, forced upon us by an attack on the Empire or its allies. The German army should safeguard peace for us and should peace, nevertheless, be broken, it would be in a position to win it with honor. The Emperor has, by his acts, fulfilled the promise he then made in twenty-six years of happy rule, despite provocations and temptations.

In the crisis which led to the present world conflagration his Majesty's efforts were up to the last moment directed toward settling

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, September 23, 1917, p. 2.

the conflict by peaceful means. After the war had broken out, against his wish and desire, the Emperor, in conjunction with his high allies, was the first solemnly to declare his readiness to enter into peace negotiations. The German people support his Majesty in his keen desire for peace.

Germany sought within her national frontier the free development of her spiritual and material possessions, and outside the imperial territory unhindered competition with nations enjoying equal rights and equal esteem. The free play of forces in the world in peaceable wrestling with one another would lead to the highest perfecting of the noblest human possessions. A disastrous concatenation of events in the year 1914 absolutely broke off all hopeful course of development and transformed Europe into a bloody battle arena.

Appreciating the importance of his Holiness' declaration the Imperial Government has not failed to submit the suggestion contained therein to earnest and scrupulous examination. Special measures, which the government has taken in closest contact with representatives of the German people, for discussing and answering the questions raised proved how earnestly it desires, in accordance with his Holiness' desires and the peace resolution of the Reichstag on July 19, to find a practical basis for a just and lasting peace.

The Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the conviction that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right. We are also convinced that the sick body of human society can only be healed by fortifying its moral strength of right. From this would follow, according to his Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all States and the institution of obligatory arbitration for international disputes.

We share his Holiness' view that definite rules and a certain safeguard for a simultaneous and reciprocal limitation of armament on land, on sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom of the community of the high seas are the things in entreating which—the new spirit that in the future should prevail in international relations—should find first hopeful expression. The task would then of itself arise to decide international differences of opinion, not by the use of armed forces, but by peaceful methods, especially by arbitration, whose high peace-producing effect we, together with his Holiness, fully recognize.

The Imperial Government will in this respect support every pro-

posal compatible with the vital interests of the German Empire and people.

Germany, owing to her geographical situation and economic requirements has to rely on peaceful intercourse with her neighbors and with distant countries. No people, therefore, has more reason than the German people to wish that instead of universal hatred and battle, a conciliatory fraternal spirit should prevail between nations.

If the nations are guided by this spirit it will be recognized to their advantage that the important thing is to lay more stress upon what unites them in their relations. They will also succeed in settling individual points of conflict which are still undecided, in such a way that conditions of existence will be created which will be satisfactory to every nation, and thereby a repetition of this great world catastrophe would appear impossible.

Only on this condition can a lasting peace be founded which would promote an intellectual *rapprochement* and a return to the economic prosperity of human society.

This serious and sincere conviction encourages our confidence that our enemies also may see a suitable basis in the ideals submitted by his Holiness for approaching nearer to the preparation of future peace under conditions corresponding to a spirit of reasonableness and to the situation in Europe.[1]

ADDRESS OF MR. ASQUITH ON PEACE TERMS INCLUDING COMMENT ON THE GERMAN REPLY TO THE POPE[2]

September 26, 1917

. . . . . .

Let me start with a proposition which may sound like a paradox—we are fighting for peace—for the peace of the world. One does not need to witness with one's own eyes, as I did last week when I went over the French and Flemish battlefield, the actual desolation of war, to feel that the attainment of peace is at the moment the supreme interest of mankind. It is worth any sacrifice—except the sacrifice of the things which make peace worth having and which ensure its stability, by basing it on a solid rock of right, internationally recognized and

[1] Cf. Gasparri in *Giornal d'Italia,* Sept. 26, 1917, and *The New York Times,* July 27, 1919, p. 2.

[2] Text in *The Times,* London, September 27, 1917, p. 7.

guaranteed. Peace in this sense is not to be found, as it has so often been sought in the past, in a cessation of active hostilities, followed by a process of territorial bargaining, to be embodied ultimately in paper protocols and pacts, and left there at the mercy of the chapter of accidents which, as someone has wisely said, is the Bible of Fools.

Still less can you look for a peace which is worthy of the word in any arrangement, imposed by the victor on the vanquished, which ignores the principles of right, and sets at defiance the historic traditions, the aspirations, and the liberties of the peoples affected. Such so-called treaties contain within themselves their own death warrant, and simply provide a fertile breeding ground for future wars. We have a crucial example of the folly and futility of transactions of this kind in the treaty of 1871, when victorious Germany insisted on dismembering conquered France by appropriating, in defiance of the will of the inhabitants, her two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. That act of high-handed and short-sighted violence, against which Europe ought to have protested, is the primary, though not, of course, the only, cause of the race in armaments which went on at an ever-accelerated pace between the great Powers for forty years before this war broke out.

It is well at this time to recall that the two greatest men in Germany—Bismarck and Moltke—appear to have foreseen the consequences, each from a different point of view. Bismarck was not over scrupulous, but there are indications that he was shrewd enough to suspect that the policy of annexation, successfully pressed by the military authorities, was not only a crime—he might have let that pass—but a blunder. We know that he was inclined to let France keep Metz, remarking significantly to his henchman Busch, "I don't want to have too many Frenchmen in our house." And Moltke—whose opinion prevailed—what was his forecast of the cost? You will find it recorded by Sir Charles Dilke so far back as 1875 in the admirable biography which has just been published by Miss Tuckwell and Captain Gwynn. "Germany," said Moltke in the Reichstag—and remember he was speaking less than four years after the Treaty of 1871—"Germany must stand armed to the teeth for fifty years to defend the provinces which it took her but six months to win." Was ever a prophecy more fully verified by the event? By far the larger share of the calamities which are now devastating the world is to be traced, directly or indirectly, to this single act of international spoliation and its inevitable consequences.

Is there reason to think that Germany has learnt that lesson? We

have been reading during the last few days the reply of the new German Chancellor to the Papal note. It teems with nebulous and unctuous generalities. The German Government tells us that it "welcomes with special sympathy" the Pope's "conviction" that "in the future the material force of arms must be superseded by the moral force of right." It will delight in the substitution of arbitration for war, and will in this respect support every proposal which (note the significant proviso) is "compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people." This is quite in the later manner of Bismarck himself, who, after he ceased to be Chancellor, came very near, in profession at any rate, to being what in these days would be called a pacifist.

"Even victorious wars"—he writes in his Memoirs—"can not be justified unless they are forced upon one. Besides," he characteristically adds, "one can not read the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical developments and make one's own calculations accordingly."

But, I ask, is there in the Chancellor's dispatch or in any recent and authoritative declaration of the German Government any indication that it is prepared not only to repeal the crime of 1871, but to take any of the practical steps which can alone open the road to a real and lasting peace? Is Germany ready to restore what she then took away from France? Or, to put again another concrete test in a question which I have asked before, and which is still unanswered, Is she ready to give back to Belgium her full independence—political—and economic—without fetters or reservations, and with as complete an indemnity as any material compensation can provide for the devastation of her territory and the sufferings of her people? A definite reply, which could be given in a couple of sentences, to inquiries like these would at this moment be worth a whole column of pious platitudes.

It is no good (in Clarendon's famous phrase) to "ingeminate" the word peace. Do not let me be misunderstood. There are questions which may and must be left over for discussion and negotiation after the combatants have agreed to drop their arms. But they relate to what are, after all, subsidiary matters of secondary importance, susceptible of adjustment—a postcript or appendix (as it were) of the real book of peace. It is not for the sake of such things that the Allies entered upon or would continue the war. No, when I say we are fighting for peace I have in contemplation a settlement of which I will once more indicate in a few words what are, to my mind, both its negative and its positive characteristics.

Negatively, it is no part, and never has been any part, of our war policy (as the Pan-Germans pretend) to aim at the annihilation of Germany, or the permanent degradation of the German people. It is true that, not only the manner in which the war was engineered and launched, but, still more, the methods, first of callousness and brutal cruelty, then of refined and inventive wickedness, by which it has been carried on—witness the latest disclosure of what was being hatched in the Imperial Consulate at Bucharest in view of a rupture with Roumania—have profoundly affected, and must for a long time continue to affect, the whole world's estimate of German character and temperament. It may not be wholly true, though in the long run it comes pretty near the truth, to say that every country has the government which it deserves. As history shows, and there could be no more poignant example than what we are witnessing this year in Russia, the process of getting rid of a bad government is apt to be a costly and protracted business. But there is nothing in this war that has aroused more worldwide surprise and consternation than that German opinion should have, in the early stages, condoned with tolerance, and should now have come to applaud with fervor, the worst and most barbarous transgressions of the German Government. It shows us at any rate from what unmeasured perils—from what a setback to the whole machinery of civilization—mankind has been delivered, now that the Allies have shattered forever the dreams of German hegemony. It shows, too, for the instruction and warning of others, whither a nation is bound to tend when it submits itself for a generation to the guidance of militarism and materialism, walking hand in hand. Prussian militarism—that has been and is our objective—since it chose to force matters to an issue. But for the German democracy we have no other wish than that, having shaken off this soul-destroying incubus, it should learn the lessons and enjoy in full measure the blessings of freedom.

I pass to the positive side of the case, and here the peace for which we are fighting has two aims, the one immediate, the other ulterior, neither of which should be left out of view. The first is—not the restoration of the *status quo*—not the revival in some revised shape of what used to be called the balance of power—but the substitution for the one and the other of an international system, in which there will be a place for great and for small States, and under which both alike can be ensured a stable foundation and an independent development. I assume as a matter of course the evacuation of the enemy of the occupied territories of France and Russia. You have only to

survey the map as it was before the war—still more as it is today—to see how much of the ground is at the mercy—to use the dialect which has now become familiar to us—of thinly covered mines and unexploded shells. I have referred already to Alsace-Lorraine and to Belgium. But wherever you turn in Central and Eastern Europe you see territorial arrangements which are purely artificial in their origin, which offend the wishes and interests of the populations most directly concerned; and which have been, and so long as they remain will continue to be, the seed-plots of unrest and of potential war. There are the just claims, long overdue, of Italy and Roumania. There is heroic Serbia, who must not only be restored to her old home, but given the room to which she is entitled for her expanding national life. There is Poland, as to whom I, and I believe all our people, heartily endorse the wise and generous words of President Wilson. There are the cases, not to be forgotten, of Greece and the Southern Slavs.

There must be—to turn for a moment from the language of war to that of commerce—a liquidation—a complete and, so far as may be, a permanent liquidation—of these dangerous accounts. The purpose must no longer be that which animated the Congress of Vienna, and after it the so-called Holy Alliance of 100 years ago. The governing principle is one which I believe all the free peoples of the world are ready and even eager to accept—that you must proceed on the lines of racial affinity, of historic tradition, above all, of the actual wishes and aspirations of the inhabitants. In no other way can you remove what has been in the recent past at once the most pestilent incentive to ambitions and intrigues, and the most legitimate motive of popular discontent.

I come now to the second and less important aspect of the case, when we are endeavoring to forecast the lineaments of an enduring peace. A peace however well initiated by the necessary ethnical and geographical changes, will not be worth many years' purchase if it permits the opening or reopening of an era of what I may call veiled warfare. It is immaterial by what methods, whether of preparation or precaution, or in what forms, naval, military, diplomatic, or economic, the disturbing and disruptive forces are allowed to operate. We must banish once for all from our catalogue of maxims the timeworn fallacy that if you wish for peace you must be ready for war. I am not a sentimentalist, and I need not say that I do not look forward to a sudden regeneration of mankind, when in the War Offices of the world the lion will lie down with the lamb, and in the stock exchanges the

bull with the bear, and international relations will assume the form of a perpetual love-feast. Posterity may witness the reopening of the Golden Age, but I fear that we—even the youngest of us—were born out of due season, and shall not live to get more than a distant and imaginative glimpse of that beatific vision.

Speaking, not as a Utopian or a dreamy idealist, but as one who has had a long and close experience of the hard realities of politics, I assert that we are waging, not only a war for peace, but a war against war. The forty-sixth Psalm has been the favorite battle-song in all ages of the soldiers of liberty. But what is its climax? "He maketh wars to cease to the ends of the earth." For the first time in history we may make an advance to the realization of an ideal to which great men of action in the past, such, for instance, as Henry IV of France, no visionary but a practical statesman, if ever there was one, have been groping their way.

What is the ideal? It is the creation, no longer of a merely European, but, since our kinsmen who across the Atlantic have joined hands with us, of a worldwide polity, uniting the peoples in a confederation of which Justice will be the base and Liberty the cornerstone. The limitation of armaments, the acceptance of arbitration as the normal and natural solvent of international disputes, the relegation of wars of ambition and aggression between States to the same category of obsolete follies in which we class the faction fights of the old Republics, the petty conflicts of feudal lords, and now private dueling —these will be milestones which mark the stages of the road. You will not at first, perhaps not for a long time, be able to dispense with coercion, military or economic, against the disloyal and the recalcitrant. But we may well hope, as has been the case in all civilized societies, so in the international sphere, that positive law with its forcible restraints may gradually recede into the background, and the sovereign authority be recognized to rest in the common sense of mankind.

These are changes which, as I have said, will not come in a day. But with them will come profound modifications, not only in the external relations of States, but in the internal structure and the working of the societies of which they are composed. It is impossible to believe that this universal upheaval will not leave abiding traces in the industrial and economic worlds. For what is it that distinguishes this war, so far as we and our allies are concerned, from most of the wars of history? It has not been a dynastic war. It has not been a capitalistic war. It has been a war in which the free peoples of the

world, here in Europe, in our Dominions beyond the sea, and in the great Republic of the West, have given their moral support, have submitted without a murmur to unwonted privations and restraints, and have offered and spent their own and their children's lives. When the storm has passed over and the day is once more clear, must we not, after such common discipline, which has spared no class in society, see the things that concern our daily lives and our relations to one another in a new and truer perspective than was ever possible before? Meanwhile we must keep our powder dry.

ADDRESS OF CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS TO THE MAIN COMMITTEE OF THE REICHSTAG[1]

September 28, 1917

. . . . . .

The German reply to the Pope's note met with the approval of our friends and allies, while a majority of our enemies have given it an obviously embarrassed reception. It is difficult to understand how any one acquainted with the international situation and international usages could believe that we ever would be in such a position as, through a one-sided public statement on important questions which are indissolubly bound up with the entire complex of questions which must be discussed at the peace negotiations, to bind ourselves to a solution to our own prejudice.

Any such public statement at the present time could only have a confusing effect and injure German interests. We should not come a step nearer peace, but it would contribute certainly to a prolongation of the war.

I must at present decline to specify our war aims and bind the hands of our negotiators.

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[1] Text in *The New York Times*, September 29, 1917, p. 1. The refusal to state Germany's war aims was the only important point of the address.

STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER VON KÜHLMANN TO THE MAIN COMMITTEE OF THE REICHSTAG ON THE GERMAN REPLY TO THE POPE AND IN REPLY TO MR. ASQUITH [1]

September 28, 1917

Following the Chancellor's statement, I should like to be allowed to elucidate some points in the European situation. In the first place, I will say a few words regarding the report which appeared in this morning's newspapers that a German note existed regarding Belgium. It is one of the most impudent inventions that has ever come before me in my political experience, and is probably of French origin. There is not a word of truth in the whole thing.

The telegraph brought us last evening and early this morning through Reuter, extracts from a speech by Mr. Asquith, leader of the Opposition in the British Lower House. A fellow-countryman of Mr. Asquith's, a distinguished political writer, once characterized present-day European diplomacy as consisting of leading statesmen of different nations screaming at one another from public platforms. If the Reuter extract gives a true picture of what Mr. Asquith said, I believe I can assert at least that he has not taken a step farther forward on that road on which it is necessary for Europe to go.

I come now to the note of his Holiness the Pope. Whatever may be the immediate result of the Papal peace step this one thing may be said at once without hesitation, that this courageous initiative of the Pope, who, standing on a watch tower supported by the most revered tradition of more than one thousand years of priestly office, felt himself especially called to the function of intermediary, signifies a stage in the history of this frightful conflict of nations which will appear as the imperishable page of glory in the annals of Papal diplomacy. It was a great act when the Pope threw the word of peace into the turmoil of conflict which threatened to convert Europe into a blood-drenched place of ruin. It was precisely the German people and the German government, for whom, in the consciousness of their strength and internal security, it was always easy to emphasize the readiness for an honorable peace. We have every reason thankfully to greet the initiative of the Curia which has made it possible to expound the national German policy again in a clear and unambiguous manner. I say intentionally "national policy," because I hope and believe that the

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 1, 1917, p. 9.

reply of the German Government, both as regards its origin and contents (so far as this can be said of any political document whatever), embodies the will of an overwhelming majority of the German people.

It is not only from an international point of view that the reply is an important document. It is also a milestone in our purely German development. Is it not the first result of the collaboration between all factors of the government and the representatives of the German people which was attempted here for the first time? If my memory does not deceive me, collaboration in such an intimate degree has never been attempted even in purely parliamentary countries. It is just this collaboration which in its course and its result may fill with hope a statesman who has German policy at heart. A foreign policy which is not supported in its broad essential bases by the assent of the people, and by the assent of chosen representatives of the people, which is not supported in Parliament by active intervention at the suitable moment and by statesmanlike and wise permission to the executive to develop untrammeled activity can not hold out in the severe struggle against a foreign enemy.

Abroad the legend is frequently put about that in Germany there is a policy of the government and a policy of the people. This is today a very definite legend, and nothing can destroy this legend more thoroughly than when you also unitedly adhere to the policy laid down in our reply to his Holiness. There are foolish notions to the effect that in the bosom of the government itself there are widely divergent opinions, or that there is friction among the leading personages themselves, or between the Imperial government and the brilliant army leaders to whom we owe it, next to God, that Germany stands as she stands today. These rumors should be treated with the derision they deserve. All these authorities collaborate daily and hourly in complete harmony. A decision on really vital questions on which a consensus of opinion is lacking is unthinkable. I do not hesitate to say that from harmonious collaboration, such as took place between Parliament and the people in regard to the Papal note, I have gained hopeful impressions for the future.

In view of the confidential nature of the Committee of Seven's proceedings which we decided upon for weighty reasons, I can not enter into details, but I consider it nevertheless worth pointing out (there is no indiscretion in this because the same was pointed out a few days ago in the papers) that the bases of the German reply in the form in which they were submitted by the government appears to be acceptable to the representatives of all the parties. I can, therefore,

I believe, say with complete truth that all the attempts of our enemies to drive a wedge between the German government and people regarding the foundation of our foreign policy and the fiction that the German people is not standing in the matter of foreign policy unitedly behind the Kaiser and the Chancellor, are to be rejected as a pure invention.

It is just from the consciousness of the complete unity between the German people and the German parliament that German policy derives its strength to pursue with calm dignity and sureness of its aim the paths which are necessary for the greatness and development of Germany. I would object to going into much detail about the note. It stands as a well-cemented structure in which stone is so firmly clamped to stone that any attempt to break out a single one, or, in other words, to make isolated comment, would weaken its effect. I will, however, briefly attempt to explain from what spirit the note proceeded and what are the conditions on which it could achieve results.

In the fourth year of the mighty war, his Holiness the Pope with still greater earnestness and greater emphasis than before, launched among the nations of Europe the word of peace upon earth. "Europe" —the word sounds to us today like a tale of far-off times, and yet it is no fairy tale, but is today also more than a geographical conception, as the result of a situation which has developed during thousands of years. The small peninsula attached to the Asiatic Continent had previously the domination of the world firmly in its hands, as regards power and trade. The memory of ancient Europe is clear in all our minds, and I do not say too much in affirming that for none of the States in this ancient Europe was the situation as it had existed for the past forty years so unbearable that it must need be upset at the risk of self-destruction. That Europe shall not perish is, perhaps, even in the midst of this colossal war the common interest of all the great Powers; and utter collapse would leave each single State, to whichever group it may belong, weaker and poorer in prospect and many of them might be utterly broken and bereft of every great national hope for the future.

When Germany, as a young great Power, fifty years ago joined the group of other great Powers, she was not greeted with overmuch tenderness by any of them. But these fifty years, to my mind, have proved that Europe with a powerful Germany in its midst could thrive, and that Europe with a powerful Germany in its midst was mightier and stronger than before, and if among our enemies there are today still many who believe that history can be revised backwards,

that a fatally mutilated Prussia and a vague conglomeration could be reconstituted—those are illusions that are hardly pardonable in the case of historical dreamers, but criminal in the case of responsible statesmen. The Pope preaches freedom on earth, but even today the word holds good: "Peace on Earth to Men of Good Will."

The chief underlying motive of the German note was to assist the Holy Father to create such an atmosphere as is absolutely essential to a fruitful discussion of the numerous matters in dispute which now divide the nations. Any diplomatic expert knows that in such negotiations the atmosphere, the circumambient air, the general feeling, is often infinitely more important than even wide divergences of demands. If one were to judge the feeling among our enemies from the utterances of their public press and their popular leaders, one would arrive at very sorry conclusions. So long as our opponents build on the illusion (and the shrewder ones among them know that it is an illusion) that the moment may yet come when the German nation will perform an act of penance, beating its breast and sitting down in sack cloth and ashes, and demean itself by crawling beneath the yoke of contemptible exactions, so long will the sword have to speak.

It surely will not be easy to show to the war-feverish Entente nations the truth through the web of legend woven around the origin of this war. That, nevertheless, is the thing needed, for otherwise the new spirit can not arise and the rising of this new spirit is indispensable and a first necessity of a happy conclusion of this terrible feud of nations. The German people is in its inmost heart firmly convinced that it is waging a just war, and from this conviction it derives strength to make joyfully the immense sacrifices which are daily required from it.

The Pope's *démarche* has placed the nations of Europe once again at the parting of the ways. Once again, before the decisive winter campaign, the possibility is offered them to begin the restoration of Europe, which is bleeding, indeed, from the deepest wounds, but which has a bright escutcheon. It is for Germany's enemies now to prove whether they have absorbed even the breath of the new spirit. The coming week should decide the great question, whether friends or foe in respect for powerful military opponents will lower the bloody sword or desire a further appeal to the decision of arms. United Germany can not be beaten. Our unity in questions of large policy, as is embodied in our reply to the Pope, presupposes our entire unity and it is precisely the fact that this unity in our deliberations could be attained on the basis of a clear and sincere peace program that gives it

double strength. Thus stands the German people in this decisive hour of destiny strong but silent, mighty but moderate, prepared for battle more than ever it was, but also prepared to collaborate for the realization of the phrase, "peace on earth."

STATEMENT OF CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS TO THE MAIN COMMITTEE OF THE REICHSTAG ON GERMANY'S ATTITUDE IN RESPECT TO BELGIUM[1]

September 28, 1917

A liberal deputy rightly observed that the attitude of the Imperial Government as regards its war aims has been clearly defined in my reply to the Pope's peace note; as this reply expressly mentioned the peace manifestation of July 19, there need be no further statement on this point. I must, however, make the following statement. There is no foundation for the report, which has been much discussed during the last few weeks, to the effect that the Imperial Government has already entered into communication with one or other of the enemy Governments and that the Imperial Government, from the beginning, was prepared to yield occupied territory thereby giving up a most valuable advantage for the future peace negotiations. I state that the Imperial Government has a free hand for future peace negotiations. This holds good also regarding Belgium.

ADDRESS OF FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN ON AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PEACE TERMS[2]

October 2, 1917

I feel compelled today to say something in public as to the Austro-Hungarian Government's ideas as regards the restoration of European relationships which have been completely shattered. In broad outlines our program for the reestablishment of order in the world (which

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 1, 1917, p. 9. This statement was made following the speech of Herr Kühlmann, and was not a part of the Chancellor's address part of which was just quoted.

[2] Text in *The Times*, London, October 4, 1917, p. 8.

might more accurately be described as the construction of a new order in the world) has been laid down in our reply to the Peace Note of our Holy Father. The only consideration today, therefore, is to complete this program, and, above all, to explain the consideration which determines us to set up these principles in opposition to the system hitherto prevailing.

To many people it may appear astonishing and inconceivable that the Central Powers, especially Austria-Hungary, desire to make a renunciation in respect of military armament as, after all, in these heavy years, it was only in their military power that they found protection against manifold superiority. The war has not only produced a new fact and condition but has also led to new conceptions which have shaken the foundations of European politics as they existed before. Among many other political theses the one which especially has crumbled is that which held that Austria-Hungary was a moribund State. It was the dogma of the impending dissolution of the monarchy which made our position in Europe difficult and from which sprang all lack of appreciation of our vital needs. By proving ourselves in this war thoroughly sound and at least equal to others the result is that we can now reckon upon a complete understanding of our vital needs in Europe, and hopes that we may be overthrown by force of arms are destroyed. Until the moment came when we had given proof of this we could not give up the protection of our armament and expose ourselves to spiteful treatment on questions vital to us by an Areopagus influenced by the legend of our impending collapse.

Now, however, when this proof has been given, we are in a position simultaneously with our allies to lay aside our arms and regulate any future conflict by arbitration and in a peaceful manner. This new conception which has forced its way into the world affords us the opportunity not only of accepting the ideal of disarmament and arbitration, but, as you gentlemen know, of working as we have done towards its realization. Europe must, without doubt, after this war, be placed on a new basis of right, offering a guarantee of permanence. This basis of right, I believe, must essentially be fourfold: First, it must offer a security that a war of revenge can not occur again on any side. We wish to achieve so much that we may be able to bequeath to our children's children as a legacy that they may be spared the terrors of a terrible time such as we are now passing through. No shifting of power among the belligerent States can attain this end. The only way to attain it is that mentioned—namely, by international disarmament and by the recognition of arbitration.

It is superfluous to state that this measure of disarmament must never be directed against any particular State, or any particular group of Powers, and that it must of course comprise the land, sea, and air in the same degree. War as an instrument of policy must be combated. On an international basis under international control, universal, equal, and gradual disarmament of all the States of the world must take place and the defensive force limited to what is absolutely necessary.

I know very well that this goal is extraordinarily difficult to reach and that the path leading to it is beset with difficulties; that it is long and thorny. Nevertheless, I am convinced that it must be trodden, and it shall be trodden, no matter whether individuals consider it desirable or not. It is a great mistake to believe that the world after this war will begin again where it left off in 1914. Catastrophes such as this war do not pass away without leaving deep traces behind, and the most terrible misfortune that could befall us would be if the competition in armament were to continue after the conclusion of peace; for it would mean economic ruin for all States. Even before this war our military burdens were oppressive, although we especially should remember that Austria-Hungary was far from being ready in a military sense when she was surprised by the war. Only during the war did she make up for her formerly neglected military equipment. In the event of unrestrained competition in armament after this war the burden for all States would be simply unbearable.

This war has taught us that we must reckon on a great increase of former armament. In order, after this war, with unrestricted rivalry in armaments, to be adequately equipped, the nations would have to multiply everything by ten. They would need ten times as many guns, munition factories, ships, and submarines as before and also incomparably more soldiers to man all this apparatus. The military estimates of all the great Powers would amount to millions. That is impossible. With all the burdens which all the belligerent States after the conclusion of peace would have to bear, this expenditure I repeat, would mean the ruin of nations. To return, however, to the relatively small armaments prior to 1914 would for any one State be entirely impossible, because it would thereby fall so much behind that its military power would not count, and consequently its expenditure would be completely purposeless. Should, however, a general return to the relatively low armament level of 1914, be brought about, that would, of itself, mean an international reduction of armaments, but there would be no meaning in not going further and actually disarming.

Out of this difficulty there is only one way—namely, complete international disarmament. Gigantic fleets will have no further purpose when the nations of the world guarantee the freedom of the seas, and land armies would have to be reduced to the level required by the maintenance of internal order. Only on an international basis—that is, under international control, is this possible. Every State will have to give up something of its independence for the purpose of insuring world peace. Probably the present generation will not live to see the end of this great pacific movement in its entirety. It can only be realized slowly but I consider it our duty to place ourselves at the head of this movement and to do everything humanly possible to accelerate its realization. At the conclusion of peace its fundamental bases must be laid down.

If its first principle is that of obligatory international arbitration and general disarmament on land, its second principle is that of freedom on the high seas and naval disarmament. I purposely say the high seas for I do not extend the idea to the narrow seas and I freely admit that for sea communications special rules and regulations must obtain. If these two first factors which I have mentioned are made clear then every ground for territorial guarantees disappears and this is the third fundamental principle of a new international basis of right. This is the basis of an idea of the beautiful and sublime note which the Pope addressed to the whole world. We have not waged war to make conquests and we contemplate no oppression. If the international disarmament which we long for from the bottom of our hearts is accepted by our present enemies and becomes a fact, then we need no territorial guarantees. In this case we can renounce the enlargement of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, always providing that the enemy completely evacuates our territory.

The fourth principle which must be observed to ensure the free and pacific development of the world after these evil times is the free economic activity of all and absolute avoidance of future economic war. Economic war must be absolutely eliminated from every future arrangement. Before we conclude peace we must have a positive certainty that our present opponents have relinquished this idea.

These, gentlemen, are the basic principles of the new world order as they are present to my mind, and they are all founded on all-round disarmament. Even Germany, too, in answer to the Papal note, has most emphatically professed adherence to the idea of all-round disarmament and our present opponents also have made these principles at least in part their own. On most points I am of different opinion

from Mr. Lloyd-George, but on the point that there must never again be a war of revenge we are at one.

The question of indemnity which the Entente is always putting forward assumes a remarkable complexion when one considers the devastation which their armies have wrought in Galicia, the Bukovina, Tyrol, on the Isonzo, in East Prussia, and in the Turkish territories, and the German colonies. Does the Entente intend to compensate us for all this, or is it so completely mistaken in its judgment of our psychology that it hopes for a one-sided indemnification? I could almost believe the latter, judging from the numerous speeches which we have heard.

STATEMENT OF CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS IN THE REICHSTAG ON GERMANY'S PEACE TERMS[1]

October 9, 1917

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We would get along much better if those who oppose the peace resolution of July 19, and who assert that its supporters want a separate peace, would be more just toward this resolution. We must work out in their positive sense and energetically the aims comprised in this resolution. We must be clear in our minds as to what we thereby desired, and must emphasize what is said in the resolution. The German nation will stand together as one man and unshakably persevere in the fight until its right and the right of its allies to existence and development is assured. In its unity the German Empire is invincible.

. . . . . .

We must continue to persevere until the German Empire on the Continent and overseas establishes its position.

We must further strive to attain that the armed alliance of our enemy does not grow into an economic offensive alliance. We can in this sense, achieve a peace which makes certain to the peasant the fruit of his land, which gives the worker a merited recompense,

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 11, 1917, p. 10.

which creates a market for industry, which supplies the foundations for social progress, and which guarantees to our ships the doctrine of the free voyage and the right to enter ports and to take in coal all the world over, a peace of the widest economic and cultural development, a real peace.

This peace we can attain within these limits.

So long as our enemies confront us with demands which appear unacceptable to every single German, so long as our opponents want to interfere with frontier posts, so long as they demand that we shall yield a piece of German soil, so long as they pursue the idea of driving a wedge between the German people and its Emperor, so long shall we with folded arms refuse the hand of peace.

We wait, and can wait. Time is working for us.

Until our enemies perceive that they must reduce their claims so long must the cannon speak and the U-boats do their work.

Our peace will yet come.

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STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER VON KUHLMANN IN THE REICHSTAG ON GERMAN PEACE TERMS[1]

October 9, 1917

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Gentlemen, a comparatively short time has elapsed since the foreign policy of the Empire was last discussed in detail in the budget committee. Today in plenary session of this House I need, therefore, make only a kind of epilogue to the statements made before the committee by the Chancellor and myself. The statements made by the government may be considered as common knowledge, they having been given full publicity.

The endeavors of the Holy See to bring about an exchange of views between the nations now fighting against one another have, so far as we are informed, not yet resulted in any considerable step forward since the reply of the Central Powers was sent. So far we can not say whether our adversaries will make up their minds even

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 11, 1917, p. 10.

to answer the Papal note. After the clear, sincere, and peace-loving notes addressed to the Holy See by us and our allies, the utterances made by influential newspapers hardly open any prospect that any answer to the Papal note on the part of our enemies, if such may yet be expected, will bring the whole world one step farther in the direction indicated by the highminded suggestion of the Pope.

Although my esteemed political colleagues, the Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, in an important and detailed political speech at Budapest, again eloquently pointed out that the Central Powers were prepared, in the sense indicated by the Papal note, to collaborate not only for the termination of the present conflict, but in the reconstruction of the European world, now nearly ruined, at the beginning of this month Mr. Churchill, a former First Lord of the British Admiralty, made a speech in London which showed no signs of the "new spirit," but in which rather the time-worn formula of "the annihilation of German militarism" was further elaborated. The leader of the Antwerp expedition counts upon our internal collapse, and wonders how thin might be the wall still separating Germany and her allies. Statesmen like Mr. Churchill should learn by experience, and Mr. Churchill especially, in looking back upon his second expedition, which aimed at Constantinople and resulted in failure before the bayonets of our gallant Turkish allies—Gallipoli should have taught him that even the thin wall can turn the dream of victory into defeat if this wall consists of men. Between the "rat hole" in the North Sea called Horns Reef and the Isonzo there is a gigantic rampart of German peoples animated by a single iron will. If Mr. Churchill counts upon its collapse, he will have to wait a very long time.

The speech by Mr. Asquith, the leader of the Liberal Opposition, in the House of Commons, of which only telegraphic extracts were to hand when I spoke before the committee gave no better reading in the full text than it did in Reuter's messages. Mr. Asquith's speech must be a lesson also to those who thought they could draw hopeful conclusions from the question put by the former Prime Minister in the House of Commons when he asked what were our intentions concerning Belgium.

As the *Manchester Guardian* rightly points out, Mr. Asquith in his most recent speech demanded the return of Alsace-Lorraine and the restitution of Belgium as absolutely equivalent postulates, thus, indeed, characterizing matters exactly as they present themselves to me in the most convincing manner and with increasing clearness after a very

thorough investigation of the whole situation according to information derived from most diverse sources.

The great question around which the struggle of the nations centers, and for which they are shedding their blood, is not in first instance the Belgian question.

The question for which Europe is being turned more and more into a heap of ruins, is the question of the future of Alsace-Lorraine. Great Britain has, according to our information, pledged herself diplomatically to France that she will continue the fight for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, both politically and with her armies, so long as France herself may adhere to the demands for the return of those provinces.

This being the actual situation, I think it proper to give a clear and firm statement of our attitude, since curiously enough there still seems to be misconceptions in this respect among our enemies, and even among one or other of our neutral friends.

There is but one answer to the question, "Can Germany in any form make any concessions with regard to Alsace-Lorraine?" The answer is—"No, never!"

So long as a single German hand can hold a gun the integrity of the territory handed down to us as a glorious inheritance by our forefathers can never be the object of any negotiations or concessions. I am sure that, whether on the Right or the Left, you will stand for that with equal resoluteness and equal self-sacrifice.

I am not of those who think that a candid statement of such a fact might be detrimental to the rise of a clear and sincere will for peace. On the contrary, I think such a will can only prosper and be fruitful on the ground of absolute clearness. Therefore, I think it necessary to state emphatically with all possible conciseness and clearness, as against all other questions which have of late so markedly come to the fore in public discussion, and which have taken up so much space, that what we are fighting for and will fight for to the last drop of our blood, is not fantastic conquests, but, before all, the integrity of German soil.

When it seemed expedient to France to accept the formula "without annexation" the French resorted to the transparent trick of shamefacedly covering up with the word "disannexation" what is in reality a bare-faced forcible conquest. The trick is really too clumsy to be worthy of refutation, but it is, nevertheless, necessary to remind the originators of this idea that, after all, there is no rule to be found by which any particular year in the world's history shall be

considered as a normal year, a *ne varietur*. If we were to go back a little farther in history we might discover a basis for very far-reaching "disannexation" in Germany's favor. Take, for instance, the two cities of Toul and Verdun.

I just wish to touch briefly on one misconception because it is frequently found in our adversaries' press. I refer more especially to an article in the *Manchester Guardian* which said that the attitude of Germany would be more clearly defined as soon as the great battle days of the autumn campaign were over.

It is an entirely wrong conception of German policy to think that we would play higher or lower stakes, or be more conciliatory or stubborn, according to the results of single military enterprises. That is entirely wrong.

The main principles of our political attitude have been laid down after detailed and careful consideration of all the factors concerned, and, as far as I am able to view the world situation, there is (with the exception of the French demand for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine) no absolute impediment to peace; no question which could not be solved by negotiations and settlements in such a way as to render the sacrifice of so much blood and treasure superfluous.

There is a fundamental error underlying the opinion frequently encountered among our opponents and sometimes met with in discussions at home and that is, to believe that in the present state of the world something real can still be done for a peaceful settlement by making public statements and speeches. Public speeches are bound to labor under grave disadvantages in this respect. A perfect statement must by its nature be comparatively simple, and can hardly meet the requirements of the situation, because all pending questions are interwoven, interconnected, and interdependent. Moreover, public statements and the discussion of such questions in parliament have the great disadvantage that no responsible opposing party is present. A public statement completely binds one side, thus benefiting only the adversary.

Our enemies have hitherto been very careful not to reveal in any way their real aims corresponding to the actual war situation. What they have told the world is a maximum program which could only be realized after the complete military defeat of the Central Powers.

The German Government hitherto has never answered this maximum program, because we believe in real sober politics, in which account is taken of the fact. If our opponents wish to maintain that they can not obtain a clear conception of the wishes and intentions

of the Imperial Government and the German people, it is pure hypocrisy. Our answer to the note of the Holy See and also the parliamentary discussions connected with it, can have no one who wishes to hear and understand in the slightest doubt as to the essential principles of our political peace program.

In my remarks before the Committee I laid stress on one thing, and I may be permitted to emphasize this once again even more strongly. Our foreign policy can only be successful if it is backed by the consent of the broad masses of our compatriots, and if it represents the will of the people in its entirety.

Therefore, I, who am entrusted with foreign affairs, must again and again recall to memory that, however high feeling may run in our internal political controversies, now in these fateful times, every single man is called upon to give our foreign policy that weight and coherence which it must have in order to obtain through struggle and perseverance victory and peace.

STATEMENT OF MR. LLOYD-GEORGE TO A DEPUTATION FROM APPROVED INSURANCE COMPANIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN REPLY TO VON KÜHLMANN'S ADDRESS[1]

October 11, 1917

I can think of no statement more calculated to prolong this terrible war than that made in the Reichstag yesterday or the day before by Baron Von Kühlmann, when he announced that under no conditions would Germany contemplate the grant of any concession to France in respect of Alsace-Lorraine. And there can be no doubt in any quarters as to what that statement means. However long the war may last, this country intends to stand by her gallant ally, France, until she redeems her oppressed children from the degradation of a foreign yoke.

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, October 12, 1917, p. 7.

ADDRESS OF MR. ASQUITH AT LIVERPOOL ON WAR AIMS[1]

October 11, 1917

This, as you know, is one of a series of meetings which are being held in our centers of population to make clear both to ourselves and to the rest of the world, what it is that we have been and still are, fighting for, and thereby, as we hope, to accelerate the well-founded and lasting peace which has become the overmastering need of mankind.

Speaking the other day at Leeds, I summarized what seemed to me to be our war aims in two short phrases: First, that it is a war for peace, and, next, that it is a war against war. We can not, of course, attain the second object until we have achieved the first, but the first—cessation of hostilities and the signing of a treaty—will be nothing better than a transient and precarious halting place unless it provides adequate and durable safeguards against the possible reopening of strife.

It is no part of our purpose in this movement, as I understand it, and so far as I have any responsibility for it, to go about the country waving the flag, and blowing the bugle and, as it were, flogging the martial ardor of the nation. The British people stand in no need of any such incitements.

Their teeth are set, and they are ready to go on giving without stint their blood and their treasure, rather than that the incalculable sacrifices which they and their allies—both great States and small States—have made, should be thrown away. No, it is precisely because we are looking through the smoke clouds of the battlefields to the ends which made it our duty to enter the war, and which, until they are within sight of attainment, make it equally our duty to continue the war, that we think it right that those ends should be clearly set forth with definiteness, with emphasis, if need be with iteration. I make no apology, therefore, if, in contributing what I can to the accomplishment of that task, I may seem from time to time to be repeating what I have said before.

I wish, indeed, I could say the same of the declarations, inspired or uninspired, of the spokesmen and writers who are for the moment the chosen exponents of German policy. What is the state of the case so far as they are concerned? Some months ago, at the outset of the régime of the new Chancellor who owed his elevation to the triumph

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 12, 1917, p. 7.

of a military faction in the inner councils of the Emperor, the majority of the Reichstag agreed to a patchwork formula, which was advertised to the world as a "peace" resolution. We had a debate about it in the House of Commons where there was a disposition in some quarters to hale it, if not as an overture, at least as an olive branch. I ventured at the time to say that I shared the doubts which the German Chancellor himself seemed to entertain whether he, or we, or anybody, understood what the resolution really meant. That skepticism has been justified by the event, for the various German parties have ever since been squabbling with infinite acrimony as to what is its orthodox interpretation. Confusion became worse confounded with the publication of the Chancellor's subsequent answer to the Papal note.

I do not doubt that there is in Germany, as there certainly is in Austria, a widespread and genuine desire for peace. In the Reichstag itself, slender as are its powers, and divided as are its counsels, there are indications of a growing spirit of revolt against the methods of the Government. No doubt, as the events of the last few days show, it is timorous and easily tamed. Still, it is there. But, things being as they are, the dominant factor with which we have to deal is neither German public opinion nor the German parliament. It is the German Government. Does it mean business? Is it sincere in its desire for peace? Depend upon it, the world will never find its way to peace through a morass of equivocation and ambiguities. Plain questions have been asked which are studiously evaded. Concrete cases, at once of primary importance and of perfect simplicity, have been put and the only response has been that everything hangs together and that there can be no premature and partial disclosures. We are left in the dimness of a rhetorical twilight, and we are asked to lay down our arms without any other satisfaction or safeguard than that we shall be offering a unique exhibition at one and the same time of the three virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity.

This, I repeat, is not business. There is another, a totally different, and, as we think, a more excellent way. No one pretends that it would be right or opportune for either side to formulate an ultimatum, detailed, exhaustive, precise, with clauses and subclauses which is to be accepted, *verbatim et literatim,* chapter and verse, as the indispensable preliminary and condition of peace. There are many things, as I have said before, in a worldwide conflict such as this, which must of necessity be left over for discussion and negotiation, for accommodation and adjustment at a later stage. But we shall make no progress towards the achievement of either of what I described a few moments

ago as our two governing objects—the attainment of a real peace and the effective prevention of future war unless we are both definite and resolute throughout in our assertion of the means by which they are to be reached. Let us see once more what are the principal steps on the road that has to be traversed and ask ourselves, as we go along, whether any of them is out of conformity with the aims and the spirit that led us at the outset to undertake our share in the unexampled burden of the war.

In regard to the territorial readjustments both in the West and the East of Europe, of which I spoke in some detail at Leeds, they all fall under the head either of actual restitution or of the long-delayed fulfilment of legitimate aspirations and hopes. Where is the exception? Which of them involves annexation in what is called the imperialist or aggressive sense? Certainly not the evacuation of the occupied territory of France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania. Nor, again, the restoration to France of the provinces which were taken from her by force in 1871.

Here I must say a word by way of comment on the reference to this matter in the remarkable speech of Herr von Kühlmann, of which we have this morning the full text. The one definite contribution it makes to the cause of peace which the German Government professes to have at heart is a flat negation.

To the question, "Can Germany in any form make any concession with regard to Alsace-Lorraine?" the answer he tells us is, "No, never." He goes on to say that "The integrity of the territory handed down to us as a glorious inheritance by our forefathers can never be the object of any negotiations or concessions." And what is the particular part of this "glorious inheritance," handed down from their forefathers of which he is speaking? It is territory which had been for long years part of France, which was French in sympathy and sentiment, which was filched from France less than fifty years ago, against the protest, so far, at any rate, as Lorraine was concerned, of the greatest of German statesmen without any consultation of or regard for the opinions or wishes of the inhabitants, to be held not merely as the price of German victory, but as the symbol of French humiliation. It is, as I pointed out the other day, this act of crude and short sighted spoliation which was the root and source of the unrest, of the unstable equilibrium, of the competition in armaments, which have afflicted Europe during the lifetime of two generations, and which have culminated in the most terrible war in history. German diplomacy is not celebrated for its deftness, but even in its annals it

will be difficult to find a clumsier or a more transparent maneuver than this maladroit attempt to sow discord between ourselves and our French ally.

Baron von Kühlmann further tells us that the "great question around which the struggle of the nation centers is not, in the first instance" (observe those words), "the Belgian question," and that, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine there is what he curiously calls no "absolute" impediment to peace. But let us look again in passing at this Belgian question, which it suits the German Minister to relegate for the moment to a secondary position. What the Allies demand in the case of Belgium is not only evacuation but the full and permanent restoration in all its integrity, of her political and economic independence. What would be the value to the brave and long-suffering Belgian people of a Belgium split into two parts under the notable scheme devised by the late German Chancellor? Or of a Belgium manacled by fiscal or other ties into permanent subservience to German policy? I have asked the question more than once whether Germany is prepared to accept the restoration of Belgium in the only real and intelligible sense as an essential condition of peace. I have got no answer and Baron von Kühlmann, who can be almost boisterously definite and precise when he is proclaiming an absolute *nonpossumus* in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, preserved in regard to the future of Belgium an unbroken and none the less significant silence.

Take once more the case of gallant Serbia and her neighbors and kinsmen, the Southern Slavs; or that of indomitable Roumania; who, under almost unexampled difficulty, has been holding back the armies of von Mackensen. These little States have as much right to their place in the sun as the richest and most populous and best-armed of those which are called the Great Powers.

They have hitherto led a cramped, to some extent a starved, and even a mutilated, life. To give them their natural boundaries is not merely not an act of aggression; it is to pay a debt long since demanded by justice; it is to bow to that highest form of political expediency which recognizes that there is no more noxious breeding ground for war, and the causes of war, than the existence of detached and discontented nationalities, artificially severed from their kindred and their proper home.

Let me pause here to add, "What is there in such changes in the map as I have been indicating to offend the interests or the common sense of the German people? I have repeatedly stated—and the same thing has been said by every responsible spokesman of the Entente—

that it has never been part of our policy to annihilate or to mutilate Germany. Our warfare is waged against Prussian militarism, the enemy of liberty at home, which everywhere else professes and practices the system of so-called "Macht Politik," under which the weak have no rights except the right of going to the war—and the inheritance of the earth belongs by an indefeasible title to the materially strongest Power. That Power was to have been Germany—animated by the Prussian spirit, drilled into conformity with Prussian ideals, obeying without question or cavil the commands of the Prussian king. Here you have what has been, and remains, the real menace to European and worldwide peace. Its ambitions were responsible for the outbreak of war. Its reluctance to acquiesce in changes which, however just in themselves, would be fatal to the realization of those ambitions, is at this moment the most solid obstacle to an honorable and enduring settlement.

This brings me to say once more that the worst thing that could happen for the world would be a patched up peace. What do I mean by a patched up peace? I mean an arrangement, or set of arrangements, of such a character that they contain within themselves the germs of future trouble, and provide merely a breathing space for the nations to heal their wounds and gird themselves for another and —this time—a decisive struggle. The daily cost of this war in blood, in material waste, and in human suffering immeasurably surpasses anything in the previous experience of mankind. Less than a month ago, on successive afternoons, I walked one day through the Delville Wood perhaps the most tragic spot in the great battlefield of the Somme—and the next through what were once the streets of the ancient town of Ypres. It is impossible to conceive two more diverse and yet equally terrible object lessons in the meaning of modern war. In the one case a smiling and fertile country-side has been converted as far as the eye can see, into a blasted wilderness in which for a generation to come nothing that is fruitful or useful to man can be made to grow. In the other case you have a famous and flourishing town, in which it is almost literally true that not one stone is left upon another, and two of the finest monuments, one of the municipal, the other of the ecclesiastical piety of the Middle Ages—the Cloth Hall and the Cathedral—are smoking ruins which can never be restored. And yet, with these scenes of pitiless desolation still fresh in the memory I say deliberately that I would rather see the war go on to a definite decision than that it should be brought to an end by an inconclusive compromise. The reason is plain. Nothing but a real, a true, and an abiding peace,

can offer, I will not say any recompense, but any justification, for what has been done and suffered and sacrificed.

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INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS TO THEIR REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIES ON WAR AIMS[1]

October 20, 1917

(1) The evacuation by the German troops of Russia and the autonomy of Poland, Lithuania, and the Lettish provinces.

(2) The autonomy of Turkish Armenia.

(3) The solution of the question of Alsace-Lorraine by means of a plebiscite in conditions of absolute liberty, the voting being organized by the local civil administrations after the removal of the troops of the two groups of belligerents.

(4) Restoration of Belgium in her ancient frontiers and compensation for her losses from an international fund.

(5) The restoration of Serbia and Montenegro, with compensation from an international fund. Serbia is to receive access to the Adriatic, Bosnia and Herzegovina are to be autonomous.

(6) The disputed districts in the Balkans to receive provisional autonomy, followed by a plebiscite.

(7) Roumania to be restored within her old frontiers; she is to give a promise to grant autonomy to the Dobrudja and solemnly to promise to put into immediate execution Article III of the treaty of Berlin, dealing with the equality of rights of Jews.

(8) Autonomy for the Italian provinces of Austria, followed by a plebiscite.

(9) Restitution to Germany of all her colonies.

(10) The reestablishment of Greece and Persia.

(11) The neutralization of all straits leading to inner seas, as well as of the Suez and Panama canals, freedom of navigation for merchant vessels and the abolition of the right to torpedo merchant vessels in time of war.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 22, 1917, p. 7. The Soviet representative was not admitted to the conference.

(12) All the belligerents are to renounce war contributions or indemnities in any form, but the moneys spent on the maintenance of prisoners and all contributions levied during the war are to be returned.

(13) Treaties of commerce shall not be the basis of peace. All countries shall agree to renounce economic blockade after the war and not to conclude separate customs understandings.

(14) The conditions of peace shall be laid down at a peace congress by delegates chosen by national representative bodies and confirmed by the parliament. An undertaking shall be given not to conclude secret treaties, which are declared to be in contravention of international law and consequently null.

(15) There shall be a general disarmament on land and sea, accompanied by the creation of a system of militia.

SPEECH OF FOREIGN MINISTER TERESTCHENKO, IN THE PRELIMINARY CONGRESS IN PETROGRAD, ON A SEPARATE PEACE[1]

October 29, 1917

The practical interests of the State imperatively demand that Russia should not remain isolated, that the grouping of existing forces should correspond perfectly to her interests, and that on the other hand, if in Russia as throughout the world, the desire for peace has become general, no one in Russia should agree to a peace which would humiliate her or adversely affect her vital interests. Such a peace would be an historical blunder which would retard for many years the triumph of democratic principles and bring a curse upon those who permitted it. Such a peace would soon be followed by another war.

. . . There is no domain where a false step would have such a repercussion as in that of foreign policy. Future historians of the Russian Revolution will be astonished to note that during the first few months of the Revolution the man who was then Minister of War and who wished to see the army successful, signed a series of documents which showed him in a wrong light, and that during the same period, when the Foreign Minister was a man who thought more than

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, October 31, 1917, p. 5.

any other citizen of the greatness of Russia, Russia approached nearer than ever before to a separate peace. I can vouch for it, because since I have become Minister of Foreign Affairs I have encountered the current which, in opposition to the real interests of the fatherland, was carrying it towards obscure and distant ends.

You have surely not yet forgotten the days in May when the armistice began on our front threatening to bring the war to a premature conclusion, which would inevitably have dragged the country into concluding a separate and disgraceful peace. Then as now, such a peace was rejected by all parties. You have not yet forgotten the efforts which the Administration had to make in order to inspire the human masses at the front with the realization that this was not the way to conclude the war and to assure the interests of Russia. I tell you that this period, namely, from the middle of May until the end of June, was the hardest and most trying for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But what encouragement did it not give us all when we heard of our offensive in the days of June and July which gave rise with it to the idea of the Russian Revolution advancing in the territory of our enemy. . . . You know also through the representatives of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates, who visited Europe, the impression which the powerful advance of Russian Revolutionary armies produced in the Allied trenches, and I tell you that if this effort had not weakened we should have had peace already.

Unfortunately the deep ignorance and the lack of the sense of responsibility inherited from the old régime again disorganized the army and left a train of bitter disappointment and defeat, and resulted according to the above-mentioned delegates, in the most terrible disillusion, confusion and dismay in Allied countries which did not understand how it was that the Russian Revolution, which in March had appealed to all the peoples to conclude a fraternal peace, has reduced the Russian people to a state of impotence.

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STATEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON THE POSSIBILITY OF RUSSIA CONCLUDING A SEPARATE PEACE[1]

November 2, 1917

A. Statement of the Secretary of State.

"There has been absolutely nothing in the dispatches received in the Department of State from Russia nor in information derived from any other source whatever to justify the impression created by the *Washington Post* today, principally by the headline "Russia Quits War," that Russia is out of the conflict. A reading of the full interview with Premier Kerensky, of which the paper published only an abbreviated and preliminary account, itself shows that the headline is entirely unwarranted.

"Our own advices show that the Provisional Government in Petrograd is attacking with great energy the problem confronting it. Reports received from Petrograd by mail and telegraph show that Premier Kerensky and his government, far from yielding to discouragement, are still animated by a strong determination to organize all Russia's resources in a whole-hearted resistance and carry the war through to a victorious completion. At the same time this Government, like those of the Allies, is rendering all possible assistance."

B. Official statement of the Russian Embassy, prepared after a consultation between the embassy and the State Department.

The *Washington Post* has published this morning an abbreviated extract of an interview given by the Russian Prime Minister Kerensky, entitled "Russia Quits War, Blames English for Not Sending Fleet." The *Washington Post* by this partial publication of Premier Kerensky's interview, has entirely misinterpreted the real sense of the declaration of the Russian Prime Minister and has done Russia great injustice, giving the people of America an impression opposed to the truth at every point.

"Russia is not out of the war and has no intention of quitting. No word in Kerensky's interview gives warrant for any assertion of that kind. As a matter of fact, the Premier stated the exact opposite. Answering the question, "Is Russia out of the War?" he most emphatically declared that this was a ridiculous question to ask.

"Aside from the fact that the publication of the *Washington Post*

[1] Texts issued to the press by the State Department. The interview to which reference is made had not the same importance as the denials which it elicited.

is only an extract of a few sentences of the Russian Premier's interview, even the part of it published does not give any justification for the preposterous and most injurious headlines by which it was entitled.

"What Premier Kerensky expressed was only a feeling of the Russian people that aid and support should be extended to them and that encouragement from the Allies is justified to a nation that has borne such heavy burdens and is now in a period of fundamental readjustment. No word in the interview was intended to express any blame or sarcasm against Allied action. A cable dispatch received lately and which is given out to the press today, shows the real military conditions at the Russian front. The best answer to the malicious assertions that Russia is out of the war will be the fact given by this cable. We are holding at the present time on our front one hundred and forty-seven divisions of enemy troops."

FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR IN DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON WAR AIMS[1]

November 6, 1917

Mr. Lees Smith (Northampton, L.), moved the following resolution:

"That this House is of opinion that, provided that satisfactory guarantees can be obtained with regard to the independence and restoration of Belgium and the evacuation of other occupied territory, no obstacle should be placed in the way of preliminaries towards negotiations for a peace settlement which ought to embody an equitable solution of the problem of Alsace-Lorraine, and the devising and enforcement of effective international machinery for the avoidance of future wars." He said that when the war broke out he supported the Government, and he would have continued to support them had there not been an entire departure from the aims for which the war was commenced. It was said, for instance, that when the war was ended it was to be followed by an economic war for the strangulation of the Central Empires. Ministers declared that after the war a League of Nations must be established. But how could a real European partnership be founded upon a commercial boycott? When war ended, let

[1] *The Times*, London, November 7, 1917, p. 10.

it end. Those proposals would merely sow the seed of another war, because no nation would submit nor ought it to submit, to be made the subject of a commercial boycott by the majority of the world. As the war proceeded new secret agreements were continually being divulged. A few months ago M. Ribot, then Foreign Minister for France, publicly admitted that there was an agreement by which, if the Allies were victorious, Germany was to lose not only Alsace-Lorraine but, in addition, whole tracts of other territory on the west bank of the Rhine, including the whole Saar Valley, were to be given to France.

Mr. BALFOUR: Absurd! There never was such an agreement.

Mr. LEES SMITH said M. Ribot made the statement in the Chamber on July 31, and it was published in *The Times*.[1] He wished to know how the right honorable gentleman was going to prove that M. Ribot's statement indicated that there was no such agreement. Only ten days ago the new Foreign Minister in France insisted that, in addition to Alsace-Lorraine, France had a right to and would seek further guarantees on the left bank of the Rhine.

Mr. BALFOUR: Does the honorable member contradict the statement I have made, that there is not an agreement between France and us?

Mr. LEES SMITH said it was an agreement between France and Russia, which M. Briand reasserted after the Czar was deposed. After declaring that he did not know what this country was now fighting for, he insisted that there was only one way to secure a stable peace and a League of Nations. It was by a settlement that abandoned the Paris conference resolutions and all the imperialistic pretensions in every part of the world, a settlement which sought to solve the problems of Africa and Asia Minor by an international system under which every interested nation would have a share, a settlement which said that, if the object of the war was to destroy Prussian militarism, the best way to do that in Prussia and everywhere else was by a drastic general reduction of armaments leading up to the universal abolition of conscription.

Mr. R. LAMBERT (Cricklade, L.), in seconding, said that he and those with whom he was associated, did not ask for peace at any

[1] In the Chamber of Deputies on July 31, 1917, M. Ribot said: "M. Doumergue, after certain conversations with the Czar, asked for and obtained M. Briand's authorization to take note of the Czar's promise to support our claims to Alsace-Lorraine which had been torn from us by violence and to leave us free to seek guarantees against fresh aggression not by annexing to France territory on the left bank of the Rhine but, if necessary, in forming out of those territories an autonomous state which would protect us as well as Belgium against an invasion from across the Rhine." *The Times*, London, August 1, 1917, p. 5.

price. They were all agreed that Belgium must be restored and made independent, and that Northern France must be freed from the invader, but there was an apprehension that we were fighting for imperialistic aims, and, among other things, for the purpose of restoring Alsace-Lorraine to France. Nobody could suppose that the question of Alsace-Lorraine could be left where it was, but its treatment was, he maintained, one of the many questions which, instead of being insisted on as preliminaries of peace, should be discussed at the peace conference. A decisive victory would not bring more friendly feelings between the belligerents, unless moderation was brought to bear when peace was discussed. Germany must be welcomed with open arms.

Mr. McCURDY (Northampton, L.) expressed his regret that this motion should have been moved at this time by his colleague in the representation of Northampton. He could add that that regret was shared by the whole of the honorable member's constituents. The two honorable gentlemen who had spoken had referred to "the original objects" for which the war was begun. They seem now to have developed for those "original objects" an enthusiasm which was not marked at the time.

Mr. LAMBERT: My colleague went to the front, and I, at all events, took part in a great many recruiting meetings.

Mr. McCURDY said that he was only stating what was a fact. But did these honorable gentlemen really suppose that, as an assembly of business people, they were going to confine their attention today to "the original objects" of the war? Had they learned nothing? They urged on the Government that if the occupied territories were to be evacuated something would have happened which would justify us in entering into peace negotiations. Those matters, near as they were to our hearts, were now matters of minor importance. The question was now not: shall Belgium be restored? but: how are we to ensure that Belgium will not have to be restored again?

There were some things which this country understood quite well. They understood the Ten Commandments. In Prussia for the last forty years kings and statesmen, poets, philosophers, and schoolmasters, had been teaching the children that "thou shalt kill" was the first commandment, and that "thou shalt steal" was the method by which nations could grow great. What the people of this country wanted was, not to see Belgium restored, but to see the Ten Commandments restored. We were fighting to disestablish war to the salvation of Europe, but if the suggestions of the mover and seconder

of the resolution were listened to, the result would be to make some sort of patched-up peace, the essence of which would be that it would leave the Hohenzollerns dictators in Central Europe and in a position at some future time to commence another war. There was one obstacle to peace at the present time which it would be folly to lose sight of or to ignore. That was that the men who for forty years had preached the war, and in its conduct had ignored all the unwritten rules of humanity which were supposed to distinguish man from the brute, were still in power in Central Europe; and to say that we should sit round a table to arrange terms of peace with pirates, murderers, ravishers of women, was to say something which the man in the street could not understand.

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD (Leicester, Lab.) said there was a danger that the country might make peace on account of war weariness. Nothing could be more fatal than that. It would mean failure to attain our objects. The only way to prevent it was for the government definitely to declare what our war aims were and to stand by them. Then there would be no war weariness and no losing of the war. Our original war aims held up before the people a bright flag of ideals. Why should they now be sneered at as of minor importance? Discussing the Alsace-Lorraine question he argued that this was no longer a French question, but a European one. If this territory was going to be handed over to one belligerent or another merely in consequence of an exercise of force, then we should not be the defenders of European liberty. He hoped the problem would be kept an open door. The French Socialists had declared themselves in favor of a plebiscite, and had suggested that a League of Nations might arrange it. Men of good will would arrange a thousand ways around such a problem before they began to bang doors, knowing that a settlement by force was no settlement at all. We wanted democracy in Germany, and he would strive might and main to get Germany not only to demand but to see that it obtained the power to govern itself. So long as Germany remained as it was, with its government and embattled form of organized force, even with the best intentions on the part of the German people, it was a menace to Europe and one of the greatest problems of this country. How was the light of the French Revolution, and the later revolution in Russia, to be brought into Berlin, and Germany to be given democratic self-government? That was a political problem of which he said, with deference and respect, that the government had made a perfect muddle. We should not bring about the political liberation of Germany by military defeat or by prolonging

the war, but by making clear what were our war aims—not provocative, but fair, just, and honorable.

Mr. BALFOUR (City of London), who was received with cheers, said: As the House knows, I am personally of opinion that discussions, however interesting, like that to which we have been listening this afternoon, do little to assist the object which those who start them have in view—the object of obtaining an honorable peace at the earliest possible date. But whether this discussion was wise or unwise we have no power to interfere with it, and as it has taken place I am sure the House will expect something to be said from this bench on the topics which have been raised. We have had three speeches from the bench opposite on which the pacifist minority is represented. I shall direct criticism against those speeches, as being strangely different in their tenor and tone. The mover and seconder of the resolution erred on the side of extreme narrowness of interpretation. They tried to make out that this country was being kept in the war in order to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France. That is a complete misapprehension of the general views of the present government, and I think I may say of the late government and of the country at large, as regards the objects of the war. It attempts to narrow down the objects of this war, and it utterly loses the perspective in which this war should be looked at. The honorable gentleman who has just sat down can not be said to have narrowed the objects of the war, because he seemed to think that we ought to fight on until every country in Europe is democratized. Is that seriously the position of the peace party? Are we really to accept it as the authentic utterance of those who desire an immediate conference and an immediate peace—that that conference and that peace should not take place until all Europe has been democratized, until every State, great and small, especially I presume, the great States, should have been fashioned on the pattern which commends itself to the honorable gentleman?

Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: I did not say that. I am sure that the right honorable gentleman does not want to misrepresent me. What I did say was that to try to attain a political democratic end by war was folly, because war could not do it; but we hope to use the opportunities of the war to push forward this democratic end, which is the only real security for the peace of Europe and we were sure that that would come as a result of the war.

Mr. BALFOUR: That is the very proposition which I have made. According to the version which the honorable gentleman has just given he desires that this war should go on, and under cover of the war that

there should be a great democratic propaganda in all the countries—(Mr. RAMSAY MACDONALD: "No"), and that the war should be used as an instrument by which a democratic form of government may be extended to all the States of Europe. I think that he made a quotation from a German Socialist to show that nothing could unite Germany more against her present enemies than the idea that those enemies intended to force upon her against her will not the form of government which Germany desires, but the form of government which her enemies happen to admire. I have always been one of those who passionately desire that free institutions should be extended throughout Europe, but I have never thought that it would be a wise or a possible thing for one country to dictate to another country under what form of government it should live.

I will leave the rather wide sweep of the honorable gentleman's political speculations on one side and come to the rather narrow issues raised by the honorable gentleman who moved the amendment. He devoted the whole of his speech to an attack upon the government for having extended the war aims of this country until they embraced every kind of end in which this country had a very small indirect interest, and in supporting that view he really gave the House to understand that he had authentic information to the effect that the Allies were bound by a secret treaty which was to hand over to France or to some independent community the truly German parts of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine. (Mr. SNOWDEN: No such thing.) That is a complete mare's nest, there is no such treaty. The British Government know of no such treaty and are party to no such treaty, nor do I believe that any such treaty exists. And I think it a great pity that the honorable gentleman should come down to this House and use arguments which will, of course, be repeated in Germany without the contradiction. The argument has for its basis that the objects of the Allied Powers are not what they have loudly proclaimed them to be—to free small nationalities, to make the constitution of the States of Europe as far as possible harmonize with the wishes of the inhabitants—but that, on the contrary, the object of the Allied Powers is to take what is admittedly German territory and tear it away from the German Empire. That never has been the object of the Allies; it is not the object of the Allies and no treaty binding the Allies together has ever suggested for a moment any such object. I think it a great pity that the honorable gentleman ever embarked upon that hazardous line of political speculation, or entered upon the consideration of what ought to be one of the most serious debates of the session with speculations and fancies

based entirely, as far as I can make out, from unauthenticated gossip. Let me turn from the imaginary treaty about the left bank of the Rhine and say one word about Alsace-Lorraine. One would suppose from the speeches delivered earlier this evening that his Majesty's Government had suddenly come to the conclusion that of all the declared objects of this war, Alsace-Lorraine stood out solitary, preeminent, unconnected with any other of the objects of the war. Of course, we desire the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine and for that without doubt we are fighting, but not for that alone—not for that as an isolated element in the war objects. We are fighting in order in the first place that Europe may be free from the perpetual menace of the military party in Germany. Partly for that reason, and partly on its own merits, we desire to see the map of Europe so rearranged that the various peoples shall live under the form of government which they desire and which they think suits their own historic development and their own cultural necessities. It is not Europe alone that we have to consider under this amendment, there is mention made of Belgium, which, of course, in the view of everybody in this country, though not of everybody in Germany, must be restored intact and rehabilitated, but you must remember that this is a war which, through no fault of ours, has expanded over not only almost the whole of Europe, but over no small part of Asia.

Have the honorable gentlemen no interest in those elements in the Turkish Empire, for example, which have suffered and are suffering, not merely under misgovernment, but under the most brutal and barbarous tyranny? Is Armenia nothing? Is Arabia nothing? They talk of democratization. Democratization is invaluable when applied to States in a certain degree of advancement. It is the one security, as I think, of good government and progress, but it is not applicable to every form of human community and at all events, you can not democratize Turkey. That is quite clear.

Turkey has come into the war. Is it to be a matter of indifference to us that Armenia should be put back as the honorable gentleman by his resolution wants her to be put back under Turkish rule? (Mr. Snowden dissented.) The first proposition in the resolution is that all territory occupied by military power to whichever side it belongs, is to be restored to its original owner. That has only one meaning, and that meaning is, you are going to put back Armenia and Arabia under Turkey. We do not want to destroy any true Turkish community made up of Turks, governed by Turks, for Turks in a manner which suits the Turks, but by all means do not let us

put altogether out of sight one of the objects which we ought to aim at now that this great international catastrophe has fallen upon us, the possibility, the duty, of taking away from under Turkish rule people who are not Turks, who have been tyrannized over by the Turks, whose development has been stopped by the Turks, and who, I believe, would flourish under their own rule and customs if they were given the chance. The honorable gentleman has framed his amendment. Has he no views about Poland? He thinks that the whole question of Poland can be satisfactorily settled in existing circumstances if you only bring European Powers together around the table. Is that common sense? Does he suppose that Germany would ever consent to restoring the ancient kingdom of Poland, or even of restoring that part of it which is especially Polish in character and in population? Of course, she would not consent. (Mr. D. MASON: Why not? May I suggest that, very probably, a conference would find these things out?) The honorable gentleman apparently thinks that a free Poland may be created by negotiation. Does he seriously think that Germany is in a mood to do that? Let him look at the German newspapers, which are not considering how they are going to restore that part of Poland which was taken by Frederick the Great, but whether or not it would be wise for them to add to their provinces by taking the Baltic provinces of Russia, Riga, and all the rest of it. It requires no investigation, I can assure the honorable member, in the present state of Europe, in the present temper of our enemies, to be aware that no such negotiations are likely to bear the smallest fruit.

There is one point which I notice in all the speeches delivered to-night and which I see habitually in all speeches delivered on the same side as that of the mover and seconder of the amendment. They always talk as if we had changed our war aims or else that we have never declared them. The people who have never declared their war aims are not the Allies, but the Central Powers. If the honorable gentleman will do me the honor to read the covering dispatch which I wrote at the beginning of this year—a dispatch which covered a more important document which represents the view of all the Allies, and which may be said specially to look at these problems from the angle of the British Government—if he will read that he will see that we have expounded our war aims. Can he point to anything said by the Central Powers at any time or under any provocation which corresponds to that dispatch?

I have heard a great deal about the reply of the Central Powers to the Pope's note. That, if anything, would give them the excuse and

occasion for declaring their war aims. They were first asked to do so by President Wilson when America was still neutral. They never responded to that. Then some months later comes a note from the Vatican. Both Germany and Austria replied to that note and the tenor of their reply only proved conclusively their inability or their unwillingness to state what their war aims are. There were two points, if I remember rightly, which were specifically mentioned in the Pope's note, one of which was Belgium and the other was Poland, but on neither of these have they said one word. They paid a great many compliments to the Vatican and they talked about disarmament and eternal peace and generalities of that kind, but about specific war aims they said nothing. Then why are we to be reproached when we have given the general view of the objects and motives which have animated both my right honorable friend, the late Prime Minister, and his colleagues, and also those who now sit on these benches, from the very beginning of this war? There has been no change in these aims, and the last objection which is to be applied to them is the one which has been borrowed by the honorable gentleman opposite from ill-informed persons in another country, who describe the war aims of the Allies as imperialistic. What is there imperialistic in desiring to see an independent Poland? What is there imperialistic in wishing to see Armenia freed from Turkey or Alsace-Lorraine restored to France? What is there imperialistic in seeing that Italy should have restoration of their own soil, should embrace those of her own race, of her own tongue, and of her own civilization? What is there imperialistic in desiring to see that the Roumanians should be under the Roumanian flag? What is there imperialistic in desiring to see the Serbian community again a great, a flourishing, and a united power? There is nothing imperialistic in these aims, and for honorable gentlemen to come down to this House, forgetting the official statements that we have made about our views, and to misrepresent them in the British House of Commons, knowing that those misrepresentations will receive currency amongst our enemies, it seems to me to be one of the greatest disservices which any man can render to his country.

One of the illusions which, apparently, it is very difficult to eradicate from the minds of honorable gentlemen opposite, is that a congress, whatever be the occasion on which it is summoned, can always deal effectively and successfully with the problems placed before it. Let the House believe that it is of no use whatever to summon a congress until the people who are to sit around the board have at all events arrived at a large measure of agreement already. If you call

them together with all their differences unsettled, with their divergences of view undiminished, with each party thinking that it has only to go on with the war and its aims will be gratified, you get no conclusion. No conclusion is possible, nor has there ever been a case that I know of in which a congress has met and succeeded in coming to any conclusion except at the end of hostilities and not in the middle.

The honorable gentleman has only got to read the extracts from German papers to discover that in the opinion of the Germans it is merely French and British stupidity that does not convince us that we are already beaten. I read an extract from an article in a well known German newspaper which adopted that peculiar line of argument. That is not our opinion. Some of us think that the Central Powers are more nearly beaten than they are willing to admit. We know that the Germans are wrong. The Germans probably think that we are wrong. What is the use of our meeting around a table to discuss things which are vital to the future of the country, of Europe, and of mankind? Is it not plain that if the Germans were in a mood seriously to discuss peace, they would, at all events, lay before the world the terms which, in their opinion, that peace should follow and the objects which that peace was intended to secure? Let me remind the House that they have ostentatiously refused to do anything of the kind, and if you read the German newspapers you will see that even those that represent the majority socialists are full of speculation whether it would, or would not, be wise to get indemnities out of the Allies to pay the crushing load of debt which Germany from day to day and from hour to hour is heaping on her shoulders; whether or not Belgium is restored completely; whether or not——

Mr. SNOWDEN: That is a gross misrepresentation. They said no such thing.

Mr. BALFOUR: It is not a misrepresentation at all.

Mr. SNOWDEN: Does the right honorable gentleman say that that is the opinion of the majority socialists in Germany? If he does he is totally inaccurate.

Mr. BALFOUR: I do not think that the majority socialists are responsible for all the things to which I have referred, but I have certainly seen statements in the German press which indicated nothing less than a German peace and who knows what a German peace is!

It would be extremely bad for the German workmen and for the socialist party, and, therefore, they ought not to support it. It is one of the perils of the present situation that the majority socialists in

Germany, and in Germany alone, are instruments in the hands of an absolute government in a way in which the socialists in no other country, so far as I know, are. The honorable gentleman said that all these questions were abstract questions in which you could say, "Well, when people have fought, they ought to meet in congress, settle their difficulties, come to some amicable conclusion, and kiss and make friends."

You can not lay down these propositions. There have been plenty of contests and plenty of wars in the world in which that is true of the belligerents; when they make peace, the past is forgotten and no distinction need be drawn by history between the temper in which the two parties entered into the war. That is not the case in this war. You must consider the psychology of the German people, and it really is not prejudice to say that the Germans have an entirely different view of international morality and of the rights and duties of a powerful State from any other community in the world.

The facts as they are, at any rate as I quite honestly read them, are these, that, at all events, since 1863, and in Prussia long before 1863, there was developed this peculiar theory of the state, which has not been allowed to remain a theory, but has gradually percolated into every social stratum. It has been resisted, I am glad to think, though I think imperfectly resisted, by the socialist party in Germany; but, apart from the socialist party in Germany, it seems for the moment to have dominated large classes of the community. Now, while that remains as it is, it is quite impossible for other nations, in many cases freer nations, to sleep comfortably in their beds. It is quite impossible that genuine freedom should be given to the minor nationalities in the immediate proximity of this dominating State.

The honorable gentleman talked as if the rest of the world were entering into a conspiracy to coerce poor, innocent, unoffending Germany. What the rest of the world have done is to form a league of self-protection against the power which is more deliberately set upon universal domination than any power, I think, that has ever existed, or than any power that has existed, for a couple of thousand years. You can not really quote such cases as Charlemagne in the Middle Ages, in the contrary direction. Cold-blooded, deliberate, calculated, educated, skilful determination to be the dominating power, first of Europe, and, secondly, of the world, is a fact of which I do not think anybody acquainted with recent German thought, illustrated by recent German practice, can have the least doubt.

Of course, in a country like this, there will be some crank found to

support almost any theory, however wild, but in Germany it is not a question of cranks. What nobody has yet found is the crank who resisted in Germany. Nothing has given rise to more bitter reflections than a comparison between the pious observations made in the German reply to the Pope about everlasting peace and arbitration, and all the rest of it, with what Germany preached and practised before this war. America and England have been trying to get those principles gradually, slowly—and not ineffectually, within the measure of our means—adopted between nations. Who has resisted? Germany. Never would Germany accept a single obligation which would diminish or hamper her powers of striking at once and at any moment against any rival whom she desired to suppress or coerce. She inherited, indeed united Germany inherited, from a preceding generation one great obligation which did hamper her—the obligation to protect Belgium and maintain its independence. That she simply brushed aside as if it did not exist.

Would honorable gentlemen who talk to us as if we were prolonging the war for imperialistic ends tell us how they think you ought to deal with a power which evidently and obviously is only a recent convert to those views of international arbitration and a league of nations, the most recent and, I am afraid I have to say, the least sincere, a nation which has preached to its people for generations the doctrine of force and which in the early days of the war, when a great and striking victory seemed within their reach, preached, not a league of nations, not international arbitration, but the enormous benefits to mankind of imposing upon them German culture. You may say, "You can not expect in a moment the military party in Germany to change its views, but, at all events, you might fight until you require them to make a treaty or treaties in which the views to which they objected would nevertheless be accepted and that Europe might rest content with the security thus obtained." Has anybody got the hardihood to suggest that any security is to be obtained on that road? Is there a single contract of any kind, however solemn it may be, however closely it may harmonize with the natural morality of mankind and with the instincts of humanity which civilization is supposed, more or less erroneously, to foster—is there a single one of those engagements, however entered into, which Germany has not broken at once and without hesitation when it suited her, whether it is the overrunning and enslaving of a country she was pledged to defend, or whether it is the sinking of hospital ships which she promised to respect, or whether it deals with the lives of women and children in the ocean? Take the whole circuit

of international duties—whatever it is—if it does not suit Germany her principles and her practice alike say the obligation may be thrown and ought to be thrown to the winds.

No doubt these atrocious doctrines are the teachings of a party, the military party in Germany. If we can really hope to see, or when we can see, Germany truly democratized I think a different creed will come in and when that different creed comes in, then indeed we may hope to see that Germany will follow the same course as other nations, and no longer be regarded by them as a standing menace to their liberties, but will vie with them in furthering the work of civilization. Are we near that? Are we near enough, at all events, to enter into those discussions with the military party in Germany which apparently is the course which the honorable gentlemen who moved and seconded desire? Nobody longs more passionately for peace than I do, no community desires peace more than the British. Our traditions, our hopes, our ideals are peaceful traditions, peaceful hopes, peaceful ideals. The war aims which we have described all conduce to peace.

The honorable gentleman talks of liberty and democratization and the rights of nationalities. Those are our objects. We have proclaimed them. Have our enemies ever proclaimed them? Have they ever done anything to promote them? The honorable gentleman belongs to a party which boasts of democracy as its one ideal. They belong to a party which has always talked loudly of reform, freedom, the rights of small nationalities, the advantage of allowing populations to be governed in the fashion of which they themselves approve—those are among the objects of the Allies. Are they among the objects of those whom the Allies are fighting? The honorable gentleman who has just sat down knows they are not. He accuses us on this bench of having missed a great opportunity in not having successfully carried out a propaganda in Germany to induce the Germans to follow the examples of the Russians. I have heard many charges brought against the War Cabinet and the Cabinet of my right honorable friend opposite, but surely a more grotesque charge was never brought against any body of ministers. How can we change the heart of Germany? That is the point—that is the difficulty. How can we approach those great classes which I am sure must exist, in potentiality if not in actuality, which will understand the ideas that commend themselves to the American, British, French, and Italian nations? They exist, I have no doubt, but they have no power and we have no power to get at them. How, under these circumstances, can you expect this conference to succeed? The proper time will come without doubt

when a conference will meet to discuss the rearrangement of the world after the war. When it will come, I know not, but surely one of the preliminaries must be that the Central Powers, who, are now united with their Turkish Allies in coercing small nationalities, and in maintaining under their heel subject peoples, these powers will tell us what it is they desire and how far they will concede to that higher spirit of policy which animates the great free communities, both of the new world and of the old. That time is not yet. May it come soon. But we should be committing a crime if we tried to persuade ourselves or others that it had come.

The honorable members who moved and seconded the amendment both dwelt most naturally upon the destruction of human life and the accumulation of human suffering which has been caused by this war. They can not be exaggerated. No rhetoric, however eloquent, will rise to the full height of describing what that destruction and what that misery has been and is, and at the moment is likely to be. But the fact that it has been borne by those freedom-loving nations, is in itself surely a conclusive argument against the waste of this suffering by consenting to give up those ideals for which this suffering has been undergone. In every one of the addresses which have been made by President Wilson, or by this Government, or, as far as I know, by any of the Allied Governments, first and foremost among our war aims has been placed and always placed, the creation of a durable peace. It is because I think that if we were to adopt the advice of the honorable members who have spoken from that bench opposite in this debate we should postpone indefinitely the possibility of securing the world against a repetition of those ills that I beg the House by an overwhelming majority to show, not merely to the country which requires no persuasion, but to our allies, and not less to our enemies, that we believe in the cause for which we are struggling, that we know we can bring it to a successful termination, that that cause is not directed against the real interests of any community, but that it is the cause of freedom and of justice, and, above all, peace. For that reason I shall certainly go into the lobby and I hope that every member, irrespective of party division, will go into the lobby and show clearly what we think and why we think it, what are the ends at which we are aiming, and proclaim at large that, great as are the sacrifices which we have already made, we are ready to continue them, and to continue them indefinitely, until the great and righteous and unselfish objects we have in view are finally secured.

Mr. Asquith: I do not think any parliamentary complaint can be

made against my two honorable friends who moved and seconded this amendment in taking this opportunity of stating their views. It is an appropriate one according to our forms of procedure. Undoubtedly the discussion has been interesting and instructive. At the same time I can not help thinking—and I think that feeling is widely shared—that in some respects the moment is not very opportune at a time when all our interests and all our sympathies are, or ought to be, concentrated upon the gallant struggle which is being made by our Italian allies, and, I am glad to say, with British and French assistance, to repel the invader from their territory, and to carry on worthily the contest which they have so splendidly and courageously waged in the last two and a half years.

My object in rising for a moment or two is not to prolong the discussion, but simply to say a word to remove, if it be necessary, what seemed to me to be two misconceptions. The first, which has run through the speeches of my three honorable friends who have supported this amendment, is that the stress which has been laid and is being laid upon the question of Alsace-Lorraine indicates that if that question were out of the way, or could be settled by itself, the other war aims, which my honorable friends profess, and I am sure quite honestly profess, to pursue with the same ardor as do some of us, are within reach of attainment. No fallacy could be more complete. I have followed with the closest attention the declarations of responsible statesmen, publicists, and exponents of opinion in Germany during the last two or three months, and I can not find a trace of evidence worthy of the name in regard to the very points on which my honorable friends so justly laid stress. In regard to the evacuation of Belgium and its restoration to a position of complete independence, to take that only as one illustration out of many, I can not find that there is any trace of evidence that the Germans are in any mood to consider such a policy. I say that because I feel very strongly upon it. It is no good attempting to isolate this or that particular purpose of the Allies and to place it in a position of independence or priority as compared with others. Unless we see in regard to all that they are all interdependent, they all really rest upon the same principle and are all directed to the same purpose—unless we see that our enemies are in the mood to concede our just claims in regard to all—it is no use whatever going into any classification or discrimination as to the relative merit of this or that aim.

The other misconception which I should like to help in removing is the notion that in some way or other definite or indefinite, we have

shifted or expanded the aims for which we entered into the war. I speak on that point with as much knowledge and more responsibility than any man in the House or in the country. It was this week three years ago that I took the opportunity at the Guild Hall of explaining and defining in the clearest possible language what were the aims for which this country entered the war. I think in the following week, certainly within a very short time, M. Vivian, then Prime Minister of France, repeated almost verbatim, or at any rate, the sense of the statement I then made, and the agreement of the French Government to those aims. They were not, as the right honorable gentleman has truly said, and are not any of them either imperialistic or vindictive. They are one and all as we then thought, and as I believe we think today, needed for the double purpose of the emancipation and security of Europe. As far as my knowledge goes they have not been in any particular expanded, and as far as my hopes go, they will not be in any particular contracted. Unless and until they are attained, there is no hope for the enduring peace of the world.

Mr. WHITEHOUSE (Mid. Lanark, L.) rose to support the amendment and was received with loud and prolonged cries of "divide." The honorable member tried for six or seven minutes to make himself heard but his voice was completely drowned by the shouts of members who were determined that his speech should not be delivered. He continued his attempt to address the House when the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved the closure. The speaker accepted the motion.

DIVISION ON THE CLOSURE

The House divided, and the numbers were:

For the amendment	33
Against	282
Majority against	249

PROCLAMATION OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AFTER THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD[1]

November 7, 1917

To the Army Committees of the Active Army and to all Councils of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates and to the Garrison and Proletariat of Petrograd:

We have deposed the Government of Kerensky which rose against the Revolution and the people. The change which resulted in the deposition of the Provisional Government was accomplished without bloodshed.

The Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates solemnly welcomes the accomplished change and proclaims the authority of the military Revolutionary Committee until the creation of a government by the Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates.

Announcing this to the army at the front the Revolutionary Committee calls upon the revolutionary soldiers to watch closely the conduct of the men in command. Officers who do not join the accomplished revolution immediately and openly must be arrested at once as enemies.

The Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates considers this to be the program of the new authority:

First—the offer of an immediate democratic peace.

Second—The immediate handing over of large proprietary holdings of lands to the peasants.

Third—The transmission of all authority to the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates.

Fourth—The honest convocation of a constitutional assembly.

The national revolutionary army must not permit uncertain military detachments to leave the front for Petrograd; they should use persuasion, but where this fails they must oppose any such action on the part of these detachments by force without mercy.

The actual order must be read immediately to all military detachments in all arms. The suppression of this order from the rank and file by army organizations is equivalent to a great crime against the revolution and will be punished by all the strength of the revolutionary law.

[1] Text in *The New York Times,* November 9, 1917, p. 1. The revolution took place on November 7, N. S. (October 25, O. S.).

Soldiers! For peace, for bread, for land, and for the power of the people!

THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE.

STATEMENT OF BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE BY FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR[1]

November 8, 1917

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

NOTE OF FOREIGN MINISTER TROTSKY TO THE ALLIED EMBASSIES IN PETROGRAD OFFERING AN ARMISTICE[2]

November 21, 1917

I herewith have the honor to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the All-Russian Congress of Soldiers and Workmen's Delegates organized on October 26, a new government in a form of a council of national commissioners. The head of this government is Vladimir Ilitch Lenine. The direction of the foreign policy has been intrusted to me, in the capacity of National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. Drawing attention to the text of the offer of an armistice and a democratic peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities and the self-determination of nations, approved by the All-Russian Congress of Soldiers and Workmen's Delegates, I have the honor to beg you to regard the above document as a formal offer of an immediate armistice

[1] *The Times,* London, November 9, 1917, p. 7.
[2] Text in *The New York Times,* November 24, 1917, p. 1.

on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations—an offer with which the authoritative government of the Russian Republic has addressed itself simultaneously to all the belligerent peoples and their governments.

Accept my assurance, Mr. Ambassador, of the profound respect of the Soldiers and Workmen's Government for the people of France which can not help aiming at peace as well as all the rest of the nations exhausted and made bloodless by this unexampled slaughter.

L. TROTSKY,
National Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

PROCLAMATION OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS IN REFERENCE TO A SEPARATE PEACE[1]

November 22, 1917

TO ALL COMMITTEES OF REGIMENTS, DIVISIONS, CORPS, ARMIES; TO ALL THE SOLDIERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND TO ALL SAILORS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY NAVY:

During the night of November 20, the Council of Commissioners of the people sent a wireless message to the Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin, containing an order that he should immediately and formally offer an armistice to all the nations, allied and hostile, involved in the war. This message was received at Headquarters on November 21, at 5.5 a. m.

Dukhonin was instructed to keep the Council continually informed of the progress of the *pourparlers,* and only to sign the agreement for an armistice after sanction by the Council.

At the same time a similar offer for an armistice was formally submitted to all the plenipotentiary representatives of the Allies in Petrograd.

Having received no answer from Dukhonin up to yesterday evening, the Council authorized Lenin, Stalin, and Krilenko to ask Dukhonin by direct wire for the cause of such delay.

The *pourparlers* have been in progress since 4.40 a. m. today. Dukhonin attempted many times to evade giving an explanation of his conduct and a clear answer to the orders of the Government. When

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, November 23, 1917, p. 6.

a categorical order was sent to Dukhonin instructing him to offer immediately and formally an armistice for the purpose of beginning peace *pourparlers* he refused to obey.

Now, in the name of the Government of the Russian Republic and by order of the Council, Dukhonin has been informed that he has been deposed from his functions for disobeying the instructions of the government, and for conduct which is bringing unheard-of and terrible suffering upon all the working masses, upon the whole country and especially upon the armies.

At the same time Dukhonin has been ordered to continue his duties until a new Commander-in-Chief or any other person authorized by him arrives to take over the command.

Ensign Krilenko has been appointed the new Commander-in-Chief.

Soldiers! The question of peace is in your hands. You must not permit the counter-revolutionary generals to destroy the great work of peace. You must arrest and guard them well, so that lynch law, which is not worthy of a revolutionary army, can not take place, and so that these generals can not evade eminent justice. You will observe the strongest revolutionary and military discipline. Let the regiments which are in the frontal positions elect immediately plenipotentiaries who shall formally begin peace *pourparlers* with the enemy. The Council gives you the right to do this. On the progress of the *pourparlers* you shall inform us by all possible means.

Only the Council has the right to sign the final agreement of armistice.

Soldiers! The question of peace is in your hands. Have watchfulness, tenacity, and energy, and the will for peace will win!

In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic,

V. Ulianoff Lenin,

President of the Council of Commissioners of the People.

N. Krilenko,

Commissioner for War and Highest Commander-in-Chief.

PROTEST OF THE ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS IN RUSSIA TO THE RUSSIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF AGAINST A SEPARATE PEACE[1]

November 27, 1917

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The undersigned Chief of the Allied National Military Missions accredited to the Russian General Staff have the honor to declare in conformity with precise indications received from their authorized representatives in Petrograd, that they protest most energetically to the Russian General Command against all violation of the conditions of the treaty of Sept. 5 (1914?) by which the Allies, including Russia, solemnly engaged themselves not to conclude an armistice separately, or to suspend military operations separately.

The undersigned Chief of the Military Missions of the Allies consider it their duty to inform the General Staff that any violation of the Treaty by Russia will have the most serious consequences.

The undersigned beg your Excellency to be so good as to acknowledge receipt of this communication in writing.

SPEECH OF CHANCELLOR MICHAELIS IN THE REICHSTAG ON WAR AIMS AND A POSSIBLE RUSSIAN PEACE[2]

November 29, 1917

The Russian Government sent out yesterday from the Tsarkoe Selo wireless station a telegram signed by the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, M. Trotsky, and by the chairman of the Council of the People's Commissaries M. Lenin, addressed to the governments and the peoples of the belligerent countries. In this telegram it is proposed that negotiations concerning a truce and general peace be opened at an early date.

Gentlemen, I do not hesitate to declare that in the proposal of the Russian Government, so far as it is at present known, the debatable principle on which the opening of negotiations may be based can be

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, November 30, 1917, p. 8.

[2] Text in *The New York Times Current History* magazine, January, 1918, p. 108. Only portions of the speech are printed.

recognized and that I am ready to enter upon such as soon as the Russian Government sends representatives having full powers for this purpose.

I hope and wish that these efforts will soon take definite shape and bring us peace.

. . . . . .

As regards the countries of Poland, Lithuania and Courland which were formerly under the sovereignty of the Czar, we consider that the people living in those countries have the right to determine their own fate. We expect that they will adopt the system of government best suited to their conditions and culture.

For the rest, matters are too nebulous. The report disseminated in the press recently to the effect that a definite agreement has been reached on one point was premature.

Our position with regard to Italy, France, and England, is otherwise, since we and our allies in answer to the Pope's appeal for peace, have placed ourselves on the foundation of the Papal note of August 1, 1917. Every ground was indeed removed for the foolish argument that the object was to destroy German militarism, which was threatening the peace of nations. On the other hand, it has been shown where, in truth, a peace destroying militarism is to be sought. The Italian Minister Sonnino, has in his speech of October 26 of this year expressly waived the thought of general disarmament. The ground for this is characteristic enough: Standing armies can not be dispensed with on account of the internal dangers. And Clemenceau goes so far in his cynicism as to shut out expressly Germany and Austria-Hungary from the peaceful community of nations of the future, when right shall take the place of armed force. Lloyd-George has declared quite distinctly that the aim of the war is the destruction of German commerce; that the war must be continued until this aim is reached. Where, in truth, the lust of conquest, falsely attributed to us, is to be sought is now placed before the world in the clearest light through the publication, which has been begun of secret treaties by the Russian Government.

Our war aims from the first day onward was the defense of the fatherland, the inviolability of its territory, and the freedom and independence of its economic life. On that account we could greet joyfully the peace appeal of the Pope. The spirit in which the answer to the Papal note has been given is still alive today, but—so much the

enemy must admit—that this answer signifies no license for a criminal lengthening of the war. For the continuation of the terrible slaughter and the destruction of irreplaceable works of civilization, for the mad self-mangling of Europe, the enemy alone bears the responsibility, and they will also have to bear the consequences. This applies especially to M. Sonnino.

If the Italian authorities who drove into the war the unfortunate population of a beautiful land bound to us by thousandfold memories, had taken the hand of peace held out to them by the Pope, the frightful defeat of their army with all the associated consequences would not have taken place. May Italy's friend accept this as a warning, so that they may lend ear at last to the voice of reason and of humanity.

. . . . . .

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON REVIEWING AMERICAN WAR AIMS AND RECOMMENDING THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT, DELIVERED AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE TWO HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS[1]

December 4, 1917

Gentlemen of the Congress: Eight months have elapsed since I last had the honor of addressing you. They have been months crowded with events of immense and grave significance for us. I shall not undertake to retail or even to summarize those events. The practical particulars of the part we have played in them will be laid before you in the reports of the Executive Departments. I shall discuss only our present outlook upon these vast affairs, our present duties, and the immediate means of accomplishing the objects we shall hold always in view.

I shall not go back to debate the causes of the war. The intolerable wrongs done and planned against us by the sinister masters of Germany have long since become too grossly obvious and odious to every true American to need to be rehearsed. But I shall ask you to consider again and with a very grave scrutiny our objectives and the

[1] Text in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

measures by which we mean to attain them; for the purpose of discussion here in this place is action, and our action must move straight towards definite ends. Our object is, of course, to win the war; and we shall not slacken or suffer ourselves to be diverted until it is won. But it is worth while asking and answering the question, When shall we consider the war won?

From one point of view it is not necessary to broach this fundamental matter. I do not doubt that the American people know what the war is about and what sort of an outcome they will regard as a realization of their purpose in it. As a nation we are united in spirit and intention. I pay little heed to those who tell me otherwise. I hear the voices of dissent—who does not? I hear the criticism and the clamor of the noisily thoughtless and troublesome. I also see men here and there fling themselves in impotent disloyalty against the calm, indomitable power of the nation. I hear men debate peace who understand neither its nature nor the way in which we may attain it with uplifted eyes and unbroken spirits. But I know that none of these speaks for the nation. They do not touch the heart of anything. They may safely be left to strut their uneasy hour and be forgotten.

But from another point of view I believe that it is necessary to say plainly what we here at the seat of action consider the war to be for and what part we mean to play in the settlement of its searching issues. We are the spokesmen of the American people and they have a right to know whether their purpose is ours. They desire peace by the overcoming of evil, by the defeat once for all of the sinister forces that interrupt peace and render it impossible, and they wish to know how closely our thought runs with theirs and what action we propose. They are impatient with those who desire peace by any sort of compromise—deeply and indignantly impatient—but they will be equally impatient with us if we do not make it plain to them what our objectives are and what we are planning for in seeking to make conquest of peace by arms.

I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this Thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we

can discuss peace—when the German people have spokesmen whose word we can believe and when those spokesmen are ready in the name of their people to accept the common judgment of the nations as to what shall henceforth be the bases of law and of covenant for the life of the world—we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly. We know what that price will be. It will be full, impartial justice—justice done at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect our enemies as well as our friends.

You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula "No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities." Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.

But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. Let it be said again that autocracy must first be shown the utter futility of its claims to power or leadership in the modern world. It is impossible to apply any standard of justice so long as such forces are unchecked and undefeated as the present masters of Germany command. Not until that has been done can Right be set up as arbiter and peacemaker among the nations. But when that has been done—as, God willing, it assuredly will be—we shall at last be free to do an unprecedented thing, and this is the time to avow our purpose to do it. We shall be free to base peace on generosity and justice, to the exclusion of all selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Our present and immediate task is to win the war, and nothing shall turn us aside from it until it is accomplished. Every power and resource we possess, whether of men, of money, or of materials, is being devoted and will continue

to be devoted to that purpose until it is achieved. Those who desire to bring peace about before that purpose is achieved I counsel to carry their advice elsewhere. We will not entertain it. We shall regard the war as won only when the German people say to us, through properly accredited representatives, that they are ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done. They have done a wrong to Belgium which must be repaired. They have established a power over other lands and peoples than their own—over the great Empire of Austria-Hungary, over hitherto free Balkan States, over Turkey, and within Asia—which must be relinquished.

Germany's success by skill, by industry, by knowledge, by enterprise we did not grudge or oppose, but admired, rather. She had built up for herself a real empire of trade and influence, secured by the peace of the world. We were content to abide the rivalries of manufacture, science, and commerce that were involved for us in her success and stand or fall as we had or did not have the brains and the initiative to surpass her. But at the moment when she had conspicuously won her triumphs of peace she threw them away, to establish in their stead what the world will no longer permit to be established, military and political domination by arms, by which to oust where she could not excel the rivals she most feared and hated. The peace we make must remedy that wrong. It must deliver the once fair lands and happy peoples of Belgium and northern France from the Prussian conquest and the Prussian menace, but it must also deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy.

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties.

And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire,

no interference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the life and very existence of their Empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candor as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are in fact fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with our own—from the fear as well as from the fact of unjust attack by neighbors or rivals or schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

The worst that can happen to the detriment of the German people is this, that if they should still, after the war is over, continue to be obliged to live under ambitious and intriguing masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, men or classes of men whom the other peoples of the world could not trust, it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace. That partnership must be a partnership of peoples, not a mere partnership of Governments. It might be impossible, also, in such untoward circumstances, to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of things sooner or later cure itself, by processes which would assuredly set in.

The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they can not and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards

of right and wrong, is the air all Governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusion will run with those tides.

All these things have been true from the very beginning of this stupendous war; and I can not help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs towards an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It can not be uttered too plainly or too often.

From every point of view, therefore, it has seemed to be my duty to speak these declarations of purpose, to add these specific interpretations to what I took the liberty of saying to the Senate in January. Our entrance into the war has not altered our attitude towards the settlement that must come when it is over. When I said in January that the nations of the world were entitled not only to free pathways upon the sea but also to assured and unmolested access to those pathways I was thinking, and I am thinking now, not of the smaller and weaker nations alone, which need our countenance and support, but also of the great and powerful nations, and of our present enemies as well as our present associates in the war. I was thinking, and am thinking now, of Austria herself, among the rest, as well as of Serbia and of Poland. Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them

candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient.

What shall we do, then, to push this great war of freedom and justice to its righteous conclusion? We must clear away with a thorough hand all impediments to success and we must make every adjustment of law that will facilitate the full and free use of our whole capacity and force as a fighting unit.

One very embarrassing obstacle that stands in our way is that we are at war with Germany but not with her allies. I therefore very earnestly recommend that the Congress immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary. Does it seem strange to you that this should be the conclusion of the argument I have just addressed to you? It is not. It is in fact the inevitable logic of what I have said. Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action. We shall go wherever the necessities of this war carry us but it seems to me that we should go only where immediate and practical considerations lead us and not heed any others.

The financial and military measures which must be adopted will suggest themselves as the war and its undertakings develop, but I will take the liberty of proposing to you certain other acts of legislation which seem to me to be needed for the support of the war and for the release of our whole force and energy.

It will be necessary to extend in certain particulars the legislation of the last session with regard to alien enemies; and also necessary, I believe, to create a very definite and particular control over the entrance and departure of all persons into and from the United States.

Legislation should be enacted defining as a criminal offense every willful violation of the presidential proclamations relating to alien enemies promulgated under section 4067 of the Revised Statutes and

providing appropriate punishments; and women as well as men should be included under the terms of the acts placing restraints upon alien enemies. It is likely that as time goes on many alien enemies will be willing to be fed and housed at the expense of the Government in the detention camps and it would be the purpose of the legislation I have suggested to confine offenders among them in penitentiaries and other similar institutions where they could be made to work as other criminals do.

Recent experience has convinced me that the Congress must go further in authorizing the Government to set limits to prices. The law of supply and demand, I am sorry to say, has been replaced by the law of unrestrained selfishness. While we have eliminated profiteering in several branches of industry it still runs impudently rampant in others. The farmers, for example, complain with a great deal of justice that, while the regulation of food prices restricts their incomes, no restraints are placed upon the prices of most of the things they must themselves purchase; and similar inequities obtain on all sides.

It is imperatively necessary that the consideration of the full use of the water power of the country and also the consideration of the systematic and yet economical development of such of the natural resources of the country as are still under the control of the federal government should be immediately resumed and affirmatively and constructively dealt with at the earliest possible moment. The pressing need of such legislation is daily becoming more obvious.

The legislation proposed at the last session with regard to regulated combinations among our exporters, in order to provide for our foreign trade a more effective organization and method of cooperation, ought by all means to be completed at this session.

And I beg that the members of the House of Representatives will permit me to express the opinion that it will be impossible to deal in any but a very wasteful and extravagant fashion with the enormous appropriations of the public moneys which must continue to be made, if the war is to be properly sustained, unless the House will consent to return to its former practice of initiating and preparing all appropriation bills through a single committee, in order that responsibility may be centered, expenditures standardized and made uniform, and waste and duplication as much as possible avoided.

Additional legislation may also become necessary before the present Congress again adjourns in order to effect the most efficient coordination and operation of the railway and other transportation systems of

the country; but to that I shall, if circumstances should demand, call the attention of the Congress upon another occasion.

If I have overlooked anything that ought to be done for the more effective conduct of the war, your own counsels will supply the omission. What I am perfectly clear about is that in the present session of the Congress our whole attention and energy should be concentrated on the vigorous, rapid, and successful prosecution of the great task of winning the war.

We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purposes of the Central Powers strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the Union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty.

It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free peoples of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we enter the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired.

I have spoken plainly because this seems to me the time when it is most necessary to speak plainly, in order that all the world may know that even in the heat and ardor of the struggle and when our whole thought is of carrying the war through to its end we have not forgotten any ideal or principle for which the name of America has been held in honor among the nations and for which it has been our glory to contend in the great generations that went before us. A supreme moment of history has come. The eyes of the people

have been opened and they see. The hand of God is laid upon the nations. He will show them favor, I devoutly believe, only if they rise to the clear heights of his own justice and mercy.

PROCLAMATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER TROTSKY ON THE ARMISTICE AND URGING ALLIED PARTICIPATION AND A STATEMENT OF WAR AIMS.[1]

December 6, 1917

Today, December 6, The People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has sent to all the Allied Embassies and Legations the following note:

The negotiations opened by the delegates of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria on the one side, and the delegates of Russia on the other side, have been interrupted, on the initiative of our delegation, for a week, with the purpose of providing the opportunity, during this period, of informing the peoples and Governments of the Allied countries on the existence of such negotiations and on their tendency.

On Russia's part it has been arranged to declare that the proposed armistice has for its object the preparation of a peace on a democratic basis as expressed in the manifesto by the All-Russian Soviet Congress.

The armistice can be signed only under the conditions that the troops will not be sent from one front to another, and that the Islands of the Moon Sound must be cleared by Germans.

Concerning the aims of the war the enemy delegates evaded a definite reply.

Indicating that they had been authorized to negotiate exclusively on the military side of the (proposed?) armistice, the delegates of the opposite side declined on the ground that they did not possess powers for deciding a general armistice with the countries whose delegates are not taking part in the conference.

The delegates of the opposite side proposed, in their turn, an armistice on the front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, the duration of this armistice to be twenty-eight days.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, December 8, 1917, p. 9.

At the same time the delegates of the opposite side promised to transmit to their respective Governments the proposal made by the Russian delegation to invite all belligerent countries (that is, all Allied countries, except Russia) to take part in the negotiations.

Our delegation refused to sign at this stage of the negotiations a formal armistice, and it was decided again to suspend all hostile activities for a week and to interrupt for the same period the negotiations on an armistice.

As a result, a period of over one month will exist between the first decree of November 8 by the Council's authority concerning peace and the moment of the continuation of the peace negotiations on December 12. This period is, even for the present disturbed state of international communications, amply sufficient to afford the Allied Governments the opportunity to define their attitude towards the peace negotiations, that is, their willingness or their refusal to take part in the negotiations for an armistice and peace.

In the case of a refusal they must declare clearly and definitely before all mankind the aims for which the peoples of Europe may have to lose their blood during a fourth year of war.

L. TROTSKY,
People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

OFFICIAL ROUMANIAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ARMISTICE WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS[1]

December 6, 1917

The Russian command having proposed an armistice to the enemy and to the Roumanian troops forming part of this front, it was decided that the Roumanian troops should associate themselves with this proposition. As a consequence hostilities were suspended at 8 o'clock on the whole of the front.

The enemy's troops loudly manifested their satisfaction and en-

[1] Text in *The New York Times,* December 8, 1917, p. 1. This truce was made permanent on December 9, as is related by the Roumanian *communiqué* of December 10, viz., "An armistice has been signed with the enemy, in consequence of which hostilities were suspended at 10.30 p. m. on the 9th inst. until further notice"; see *The Times,* London, December 13, 1917, p. 8. Roumania began negotiations for a separate peace about the middle of January; see *The New York Times,* January 30, 1918, p. 1.

deavored to approach the Roumanian network system. The Roumanian troops maintained a reserved and dignified attitude and rejected every attempt at fraternization.

SPEECH OF FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON AND ON WAR AIMS[1]

December 7, 1917

Eminent Hungarian party leaders have addressed questions to me which I should like, as far as possible, to answer immediately. Count Andrassy asked whether and how far we are at one with Germany in our war aims. I can answer this question positively. We are at one with Germany on the basis of a defensive war, which was laid down in the German Reichstag as the guiding line for our war aims, and which Herr von Kühlmann exactly stated when he said: "There is no other obstacle to peace than Alsace-Lorraine." Of course when we compare our situation with that of our German allies we should not forget one thing—that in certain respects we are in a better position than they are; we have practically our entire territory in our hands, whereas Germany's colonies are today in the hands of the enemy.

When I am now reproached with weakness in my policy, which is said to be in tow of Germany, when it is said that this policy forces us to continue the war longer than would otherwise be the case, and that we are even forced to fight for German aims of conquest, I say emphatically—No. We are fighting for the defense of Germany just as Germany is fighting for our defense. In this respect I know no territorial boundaries. If anyone should ask whether we are fighting for Alsace-Lorraine I would reply—Yes; just as Germany is fighting for us. I know of no difference between Strassburg and Trieste. If on other fronts big events should occur, then I should heartily welcome the moment that I found us fighting on other fronts together with our allies. If, therefore, after the course which we have taken since the outbreak of the war, and which we are pursuing with the full consent of the overwhelming majority of Austria as well as of Hungary, there should still be people on the side of the Entente living under the impression that they might succeed in separating us

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, December 10, 1917, p. 7.

from our allies, I say that they are bad politicians and persons of childish mind.

Before the war Italy might have negotiated with us, because we were greatly interested in avoiding this unnecessary war. Italy could have concluded an agreement with us which today even in her wildest dreams she can hardly hope to attain. Since then Italy has lost hundreds of thousands of dead, milliards in treasure, and large tracts of her territory. At the most Italy can today only hope to reach the *status quo ante bellum.*

If Italy wantonly continues the war she will later get a bad peace. I have one aim—namely, the speediest possible conclusion of an honorable peace, but at the same time I refuse to give our enemies a premium on the prolongation of the war.

. . . . . .

The speech by President Wison is in many respects incomprehensible, but it contains a noteworthy step forward. In one passage the President said: "We owe it to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands in all matters, great or small." If we compare this conception with that of the Entente regarding the monarchy—described by the catchword, the right of the nations to govern themselves—I see in it a great and important advance, which it is greatly to our interest to nail down.

The Entente really believe that the assistance of America will be on a great scale, and they expect from it a turning-point in the war, but it is possible that the Entente are mistaken. It is very easy to speak of transporting an army of millions from America to Europe, but whether such plans can be realized remains to be proved. The military authorities consider it out of the question.

As to Russia's peace efforts, the Entente will make every effort to thwart them. I am convinced that great obstacles will arise which we must overcome. We desire an immediate and, if possible, a general peace. We shall not attempt to separate Russia from her former allies, but the road to a general peace can surely lead only through Russia, because Russia is the only State inclined toward peace. We demand neither annexations nor indemnities. If Russia really desires peace, and there is no doubt she does, then she will be able to make her standpoint clear to the Entente.

CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE UNITED STATES[1]

December 7, 1917

Joint Resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government and the Government and the people of the United States, and making provision to prosecute the same.

Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a state of war is hereby declared to exist between the United States of America and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

CHAMP CLARK,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
THOMAS R. MARSHALL,
Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate.

Approved, December 7, 1917.
WOODROW WILSON.

ADDRESS OF MR. ASQUITH ON WAR AIMS AND PEACE TERMS[2]

December 11, 1917

. . . . . .

Has it been, is it, worth while? some people will ask. It is certainly a question that will be put by history. My answer is, without

[1] Text as issued by the State Department.
[2] Text in *The Times,* London, December 12, 1917, p. 9.

doubt or hesitation: Yes—subject only to one condition, that the war ends in a peace which secures the attainment of our original purposes and which contains in itself the safeguards of its own permanence. Such a peace, as I have said more than once, has become the supreme and dominating need of the world, and there is no greater enemy of the human race at this moment than the man, if there be such a man, who by word or act makes it more difficult to achieve.

As to these purposes, I have in two speeches this autumn, at Leeds and Liverpool, set out in positive and concrete form what I conceive them to be. I have nothing to take away from what I then said, and I am glad to observe that President Wilson in his recent address to Congress arrives by very nearly the same route practically at the same conclusion. It may therefore be of advantage if, without either repeating or qualifying what I have said before, I say something tonight of what, in my view, our war and peace aims are not.

Here I must interject one or two words—they shall be very few—on an event which has caused a good deal of commotion both here and abroad—the publication of Lord Lansdowne's letter. During the whole of my political life, up to the outbreak of the war, Lord Lansdowne has been one of the doughtiest and most formidable opponents of my party and, after I became its leader, of myself. I learned in the Coalition Government, where he was a most loyal and weighty colleague, to appreciate at first hand the value of his counsels and the ardor of his patriotism. I had no more knowledge than any member of the Government of his letter until I saw it in the Press, and I have no responsibility, direct or indirect, for its terms.

But I must confess that much of the criticism which has been passed upon it—I do not, of course, refer to such temperate and restrained comments as those of my right honorable friend who sits here, Mr. Austen Chamberlain—appears to me to arise from reading into it meanings and intentions which I do not understand it to convey. If Lord Lansdowne had suggested that we should slacken our prosecution of the war, or abandon the cause of one or more of our Allies; or indicate to enemies, who have so far steadily refused to state, or even to hint, their terms, that we are ready to sue for peace—and I have seen all these interpretations put upon his letter either at home or in other countries—there are few among us who would not dissociate themselves from any such proposals. But I take the stress of his main argument—apart from subsidiary points—to be this:

that the Allies, while pursuing the war with vigor and purpose, should endeavor to make it increasingly clear to the peoples of the world, both belligerent and neutral, that the only aims for which we are fighting are rational and unselfish in themselves, and are those for which we entered the war; and that by their attainment we are convinced that we may look for a durable peace, safeguarded by the conjoint authority of an international league. To use President Wilson's latest words, the aim is to bring into effective existence that "partnership, not merely of governments, but of peoples, which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace." Even now there is abundant evidence, not that the governments, but that the peoples of the enemy countries, are kept artificially in the dark as to our real purposes, both for war and for peace, and I for one shall continue to do what I can to raise the veil, and to let in, if it may be, some rays of light.

The first, and I believe by far the most dominating and persistent misconception of our aims, is that the ulterior, though unavowed, object of the Allies is not merely to vanquish, but to humiliate, to impoverish, and in the end to annihilate, as a factor in the future and fuller movement of humanity, Germany and the German people.

It has, of course, to be admitted that neither here nor in America has any such purpose ever been formulated or even suggested. I go back to my own summary of our aims at the Guildhall in November, 1914. I said then that we should not sheathe the sword until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.

"Prussian militarism"—what have we meant, and what do we mean, by that? I cite again President Wilson's latest word, which I think I have anticipated, but which I gladly and gratefully appropriate as ours no less than his: "No one is threatening the existence, the independence, the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire." Let me add that no one among the Allies seeks or presumes to prescribe the internal constitution and arrangements of the Germany of the future. It is a root principle of democracy that every organized people is the true, the authentic, the final, and the only responsible judge of its form of government. That is their own affair. What we of the rest of the world are concerned with is not a people but a system—a system which has used as its instrument first in Prussia, then in the rest of Germany, "that two-handed engine"—the military and the bureaucratic machines carefully and cunningly interlocked.

It is that system which has enthroned Force as the sovereign

authority; which has held itself at liberty, in the pursuit of its supposed interests, to falsify, to deride, or to supersede (according to the exigencies of the hour) the most solemn pacts, which claims in effect a more than Pontifical power of self-absolution from the engagements and restraints which safeguard the rights of the peoples of the world. It is this that must come to an end. Germany must learn, as we believe that she is learning, that as a matter of business (apart from sentiment and apart from ethics) the system does not pay. We have not, and we do not desire to have, any quarrel internecine and perpetual with the German nation. We acknowledge the contribution which they have made, and we believe will continue to make, to the common stock of knowledge, of research, of invention, of material and intellectual resource. But if there is to be a pact, a real pact, an enduring pact, it must be something more than a paper document written in ink and sealed with wax. It must rest upon authentic proof that the German people are as ready as we are to set up the rule of common and equal right, as not only technically sovereign, but as, in fact, by means of appropriate and effective sanctions, the controlling authority in the world.

Another, and an equally radical misconception is that the Allies, and especially Great Britain, are aiming at the destruction, for their own political and economic objects, of what is vaguely called the "freedom of the seas." I have sought in vain for any exact, or even approximate, definition of the meaning of the phrase. No one disputes that in time of peace the seas are and must continue to be open to the maritime marine of all the nations of the world. What stipulation is it, or can it be suggested, that Great Britain, for instance, would propose to embody in the terms of peace which could curtail or fetter this natural and immemorial right? The formula therefore, if it has any relevance at all, can only be used to indicate some new limitation in time of war upon the belligerent rights of the Power which happens to have the command of the sea. No corresponding limitation is suggested for land warfare, where existing conventions of the most solemn character have been in this conflict systematically violated by the enemy.

There is, indeed, a sense in which it is well worth considering whether something ought not to be done to secure the "freedom of the seas." I mean, of course, the prosecution of the lawless and infamous submarine campaign, with its ruthless sacrifice of innocent life, which has compelled us to arm our merchantmen, and has exposed not only belligerents but neutrals to hazards and outrages

hitherto unknown in the annals of naval war. I do not think that we are likely to hear very much more from enemy lips of the "freedom of the seas."

Finally, under this head, there is the accusation that the peace which we have in view is to be a blind and a disguise for the continuance of the war under another name. In my judgment, and I hope in yours, no peace will be worth the name which, although it involved a suspension of hostilities and the laying down of arms, permitted or contemplated what I called the other day a "veiled war" to be carried on by other methods, but none the less in a belligerent spirit. I have asserted, and shall continue to assert, as strongly as any man, our rights to use all legitimate methods, economic as well as military, to secure our main purpose, and to bring about such a lasting and fruitful peace as the world needs. The position of the Allies in that matter is stated with perfect lucidity by President Wilson in his recent address, and I respectfully subscribe to and endorse the language which he has used. But when the object is accomplished "We shall be free," as he well and wisely says, "to base peace on generosity and justice to the exclusion of selfish claims to advantage even on the part of the victors."

A clean peace. That is what the people of this country and all the Allied peoples desire. And that it may be attained—nothing more, but nothing less—they are unflinching in their resolve and in their willingness to go on making necessary efforts and sacrifices.

ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE ON WAR AIMS[1]

December 14, 1917

. . . . . .

Recently a highly respected nobleman, who has rendered distinguished service to the State in many spheres, startled the nation by a letter which gave rise to very considerable apprehension on the part of those whose main anxiety is that this war should terminate in an upright and enduring peace and not in a humiliating surrender. I now understand that all our anxieties as to this epistle were ground-

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, December 15, 1917, p. 7.

less, that Lord Lansdowne had not intended in the least to convey the meaning which his words might reasonably bear; that all the time he was in complete agreement with President Wilson, and only meant to say exactly the same thing as the American President said in his recent great speech to Congress. Now the government are in full agreement with that speeech. Mr. Asquith, I am not surprised to see, is also in agreement with it. The British nation is undoubtedly in agreement with it, and as Lord Lansdowne has also declared that he agrees with it, things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. I therefore take it that the interpretation placed on Lord Lansdowne's letter, not merely by strong supporters of the Allied case, but also by its opponents, in this country, in America, and in France, and now also, I observe, in Germany and in Austria, was not in the least that which Lord Landsdowne desired to give to it. I do not desire to force a controversy if none exists, for national unity is essential to success. But I might be forgiven for saying that if Lord Lansdowne simply meant to say exactly the same thing as President Wilson, it is a great misfortune that he did not carry out that intention. I was attending the Allied Conference in Paris at the time that his letter appeared. It was received there with painful amazement. However, it is satisfactory to know that Lord Lansdowne was misunderstood both by his friends and by his critics, and that the whole weight of his authority and influence may be reckoned on the side of the enforcement of what I call the Wilson policy.

I shall therefore pass on from this letter to the view which it was supposed to advocate but did not, to the opinions which are held and expressed by a number of people in this country. It is true they are in a minority, but they are a very active minority, and they busy themselves insidiously, persistently, skilfully, impressing these views on the people. The Lansdowne letter brought them out into the open. They thought that at last they had discovered a leader, and there is no doubt that they were prepared to take action with a view to forcing this country into a premature and vanquished peace. The danger is not the extreme pacifist. I am not afraid of him. But I warn the nation to watch the man who thinks that there is a halfway house between victory and defeat. There is no halfway house between victory and defeat. These are the men who think that you can end the war now by some sort of what they call pact of peace, by the setting up of a League of Nations with conditions as to arbitration in the event of disputes, with provisions for disarmament, and with a solemn covenant on the part of all nations to sign a treaty on those

lines, and not merely to abide by it themselves, but to help to enforce it against any nation that dares to break it.

That is the right policy after victory. Without victory it would be a farce. Why, we are engaged in a war because an equally solemn treaty was treated as a scrap of paper. Who would sign the new treaty? I presume, among others, the people who have so far successfully broken the last. Who would enforce the new treaty? I presume that they would be the nations that have so far not quite succeeded in enforcing the last. To end the war entered on, to enforce a treaty without reparation for the infringement of that treaty, merely by entering into a new, a more sweeping and a more comprehensive treaty, would be, indeed, a farce in the setting of a tragedy. We must take care not to be misled with mere words—"league of nations," "arbitration," "security." They are all great and blessed phrases. But without the vitalizing force of victory they are nothing but words. You can not wage war with words.

You can not secure peace with words. You can not long cover defeat with words. Unless there are deeds behind them, they are but dead leaves which the first storm will scatter and reveal your strangled and abandoned purpose to the world.

We ought never to have started unless we meant, at all hazards, to complete our task. There is nothing so fatal to character as half-finished tasks. I can understand, although I can not respect, the attitude of the man—and there are a few—who said from the first, "Do not interfere, whatever happens." When you said to them, "Supposing the Prussians overrun Belgium?" their answer was, "Let them overrun Belgium." If you said, "We promised solemnly to protect Belgium against all invaders and we ought to stand by our word," they replied, "We ought never to have given our word." If you said to them, "What if the Germans trample in the mire our friends and neighbors, the free Republic of France?" they answered, "That is not our business." If you asked, "What if they murder innocent people, old and young, male and female, burn cities and ravage and outrage before your eyes?" in effect they said, "Let them perpetrate every crime in the calendar so long as it is not done in our land. What concern is it of ours? Are we our brothers' keepers? Let us not meddle and provoke anger which might disturb our serenity and our comfort." In fact, as one leading journalist put it with shameless candor, "Let us rather profit by manufacturing goods for both sides; for the assassins as well as for the survivors among our friends."

That is not an exalted line to take, but it is a definite and clear line of action, intelligible in consciences of a certain quality. "Ourselves first, ourselves last, ourselves all the time, and ourselves alone." It is pretty mean, but there are in every country men built that way, and you must reckon with them in the world. But the man I can not comprehend is the sort of man who, when he first saw these outrages, called out, his generous soul aflame with righteous wrath, "In the name of Heaven let us leap in and arrest this infamy, and, if we fail, then at least let us punish the perpetrators so as to make it impossible for it to happen again." And having said all this and having helped to commit the nation to that career of honor, now before the task is nearly accomplished, he suddenly turns round and says: "I have had enough of this. It is time it should come to an end. Let us shake hands with the malefactor. Let us trade with him to our mutual advantage."

He is not to be asked for reparation for damage done. He need not even apologize. He is simply invited to enter into a bargain to join with you in punching the head of the next man who dares to imitate his villainies. And we are told that we can have peace now on these terms. Germany has said so, Austria has said so, the Pope has said so. It must, therefore, be true. Of course, it is true. Why should they refuse peace on such terms? Especially as it would leave them with some of the richest provinces and fairest cities of Russia in their pockets. There are distinguished judges present. They are often called on to administer justice for offenses not unlike those committed by Prussia. It is true that rarely have they had before them a criminal who, in his own person, has committed all these offenses—murder, arson, rape, burglary, fraud, piracy. Supposing next time they try such a case and are tired out by the insistence of the prisoner's advocate, they were to turn to the offender and say, "This is a profitless business. We are wasting a good deal of money and valuable time. I am weary of it. I want to get back to more useful work. If I let you off now without any punishment beyond that which is necessarily entailed in the expenses which you have been put in defending your honor, will you promise me to help the police to catch the next burglar? If you agree to these terms I propose to enroll you now as a special constable. I will now formally put on your armlet, and, by the way, if you leave me your address I will promise to cement the good feeling which I wish to prevail in future between us, to deal at your store without further inquiry as to where, or how, you got the goods. I might add that you need

not worry to return the stuff you stole from your next-door neighbor on your right, as I understand he has withdrawn his claim to restoration."

Now, what do you think would be the effect on crime? It is idle to talk of security to be won by such feeble means. There is no security in any land without certainty of punishment. There is no protection for life, property, or money in a State where the criminal is more powerful than the law. The law of nations is no exception, and, until it has been vindicated, the peace of the world will always be at the mercy of any nation whose professors have assiduously taught it to believe that no crime is wrong so long as it leads to the aggrandizement and enrichment of the country to which they owe allegiance. There have been many times in the history of the world criminal States. We are dealing with one of them now. And there will always be criminal States until the reward of international crime becomes too precarious to make it profitable, and the punishment of international crime becomes too sure to make it attractive.

Let there be no doubt as to the alternatives with which we are confronted. One of them is to make easy terms with the triumphant outlaw, as men are driven to in order to buy immunity in lands where there is no authority to enforce law. That is one course. It means abasing ourselves in terror before lawlessness. It means, ultimately, a world intimidated by successful bandits. The other is to go through with our divine task of vindicating justice, so as to establish a righteous and everlasting peace for ourselves and for our children. Surely no nation with any regard for its interests, for its self-respect, for its honor, can hesitate a moment in its choice. Victory is an essential condition for the security of a free world. All the same, intensely as I realize that, if I thought things would get no better the longer you fought not merely would there be no object in prolonging the war, but to do so would be infamous. Wantonly to sacrifice brave lives, nay, to force brave men to endure for one profitless hour the terrible conditions of this war merely because statesmen had not the courage to face the obloquy which would be involved in agreeing to an unsatisfactory peace, would be a black crime when we remember what we owe to these gallant men. It is because I am firmly convinced that, despite some untoward events, despite discouraging appearances, we are making steady progress towards the goal which we set in front of us in 1914 that I would regard peace overtures to Prussia, at the very moment when the Prussian military spirit is

drunk with boastfulness as a betrayal of the great trust with which my colleagues and I have been charged.

Much of the progress we are making may not be visible except to those whose business it is to search out the facts. The victories of Germany are all blazoned forth to the world. Her troubles appear in no press *communiqués* or wireless messages, but we know something of these. The deadly grip of the British Navy is having its effect, and the valor of our troops is making an impression which in the end will tell. We are laying, surely, the foundation of the bridge which, when it is complete, will carry us into the new world. The river is, for the moment, in spate, and some of the scaffolding has been carried away, and much of the progress we have made seems submerged and hidden, and there are men who say, "Let us abandon the enterprise altogether, it is too costly. It is impracticable of achievement. Let us rather built a pontoon bridge of new treaties, league of nations, understandings." It might last you some time. It would always be shaky and uncertain. It would not bear much strain. It would not carry heavy traffic, and the first flood would sweep it away. Let us get along with the piledriving, and make a real, solid, permanent structure.

REPLY OF CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING TO MR. LLOYD-GEORGE'S SPEECH [1]

December 17, 1917

In his last speech Mr. Lloyd-George calls us criminals and bandits. As has already once been declared in the Reichstag, we do not intend to join in this renewal of the customs of the Homeric heroes. Modern wars are not won by invective, but are rather, perhaps, prolonged, because after this abuse by the English Prime Minister it is clear that it is out of the question for us to negotiate with men of such temper.

You know that it is only recently that I have become the head of the Imperial Government. My previous position, however, gave me the opportunity of following the foreign policy of my predecessors and that of Allied statesmen from a particularly good observation

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, December 18, 1917, p. 6.

post. And as a statesman and historian who has devoted a long life to the search for historical truths I can declare that the German conscience is clear. It was not we who brought about the murder at Serajevo. The Sukhomlinoff trial in Petrograd made absolutely clear what we knew from the end of July, 1914. It was the order for a general mobilization forced from the Czar Nicholas II by his unscrupulous counselors which forced on us a war on two fronts.

Just over a year has passed since we and our allies offered the enemy the hand of peace. It was rejected. Meanwhile our reply to the Papal note has again set forth our standpoint.

At this moment, when I have just received news that the truce which already existed between us and our Eastern neighbors has passed into a formal armistice, the speech of the British Prime Minister is before me. It is the answer of the present British Cabinet to the Papal note. Our way in the West is accordingly clear. It is not Mr. Lloyd-George who is the world-judge, but history. As on August 2, 1914, so also today we can look forward to its verdict with equanimity.

STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON PEACE TERMS[1]

December 20, 1917

Yesterday there was a very interesting discussion in this House on war aims. I read every word of it with very great interest. There was a good deal of criticism of Ministerial utterances by honorable members who took part in the discussion. Were they really merely seeking to criticize Ministers or were they trying to find out exactly what the war aims of the country are? I will tell honorable members why I say that. I am told I have never said anything which in the least traveled in the same direction as President Wilson. I failed to see in any speech delivered yesterday a single word about what I said at Glasgow.

I am going to take four or five points in that speech which I emphasized then, and which I think it is important should be kept at the front now. I ventured to speak about peace conditions and war

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, December 21, 1917, p. 8.

aims. What was the first? The first was a demand for the complete restoration of the national territories conquered by Germany and reparation for damage done. Who is prepared to challenge? Since Russia has entered into separate negotiations she alone must be responsible for the terms in respect of her own territory. I am speaking now of Belgium, Roumania, Serbia, and the other countries which have not entered into any separate negotiations and for which, therefore, we are completely responsible.

Of course the fact that Russia has entered into separate negotiations absolutely disposes of any criticism there may be about Constantinople. The second point which I emphasized then, as I do now, was one of the questions dwelt upon yesterday and the statement I had made was completely ignored, as to Mesopotamia and the German Colonies. Since then we have conquered most of the important colonies and the whole of East Africa. The same statement will cover what has been added since. These are the words I ventured to say then: "What will happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the Peace Conference when it meets, but there is one thing which will never happen, it will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk. At best he was the trustee of this far-famed land on behalf of civilization. Ah! What a trustee! He has been false to his trust, and the trusteeship must be given over to more competent and more equitable hands, chosen by the congress which will settle the affairs of the world. The same observation applies to Armenia—a land soaked with the blood of innocents massacred by the people who were bound to protect them."

That covers Mesopotamia. Now I come to the question of the German colonies, and this is the statement which I made then: "As to the German colonies, that is a matter which must be settled by the great international Peace Congress. Let me point out that our critics talk as if we had annexed lands peopled by Germans, as if we had subjected the Teutonic people to British rule. When you come to settle who shall be the future trustees of these uncivilized lands, you must take into account the sentiments of the people themselves. What confidence has been inspired in their untutored minds by the German rule of which they have had an experience, whether they are anxious to secure the return of the former masters, or whether they would rather trust their destinies to other and juster and—may I confidently say—gentler hands than those which have had the government of them up to the present time. The wishes, the desires, and the interests of the people of those countries must be the dominant factor

in settling their future government. That is the principle upon which we are proceeding.

I ask is it suggested that whether the Arabs wish to be returned to Turkish rule or not, even if they are anxious not to be, we should hand them back? Is it suggested that if the Armenians who have gone through terrorism and massacre pray not to be returned to future massacres, we should say to them in the interests of international morality and peace and good will amongst men—Go back? And as for the German colonies, about which tales are told which make you shudder, are you to say to these poor helpless people, begging and craving as they are doing not to be returned to German terrorism—are you to say to them now, "Yes, we will, whether you want it or not?" Is that the demand which is made? It is no use criticizing it unless we know what it is. What is it? The will of the people, the sentiments of the people amongst the whites in Europe you have to respect, but not amongst the poor blacks, not amongst the Arabs? Is that really what is to be said? What we have said is that the Peace Congress shall settle the matter, but it must settle it upon the principle of respecting the desires of the people themselves. That we laid down, and that we stand by now. We have conquered no country where the population belonged to the governing race. And I want the House and those who criticize to bear that in mind. We have annexed no country. We have overrun no country where the population belongs to the ruling race. Not one. In Mesopotamia, Palestine, Samoa, and other places, whether in the Southern seas, whether in the East or in the West, we have not conquered a single yard of territory where there is a German population.

Now I come to the other question. What is the condition which I ventured to lay down? The condition which has been laid down over and over again by everyone who has spoken on behalf of the Government in this country, including my right honorable friend opposite, is, "You must have security," and that is the most important thing of all. May I just repeat what I said then? I would not do it if it were not for the fact that last night again speaker after speaker said the Government had made no declaration. I made a declaration, and a considered declaration, after discussing the matter with my colleagues, and I stand by it now. I said: "What are to be the guarantees? Peace must be guaranteed first of all by the conditions of peace. That is they shall be framed upon so equitable a basis that nations will not wish to disturb them." Does anyone challenge that? What is the second guarantee?

"They must be guaranteed by the destruction of the Prussian military power." What is the third? "A better guarantee than either would have been the democratization of the German Government. No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form of government they shall have. That is a matter entirely for themselves. But it is right that we should say we could enter into negotiations with a free Government with a different attitude of mind, temper, and spirit, with less suspicion, with more confidence, than we could with a Government whom we knew to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism, and the Allied Governments would in my judgment act wisely if they made that distinction in their general attitude in the discussion of terms of peace."

Is that changed? I said that six or seven months ago. There has been no response either from Germany or even from pacifists in this country. May I say this—that the third condition with regard to the democratization of Germany goes to the very root of this. Why were the Allies forced into the war? Certainly not for territorial aggrandizement. No one believes it. Did Russia want any territory from Austria or Germany when she went into this war? What did we enter into the war for? Does anyone believe that my noble friend Lord Grey's one motive when he came to advise the Government upon the subject of peace or war was to sacrifice millions of lives in order to annex German colonies? Who believes it, and who dares say it? Then let us get rid of that idea. When we entered this war we may have been right or we may have been wrong, but at any rate we did not enter this war to annex a yard of anybody else's territory. We entered into the war because we believed that the honor of Britain was involved in standing by her word.

But what brought the war about? Does anyone doubt, who has read the whole history, that the restless, and vicious, arrogant military caste of Prussia determined to force their dictation and domination over Europe, and through Europe over the world? They planned and they plotted for years for this war. They were even prepared, and everybody in Germany knew it, to overthrow their own ruler in order to set up another ruler who was more in sympathy with their ambitious designs. It was common talk in Germany, and there were pamphlets on the subject circulated throughout Prussia and the whole of Germany. They repeatedly tried to force war on Russia, and Russia purchased peace once or twice at the price of humiliation. They tried to force war on France. Has anyone taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the temper of the military caste?

We all know the Zabern history. Only yesterday a British general gave me an instance, which had happened in this country, which is an illustration of what we are up against and what we are fighting against. A Prussian officer, who is interned, strolled into an engine house, where he had no business to be. The engineer ordered him out. He took no notice of it, but answered him in German. The engineer said, "You have no business here, and I must request you to leave." Then the officer said, "I am not going to take any orders from you." The engineer then took him by the coat, not roughly, and began to take him out, and the German hit him in the face. The point I want to put is this: You are dealing now with the temper which has made this war. The point I wish to come to is the defense which was made by this officer when he was put on his trial. Here it is in the report: "Furthermore, according to German military law, I have the right, in the event of any interference by civilians, to have recourse to arms." That meant, if he had had a sword he would have had a right to run the man through, and he would have done it. That was what happened in Zabern. Now translate that into terms of international relation. Britain was a civilian nation until this war began. The civilian nation says: "You have no business in Belgium, you go out," and Germany says, "How dare you? By the German military law I have the right to use arms against you and run you through for attempting to interfere." That is the temper that has made the war, and until you break that you will never get peace in this world. That is why, when we say—whether it is President Wilson or my right honorable friend, Mr. Asquith, or myself—that victory is an essential condition. It is not because it satisfies some low vindictive sense in human nature, because you want merely to punish, but it is because we realize that victory is the only thing that will give reality to peace terms. A league of nations in which Germany is represented by that military caste triumphant would be a hollow farce, but the people of Germany must be there, and that is why victory in itself is more important than mere terms. Victory alone will give reality to it, and that is also the reason why the government after mature reflection have decided to go first to the trade unions and afterwards to the House of Commons to ask them to equip us with greater powers to enable us to increase the means of victory.

STATEMENT OF COUNT CZERNIN AT BREST-LITOVSK OF THE TERMS ON WHICH THE CENTRAL POWERS WERE WILLING TO CONCLUDE A GENERAL PEACE[1]

December 25, 1917

The delegations of the allied Powers, acting upon the clearly expressed will of their governments and the peoples, will conclude as soon as possible a general peace. The delegations, in complete accord with the repeatedly expressed viewpoint of their governments, think that the basic principles of the Russian delegation can be made the basis of such a peace.

The delegations of the Quadruple Alliance are agreed immediately to conclude a general peace without forcible annexations and indemnities. They share the view of the Russian delegation, which condemns the continuation of the war purely for aims of conquest.

The statesmen of the allied Governments in programs and statements have emphasized time and again that for the sake of conquest they will not prolong the war a single day. The Governments of the allies unswervingly have followed this view all the time. They solemnly declare their resolve immediately to sign terms of peace which will stop this war on the above terms, equally just to all belligerents without exception.

It is necessary, however, to indicate most clearly that the proposals of the Russian delegation could be realized only in case all the Powers participating in the war obligate themselves scrupulously to adhere to the terms, in common with all peoples.

The Powers of the Quadruple Alliance now negotiating with Russia can not, of course, one-sidedly bind themselves to such terms, not having the guarantee that Russia's allies will recognize and carry out these terms honestly without reservation with regard to the Quadruple Alliance. Starting upon these principles, and regarding the six clauses proposed by the Russian delegation as a basis of negotiations, the following must be stated:

Clause 1. Forcible annexations of territories seized during the war does not enter into the intention of the allied Powers. About troops now occupying seized territories, it must be stipulated in the peace treaty, if there is no agreement before, regarding the evacuation of these places.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, December 28, 1917, p. 2.

Clause 2. It is not the intention of the allies to deprive of political independence those nations which lost it during the war.

Clause 3. The question of subjection to that or the other country of those nationalities who have not political independence can not, in the opinion of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, be solved internationally. In this case it must be solved by each Government, together with its peoples, in a manner established by the Constitution.

Clause 4. Likewise, in accordance with the declaration of statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance, the protection of the rights of minorities constitutes an essential component part of the constitutional rights of peoples to self-determination. The allied Governments therefore grant validity to this principle everywhere in so far as it is practically realizable.

Clause 5. The allied Powers have frequently emphasized the possibility that both sides might renounce not only indemnification for war costs, but also indemnification for war damages. In these circumstances, every belligerent power would have only to make indemnification for expenditures for its nationals who have become prisoners of war, as well as for damage done in its own territory by illegal acts of force committed against civilian nationals belonging to the enemy. The Russian Government's proposal for the creation of a special fund for this purpose could be taken into consideration only if the other belligerent Powers were to join in the peace negotiations within a suitable period.

Clause 6. Of the four allied Powers, Germany alone possesses colonies. On the part of the German delegation, in full accord with the Russian proposals regarding that, the following is declared:

The return of colonial territories forcibly seized during the war constitutes an essential part of German demands, which Germany can not renounce under any circumstances. Likewise, the Russian demand for immediate evacuation of territories occupied by an adversary conforms to German intentions. Having in view the nature of the colonial territories of Germany, the realization of the right of self-determination, besides the above outlined considerations, in the form proposed by the Russian delegation is at present impossible.

The circumstance that in the German colonies the natives, notwithstanding the greatest difficulties and the improbability of victory in a struggle against an adversary many times stronger and who had the advantage of unlimited import by sea, remaining in the gravest circumstances faithful to their German friends, may serve as a proof of their attachment and their resolve by all means to preserve allegiance

to Germany, proof which by its significance and weight is far superior to any expression of popular will.

The principles of economic relations proposed by the Russian delegation in connection with the above six clauses are approved wholly by the delegations of the allied Powers, who always have denied any economic restrictions and who see in the reestablishment of regulated economic relations, which are in accord with the interests of all people concerned, one of the most important conditions for bringing about friendly relations between the Powers now engaged in war.

REPLY OF BELGIUM TO THE PAPAL PEACE NOTE[1]

December 27, 1917

VERY HOLY FATHER: I have taken note, with lively sympathy and interest, of the message your Holiness was good enough to send to the heads of the belligerent countries the 1st of August, and have hastened to submit it to my Government, which has studied it with most serious and deferential attention. The result of that study has been recorded in a note which I am happy to communicate to your Holiness.

In associating myself with the wishes of the Holy See that a just and durable peace may promptly put an end to the evils from which humanity, and particularly the Belgian people, so rudely tried, are suffering, I beg your Holiness to believe in my final and respectful attachment.

(Signed) ALBERT.

The Royal Government, as soon as it received the message of your Holiness to the heads of the belligerents, hastened to reply, that it would study with the greatest deference the propositions the document set forth in such elevating language.

At the same time it desired particularly to express its lively and profound gratitude for the particular interest the Holy Father manifested in the Belgian Nation, and of which the document was new and precious proof.

[1] Text furnished by the Belgian Official Information Service, Washington, D. C.

At the outset of his message the Holy Father took pains to declare he had forced himself to maintain perfect impartiality toward all the belligerents, which renders more significant the judgment of his Holiness when he concluded in favor of the total evacuation of Belgium and the reestablishment of its full independence, and also recognized the right of Belgium for reparation for damages and the cost of the war.

Already in his consistorial allocution of January 22, 1915, the Holy Father had proclaimed before the world that he reproved injustice, and he condescended to give the Belgian Government the assurance that in formulating that reprobation, it was the invasion of Belgium he had directly in view.

The honorable people of all countries will rejoice with the Belgian Government that the injustice of which Belgium was the victim and the necessity for reparation have been proclaimed, and that the highest moral authority of Christendom remains watchful amidst the passions and conflicts of men.

It was because of the gratitude felt on this account, which was augmented by the numerous charitable acts of the Holy Father in favor of so many Belgians, victims of the violence of the enemy, that the Royal Government has examined into the possibility of contributing in the measures depending upon it, toward the realization of the double desire which inspires the Pontifical message, to hasten the end of the present war and render a return of similar catastrophes impossible by the adoption of guarantees destined to assure the supremacy of right over force.

At the beginning of September the Royal Government informed his Holiness that it must reserve decision regarding its action on the propositions contained in the message until the Powers at war with Belgium had clearly made known their war aims. It added that in any case Belgium would make no pronouncement on general peace conditions and the reorganization of international relations excepting in full accord with the Powers guaranteeing its independence that have done honor to their obligations toward her, and whose aims fight with hers for the cause of right.

Nothing has modified the situation that existed at the moment the Royal Government made known that point of view to his Holiness. However, Belgium seizes eagerly the occasion furnished it by his Holiness to repeat before the civilized world what it wrote nearly a year ago to President Wilson:

"Before the German ultimatum Belgium aspired only to live on

good terms with all its neighbors. She practiced with scrupulous loyalty to each of them the duties imposed by this neutrality.

"How was she recompensed by Germany for the confidence she showed in her? If there is a country that has the right to say it took up arms to defend its existence, it assuredly is Belgium. She desires passionately that an end be brought to the unheard sufferings of its population, but she would have kept only a peace that would assure her at the same time the equitable reparation and security and guarantees for the future."

The integrity of Belgium, the territory of the mother country and colonies, political, economic, and military independence without condition or restriction, reparation for damage suffered, and guarantees against a renewal of the aggression of 1914—such remain the indispensable conditions of a just peace so far as concerns Belgium. Any settlement that would not recognize them would shake the very foundations of justice, since it would forevermore be established that in international domains the violation of right creates a claim for its author and may become a source of profit.

Since the Royal Government a year ago formulated its conditions, it permits itself to recall that the Reichstag voted resolutions called peace resolutions. Chancellors and Ministers of Foreign Affairs have followed each other in the German Empire, and more recently in the Central Empires, and have published notes replying to the message of his Holiness, but never a word has been pronounced and never a line written clearly recognizing the indisputable rights of Belgium, that his Holiness has not ceased to recognize and proclaim.

STATEMENT OF BRITISH WAR AIMS BY PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE[1]

January 5, 1918

When the Government invite organized labor in this country to assist them to maintain the might of their armies in the field, its representatives are entitled to ask that any misgivings and doubts which any of them may have about the purpose to which this precious strength is to be applied should be definitely cleared, and what is true

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, January 7, 1918, p. 7.

of organized labor is equally true of all citizens in this country without regard to grade or avocation.

When men by the million are being called upon to suffer and die and vast populations are being subjected to the sufferings and privations of war on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world, they are entitled to know for what cause or couses they are making the sacrifice. It is only the clearest, greatest, and justest of causes, that can justify the continuance even for one day of this unspeakable agony of the nations. And we ought to be able to state clearly and definitely not only the principles for which we are fighting but also their definite and concrete application to the war map of the world.

We have arrived at the most critical hour in the terrible conflict, and before any Government takes the fatal decision as to the conditions under which it ought either to terminate or continue the struggle, it ought to be satisfied that the conscience of the nation is behind these conditions, for nothing else can sustain the effort which is necessary to achieve a righteous end to this war. I have, therefore, during the last few days, taken special pains to ascertain the views and the attitude of representative men of all sections of thought and opinion in the country. Last week I had the privilege not merely of perusing the declared war aims of the Labor Party, but also of discussing in detail with the labor leaders the meaning and intention of that declaration. I have also had an opportunity of discussing the same momentous question with Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey. Had it not been that the Nationalist Leaders are in Ireland engaged in endeavoring to solve the tangled problem of Irish self-government, I should have been happy to exchange views with them, but Mr. Redmond, speaking on their behalf, with his usual lucidity and force, in many of his speeches, made clear what his ideas are as to the object and purpose of the war. I have also had the opportunity of consulting certain representatives of the great Dominions overseas. I am glad to be able to say as the result of all these discussions, that, although the government are alone responsible for the actual language I propose using, there is national agreement as to the character and purpose of our war aims and peace conditions, and in what I say to you today, and through you to the world, I can venture to claim that I am speaking not merely the mind of the government but of the nation and of the empire as a whole.

We may begin by clearing away some misunderstanding and stating what we are not fighting for. We are not fighting a war of aggres-

sion against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this date. Most reluctantly and, indeed, quite unprepared for the dreadful ordeal, we were forced to join in this war in self-defense, in defense of a violated public law of Europe and in vindication of the most solemn treaty obligations on which the public system of Europe rested, and on which Germany had ruthlessly trampled in her invasion of Belgium. We had to join in the struggle or stand aside and see Europe go under and brute force triumphant over public life and international justice. It was only the realization of that dreadful alternative that forced the British people into the war. And from that original attitude they have never swerved. They have never aimed at the break-up of the German peoples or the disintegration of their State or country. Germany has occupied a great position in the world. It is not our wish or intention to question or destroy that position for the future, but rather to turn her aside from hopes and schemes of military domination and to see her devote all her strength to the great beneficent tasks of the world. Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.

Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that in her the old spirit of military domination has indeed died in this war, and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. But, after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.

It is now more than a year since the President of the United States, then neutral, addressed to the belligerents a request that they should state clearly the aims for which they were fighting. We and our allies responded by the note of January 10, 1917.

To the President's appeal the Central Empires made no reply and, in spite of adjurations, both from their opponents and from neutrals, they have maintained a complete silence as to the objects for which they are fighting. Even on so crucial a matter as their intention with

regard to Belgium they have uniformly declined to give any trustworthy indication.

On December 25 last, however, Count Czernin, speaking on behalf of Austria-Hungary and her allies, did make a pronouncement of a kind. It is indeed deplorably vague. We are told that "it is not the intention" of the Central Powers "to appropriate forcibly" any occupied territories or "to rob of its independence" any nation which has lost its "political independence" during the war. It is obvious that almost any scheme of conquest and annexation could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge.

Does it mean that Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania would be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies as the Germans or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner of interferences and restrictions, political and economic, incompatible with the status or dignity of a free, self-respecting people, are to be imposed? If this is the intention then there will be one kind of independence for a great nation and an inferior kind of independence for a small nation. We must know what is meant, for an equality of right amongst nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country and her allies are fighting to establish in this war. Reparation for the wanton damage inflicted on Belgian towns and villages, and their inhabitants, is emphatically repudiated. The rest of the so-called "offer" of the Central Powers, is almost entirely a refusal of concessions. All suggestions about the autonomy of subject nationality are ruled out of the peace terms altogether. The question whether any form of self-government is to be given to the Arabs, Armenians, or Syrians, is declared to be entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte. A pious wish for the protection of minorities "in so far as it is practically realizable" is the nearest approach to liberty which the Central Powers' statesmen venture to make.

On one point only are they perfectly clear and definite. Under no circumstances will the "German demand" for the restoration of the whole of Germany's colonies be departed from. All principles of self-determination, or, as our earlier phrase goes, government by consent of the governed, here vanish into thin air.

It is impossible to believe that any edifice of permanent peace could be erected on such a foundation as this. Mere lip service to the formula of no annexation and no indemnities or the right of self-determination is useless. Before any negotiation can ever be begun, the Central Powers must realize the essential facts of the situation.

The days of the Treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer

submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators, striving to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation. The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared, at whatever sacrifice, to honor the national signature it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written.

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their allies has been the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. This is no demand for war indemnity such as was imposed on France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another which may or may not be defensible. It is no more and no less than an incident that before there can be any hope for stable peace, this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated, and, so far as possible, repaired. Reparation means recognition. Unless international life is recognized by insistence on payment for injury done in defiance of its canons, it can never be a reality. Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro and the occupied part of France, Italy, and Roumania. The complete withdrawal of the alien armies and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.

We mean to stand by the French Democracy to the death in the demand they make for reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century and until it is cured healthy conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national life.

I will not attempt to deal with the question of the Russian territories now in German occupation. The Russian policy since the Revolution has passed so rapidly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak without some suspension of judgment as to what the situation will be when the final terms of European peace come to be

discussed. Russia accepted the war with all its horrors because, true to her traditional guardianship of the weaker communities of her race, she stepped in to protect Serbia from a plot against her independence. It is this honorable sacrifice which not merely brought Russia into the war but France as well. France, true to the conditions of her treaty with Russia, stood by her ally in a quarrel which was not her own. Her chivalrous respect for her treaty led to the wanton invasion of Belgium; and the treaty obligations of Great Britain to that little land brought us into the war.

The present rulers of Russia are now engaged, without any reference to the country whom Russia brought into the war, in separate negotiations, with their common enemy. I am indulging in no reproaches; I am merely stating facts with a view to making it clear why Britain can not be held accountable for decisions taken in her absence and concerning which she has not been consulted or her aid invoked. No one who knows Prussia and her designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ultimate intention. Whatever phrases she may use to delude Russia, she does not mean to surrender one of the fair provinces, or cities, of Russia, now occupied by her forces. Under one name or another—and the name hardly matters—these Russian provinces will henceforth be in reality a part of the dominions of Prussia. They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the interests of Prussian autocracy and the rest of the people of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases and partly bullied by the threat of continued war against an impotent army into a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany. We all deplore the prospect. The democracy of this country means to stand to the last by the democracies of France and Italy and all our other allies. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side with the new democracy of Russia, so will America and so will France and Italy, but if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people. We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe.

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it it is

impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace.

On the same ground we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Roumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. If these conditions are fulfilled Austria-Hungary would become a power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe instead of being merely an instrument to the pernicious military autocracy of Prussia that uses the resources of its allies for the furtherance of its own sinister purposes.

Outside Europe we believe that the same principles should be applied. While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish empire in the home lands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized—Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national condition.

What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.

Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our allies on this and on other subjects. I can only say that as new circumstances, like the Russian collapse, and the separate Russian negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our allies.

With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a conference whose decisions must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of those territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, in all these cases must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or governments. The natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members, and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal.

The general principle of national self-determination is therefore as

applicable in their cases as in those of occupied European territories. The German declaration that the natives of the German colonies have, through their military fidelity in the war, shown their attachment and resolve under all circumstances to remain with Germany, is applicable not to the German colonies generally, but only to one of them, and in that case (German East Africa) the German authorities secured the attachment, not of the native population as a whole which is and remains profoundly anti-German but only of a small warlike class from whom their Askaris, or soldiers, were selected. These they attached to themselves by conferring on them a highly privileged position as against the bulk of the native population which enabled these Askaris to assume a lordly and oppressive superiority over the rest of the natives. By this and other means they secured the attachment of a very small and insignificant minority whose interests were directly opposed to those of the rest of the population and for whom they have no right to speak. The German treatment of their native populations in their colonies has been such as amply to justify their fear of submitting the future of those colonies to the wishes of the natives themselves.

Finally there must be reparation for injuries done in violation of international law. The Peace Conference must not forget our seamen and the services they have rendered to and the outrages they have suffered for, the common cause of freedom.

One omission we notice in the proposal of the Central Powers which seems to us especially regrettable. It is desirable, and indeed essential, that the settlement after this war shall be one which does not in itself bear the seed of future war. But that is not enough. However wisely and well we may make territorial and other arrangements, there will still be many subjects of international controversy. Some indeed are inevitable.

The economic conditions at the end of the war will be in the highest degree difficult. Owing to the diversion of human effort to warlike pursuits, there must follow a world shortage of raw materials which will increase the longer the war lasts, and it is inevitable that those countries which have control of the raw materials will desire to help themselves and their friends first.

Apart from this, whatever settlement is made will be suitable only to the circumstances under which it is made, and, as those circumstances change, changes in the settlement will be called for.

So long as the possibility of dispute between nations continues, that is to say, so long as men and women are dominated by passion

and ambition and war is the only means of settling a dispute, all nations must live under the burden not only of having from time to time to engage in it, but of being compelled to prepare for its possible outbreak. The crushing weight of modern armaments, the increasing evil of compulsory military service, the vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation—these are blots on our civilization of which every thinking individual must be ashamed.

For these and other similar reasons, we are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes. After all, war is a relic of barbarism, and just as law has succeeded violence as the means of settling disputes between individuals, so we believe that it is destined ultimately to take the place of war in the settlement of controversies between nations.

If, then, if we are asked what we are fighting for, we reply, as we have often replied—we are fighting for a just and a lasting peace—and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for, three conditions must be fulfilled:

First—the sanctity of treaties must be established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war.

On these conditions the British Empire would welcome peace; to secure those conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.

TELEGRAM FROM PREMIER CLEMENCEAU TO PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE ENDORSING HIS STATEMENT OF JANUARY 5[1]

January 6, 1918

I hasten to send you my heartiest congratulations and those of all Frenchmen at the front and behind the front on the admirable speech in which you have so happily summarized the actual truths that we must never grow weary in affirming against German falsehoods.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, January 7, 1918, p. 8.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE DELIVERED AT A JOINT SESSION OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS[1]

January 8, 1918

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible bases of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace but also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They can not entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for

[1] Text in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan States which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the Resolutions of the German Reichstag of the ninth of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd-George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what it is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heart-felt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest and

for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act

the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We can not be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and

to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE ON THE FOURTEEN POINTS[1]

January 18, 1918

I have come here to thank you on behalf of the Government, and, I venture to say, on behalf of the country, for the spirit in which you have met the Government and its representatives. A spirit of complete frankness exists on both sides.

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What is the position? I assume that you all here in your hearts believe that the war ends declared by the great labor conference represents the minimum of justice which you can possibly accept as a settlement of this terrible dispute—the minimum. If we are not able to defeat the German forces, if we are not able to resist the military power of Prussia, is there any man here in possession of his wits who believes that one of your terms—the least of them—would be enforced? I am not talking about the demands of Imperialism. I am not talking about the demands of extreme war men who want to grab everything and annex the earth and the heavenly firmament. I am talking of the moderate demands of the most pacifist soul in this assembly. Go to von Hindenburg with them. Try to cash that check at the Hindenburg bank. It will be returned dishonored. Whatever terms are set forward by any pacifist orator in these lands, you will not get them cashed by Ludendorf or the Kaiser, or any of those great magnates—not one of them—unless you have got the power to enforce them.

I felt very strongly that the time had come for restating our war aims, and for restating them in a way that would carry with us all the moderate rational opinions of this land and of all other lands. Almost simultaneously the same idea came to President Wilson, and without any opportunity of previous consultation—because there was none—President Wilson and myself laid down what was substantially the same program of demands for the termination of this war. How has that program been received? Throughout the whole of the Allied land it has been received with acclaim. There has hardly been the voice of criticism except from a few men who wish I had made more extreme demands. The Socialists of France, the Socialists

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, January 19, 1918, p. 7.

of Italy, as well as the Socialists of this country have in the main accepted them as very fair general demands to put forward.

What has been their reception in Germany? I beg to consider this, especially those who think that we are responsible for perpetuating this horror. I would not have this war for a second on my soul if I could stop it honorably. What has been their reception in Germany? The only comment has been "behold how England is weakening! Go on and they will come down again." There has been no response from any man in any position in Germany that indicates a desire on the part of the ruling powers in that land to approach the problem in a spirit of equity. We demanded the restoration of Belgium. Is there one man here who would make peace without the complete restoration of Belgium and reparation for its wrongs? Is there one man; I would like to see him stand up. Is there one man who would do it? What is the answer from Germany? There has been but one answer and it has come from von Tirpitz's soul. "Never." There was a demand for a reconsideration of the wrong of Alsace-Lorraine. What is the answer from Germany? "Never." When I suggested that Mesopotamia and Palestine should never be restored to the tyranny of the Turk whatever else happened to them, what was the answer of Germany? "We will go on until they are restored."

Is there a single condition laid down by you in your trade union aims to which you have had any response from anybody in Germany who has got any authority to speak? Not one. I will tell you another fact which is very significant. There has been no civilian answer at all. I spoke here a fortnight ago. President Wilson's speech was delivered a few days after that. Both speeches have been thoroughly discussed in the German papers, but no civilian minister has said a word. There have been conferences hurriedly called together. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorf were brought back from their armies in a great hurry to Berlin, but Herr Kühlmann has not been allowed to speak. Why? If it means anything it means this. That the Prussian military power is dominant. The answer which is to be given to civilization is an answer which will be given from the cannon's mouth.

. . . . . .

Now I should like to ask you this. I have suggested it before. If we were not prepared to fight, what sort of terms do you think we would get from von Hindenburg? If you sent a delegation to him I know the answer. If you said to him, "We want you to clear out of

Belgium," I know his answer. He would just mock you. He would say in his heart "You can not turn me out of Belgium with trade union resolutions." No, but I will tell you the answer which you can give him. "We can and will turn you out of Belgium with trade union guns and trade unionists behind them." They have broken his line already and if we endure with the spirit of our fathers and the spirit that has made the greatness of this land, that has made its power, its prestige and its honor, that has made it great in the past and will make it greater in the future—if we do that we shall yet be able to carry to conviction, to carry to triumph, carry to reality, carry as an essential part of the story of this world, the great aims that you in your own language, that the government in their language, and that President Wilson in his noble language have been proclaiming in the last few days.

A DELEGATE. Did not the Prime Minister think it was advisable to enter into negotiations with the Germans when they were alleged to be whining and squealing for peace?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. The Germans have always been ready for peace at their own price, but that is not a price we are prepared to pay them. We have not been prepared to pay it in the past, and we are not prepared to pay it now. That, I am confident, is the opinion of the people of this country. The moment the Germans show a disposition to negotiate peace on equitable terms—the terms have been stated, and they are terms which the Labor Party itself in substance adopted, then there will be no reluctance to enter into peace negotiations.

A DELEGATE. Is not the best way to get at the opinion of the German people to allow representatives of this nation to meet representatives of the other Powers at Stockholm or elsewhere?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. The representatives of the German nation would, of course, be chosen by the German Government. (A DELEGATE. Not necessarily.) Believe me, do not let us really deceive ourselves with an illusion. You can only make peace with a Government. If the Government does not represent the people of Germany let them change their Government, and if this Government does not represent the people of this country, they can change it. (A DELEGATE. Give us an opportunity). We have given you the best opportunity that has been given for a long time, because this Government has introduced a franchise bill which has added eight millions to the electorate. You can have your opportunity any time you like it. It is not the Government which shrinks from it.

A DELEGATE. If the German people decide upon a similar Government to that which is now in existence in Russia, will this Government recognize their representatives?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. We will recognize the representatives of any Government set up by the German people whatever it is.

A DELEGATE. Do I understand the Prime Minister to state that the acceptance of the Allied terms of peace is a necessary condition of calling a peace conference, or am I to understand that it is the function of the peace conference to receive a statement of peace terms from each of the belligerents, and from those statements to plan a policy or scheme that all countries can listen to and give a decision upon it?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. It is a very difficult problem for any Government to decide the moment at which it is desirable to enter into a peace conference. You may enter into it at one moment and find you have put your head into a noose. That is a position which the responsible heads of the Governments in all these countries will have to consider very carefully. My own personal view is that it is not desirable to enter into a peace conference until you see that there is a fair chance of emerging out of it with a satisfactory settlement. I am firmly convinced from the attitude of the leaders of the German Government at the present moment, that if you entered the peace conference it would not result in anything like an equitable understanding. In that case it would aggravate matters instead of improving them. . . .

A DELEGATE. In President Wilson's speech there is a reference made to the freedom of the seas. I want to ask if the views expressed by President Wilson are the views of our Government or if not will the Prime Minister kindly let us know what are the views of the British Government

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. I want to know what "freedom of the seas" means. Does it mean freedom from submarines, and does it mean starvation for this country? After all we are in a very different position from America, or Germany or France, or any other continental country. We are an island and we must scrutinize with the very greatest care any proposal which might impair our ability to protect our lines of communication across the seas. "Freedom of the seas" is a very elastic term. There is a sense in which we would rejoice to accept it, but we must guard very carefully against any attempt to interfere with the capacity to protect our shores and our

shipping that has alone enabled us even to exist up to the present moment.

A DELEGATE. Will the Prime Minister state, in view of the declared unanimity of the Allies with the war aims of this Government, that steps to consolidate the respective war aims of America and the Allies will be taken in order to present a unified front to the Germans?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. I think there is a good deal to be said for that suggestion. We did hope to be able to do it at a great conference in Paris which was held about two months ago. Representatives of the Russian Government were coming over, but accidents happened to them meanwhile. The Government was turned out of office and there was a period of anarchy and confusion there and civil war, and at the time the conference was held, we had no one there to speak on behalf of Russia. It was quite impossible to attempt to coordinate the war aims of the Allies without having representatives of the Russian Government present, and that was the reason we did not enter upon the discussion. A good many of our difficulties arose from the demands which had been put forward by the previous Russian Government. Constantinople was the case in point. We could not have dropped Constantinople as a war aim without the assent of the Russian Government. I agree with our friend that if there were any doubt at all about the war aims of the Allies which have been stated by President Wilson and myself, it would be desirable that we should meet, but so far we have had nothing but complete assent.

A DELEGATE. Will the Prime Minister briefly explain what he means by the reconsideration of the position of Alsace-Lorraine?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. I stated the view of the Government, I think, last time. My view is that the people of this country will stand by the people of France. It is a question for them to decide. You must remember this is really not a question of territory to them. It has been a question of vital principle. It has been like an open sore in their side for nearly fifty years. They have never been able to live in peace during the whole of that time, and their view undoubtedly is that you can not have peace in France until you have settled this question once and forever. And if you can not have peace in France you can not have peace in Europe, and you must settle this question unless you are going to have a series of wars in Europe. Therefore, our view is that the people of France who are primarily concerned are the people who have to determine what they regard as fair, and in this

respect the determination of the Government is to stand by the democracy of France in their struggle.

A DELEGATE. Is it the people of France, or the people of Alsace-Lorraine who are complaining of how they are situated?

Mr. LLOYD-GEORGE. The people of Alsace-Lorraine have never ceased to complain, but you must remember what has happened there. A very considerable proportion of the population of Alsace-Lorraine has been forcibly expropriated by the Germans. Some of them have been driven out of the country and if you take the real population of Alsace-Lorraine there is absolutely no doubt at all that the overwhelming mass of them are in favor of being restored to the French flag. Allow me to recall a personal incident. I remember once crossing over the Vosges into Alsace-Lorraine. It was late at night, and we stopped at a little inn on the French side, just a mile or two beyond the German frontier, and the old people who kept the inn told us that every Sunday working people and peasants came from the German side over to the French side merely in order to spend Sunday under the French flag.

OPINION OF FOREIGN MINISTER TROTSKY ON THE GERMAN POSITION AT BREST-LITOVSK[1]

January 23, 1918

. . . . . .

The significance of the Brest-Litovsk *pourparlers* are that they stripped from German imperialism its false coats temporarily borrowed from the democratic wardrobe and exposed the cruel reality of annexationism of owners and capitalists. There is nothing more to be demanded from the *pourparlers.*[2]

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, January 24, 1918, p. 3.

[2] The Russian representatives at Brest-Litovsk were unwilling to accept the German terms and returned to Petrograd on January 23 to submit the case to the Congress of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies. See *The New York Times,* January 25, 1918, p. 1.

REPLY OF CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING TO THE STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT WILSON OF JANUARY 8, 1918[1]

January 24, 1918

When last I had the honor to speak before your Committee—that was on January 3—we were faced by an incident which had occurred at Brest-Litovsk. At that time I expressed the opinion that we should await the settlement of this incident in all equanimity. The facts have corresponded with the expectation. The Russian Delegation has again arrived at Brest-Litovsk, and negotiations have been resumed and continued. The negotiations are progressing slowly. They are exceedingly difficult. I have already referred, on a previous occasion, to the exact circumstances from which these difficulties arise. Indeed many times there were reasons to doubt whether the Russian Delegation was in earnest with its peace negotiations, and all sorts of wireless messages which were going around the world with remarkably strange contents tended to strengthen this doubt. Nevertheless, I hold firmly to the hope that we shall come to a favorable conclusion in the near future with the Russian Delegation at Brest-Litovsk.

Our negotiations with the representatives of the Ukraine stand favorably. Here also there still are some difficulties to be overcome, but the prospects as I regard them are favorable. We hope in the near future to arrive at a settlement with the Ukraine which will be to the interest of both sides and which should also be advantageous as far as their economic aspect is concerned.

One result could already be recorded on January 4 at 10 o'clock in the evening. As you all know, the Russian Delegation, at the end of December, made the proposal to send an invitation to all the participators in the war asking them to take part in the negotiations. As a basis for this the Russian Delegation submitted certain proposals of a very general character. We, at the time, agreed to the proposal for inviting participators in the war to the negotiations, with the condition, however, that this invitation should be limited to a clearly defined period. On January 4, at 10 o'clock in the evening, this period expired. No answer had been received. The result is that we are bound no longer in any way so far as the Entente is concerned, that we have a clear road in front of us for separate negotiations with Russia and also that, obviously, we are no longer bound in any way,

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, January 26, 1918, p. 7.

as far as the Entente is concerned, to the proposals for a general peace which have been submitted by the Russian Delegation.

Instead of the then anticipated reply, which failed to come, two announcements have, as we all know, been made in the meantime by enemy statesmen—the speech by the English Minister, Mr. Lloyd-George, of January 5 and the message of President Wilson of the day after. I freely admit that Mr. Lloyd-George has changed his tone. He no longer uses abuse, and thus appears to wish to establish again his claim to negotiating abilities, of which I had previously despaired. All the same, I can not go as far as the many opinions from neutral countries which claim to read in the speech of Mr. Lloyd-George a sincere desire for peace, and even a friendly spirit. It is true that he declares that he does not wish to destroy Germany, and that he has never wanted to destroy her. He even finds expressions of respect for our economic, political, and cultural position, but amongst them there is no lack of other utterances, and between the lines there is always present that it is his duty to sit in judgment on guilty Germany for all sorts of crimes.

This is a spirit, gentlemen, with which, naturally, we can have nothing to do, and in which as yet we can observe no trace of a sincere desire for peace. We are supposed to be culprits over whom the Entente is now sitting in judgment. That forces me to pass in review the conditions and incidents which preceded the war, even at the risk of once again repeating what has long since been known. The establishment of the German Empire in the year 1871 put an end to the old state of dismemberment; by uniting its peoples the German Empire, in short, attained that position which corresponded with its economic and cultural achievements, and the claims founded thereon. Prince Bismarck crowned his life's work by the alliance with Austria. It was a purely defensive alliance, and was from the very first day regarded and desired as such by the high contracting parties. In the course of decades never has the slightest thought of its misuse for aggressive purposes cropped up. The defensive alliance between Germany and the closely allied Danube Monarchy, united with us by the traditions of centuries and common interests, should especially serve to maintain peace.

But Prince Bismarck was often reproached with being haunted by the nightmare of coalitions, and the events of the times that followed have shown that it was not a mere terrifying phantom. The danger of enemy coalitions which threatened the allied Central Powers often made an appearance. The dread of coalitions became a reality,

owing to the hemming-in policy of King Edward. The German Empire, struggling upwards and increasing in strength, stood in the way of English Imperialism. This British Imperialism only too readily found support in the French longing for revenge and in the Russian struggle for expansion. And so plans for the future developed which were dangerous to us.

Germany has always been faced with the danger of war on two fronts owing to her geographical position. It now became more and more visible. An alliance was concluded between Russia and France, whose inhabitants were more than double those of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. France—Republican France—lent to Czaristic Russia milliards for the construction of strategic railways in the Kingdom of Poland, which were to facilitate an advance against us. The French Republic called up its last man for three years military service. Thus France, together with Russia, created for herself an armed force up to the limits of her capacity. Both pursued aims which our enemies now characterize as imperialistic. It would have been neglect of duty if Germany had merely looked on quietly and also if we had not attempted to create for ourselves an armament with the object of protecting ourselves against future enemies.

I may perhaps remind you of the fact that I myself, as a member of the Reichstag, have often spoken about these things, and that on the occasion of new army budgets I have always pointed out that the German nation, in agreeing to these armaments, merely wished to pursue a policy of peace, and that these armaments were forced upon us for defense against the danger threatening us from our enemies. It does not seem that these words were in any way heeded by foreign countries.

And now, as to Alsace-Lorraine—which is once again referred to by Mr. Lloyd-George. Once again he speaks of the injustice which Germany committed against France in the year 1871. Alsace-Lorraine—I do not say this to you, you do not need this information, but abroad there still seems to be ignorance about these things—Alsace-Lorraine, as is known, includes for the greater part purely German territory, which was detached from the German Empire by centuries of continuous violation and breaches of right, until finally in 1789, the French Revolution swallowed up what was left. At that time they became French provinces. When, therefore, in the war of 1870, we demanded back the regions which had been wantonly wrested from us, that was not conquest of foreign territory, but was in reality what today is called disannexation, and this dis-

annexation was expressly recognized by the French National Assembly and the Constitutional representatives of the French nation at that time, March 29, 1871; and in England people at that time spoke very differently from what they do today.

I can refer to a classical witness. He is no other than the celebrated English historian and author, Thomas Carlyle, who, in a letter to *The Times* in December, 1870, wrote as follows: "No nation ever had such a bad neighbor as Germany has possessed in France during the last four hundred years. Germany would be mad if she did not think of erecting a frontier wall between herself and such a neighbor. I draw attention to the fact that for my part I am not repeating the very sharp terms which Carlyle used against the French in this connection,—"and if she does not erect for herself such a frontier-wall when she has the opportunity to do so, I know of no natural law and no Heaven-sent decree on the strength of which France, alone among the dwellers of the earth, should not be obliged to return a portion of stolen territories when the owners from whom they were wrested, [have] a favorable opportunity to get them back." And prominent English press organs expressed themselves in the same sense. I may mention for instance *The Daily News*.

And now, gentlemen, I come to President Wilson. Here also I admit that the tone has changed. It appears that the unanimous rejection of the attempt of Mr. Wilson, at the time of the reply to the Papal note, to sow discord between the German Government and the German nation has done its work. It was possibly this unanimous rejection which led Mr. Wilson on to the right road, and perhaps a beginning has been made, because now there is, at least, no longer any question of the suppression of the German nation by an autocratic Government, and the former attacks against the House of Hohenzollern are not repeated. I will not go into the distorted representations of German policy which are even yet to be found in Mr. Wilson's message, but I will discuss in detail the points which Mr. Wilson brings forward. There are no less than fourteen points in which he formulates his peace program, and I beg you to have patience if I bring forward these fourteen points for discussion, as briefly as possible.

I. *No Secret International Agreements*

History records that we were the first to be able to declare ourselves in agreement with the most extensive publicity of diplomatic

agreements. I remind you of the fact that our defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary has been known to all the world since the year 1889, whilst the offensive agreements of our enemies have had to be disclosed during the course of this war, chiefly by the publication of the Russian secret documents. The full publicity also given to the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk proves that we were in a position to consent readily to this proposal, and to declare the publication of negotiations as a general political principle.

II. *The Freedom of the Seas*

Complete freedom of navigation on the seas in war and peace is also put forward by Germany as one of the first and most important demands for the future. Here, therefore, there is no difference of opinion whatever. The restriction mentioned by Mr. Wilson towards the end is incomprehensible and seems superfluous. It should therefore be suppressed. It would, however, be important in a high degree for the future freedom of the seas if claims to strongly fortified naval bases on important international shipping routes, such as England maintains at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong Kong or the Falkland Islands, and at many other points, were renounced.

III. *The Abandonment of all Economic Restrictions Which Hinder Commerce in an Unnecessary Manner*

With this we wholly agree. We also condemn an economic war which would inevitably bring with it causes for future warlike complications.

IV. *The Limitation of Armaments*

As has already been declared by us on previous occasions, the subject of the limitation of armaments is a matter quite suitable for discussion. The financial situation of all the European States after the war should further its satisfactory solution in a most effective manner.

It will be seen that as to the first four points of the program argument could be reached without difficulty.

V. *The Amicable Arrangement of all Colonial Claims*

The practical carrying out of the principle laid down by Mr. Wilson will, in this world of realities, meet with some difficulties. In

any case I believe that, for the time being, it may be left to the greatest colonial Empire—England—to determine as to how she will come to terms with her ally regarding this proposal. We shall have to talk about this point of the program at the time of the reconstruction of the colonial possessions of the world, which has also been demanded unconditionally by us.

VI. *The Evacuation of Russian Territory*

The Entente States having refused to join in the negotiations within the period agreed upon by Russia and the four allied Powers, I must decline, in the name of the latter, any subsequent interference. The question here involved is one which alone concerns Russia and the four allied Powers. I cherish the hope that, under the conditions of the recognition of the right of self-determination for the nations within the western boundaries of the former Russian Empire, it will be possible to be on good relations with these nations, as well as with the rest of Russia, for whom we urgently wish a return of guarantees which will secure a peaceful order of things and the welfare of the country.

VII. *The Belgian Question*

As far as the Belgian question is concerned it has been declared repeatedly by my precedessors in office that at no time during the war has the forcible annexation of Belgium by the German Empire formed a point in the program of German politics. The Belgian question belongs to a complicity of questions, the details of which will have to be regulated during the peace negotiations. As long as our enemies do not unreservedly adopt the attitude that the integrity of the territory of our allies offers the only possible foundation for peace negotiations, I must adhere to the standpoint which, up to the present, has always been taken, and must decline any discussion of the Belgian question until the general discussion takes place.

VIII. *The Liberation of French Territory*

The occupied parts of France are a valuable pawn in our hands. Here also forcible annexation forms no part of the official German policy. The conditions and mode of the evacuation, which must take into consideration the vital interests of Germany, must be agreed upon

between Germany and France. I can only once again expressly emphasize that there can never be any question of the separation of the Imperial Provinces. We will never permit ourselves to be robbed of Alsace-Lorraine by our enemies under the pretext of any fine phrases—of Alsace-Lorraine which, in the meantime, has become more and more closely and internally allied with German life, which is developing more and more economically in a highly satisfactory manner, and where more than eighty-seven per cent of the people speak the German mother tongue.

IX, X, *and* XI. *The Italian Frontiers, the Question of Nationality in the Danube Monarchy, and the Balkan States.*

As regards the questions dealt with by President Wilson under these clauses, they embrace questions of paramount importance to the political interests of our ally, Austria-Hungary. Where German interests are concerned we will guard them to the utmost, but the reply to President Wilson's proposals in connection with these points I would prefer to leave in the first instance to the Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. A close connection with the allied Danube Monarchy is a vital point of our policy today and must be a guiding line for the future. The faithful comradeship in arms which proved itself so brilliantly during the war must continue to have its effect also in peace, and we on our part will bring everything to bear in order to bring about for Austria-Hungary a peace which takes into account her justified claims.

XII. *Turkey*

Also in connection with the point which concerns our brave and powerful ally Turkey, I would like in no way to forestall the attitude of Turkish statesmen. The integrity of Turkey and the security of her capital which is closely connected with the questions of the Straits, are important and vital interests also of the German Empire. Our ally can, in this respect, always rely on our most explicit assistance.

XIII. *Poland*

It was not the Entente—who found nothing but meaningless words for Poland and before the war never mediated on her behalf

with Russia—but the German Empire and Austria-Hungary who freed Poland from the Czaristic régime which was oppressing her national individuality. Therefore, it must be left to Germany and Austria-Hungary and Poland to come to an agreement about the future organization of that country. We are, as has been proved by the negotiations and declarations of the last year, well under way with the task.

XIV. *The League of Nations*

In regard to this point I am sympathetic, as is shown by my previous political activity towards any thought which for the future excludes all possibility and probability of wars and tends to promote a peaceful and harmonious cooperation between the nations. If the conception of the "league of nations" mentioned by President Wilson demonstrates under further development and after a trial that it really was conceived in a spirit of complete justice to all, and with complete freedom from prejudice, the Imperial Government will be gladly prepared—after all the other questions in suspense have been settled—to investigate the principles of such a national union.

Gentlemen, you are conversant with the speeches of Mr. Lloyd-George and the proposals of President Wilson. I must repeat what I said at the beginning. We must now ask ourselves, whether out of these speeches and proposals, a really earnest and honest desire for peace appears before us. They contain certain principles for a general world peace, which we also admit, and could form points of departure and aim for negotiations. Where, however, concrete questions are concerned—points which are of decisive importance to us and to our allies—there the wish for peace is left perceptible. Our enemies do not wish to "destroy" Germany, but they cast furtive and covetous glances towards parts of our lands and those of our allies. They speak with respect of Germany's position, but the idea that we are culprits who must do penance and promise reformation repeatedly makes itself apparent. This is the usual tone of the victor to the vanquished. This also is the tone of a man who points to all our former statements of willingness for peace as mere signs of weakness. From this standpoint, from this conception, the leaders of the Entente will first have to free themselves.

In order to make this easier for them I would like to remind them exactly how the situation really stands. May they believe me when I state that our military situation was never so favorable as it

is now. Our highly gifted army leaders face the future with undiminished confidence in victory. Throughout the whole army, in the officers and in the men, lives the unbroken joy of battle. I remind you of the words which I spoke on November 29, in the House. I repeatedly expressed willingness for peace and the spirit of reconciliation which is revealed by our proposals, must not be regarded by the Entente as a license permitting an indefinite lengthening of the war. Should our enemies force us to prolong the war, they will have to bear the consequences resulting therefrom. If the leaders of the enemy Powers are really inclined towards peace, let them revise their program once again. Or, as Mr. Lloyd-George said, introduce another reconsideration.

If they do that and come forward with fresh proposals, then we will examine them carefully because our aim is no other than the reestablishment of a lasting general peace. But this lasting general peace is not possible so long as the integrity of the German Empire, the security of her vital interests, and the dignity of our fatherland are not guaranteed. Until that time we must quietly stand by each other and wait. As to this purpose, gentlemen, we are all one.

In regard to the methods and the "modalities" there may be differences of opinion. But let us shelve all these differences. Let us not fight about formulæ which always fall short in the mad course of the world events, but, above dividing party controversies let us keep our eyes on the one mutual aim, the welfare of the fatherland. Let us hold together the government and the nation and victory will be ours. A good peace will and must follow and must come. The German nation bears in an admirable manner the sufferings and the burdens of the war, which is now in its fourth year. In connection with these burdens and sufferings I think especially of the sufferings of the small artisan and the lowly paid official. But you all, men and women, will hold on and see it through. With your political knowledge you do not allow yourself to be fooled by hatched phrases, you know how to distinguish between the reality of life and the promising dreams. Such a nation can not go under. God is with us and will be with us also in the future.

REPLY OF FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN TO THE FOURTEEN POINTS[1]

January 24, 1918

I consider it my duty to present a faithful report of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, to relate the different phases of the events which occurred previous to them, and to draw conclusions from them which are logical and justified.

In reply to those who find the course of the negotiations too slow, we must recall the difficulties of these negotiations, of which I could not even give an approximate idea. We must recall the complete difference between the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and any known in history. One of the chief differences was the publicity given to the various phases of the negotiations, the details of which are daily telegraphed throughout the entire world.

It is quite natural in view of the nervousness which prevails throughout the entire world that that should produce the effect of an electric shock, which agitates public opinion. We are in no doubt as to the inconvenience of this system, but nevertheless we yielded to the Russian Government's desire for publicity because we have nothing to hide. If we had wished to keep the former secret system that might have created a false impression. To counterbalance this complete publicity it is necessary for the public, as well as the leaders, in the rear and in front, to keep calm. The business will be conducted to the end with coolness, and will achieve a good result if the peoples of the monarchy support the responsible delegate at the peace conference.

The basis of the negotiations between Austria-Hungary and the various recently created Russian States, is a peace without annexation or indemnity. I should not abandon this program, and those who thought I should allow myself to be led away from the path which I have determined on are bad psychologists. I have never left public opinion in the least doubt as to the path which I am following, and I have never let myself be led an inch from this path, neither to the right nor to the left. While Pan-Germans and all those in the monarchy who take them as their models have honored me with their undoubted support. I am considered by those who wish peace at any price as being in favor of war, but neither the one side nor the other have

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, January 26, 1918, p. 8; *The New York Times*, February 2 and February 6, 1918, p. 2.

ever worried me. Their insults are, on the contrary, my only distraction in these serious times.

I declare once again that I demand not a square meter or a kreuzer from Russia and that if Russia, as seems to be the case, adopts the same point of view, peace ought to result, but those who wish peace at any price might be able to cast doubts upon my loyalty if I did not tell them to their face, with the same categorical frankness that I shall never agree to contemplate peace exceeding the limits which I have just indicated. If our Russian interrogatories ask us to cede territories and pay indemnity I should continue the war despite the desire for peace which I share as much as you, or I should resign if I were unable to make my opinion prevail.

But it can once more be stated that there is no reason to draw the pessimistic conclusion that the peace negotiations will fail. For the commissions which are confirmed have agreed to the principle of peace without annexation or indemnity, and only new instructions from the various Russian Governments or their disappearance could change this basis.

The first of a few most serious difficulties which are the cause of the negotiations not proceeding as quickly as everyone would wish is that we are not dealing with one interrogatory. We have to negotiate with various newly created Russian States, with Russia as represented by Petrograd, with the Ukraine, with Finland, and Caucasus directly and with others who, for the moment, are not represented at Brest-Litovsk.

The negotiations with the Ukraine are already far advanced. We have come to an understanding on the basis of no annexations or indemnities, and we are already agreed to a great extent that commercial relations should be resumed as they ought to be, but the great difficulty is that the Ukrainian republic adopts this principle on the understanding that it is negotiating with us as a completely independent State, with absolute autonomy, while the Russian delegation assert that, as the frontiers of the Ukraine have not yet been definitely fixed, it has the right to take part in our negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation, a right which the latter does not wish to admit. The uncertainty as to the internal situation of Russia, is causing a considerable delay, but we have also overcome this difficulty. And I believe that an early date will see the way free for the resumption of the negotiations.

I confess I do not know what the situation is today, for yesterday my representative at Brest-Litovsk received two telegrams to the effect that M. Joffe, the President of the Russian delegation, had sent to

the delegations of the Quadruple Alliance a circular note declaring that the Government of the Republic of Workmen and Peasants of the Ukraine, which sits at Kharkoff, in no case recognizes the Secretariat General of the Central Rada as representing the entire Ukrainian people because the Central Rada represents only the capitalistic classes, and can not, consequently, speak in the name of the Ukrainian people. The note also states that the Kharkoff Rada does not recognize any agreements which might eventually be concluded by the Central Rada without its assent, and announces that the Kharkoff Rada is sending two delegates to Brest-Litovsk as delegates of the Central Committee of all the Councils of Workmen, Soldiers, and Peasants, in the Ukraine.

According to the decision of January 12, of the Central Executive Committee, the note proceeds, these delegates must declare categorically that all attempts on the part of the Central Rada to speak in the name of the Ukrainian people must be considered as overtures due solely to the initiative of the bourgeois groups of the Ukrainian people in opposition to the interests and will of the working classes of the Ukraine. They must declare that the decisions taken by the Rada will not be recognized by the Ukrainian people; that the Rada of workmen and peasants recognizes the People's Commissioners as the organ of all the Soviets of Russia and as having the right to speak in the name of the entire Russian Federation; that the Delegation of the Rada of Workmen and Soldiers sent to Brest-Litovsk to denounce the intrigues of individuals at Kieff will act in complete accord with the delegation of all Russia. President Joffe adds in his communication that his delegation is ready to cooperate to the fullest extent with the new Ukrainian delegation.

There is a new difficulty for we can not and do not wish to meddle in the internal affairs of Russia, but, if the war is once clear, other difficulties will not arise. We will agree with the Ukrainian Republic that the old frontiers of Russia and Austria-Hungary will also apply to the Ukraine.

As regards Poland, the frontiers of which have, up to the present, not been exactly fixed, we do not desire anything at all from this new State. The people of Poland must freely and without being influenced in any way, settle their own destiny. For my part I attach no particular importance to the form in which their vote will be taken on this subject, but it will please me all the more if this vote reflects the precise will of the majority of the people, for I wish for Poland a free decision.

I see in the desire of Poland only a guarantee for lasting harmony. I am irrevocably of the opinion that the Polish question ought not to delay peace for a day. If, after the conclusion of peace, Poland wishes to come to us, we will welcome her willingly. The Polish question can not and will not endanger the question of peace.

I would willingly have seen Poland participating in the peace negotiations, for, in my view, Poland is an independent State, but as the Russian Government did not recognize the present Polish Government as qualified to represent their country, we did not insist, in order not to cause a conflict of opinions. The question is certainly important, but it is undoubtedly more important still to remove difficulties which are calculated to delay the conclusion of the negotiations.

The second difficulty is, undoubtedly, the divergence of view between our German ally and the Russian Government on the interpretation of the right of the Russian peoples to decide their own destiny in the territories occupied by German troops.

Germany has no intention of making any territorial conquest by violence at the expense of Russia, but the difference of opinion is of a twofold character. Germany adopts the legitimate point of view that the numerous expressions of the will of a people for independence and autonomy evinced by legislative corporations and communal representatives, et cetera, in the occupied provinces should be considered as the provisional basis of the opinion of the people, which could subsequently be ascertained by a popular vote on extended bases. The Russian Government still opposes this point of view as regards Courland, Lithuania and the Polish provinces.

The second difference of opinion arises from the Russian demand for a withdrawal of all German troops and administration from the occupied territories before the popular vote has been taken. But a sudden evacuation and departure of all the organizations, communications, industries and administrations which are in German hands would certainly lead to complete anarchy and the greatest misery.

. . . . . .

When peace has been concluded with Russia it will no longer be possible in my opinion to prevent for long the conclusion of a general peace in spite of the efforts of the Entente statesmen. Although I am under no delusion and realize that the fruit of peace can not be matured in a few hours I am nevertheless convinced that it is now maturing and that the question whether or not an honorable general

peace can be secured is merely a question of resistance. President Wilson's peace offer confirms me in this opinion.

Naturally an offer of this kind can not be regarded as a matter acceptable in every detail, for that would obviously render any negotiations superfluous. I think there is no harm in stating that I regard the recent proposals of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view and that to some of them Austria-Hungary could joyfully give her approval, but I must first lay down this principle—that, in so far as these propositions concern her allies, whether in the case of Germany, Bulgaria, or in the case of Turkey—Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engagements to fight to the end *in defense* of her allies, will defend the possessions of her war allies as she would her own. That is the standpoint of the four allies in regard to which there is perfect reciprocity.

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In reference to the proposals of President Wilson I have no objection to the suppression of secret diplomacy although I doubt whether this method is in every case the most practical and rapid way to arrive at a result. The public discussion of diplomatic treaties might for example in the case of an economic agreement make impossible the conclusion of such an agreement which is nothing but a commercial transaction and might increase the friction between the two States. It is the same in the case of political agreements.

If by the suppression of secret diplomacy it is meant that there should no longer be any secret treaties I have no objection to make to the realization of this idea though I do not know how one can execute and control this realization, but these are supplementary details which could be discussed.

In his demand for the freedom of the seas the President said what is in the hearts of us all. I subscribe absolutely and entirely to this wish of America especially because the President adds the words "outside territorial waters." That means then the freedom of the open seas, but of course no doing of violence to sovereign rights of our loyal Turkish allies.

Article 3 of President Wilson's declaration which pronounces in a formal manner against a future economic war is so just and reasonable and its application has so often been urged by us that we have nothing to add to it.

Article 4 which demands general disarmament expresses in a

particularly clear and just manner the necessity of bringing the rivalry in armaments to the limit already indicated in the President's profession of faith and therefore I greet with gratitude any voice which makes itself heard in the sense of my previous statement.

We have already shown by acts that we desire to establish good neighborly relations with Russia (Article 6).

On the subject of Italy, Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania (Articles 9 and 11) I repeat what I have already said to the Hungarian delegation: "I refuse to place a premium on the military adventures of our enemies. I refuse to make our enemies, who obstinately persist in wishing to wage war until final victory, one-sided concessions by which the monarchy would permanently suffer and which would give them the infinite advantage of being able to drag on the war relatively without risk."

In the next place I have to observe that we courteously but resolutely reject the advice as to how we are to govern ourselves. We have in Austria a parliament elected by universal, equal, direct and secret franchise. There is no more democratic parliament in the world and this parliament together with the other constitutionally authorized factors alone has the right to decide upon the internal affairs of Austria. I speak only of Austria because I should regard it as unconstitutional to speak in the Austrian delegation of the internal affairs of the Hungarian State. We do not interfere in American affairs and we do not want any foreign guardianship by any State.

. . . . . .

I will speak as freely and as frankly as I have done here with President Wilson and with all those who would like to speak but naturally the duration of the war will not be without influence on this situation. Italy is a striking illustration of this. Italy had before the war an opportunity of realizing a great territorial expansion without firing a shot. She refused to do this and joined in the war. She has lost hundreds of thousands in killed and millions of money in war expenses and destroyed riches. Her own population is in distress and misery—all that solely in order to lose the advantage which she would have been able to gain.

We are also supporters of the creation of an independent Polish State (Article 13) which should include all the territories the populations of which are indisputably Polish. On this point also we believe we should quickly come to an understanding with President Wilson.

Finally in his idea of a league of peoples (Article 14) the President would very probably meet with no opposition in the monarchy.

We are therefore in agreement in the main. Our views are identical, not only in the broad principles regarding the new organization of the world after the war, but also in several concrete questions, and the differences which still exist do not appear to me to be so great that a conversation regarding them would not lead to enlightenment and a *rapprochement.* This situation which doubtless arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary on the one side and the United States on the other are composed of States whose interests are least at variance with one another tempts one to ask if an exchange of ideas could not be the point of departure for a personal conversation between all the States which have not yet joined in the peace negotiations.

. . . . . .

Let Herr Wilson employ the great influence which he doubtless possesses over all his allies so that they shall for their part state the conditions upon which they are ready to talk. If he does so he will have rendered the inestimable service of setting general peace negotiations in motion.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SEPARATE PEACE AT BREST-LITOVSK ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTER VON KÜHLMANN[1]

January 25, 1918

I wish to refer to the fable that the German negotiators left for Brest-Litovsk suddenly and there concocted a policy on the spot according to the requirements of the position. These statements lack all foundation. When I took office in July last year our policy in the East was already fixed. The activities of Brest-Litovsk must be considered as having two clearly divided stages. Russia had in her wireless message only proposed a general peace. At first therefore the negotiations with Russia could not be extended beyond the limits of a general peace. The negotiations on a general peace corresponded to the much discussed note of December 25. Anyone who asks why

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, January 28, 1918, p. 5.

a beaten Russia was permitted on its part to make proposals is starting with a wrong conception of the historical circumstances. In the general wireless message Russia laid down certain fundamental lines for a general peace and was only obliged after we had declared these lines to be capable of discussion to amplify them so as to make it possible for us to give a detailed answer. Russia declared that our reply was a suitable basis upon which the Entente might conclude peace. If within the fixed period of ten days the Entente had not joined in the peace negotiations on this basis then according to the Russian view a bad will was clearly proved and Russia felt herself free to enter into separate negotiations with us.

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OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL AT VERSAILLES ON THE STATEMENTS OF VON HERTLING AND CZERNIN[1]

February 3, 1918

The Council was unable to find in von Hertling's and Czernin's recent utterances any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by the Allied Governments. Under the circumstances, the Council decided that the only task before it to meet was the vigorous and effective prosecution of the war until the pressure of that effort produced a change of temper in the enemy Governments justifying the hope of the conclusion of a peace based on the principles of freedom, justice, and respect for international law.

The Council arrived at a complete unanimity of policy on measures for the prosecution of the war.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, February 4, 1918, p. 1.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE PEACE WITH UKRAINA[1]

February 9, 1918

German Report

Peace was signed with the Ukraine at 2 a. m. today.

Austrian Report

Today, at Brest-Litovsk, at 2 a. m. peace was signed with the Ukrainian Republic.[2]

RUSSIAN PROCLAMATION OF THE END OF THE WAR AND OF DEMOBILIZATION[3]

February 10-11, 1918

COMRADES: The peace negotiations are at an end. German capitalists, bankers, and landlords, supported by the silent cooperation of the English and French *bourgeoisie,* submitted to our comrades, the members of the peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk, conditions such as could not be subscribed to by the Russian Revolution.

The Governments of Germany and Austria desire to possess countries and peoples vanquished by the force of arms. To this the authority of the Russian peoples of workmen and peasants could not give its acquiescence. We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression, and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants. But we also can not, will not, and must not continue a war which was begun by Czars and capitalists in alliance with Czars and capitalists. We will not, and we must not, continue to be at war with Germans and Austrians—workmen and peasants like ourselves.

[1] Texts in *The Times,* London, February 11, 1918, p. 7.

[2] The German delegates at Brest-Litovsk succeeded in obtaining separate discussions with the representatives of the Ukraine; the result is recorded above. The representatives of the Ukraine had only been included in the Russian Delegation since January 30; see *The New York Times,* February 1, 1918, p. 2.

[3] Texts in *The Times,* London, February 13, 1918, p. 6.

We are not signing the peace of landlords and capitalists. Let German and Austrian soldiers know who are placing them in the field of battle, and let them know for what they are struggling. Let them know also that we refuse to fight against them.

Our delegation, fully conscious of its responsibility before the Russian people and the oppressed workers and peasants of other countries, declared on February 10, in the name of the Council of the People's Commissioners of the Governments of the Federal Russian Republic, to the Governments of the peoples involved in war with us and of neutral countries, that it refuses to sign an annexationist treaty.

Russia, for her part, declares the present war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria at an end.

Simultaneously the Russian troops receive the order for complete demobilization on all fronts.

Brest-Litovsk, Feb. 10, 1918.

L. Trotsky, President of the Russian Peace Delegation, and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; A. Bicenko, Commissioner for State Properties; W. Karelin, A. Joffe, M. Pokrovsky, Members of the Peace Delegation; W. Medvedioff, President of the All-Ukrainian Executive Committee of the Soviets; Shakhrai, Secretary for War of the Ukrainian Republic; L. Karahan.

Demobilization Order

In connection with the above, I order that the necessary steps be immediately taken for declaring to the troops that the war with Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria is regarded from the present moment as being at an end. No military operations must again take place. With the present order the beginning of a general demobilization on all fronts is decreed.

I order the Staffs on the front to issue instructions for the withdrawal of troops from the first lines and for their concentration in the rear, and further for their being sent to the interior of Russia, in accordance with the general plan for demobilization.

For the defense of the frontier some detachments of the younger soldiers must be left.

I beg our soldier comrades to remain calm, and to await with patience the moment for the return of each detachment to its home and in its turn.

I beg that no effort be spared in bringing into stores all artillery and other military equipment, which has cost milliards of the people's money.

Remember that only systematic demobilization can be carried out in the shortest time, and that systematic demobilization alone can prevent interference with the sending of food supplies to those detachments which remain for a certain period at the front.[1]

Unsigned.

February 11, 1918.

REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE ADDRESSES OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, AND THE IMPERIAL AND ROYAL AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

February 11, 1918

Address Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress[2]

Gentlemen of the Congress: On the eighth of January I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on the fifth of January. To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on the twenty-fourth and Count Czernin, for Austria, on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of views on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address of the eighth of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Govern-

[1] The Congress of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies (see item under date of January 23 just quoted) agreed that the peace terms of the Germans were inacceptable; it also recognized the inability of Russia to continue the war. The result, as here illustrated, was an effort to avoid the unpleasant alternatives by proclaiming the war "ended" and justifying this action for intrinsic reasons while refusing to sign a peace treaty because of its unpleasant possibilities in the results.

[2] Text in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

ments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them: but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes, the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three States now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood. He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire,

to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

It must be evident to everyone who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We can not and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of the nineteenth of July, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between State and State. The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They can not be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed

about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We can not have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It can not be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany, against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She can not see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful governments which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the

whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he can not expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He can not ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern and must of course be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own Empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be

made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States; and

Fourth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays. We are indomitable in our power of independent action and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for new international order under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words but a passion which, once set in motion, must be satisfied. The power of

the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.

REPLY OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE TO CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING AND FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN[1]

February 12, 1918

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I sought to find out what questions were to be addressed to the Government on this occasion because I thought it was exceptionally important that the Government should be informed so that whatever answers should be given should be well considered. I regret—perhaps it was owing to the absence of my right honorable friend—that I was unable to ascertain until, through the courtesy of my right honorable friend, this morning one of the questions which have been referred to was mentioned to me. My right honorable friend has said a good deal about the speeches which have recently been delivered on the question of peace. The Government stand by the considered declaration which I made on behalf of my colleagues and myself to the trade union representatives early this year.

I read with profound disappointment the replies given to President Wilson's speech and the one which I delivered on behalf of the Government by the German Chancellor and Count Czernin. It is perfectly true, as far as tone is concerned, that there was a great difference between the Austrian speech and the German speech, but I wish that I could believe that there was a difference in substance. I can not altogether, and I regret it, accept that interpretation of Count Czernin's speech. It was extraordinarily civil in tone and friendly, but when you came to the real substance of the demands put forward by the Allies it was adamant. It put Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Arabia in exactly the same category as Belgium. They were to be restored to the Turks on the same conditions presumably as those on which Germany was to restore Belgium. When it came to the demands of Italy Count Czernin simply said that certain offers had

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, February 13, 1918, p. 11.

been made before the war and that they were now withdrawn. As far as the Slavonic population of Austria was concerned it was purely a polite statement to President Wilson and others that it was none of our business to inquire.

There was not a single definite question dealt with where Count Czernin did not present the most definite refusal to discuss any terms which might be regarded as possible terms of peace. And when you come to the German reply it is very difficult for anyone who reads the answer to believe that Count Hertling could be even serious in some of the demands which he put forward. What was his answer to the very moderate terms which had been put forward by the Allies? His answer was that Britain was to give up her coaling stations throughout the world. He named half-a-dozen. For the first time that demand was put forward. I confess I think that that was the last demand that Germany ought decently to have put forward. These coaling stations had been as accessible to German as to British ships in the past. The German fleet always received the most hospitable treatment at all these coaling stations. In 1913 the various visits paid by German men-of-war and transports to these ports came to something like 50 or 60. These vessels received exactly the same coaling facilities as a British man-of-war. The same thing applied to ordinary German merchant ships. There were German coaling firms there conducting their trade under exactly the same conditions as the British firms.

I confess that to put forward a demand of that kind for the first time in the fourth year of the war is the best possible proof that the German Empire, or those at any rate at the present moment controlling it, are not in a mood to discuss reasonable terms of peace with the Allies. I regret it profoundly. But there is no use crying peace when there is no peace. These terms were examined carefully, examined with a real desire to find something in them which indicated that the Central Powers were prepared to listen—were coming somewhere near a basis of agreement, and I confess that an examination of these two speeches proved profoundly disappointing to those who are sincerely anxious to find any real and genuine desire for peace in them. The action of the German Empire in reference to Russia proves that all the declarations about annexation or about indemnity and contribution have no real meaning. No answer has been given with regard to Belgium which anyone can regard as satisfactory. No answer has been given with regard to Poland or with regard to the legitimate claims of France for the restoration of her lost provinces. Not a word was said about the men of Italian race and tongue who

are now under the Austrian yoke, and when you came to Turkey, as I have already indicated, so far from Count Hertling or Count Czernin indicating that they were prepared to recognize the rights of the Arabs in Mesopotamia and in Arabia it was a pure denial of those rights, an indication that they were determined to maintain something which they call the integrity of Turkey.

I should like any honorable gentleman in this House to point out anything in these speeches which he could possibly regard as a proof that the Central Powers are prepared to make peace on terms which he would regard as just and reasonable. I fail to find anything of the kind, and it is with the profoundest regret that I say so, but the Government do not recede in the least from the statement of war aims which they have made. They still consider those as being the aims and ideals for which we are fighting, and there is every indication that the nation as a whole accepted those as a fair, just, and moderate statement, and until there is some better proof than here supplied in any of these speeches that the Central Powers are prepared to consider them it will be our regrettable duty to go on making all the preparations necessary in order to establish international right in the world.

ADDRESS OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR ON COUNT CZERNIN'S SPEECH AND THE VERSAILLES COUNCIL DECISION[1]

February 13, 1918

Turning to the general course of the debate, it seems to me that the course of that debate is entirely founded upon a misunderstanding of what happened at Versailles, and a misunderstanding of what was stated in the King's speech. Let me take the Versailles case first, as I understand it. It is assumed that the object of the Versailles meeting was a general survey of the political conditions of Europe, and of the general diplomatic relations subsisting between the nations concerned in the war, and not the immediate problem before the Allies. That is a mistake. The supreme war council met at Versailles to deal primarily with the great military problem with which we are faced, which is its main business. That it did. It is perfectly true

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, February 14, 1918, p. 10.

that it made a statement, the exact purport of which I will come to in a moment, upon the conclusions to be drawn from the speeches of the German Chancellor and the Austrian Foreign Secretary. It did do that, but it did not attempt either to survey the war aims of which the honorable gentlemen on both sides of the House have spoken, nor was it in fact fitted to deal in a full or exhaustive manner with those war aims. As the House is aware, the Council consists, besides the military advisers, of the Prime Minister of each of the countries concerned, with another Minister. That is, as far as Europe is concerned. America is represented at it only by a military adviser. America, therefore, it is quite obvious, could not and did not deal with this question at Versailles in the sense in which the honorable gentlemen appear to think it was and ought to have been dealt with. Neither was this country equipped at Versailles to deal with this class of questions. If peace terms or questions connected with diplomacy had been the object of the conference necessarily and obviously the Foreign Secretary of each country would have had to be present. I was not there, nor was any member of my office, and the reason is quite obvious—that was not the business for which the Council met; those were not the problems discussed and the great issues involved; and the resolutions come to had no direct reference to those diplomatic questions.

It is perfectly true that as was most natural, the Council considered the two speeches to which I have referred, and came to the conclusion that out of those speeches there was no glimmer of the light of peace dawning above the horizon, and therefore, the military measures which they were there to consider were obviously more important than ever. They considered the two speeches and came to the conclusion that they were unable to find in them any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by the Allied Governments. I am bound to say, as far as I can see, that conclusion was a very correct one. We have had four or five speeches tonight and there were speeches yesterday upon this subject, and there has been endless debate in the newspapers. Has anybody been able to extract from what is regarded as the more pacifist of those two speeches, anything which can be described as a satisfaction of the declared war aims of President Wilson, or of the Prime Minister, or of any of the Allies. I think not. They have not been able to do it because it does not exist. It is perfectly true that President Wilson referred to Count Czernin's speech, and as is most natural Count Czernin referred to President Wilson, and it is also true that President Wilson saw, and most readers, I think, will agree that he

was right in seeing a softer note, a tenderer atmosphere in the statement made by Count Czernin. It is also true that Count Czernin made certain statements which did not appear in the parallel and apparently agreed speech of Count Hertling. That is quite true, and President Wilson was amply justified in dwelling on that difference of tone. But when you leave tone and temper, and come to definite and formulated propositions, or propositions which can be made definite, you will not find them in Count Czernin's statement, and so far as I am aware, President Wilson did not profess to find them. Is it not rather unreasonable to make this the basis of any sort of charge, either against the council at Versailles, or against his Majesty's Government. The council at Versailles was faced with these two agreed and simultaneous utterances of the Central statesmen, and they were right in refusing to see in them anything which could be described as an effective approach to the position of the Entente Powers.

Remember that the Entente Powers, or at all events America and this country, had made abundantly clear what are the war aims for which we are striving. The President has made those great announcements which have, I think, been the admiration not only of the English speaking world, but of all the world. The Prime Minister made a statement to the Trades' Union Congress which I think received the approbation of every speaker who has addressed the House tonight. I, speaking on behalf of the Foreign Office, made, on January 10, I think, a speech on war aims which followed closely in tone and in temper those two great announcements. Those were three definite speeches made by authoritative statesmen early in this year. The Central authorities had those speeches before them when they replied. They had before them the authoritative public announcements of America and of England. They could have replied. Count Czernin, as we all know, made some effort, I never exactly understood of what character, to get his speech into the hands of President Wilson. Therefore, he was thinking of President Wilson. He made an appeal to President Wilson. He had before him President Wilson's precise statement of terms, he had every opportunity of saying what he thought about those terms, but though he referred to President Wilson, he never referred to President Wilson's terms. (Sir TUDOR WALTERS: That is exactly what he did do.) I think the interruption is well founded, and that I stated the matter inaccurately, and I apologize to the House. Let me put it in this way—what is quite evident in Count Czernin's speech is that he was not prepared to accept any of President Wilson's important war aims. (An HONORABLE MEMBER:

He accepted most of them.) Which of them? I understand the interruption as signifying that Count Czernin made some announcement of acceptance of President Wilson's war aims. If that is so, there is no doubt that the Versailles council were profoundly wrong, and that this Government is also profoundly wrong. We were not able to read into Count Czernin's speech any such statement. I am not aware that any newspaper tells us in what respect the Austrian terms resemble President Wilson's terms, and that being so, it seems to me utterly absurd either to criticise the King's speech or the council at Versailles for having said that the immediate duty before us was a duty of fighting. The honorable member who moved this amendment dwelt upon the word "only," I think, which he declared indicated that his Majesty's Government actually were of opinion that we had nothing whatever to think of but war; and that diplomacy and all the great moral objects on which we have dwelt at other times were ruled out. Is not this dwelling upon the word "only" one of the most unreasonable perversions of a public document? You say the task before us is war. Does that mean that the task of reconstruction is not always before us? Of course the tasks before us are not only concerned with war, but with diplomacy, with reconstruction after the war, with all the vast problems which the world will have to attempt to solve. The word "only" so far as it is my business to deal with this sentence of the Versailles Conference is not capable of bearing the weight the honorable gentleman puts upon it. He goes the length of suggesting that because the word "only" appears in the Versailles resolution, therefore diplomacy has nothing more to do with the situation and no more effort shall be made by any of the belligerent countries to come to terms. That is not the view of the Government.

The view of the Government is that at present the attitude of the Central Governments shows that diplomacy at the present moment is entirely out of court, so far as they are concerned. It is they who have banged the door and shut it; it is they who have laid down clearly by the mouth of their Chancellor and, if that be more authoritative, by the mouth of their Kaiser, that they are as far removed as they were three years ago from accepting those ideals to which President Wilson has given classic expression, and which represent the common view both of America, of England, and of the Allies, by whose side America and England are fighting. If that is true, what is the use of criticising the Government for not using the method of diplomacy? The methods of diplomacy are only of use when you deal with people who are prepared to come to terms. The Central Powers have openly

shown that they do not mean to come to terms. At all events Germany has shown this. The difference of tone, not of substance, between Count Hertling's speech and Count Czernin's speech have shown that Austria is more nearly in a reasonable frame of mind than her all-powerful ally; but to suggest that even Count Czernin's speech indicates that Germany is prepared to come to terms appears to me to be extravagant in the highest degree. This war is not coming to an end until Germany and the Allies are prepared to go into council together over the terms of peace. Has Germany, who knows our terms, shown the slightest desire at any moment, to make that approach which would render a council of the nation of value? There are some gentlemen who talk as if the mere summoning of people round a table were a method of arriving at peace. It is only a method of arriving at peace if before they meet round the table there is a certain community of ideas and aims which enable discussion between them to settle the outstanding details. But if they meet round that table with differences fundamental and irreconcilable then the meeting only makes matters worse and not better. It accentuates differences; it does not emphasize agreements, and the interests bound up with peace are further off then ever.

Some of my honorable friends who have criticized the Government this evening for their diplomatic procedure emphasize their view that one of the objects of this war was the destruction of militarism. Is there anything in Count Hertling's speech which suggests that the end of militarism is near in Germany? The most microscopic examination, the friendliest investigation has not shown any symptoms of that character. On the contrary their successes on the Eastern front—I will not call them military successes; fighting has very little to do with them—have at once shown what has been throughout the true German military spirit:—Add to our territory, secure our commercial expansion by acquiring a controlling influence over this or that great area, make our borders secure by getting this or that alien population under our control. That was German policy three years ago. That is the German policy, so far as I understand the Kaiser and Count Hertling, at the hour at which I speak. How much that policy has behind it the true spirit of the German nation, I can not say, but so far as outward marks go, so far as the declarations of responsible statesmen go, I see not a hair's breadth of variation from their old ambitions of getting what they call a German peace. And all of us know that a German peace has one meaning alone—it is a peace which will make every other nation subservient to Germany.

STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER LENINE AND FOREIGN MINISTER TROTSKY ON THE GERMAN INFRACTION OF THE ARMISTICE AND THEIR READINESS TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY[1]

February 19, 1918

To the Government of the German Empire, Berlin:

The Council of the People's Commissaries protest against the fact that the German Government has directed its troops against the Russian Council's Republic, which has declared the war as at an end, and which is demobilizing its army on all fronts.

The Workmen's and Peasants' Government of Russia could not anticipate such a step, because neither directly nor indirectly, has any one of the parties which concluded the armistice given the seven days' notice required in accordance with the treaty of December 15, for terminating it.

The Council of the People's Commissaries in the present circumstances regards itself as forced to formally declare its willingness to sign a peace upon the conditions which have been dictated by the Delegations of the Quadruple Alliance at Brest-Litovsk.

The Council of the People's Commissaries further declares that a detailed reply will be given without delay to the conditions of peace as proposed by the German Government.[2]

RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF GERMAN PEACE TERMS[3]

February 24, 1918

To the German Government, Berlin: Our Parlementaires left Petrograd today, February 24, at noon, in the direction of Dvinsk, for the purpose of transmitting to the German Government, through the

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, February 20, 1918, p. 6.

[2] The German Government, not appreciating the value of the Russian proclamation of February 10, recommenced military operations at the expiry of the truce at noon on February 19. The result was to destroy the Russian faction of that date and compel them to accept the only possible horn of the dilemma presented to them at Brest-Litovsk, not without neutral reservations as to the permanence of the treaty they were now "ready to sign."

[3] Texts in *The Times,* London, February 25, 1918, p. 9.

Dvinsk High Command, the official reply of the Russian Government to the peace conditions offered by the German Government, which had been communicated to Berlin by wireless from Tsarskoe Selo today at 7.32.

GORBUNOFF,
Secretary of the Council of People's Commissioners.

According to the decision taken by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers,' and Peasants' Delegates on February 24, at 4.30 a. m., the Council of People's Commissioners has decided to accept the peace conditions offered by the German Government and to send a delegation to Brest-Litovsk.[1]

(Signed) VL. ULIANOFF LENIN,
President of the Council of People's Commissioners.
L. TROTSKY,
People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

The delegation leaves for Brest-Litovsk at 8 p. m. February 24.
(Signed) N. GORBUNOFF,
Secretary of the Council.

REPLY OF CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING TO PRESIDENT WILSON[2]

February 25, 1918

The Reichstag has a right to receive an explanatory statement in regard to the foreign situation and the attitude of the Government concerning it. I will meet the obligation arising therefrom, even though I entertain certain doubts as to the utility and success of dialogues carried on by ministers and statesmen of belligerent countries.

Mr. Runciman in the House of Commons recently expressed the opinion that we would get much nearer peace if, instead of this, responsible representatives of the belligerent Powers would come together in an intimate meeting for discussion. I can only agree with him that that would be the way to remove numerous intentional and

[1] The acceptance of February 19 was an acceptance in principle only.
[2] Text in *The New York Times*, February 27, 1918, p. 1.

unintentional misunderstandings and compel our enemies to take our words as they are meant, and on their part also to show their colors.

I can not at any rate discover that the words which I spoke here on two occasions were received in hostile countries objectively and without prejudice. Moreover discussion in an intimate gathering alone could lead to understanding on many individual questions which can really be settled only by compromise.

It has been repeatedly said that we do not contemplate retaining Belgium, but that we must be safeguarded from the danger of that country, with which we desire after the war to live in peace and friendship, becoming the object or the jumping-off ground of enemy machinations. If, therefore, a proposal came from the opposing side, for example from the Government in Havre, we should not adopt an antagonistic attitude, even though the discussion at first might only be unbinding.

Meanwhile it does not appear as if Mr. Runciman's suggestion has a chance of assuming tangible shape, and I must adhere to the existing methods of dialogue across the Channel and the ocean.

Adopting this method, I readily admit that President Wilson's message of February 11 represents, perhaps, a small step toward a mutual *rapprochement.* I, therefore, pass over the preliminary and excessively long declarations in order to address myself immediately to the principles, which, in President Wilson's opinion, must be applied in a mutual exchange of views.

The first clause says that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.

Who would contradict this? The phrase, coined by the great father of the Church, Augustine, 1500 years ago—*"justitia fundamentum regnorum"*—is still valid today. Certain it is that only peace based in all its parts on the principles of justice has a prospect of endurance.

The second clause expresses the desire that peoples and provinces shall not be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power.

This clause, too, can be unconditionally assented to. Indeed one wonders that the President of the United States considered it necessary to emphasize it anew. This clause contains a polemic against conditions long vanished, views against Cabinet politics and Cabinet wars, against mixing State territory and princely and private property, which belongs to a past which is far behind us.

I do not want to be discourteous, but when one remembers the earlier utterances of President Wilson, one might think that he is laboring under the illusion that there exists in Germany an antagonism between an autocratic Government and a mass of people without rights.

And yet President Wilson knows (as, at any rate, the German edition of his book on the State proves) German political literature, and he knows, therefore, that with us princes and Governments are the highest members of the nation as a whole, organized in the form of a State, the highest members, with whom the final decision lies. But, seeing that they also, as the supreme organs, belong to the whole, the decision is of such a nature that only the welfare of the whole is the guiding line for a decision to be taken. It may be useful to point this out expressly to President Wilson's countrymen.

Then finally at the close of the second clause the game of the balance of power is declared to be forever discredited. We, too, can only gladly applaud. As is well known, it was England which invented the principle of the maintenance of the balance of power in order especially to apply it when one of the States on the European Continent threatened to become too powerful for her. It was only another expression for England's domination.

The third clause, according to which every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival States, is only the application of the foregoing in a definite direction, or a deduction from it, and is therefore included in the assent given to that clause.

Now in the fourth clause he demands that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world. Here, also, I can give assent in principle, and I believe, therefore, with President Wilson, that a general peace on such a basis is discussible.

Only one reservation is to be made. These principles must not be proposed by the President of the United States alone, but they must also be recognized definitely by all States and nations. President Wilson, who reproaches the German Chancellor with a certain amount of backwardness, seems to me in his flight of ideas to have hurried far in advance of existing realities.

Certainly a League of Nations, erected upon justice and mutual

unselfish appreciation—a condition of humanity in which war, together with all that remains of the earliest barbarism, should have completely disappeared and in which there should be no bloody sacrifices, no self-mutilation of peoples, no destruction of laboriously acquired cultural values—that would be an aim devoutly to be desired.

But that aim has not yet been reached. There does not yet exist a court of arbitration set up by all nations for the safeguarding of peace in the name of justice. When President Wilson incidentally says that the German Chancellor is speaking to the court of the entire world, I must, as things stand today, in the name of the German empire and her allies, decline this court as prejudiced, joyfully as I would greet it, if an impartial court of arbitration existed and gladly as I would cooperate to realize such ideals.

Unfortunately, however, there is no trace of a similar state of mind on the part of the leading power in the Entente. England's war aims, as recently expressed in Lloyd-George's speeches, are still thoroughly imperialistic and seek to dominate the world according to England's good pleasure. When England talks about the people's right of self-determination, she does not think of applying the principle to Ireland, Egypt, or India.

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Our war aims from the beginning were the defense of the fatherland, the maintenance of our territorial integrity, and the freedom of our economic development. Our warfare, even where it must be aggressive in action, is defensive in aim. I lay especial stress upon that just now in order that no misunderstandings shall arise about our operation in the East.

After the breaking off of peace negotiations by the Russian delegation on February 10, we had a free hand as against Russia. The sole aim of the advance of our troops, which was begun seven days after the rupture, was to safeguard the fruits of our peace with the Ukraine. Aims of conquest were in no way a determining factor. We were strengthened in this by the Ukrainians' appeal for support in bringing about order in their young State against the disturbances carried out by the Bolsheviki.

If further military operations in other regions have taken place, the same applies to them. They in no way aim at conquest. They are solely taking place at the urgent appeals and representations of the populations for protection against atrocities and devastation by red

guards and other bands. They have, therefore, been undertaken in the name of humanity. They are measures of assistance, and have no other character. It is a question of creating peace and order in the interest of peaceable populations.

We do not intend to establish ourselves, for example, in Esthonia or Livonia. In Courland and Lithuania our chief object is to create organs of self-determination. Our military action, however, has produced a success far exceeding the original aim.

News was received yesterday that Petrograd had accepted our conditions and had sent its representatives to Brest-Litovsk for further negotiations. Accordingly, our delegates traveled thither last evening. It is possible that there will still be dispute about the details, but the main thing has been achieved. The will to peace has been expressly announced from the Russian side, while the conditions have been accepted and the conclusion of peace must ensue within a very short time.

To safeguard the fruits of our peace with the Ukraine, our army command drew the sword. Peace with Russia will be the happy result.

With regard to Roumania, too, the guiding principle will be that we must, and desire to, convert into friends the States with which on the basis of the success of our army we now conclude peace.

Peace negotiations with Roumania began at Bucharest yesterday. It appeared necessary that Secretary von Kühlmann should be present there during the first days when the foundations were laid. Now, however, he will presumably soon go to Brest-Litovsk. It is to be remembered regarding negotiations with Roumania that we are not taking part in them alone, and are under obligation to champion the interests of our allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and to see to it that a compromise is arranged there regarding any divergent desires that will possibly give rise to difficulties, although these difficulties will be overcome.

I will say a word regarding Poland, in behalf of whom the Entente and President Wilson have recently appeared specially to interest themselves, as a well-known country liberated from oppressive dependence on Czarist Russia by the united forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary, for the purpose of establishing an independent State, which, in unrestricted development of its national culture, shall at the same time become a pillar of peace in Europe.

The constitutional problem—in the narrower sense the question what constitution the new State shall receive—could not, as is easily

understood, be immediately decided, and is still in the stage of exhaustive discussions between the three countries concerned. A fresh difficulty has been added to the many difficulties which have in this connection to be overcome, difficulties especially in the economic domain in consequence of the collapse of old Russia. This difficulty results from the delimitation of the frontier between the new State and the adjacent Russian territory. For this reason the news of peace with the Ukraine at first evoked great uneasiness in Poland. I hope, however, that with good-will and proper regard to the ethnographical conditions a compromise on the claims will be reached. The announced intention to make a serious attempt in this direction has greatly calmed Polish circles.

In the regulation of the frontier question only what is indispensable on military grounds will be demanded on Germany's part.

The Entente are fighting for the acquisition of portions of Austro-Hungarian territory by Italy and for the severance of Palestine, Syria and Arabia from the Turkish Empire. England hopes by the creation of a dependent protectorate to annex new portions of territory to the British Empire and to increase and round off the British possessions, especially in Africa.

In the face of this policy Entente statesmen dare to represent Germany as the disturber of peace, who must be confined within the narrowest bounds. By a system of calumny and lies they endeavor to instigate their own people and neutral countries with the specter of the violation of neutrality by Germany.

Regarding the intrigues recently carried on in Switzerland we never thought, nor will we think, of assailing Swiss neutrality. We are much indebted to Switzerland. We express gratitude to her, Holland, the Scandinavian countries and Spain, which by her geographical position is exposed to especial difficulties and no less to the extra-European countries which have not entered the war, for their manly attitude in that, despite all temptations and oppressions, they preserve their neutrality.

The world is longing for peace, but the Governments of the enemy countries are again inflaming the passion for war. There are, however, other voices to be heard in England; it is to be hoped that these voices will multiply.

The world yearns for peace and desires nothing more than that the sufferings of war under which it groans should come to an end. But the Governments of the enemy States contrive ever anew to stir up the war fury among their peoples. A continuation of the war

to the utmost was, so far as has transpired, the most recent watchword issued by the Conference of Versailles, and in the English Premier's speeches it again finds loud echo.

Our people will hold out further, but the blood of the fallen, the agonies of the mutilated and the distress and sufferings of the peoples will fall on the heads of those who insistently refuse to listen to the voice of reason and humanity.

REPLY OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR TO CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING[1]

February 27, 1918

My honorable friend (Mr. Holt) has dealt with two speeches, one delivered by myself a fortnight or three weeks ago, already therefore fading into the past, and the other delivered by the German Chancellor the day before yesterday in the Reichstag. I only wish that the honorable member had dealt as kindly and as gently with the speech of his colleague in the House of Commons as he did with the speech of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag. So far as my own humble effort of three weeks ago is concerned, the main complaint of the honorable gentleman is that I observed that the Versailles Council was not very well equipped in my opinion to deal with these difficult diplomatic questions, and to that opinion I still hold. Let me observe that a great deal of criticism leveled at the resolutions of the Versailles Conference is wholly out of perspective. I do not necessarily say that the honorable gentleman or the House itself is wholly to blame for that, because in the very nature of the case the real work performed by the Versailles Council at its last meeting was necessarily private. It has never been wholly communicated. Its real work was concerned with military procedure. A *communiqué* was made, as is customary, of certain things in which the public might be interested, and which could be safely stated, but from that *communiqué* it was quite impossible to judge of the work of the conference. This particular statement which the honorable member refers to was no doubt the result of some discussion, but it in no sense represents the mature

[1] In debate in the House of Commons. Text in *The Times*, London, February 28, 1918, p. 10.

work of a long debate upon the diplomatic situation in the various countries of Europe. If the honorable gentleman thinks that an adequate defense of my speech I should be happy, but if he thinks it is inadequate I can only deeply regret that it is the best I can offer. To the substance of my observation on that particular utterance of the Versailles Council I entirely adhere.

The honorable member is very angry because he says I misquoted Count Czernin's speech. If I had had any idea that Count Czernin's speech was to be discussed I would not have laid myself open to the charges which have been made against me of verbal inaccuracies. I do not think that I really did misinterpret the substance of Count Czernin's speech. I do not believe that he meant in the least to separate himself from the statement made by his German colleague at the same time. They had been together in council, and the information that I have received on the subject induces me to believe that these speeches were made after consultation and in consultation, and I do not think that I did any very substantial injustice to Court Czernin. If I did I greatly regret it. I think the honorable member has misinterpreted one very important statement of Court Czernin about Poland. That was an ambiguous statement of Court Czernin, and I am not at all sure that President Wilson has not also put a much more favorable interpretation upon that statement than it deserves to receive. The honorable gentleman talks as if it were the desire of Count Czernin to establish the ancient kingdom of Poland, so far as that was a Polish nationality, upon an independent basis. I think the words he used might cover that interpretation, but I do not think it was his meaning and the reason is this: You can not confidently, completely, or adequately carry out any policy of that kind without restoring to Poland those provinces ravished from her by Germany at the time of the partition, or since, and which are, to a very great extent, at the present time inhabited by Poles. I do not know whether the honorable member thinks that that is Count Czernin's policy.

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I really think that, in substance, I have answered it. If any honorable member thinks not, there may be an opportunity of explaining whether, in his opinion, Count Czernin really did intend to indicate that he desired to restore the ancient kingdom of Poland.

The honorable gentleman's last criticism upon my now rather ancient speech was directed against my statement that for the moment diplomacy was out of court.

It is quite evident that diplomacy is out of court in so far as negotiations between belligerents are concerned—and that is the only point with which we are dealing at this moment—unless there is that measure of potential agreement between them which would make diplomatic conversations fruitful of good results. I am afraid, and I say it with the profoundest regret, that all the indications show that we have not as yet reached that happy stage. It is that conviction which makes me feel that the clouds of war are still lowering heavily over the whole civilized world, and that there is no clear and obvious direction in which the sunlight of approaching peace can make itself felt. May that time come soon! But in face of Court Hertling's speech I am afraid we should be deceiving ourselves if we took that view. I am aware that in saying this I separate myself widely from the honorable gentleman. He is of opinion that Count Hertling's speech is a thoroughly satisfactory basis of negotiations, and he has formed that opinion, apparently, on the ground that Count Hertling has accepted the four propositions of President Wilson. He turned to me with an air of challenge and asked whether his Majesty's Government were prepared to go as far. I think that President Wilson was most well advised to lay down those broad propositions of international equity, but President Wilson would be himself the first to say that though it was necessary to lay them down there was nothing in them novel or paradoxical, and it never occurred to me that I should have to get up in this House and say that with the spirit of all those four propositions I was in thorough agreement. Perhaps it might be as well, indeed I think that it is absolutely necessary, that I should examine the precise value which we are to attach to Count Hertling's assent to President Wilson's propositions.

Before I come to that I think it right to say something about what fell from the honorable gentleman with regard to Belgium. He, and he alone, so far as I know, in the world, outside the precincts of Germany would regard Count Hertling's statements about Belgium as satisfactory. There are a great many questions besides Belgium which have to be settled at a peace conference and which now divide the nations of Europe. Though Belgium is very far from being the only one, though there are perhaps other questions of equal importance, there is no question which is a better touchstone of the honesty of purpose of Central European diplomacy, and especially German diplomacy. The honorable gentleman knows well enough that these are things which we are all weary of saying, which are horrible to think of, but he knows, as everybody in the House knows, that the

German attack on Belgium was unprovoked. He knows as well as everybody knows that it was not merely an unprovoked attack upon a small and unoffending nation, but that it was an attack carried out by one of the nations which had guaranteed the security of that small and unoffending nation. Those are the commonplaces of the situation, those are historical propositions which everybody knows by heart. Well, there is only one course for the offending nation to pursue in those circumstances, which is to say, as it has said, "I have sinned." That it has said through the mouth of its former Chancellor. The next thing to do is to say, "Having sinned, I make reparation. I restore again what I never should have taken, and I restore it necessarily without condition." What does the statesman who now meets with the unqualified approval, apparently, of my honorable friend say on this subject? He says: "By all means restore Belgium. We do not want to stay there. But we must take care that it shall not become a jumping-off ground for enemy machinations." When was Belgium a jumping-off ground for enemy machinations? Why should Germany suppose that it is going to be a jumping-off ground for enemy machinations? Belgium has been the victim, not the author, of these crimes. Why is it to be punished because Germany was guilty? What sort of conditions is it that Count Hertling contemplates when he says that Belgium must no longer be the jumping-off ground for enemy machinations? The honorable gentleman appears to think that Count Hertling is a master of explicit statement. It is a pity that Count Hertling did not state explicitly what he meant by that.

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We know the sort of thing that Count Hertling has in mind. We know what a German always does mean when he talks of economic freedom and frontier security. He always means imposing some commercial trammels upon a weaker neighbor, or appropriating some of his territory in order to strengthen his own frontier. I am perfectly certain if the honorable gentleman will take the trouble to look back through the various speculations on the question of Belgium, of which the German papers have been full ever since the beginning of the war, he will see, and he will always see, that by such a phrase as that used by Count Hertling as to making use of Belgium as a jumping-off ground for enemy machinations, that when they deal with these sorts of problems they always have in their minds the restoring of a Belgium which shall be subject to Germany by various new conditions, either

territorial or commercial or military, which will prevent Belgium having that independent place among the nations of Europe of which Germany has tried to deprive her, but which Germany and ourselves are pledged to preserve for her.

And now turn from this particular example of the method in which Count Hertling carries out the general policy which the honorable gentleman admires to the four principles on which he asks my specific opinion. What we have got to consider is how far the lip service which Count Hertling does to these four principles is really exemplified by German practice. The first one deals with "the principle of essential justice." Court Hertling gives warm approval to that doctrine, and quotes St. Augustine in its favor. Does the honorable gentleman think that essential justice is the leading principle of German foreign or military policy? Just consider the frame of mind which Count Hertling shows about Alsace-Lorraine. I want to be perfectly fair. It is imaginable that a German would take a different view from that which is taken by the French, the British, the Italians, and the Americans on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine, but I can not imagine a man who is discussing the principle of essential justice saying, "There is no question of Alsace-Lorraine; Alsace-Lorraine is so obviously, so plainly out of court that we refuse even to consider it when the council of peace comes." That is the declaration made by this advocate of peace, whose recommendations the honorable gentleman is pressing upon the benevolent attention of the House. Take the second great principle: "Peoples and provinces shall not be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels." We have got quite recently, within the last few weeks, an exact specimen of how Count Hertling interprets, in action, the principle of which he approves so glibly in theory. Without going into other conquests or territorial arrangements which Germany has made, or is in process of making, in Russia, the honorable gentleman knows perfectly well that when they settled the boundaries of the Ukraine they handed over a portion of undoubted Polish territory to the new Republic. It is perfectly true that the result of that was a burst of Polish indignation, which however Germany might neglect it in that part of Poland which is subject to Germany, made itself felt in that part of Poland which is subject to Austria, and the result of that indignation was that a concession has been made, and the frontier settled under German inspiration is apparently going to be modified. When they settled that frontier I presume they had President Wilson's principle in mind and I presume they gave it that whole-hearted adhesion to which the hon-

orable member referred. How came they, then, to make this gross violation of their own principles, and that within a few weeks?

. . . . . .

Then we come to the third principle, and here Count Hertling, I observe, makes an historical excursion and says, with, I think, a great measure of truth and justice, that the balance of power is more or less an antiquated doctrine. He goes further when he observes that England has been the great upholder of the doctrine of the balance of power and that England has always used it for the purpose of aggrandizement. These are the exact words: "It is only another expression for England's domination." That is a profoundly unhistorical method of looking at the question. This country has fought once, twice, thrice, for the balance of power, and it has fought for the balance of power because it was only by so fighting that Europe could be saved from the domination of an overbearing nation. It is because we fought for the balance of power that we saved Frederick the Great from destruction, and the Prussian State of that day—it is because we fought for the balance of power that we enabled Prussia to recover that independence which had been squeezed out of her by the triumphant armies of Napoleon; and it ill becomes German statesmen, looking back on the past either to deride England's efforts for the balance of power or the gratitude which Germany owes to England for the efforts she has made in that connection. I go further. I say that until German militarism is a thing of the past, until that ideal is reached for which we all long, in which there shall be an international court, armed with executive power, so that the weak may be as safe as the strong—till that time comes it will never be possible to ignore the principle of action which underlies the struggle for the balance of power in which our forefathers engaged. If Count Hertling really wants to render the balance of power an antiquated ideal of international statesmen he must induce his countrymen to give up that policy of ambitious domination which overshadows the world at this moment, which is the real enemy, and without which, alone, if it were destroyed, peace would come upon us now and forever.

I return to the third and fourth principles laid down by President Wilson. "What ought to be regarded in all these arrangements are the interests and the benefit of the populations concerned." I wish the House to consider how Count Hertling desired to see that principle carried into effect—translated from a paragraph in his speech and

embodied in the policy of the world. He mentions three countries which he desires to see restored to the Turk—Armenia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Does the honorable gentleman consider that the interests and benefit of the populations in these areas are going to be consulted by transferring them back to their Turkish masters? Count Hertling accuses us of being animated by purely ambitious designs when we invaded Mesopotamia, when we captured Jerusalem; and I suppose that he conceived that former Russia was animated by purely ambitious designs when she occupied Armenia. But Turkey went to war and picked a quarrel with us for purely ambitious purposes. She was promised by Germany the possession of Egypt. It was in order to get Egypt, and animated largely by that bribe, that she joined her forces with the Central Powers. What happiness, benefit and interests of the populations would have been consulted by the Turkish conquest of Egypt? The Germans, in their search for the greatest happiness of these populations, would have restored Egypt to the worst rule that the world has ever known; they would, if they could, destroy Arab independence; they would, if they could, put the country which is the center of so reverential an interest—Palestine—back under those who rendered it sterile for all these centuries, as they have rendered every place sterile on which they have imposed their domination. How can honorable gentlemen treat seriously a profession of faith about the interests of populations when, in the very speech in which the profession of faith is made, we have this evidence of the manner in which Count Hertling would like to see it carried out? I do not know whether the Reichstag is an assembly with much sense of humor, but if it had any sense of humor, it surely must have smiled when it heard its Chancellor dealing in that spirit with the *Realpolitik* which has been the true and dominating doctrine of every important German statesman, German soldier, and German thinker for two generations at least. So much for the four principles which the honorable gentleman says Count Hertling accepts and which he thinks his Majesty's Government are backward in not accepting. I hope the result of the short analysis I have made may convince him that there are two sides to that question.

I can not, however, leave Count Hertling without making some observations upon his Russian policy, which he defends. For that also is not an infelicitous illustration of German methods or the exact degree of importance which we are to attach to Count Hertling's verbal agreement with President Wilson. He tells us that the recent invasion of Russia was solely taking place on urgent appeals from

populations for protection against the atrocities and devastations by the Red Guard and other bands, has, therefore, been undertaken in the name of humanity. We all know—of course we all know—the poet has told us so—"That East is East and West is West," but I can not, even with that aphorism ringing in my ears, quite follow the distinction between German policy on the East and German policy on the West. German policy on the East it appears, has been, recently, entirely directed towards preventing atrocities and devastation and carrying out military operations in the name of humanity. German policy on the West is entirely occupied in performing atrocities and devastation and in trampling underfoot not only the letter and spirit of treaties, but the very spirit of humanity itself. Why is there this difference of treatment of Belgium on the one side and of the Baltic Provinces on the other? Why does this humanity appeal, with such an overmastering force, to Count Hertling when he talks about Russia, and why is it brushed aside as a negligible quantity by him and his associates when he is talking of Belgium? I know of no explanation except one, which is, that Germany pursues her method with remorseless insistency. All that varies is the excuse that she gives for her policy.

If she wishes to invade Belgium it is a military necessity; if she wishes to invade Courland it is the dictates of humanity and the desire to prevent outrages and devastations. It is impossible, in the light of facts like these, to rate very high the professions of humanity, international righteousness, equity, and regard for populations which figure so largely in speeches like that which the honorable gentleman has required me to consider, and which show themselves in so strange and so inconsistent a guise in the actual practice of those which have been making those interesting professions.

I confess myself frankly unable to follow what is called the German mentality in this case. I am quite unable to understand how any man can get up in the Reichstag and say as Count Hertling said, that the war Germany has been waging is a defensive war. It was provoked by Germany, it was carried out in accordance with doctrines perfectly well known before the war broke out and universally approved in Germany. It was no sudden outburst of passion that made them drench the world in blood. It was, no doubt, a miscalculation, because they thought their ends could be obtained without the sacrifices which they have forced upon themselves and, unhappily, upon the rest of mankind. But the plan itself, as we all know now, was an old plan. Nobody can even at this stage make himself

acquainted with the tenor and speculations in German newspapers and German reviews without seeing that the old doctrines remain unaffected, dominating the intellectual life of a very large and by no means the least able portion of their population.

It is not merely the doctrine of a few ambitious soldiers. It is a profound mistake to suppose that German militarism means simply the domination of a military caste in isolation. On the contrary, it is the deliberate intention of a large and important section of intellectual Germany to use all weapons, military and economic to give to their country that dominating position which they think is its right. They can not understand why the rest of the world do not agree with them. They are quite ready in that great cause not merely to spend their blood, treasure, life, not merely to undergo great sacrifices, but to decorate the idol of their ambitions with every sort of fine phrase about a defensive war and economic independence and all the rest of it. When you get to the bottom of these phrases you always find a defensive war means a war which is going to extend their territory, and economic security is an economic policy which is going to put some other nation in economic fetters for their advantage. It is a most deplorable and most unhappy condition of things.

I have spoken quite openly and frankly about an eminent contemporary statesman and about a great nation. I have the less remorse in doing it, as Count Hertling did not hesitate to use very strong language about the British Empire and the nation of which we are citizens. There is nothing in the world I am more certain of than this—that the impartial historian, looking back critically at German theories and German practice, and comparing them with British theories and British practice, will say that while both created great empires it has not been the object and it has not been the result of the British Empire to squeeze out the individual life of the nations concerned. Where the British Empire has gone liberty and local interests and local culture have not been neglected. We have not tried—I think we are incapable of doing it—to force our own culture upon India or upon Egypt, or upon any nation or group of nations—India is not as yet a nation—which have come under our protection. Germany has pursued, is pursuing, and always has pursued a different path. Her policy has been more deliberately ambitious than that of any nation. I think, leaving out certain episodes in the history of France, she has been more ambitious of domination than any nation since Louis XIV. However that may be, it really is absurd to compare the results of German expansion and those results which have

made the British Empire what it is. We therefore can listen to those criticisms of Count Hertling with perfect equanimity.

We are ready to stand our trial at the bar of history. To say that we never made mistakes, to say that we have never committed errors and injustice, as it may be, against those with whom we are connected is of course what no wise man would think of saying. I am talking of the broad facts of history; and looking at the broad facts of history, what I say I am confident will stand the test of examination. Everything that I read with regard to German expansion foretells it as being carried out at the cost of somebody else, and it always is carried out at the cost of somebody else.

It is that combination of passion for universal expansion and domination, combined with the deliberate intention of Germany not merely to be a great and growing empire, but to have the rest of civilization creeping at its feet—it is that determination which makes it so difficult to carry out those diplomatic conversations which must be the prelude to peace and which nobody longs for more than I do or than is done by my colleagues in the Government. Those conversations must take place, but how can they take place at this moment if Count Hertling's speech represents the extreme high-water mark of German concession? Does the honorable gentleman really think if Count Hertling were able to carry out that conversation of which he spoke in the earlier part of his address, if he could meet round a table my right honorable friend whom he quotes as desiring that conversation—does he really at this moment think, with the doctrines contained in this speech, that the conversation could end in anything like an agreement? Does he not think a conversation which is begun and which ends in discord is worse than no conversation at all? Well, that is my deliberate opinion. I am convinced—and I beg the House to weigh my words—that to begin negotiations unless you see your way to carrying them through successfully would be to commit the greatest crime against the future peace of the world.

Therefore it is that while I long for the day when negotiations may really take place—negotiations which must be a preparation for bringing ideas closer together—I believe I should be doing an injury to the cause of peace, which is the great cause I have at heart, if I were either to practice myself or to encourage others to practice, to hope myself or to encourage others to hope, that there was any use in beginning those verbal personal communications until something like a general agreement was apparent in the distance, and until statesmen of all countries concerned saw their way to the broad outlines of the

great settlement which it is my most earnest hope will bring permanent peace to this sorely troubled world.

GERMAN OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE WITH RUSSIA [1]

March 3, 1918

Evening—By reason of the signing of the peace treaty with Russia the miltary movements in great Russia have ceased.

RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK BY THE CONGRESS OF SOVIETS [2]

March 16, 1918

The fourth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets sanctions the Treaty of Peace concluded by our representatives at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, and approves of the actions of the Central Committee and of the Council of the People's Commissioners who decided to sign a painful, forced, and dishonoring peace.

The Congress also approves of the acts of the peace delegation, who refused to discuss the details of the German conditions of peace, as these conditions are forced upon us by an ultimatum and violence.

The Congress recognizes as their duty that all the working masses should employ all their strength to establish the defense of our country upon the basis of a Socialist militia, and that all persons of both sexes, both young and old, should receive military training.

The Russian Federal Socialist Republic, while condemning a war of pillage, recognizes its right and duty to defend the Socialist community against possible aggressions by imperialistic countries.

The Congress expresses its deep conviction that the Government

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, March 4, 1918, p. 9. Peace with Finland was signed on March 7; see the official statement in *The Times*, London, March 8, 1918, p. 6.

[2] Text in *The Times*, London, March 18, 1918, p. 8.

of the Soviets should do everything possible to assist the national Socialist movement and the workers of all countries in their struggle against capitalism and Imperialism, in order to create a Socialistic community and to establish between the peoples a lasting peace.

The Congress is deeply convinced that the workmen's revolution is near, and that the victory of the Socialist proletariat is assured, in spite of the savage measures due to Imperialistic intervention.[1]

STATEMENT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF ENTENTE MINISTERS IN REGARD TO THE TREATIES OF BREST-LITOVSK AND BUCHAREST[2]

March 18, 1918

The Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the Entente, assembled in London, feel it to be their bounden duty to take note of the political crimes which, under the name of a German peace, have been committed against the Russian people.

Russia was unarmed. Forgetting that for four years Germany had been fighting against the independence of the nations and the rights of mankind, the Russian Government, in a mood of singular credulity, expected to obtain by persuasion that "democratic peace" which it had failed to obtain by war.

The results were immediate. The armistice had not expired before the German Command, though pledged not to alter the disposition of its troops, transferred them *en masse* to the Western front and so weak did Russia find herself that she dared raise no protest against this flagrant violation of Germany's plighted word.

What followed was of like character. When the "German Peace" was translated into action it was found to involve the invasion of Russian territory, the destruction or capture of all Russia's means of defense, and the organization of Russian lands for Germany's profit—

[1] The Congress voted to ratify the treaty by a majority of 453 votes in a total voting strength of 923. Prime Minister Lenine urged the necessity of the action as the Revolution was, for the time being, too weak to resist German Imperialsim. He concluded: "But history teaches us that, after the dishonorable peace of Tilsit with Napoleon, Germany rose again. We should accept this peace as a temporary respite and await the moment when the European proletariat will come to our assistance."

[2] Text in *The Times*, London, March 19, 1918, p. 6.

a proceeding which did not differ from "annexation" because the word itself was carefully avoided.

Meanwhile those very Russians who had made military operations impossible found diplomacy impotent. Their representatives were compelled to proclaim that, while they refused to read the treaty presented to them, they had no choice but to sign it; so they signed it, not knowing whether, in its true significance, it meant peace or war, nor measuring the degree to which Russian national life was reduced by it to a shadow.

For us of the Entente Governments the judgment that the free peoples of the world will pass on these transactions could never be in doubt. Why waste time over German pledges, when we see that at no period in her history of conquest—not when she overran Silesia, not when she partitioned Poland—has she exhibited herself so cynically as the destroyer of national independence, the implacable enemy of the rights of man and the dignity of civilized nations?

Poland, whose heroic spirit has survived the cruelest of national tragedies, is threatened with a fourth partition, and, to aggravate her wrongs, the devices by which the last trace of her independence is to be crushed are based on fraudulent promises of freedom.

What is true of Russia and Poland is not less true of Roumania, overwhelmed, like them, in the flood of a merciless passion for domination.

Peace is loudly advertised, but under the thin disguise of verbal professions lurk the brutal realities of war and the untempered law of lawless force.

Peace treaties such as these we do not, and can not, acknowledge. Our own ends are very different; we are fighting, and mean to continue fighting, in order to finish once for all with this policy of plunder and to establish in its place the peaceful reign of organized justice.

As the incidents of this long war unroll themselves before our eyes, more and more clearly do we perceive that the battles for freedom are everywhere interdependent; that no separate enumeration of them is needed; that in every case the single but all sufficient appeal is to justice and right.

Are justice and right going to win? In so far as the issue depends on battles yet to come, the nations whose fate is in the balance may surely put their trust in the armies which, even under conditions more difficult than the present, showed themselves more than equal to the great cause entrusted to their valor.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR FRANCIS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD RUSSIA AND THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK [1]

March 19, 1918

The friendship between Russia and the United States, which has existed for a century or more, should be augmented rather than impaired by Russia becoming a republic, and Americans are sincerely desirous that Russians be permitted to continue free and independent and not become subjects of Germany.

I have not seen an authentic copy of the peace treaty, but I am sufficiently acquainted with its provisions to know that if the Russian people should submit to it Russia not only would be robbed of vast areas of her territory, but her people eventually would become subjects of Germany. Russia eventually would become virtually a German province, and her people would lose the liberties for which their ancestors struggled for generations.

My Government still considers America an ally of the Russian people, who surely will not reject the proffered assistance we shall be prompt to render to any Government in Russia that will offer a sincere and organized resistance to the German invasion.

If the Russian people will be brave and patriotic, will lay aside temporarily their political differences and be resolute, firm, and united, they will be able to drive the enemy from the borders, and procure, therefore, at the end of 1918 an enduring peace for themselves and the world.

FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN'S DISCUSSION OF PEACE TERMS, REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON AND REVELATION OF FRENCH PEACE MANEUVERS [2]

April 2, 1918

With the conclusion of peace with Roumania the war in the East is ended. Peace has been concluded with three parties—namely,

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, March 22, 1918, p. 3.
[2] Text in *The Times*, London, April 4, 1918, p. 7.

Petrograd, the Ukraine, and Roumania. One chapter of the war is therefore finished. Before, however, turning to the individual peace treaties and discussing them in detail, I should like to revert to the declarations of the President of the United States in which he replied to the speech delivered by me on January 24 in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrian Delegation.

In many parts of the world President Wilson's speech was interpreted as an attempt to drive a wedge between Vienna and Berlin. I do not believe that because I have too high an opinion of the President of the United States and of his outlook as a statesman to believe him capable of such a way of thinking. President Wilson is no more able to ascribe dishonorable action to us than we to him. President Wilson does not desire to separate Vienna from Berlin, and he knows, too, that that would be impossible.

Perhaps President Wilson says to himself, however, that Vienna is a more favorable soil for sowing the seed for a general peace. Perhaps he says to himself that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has the good fortune to possess a ruler who sincerely and honestly desires a general peace, but who will never commit a breach of faith or conclude a dishonorable peace, and that behind the Emperor-King there are fifty-five millions of people. President Wilson says also, perhaps, to himself, that this united mass represents a force which is not to be under-estimated, and that this honest and strong desire for peace which binds the Monarch's Governments and the peoples of both States is capable of being the bearer of that great idea in whose service he has placed himself.

. . . . . .

I can only say that I esteem it highly that the German Chancellor, in his excellent speech on February 25, took the words out of my mouth by declaring that the four principles developed in President Wilson's speech on February 11 formed a basis upon which a general peace could be discussed. I am in entire agreement therewith. The four points laid down by the President are a suitable basis to begin a discussion for a general peace. Whether, however, the President will succeed in his endeavors to rally his allies on this basis or not is the question.

God is my witness that we have tried everything possible to avoid a fresh offensive, but the Entente would not have it thus.

Some time before the beginning of the Western offensive M.

Clemenceau inquired of me whether and upon what basis I was ready to negotiate. In agreement with Berlin, I at once replied that I was ready, and that, as regards France, I could see no obstacle to peace save France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine. Paris replied that negotiations were impossible on this basis. No choice then remained.

The gigantic struggle in the West has already begun. Austro-Hungarian and German troops are now fighting side by side, as they fought together in Russia, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy. We are fighting unitedly for the defense of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Our armies will show the Entente that French and Italian aspirations after our territory are Utopias which will entail terrible consequences. The explanation, however, of this action of the Entente Powers, which borders on madness, is largely to be found in certain happenings in our own country, to which I shall revert later. Whatever happens, we shall never abandon Germany's interests, just as Germany will never leave us in the lurch. Faithfulness on the Danube is not less than German faithfulness. We are not fighting for imperialistic or annexationist aims, either for ourselves or Germany; but we should go forward together to the last for our defense, for our existence as a State, and for our future.

The first breach in the will to war of our enemies was made by the peace negotiations with Russia. It was a break through of the peace idea. It is an evidence of childish dilettantism to overlook the inner connection between the various conclusions of peace.

The constellation of enemy Powers in the East resembled a net. When one mesh was severed the others gave way of themselves. We were the first to recognize internationally the accomplished separation from Russia and to utilize for our purpose the favorable situation which arose therefrom by concluding with the Ukraine the peace which it was striving for. This led to the peace with Petrograd, as a result of which Roumania became so isolated that she likewise was obliged to conclude peace. Thus one peace brought others with it, and the result desired brought the termination of the war in the East.

We had to begin with the Ukraine both on technical and material grounds. The blockade had to be broken, and the future will show that the conclusion of peace with the Ukraine was a blow at the heart of the rest of our enemies.

The peace concluded with Roumania is calculated to be the starting-point of friendly relations. The slight frontier rectifications which we receive are not annexations. Almost uninhabited regions

as they are, they solely serve for military security. To those, however, who insist that these rectifications fall under the category of annexations, and accuse me of inconsistency, I can only reply that times out of number and in both Delegations I have publicly protested against holding out a license to our enemies which would assure them against the dangers of further adventures. It was not my fault that Roumania did not sit at the peace table simultaneously with Russia. From Russia I did not demand a single square meter, and Roumania neglected the favorable moment.

The protection and promotion of the eminently important mercantile shipping on the Lower Danube, as well as the safeguarding of the Iron Gate, are guaranteed by the extension of the frontier to the heights of Turnu-Severin, by the leasing for thirty years of the valuable wharf near this town, together with the strip of land along the river bank between the wharf and the new frontier, at an annual rental of one thousand lei, and, finally, by obtaining a leasing right on the Islands of Ostrovo, Mare-Corbu, and Simianu, and by the transfer of the frontier several kilometers southward in the region of the Petroseny coal-mine, which has made our possession of the dominating point of Lainek on the Szurduk Pass coal basin appear to be better safeguarded. Nagyszeben and Fogaras receive a new security frontier of an average width of from eight to ten miles. At all the passes of importance—as, for instance, Predeal, Bodza, Gyimes, Bekas, Tolgyes—the frontier has so far been removed to Roumanian ground as military reasons required.

. . . . . .

At a moment when we are successfully endeavoring to renew friendly and neighborly relations with Roumania it is unlikely that we shall open up old wounds; but every one of you knows the history of Roumania's entrance into the war, and will therefore admit that my duty is to protect the peoples of the Monarchy against all future surprises of a similar kind.

Therefore I repeat that I consider, as the safest guarantee for the future, international agreements preventing war. In any such agreements, if they were framed in a binding form, I should see much stronger guarantees against surprise attacks by neighbors than in frontier rectifications; but I have so far, except in the case of President Wilson, been unable to discover amongst any of our enemies a serious inclination to accept this idea. However, despite the small

degree of approval which this idea at present receives, I consider that it will nevertheless be realized.

I take up my pencil and calculate the burdens with which the States of the world will emerge from this war, and I vainly ask myself how they will cover the military expenditure if the competition in armaments remain unrestricted. I do not believe that it will be possible for any State after this war adequately to meet any considerably increased requirements due to war. I rather think that financial *force majeure* will compel all States to enter into an international compromise regarding the limitation of their armaments. This calculation of mine is neither idealistic nor fantastic, but is based upon reality in politics in the most literal sense of the word. I, for my part, would consider it a great disaster if in the end there should be a failure to achieve a general settlement regarding a diminution of military armaments.

It is obvious that in the peace with Roumania we shall take precautions to have our interests in the questions of grain and food supply and raw petroleum fully respected.

We shall further take precautions that the Catholic Church and our schools receive such State protection as they need, and we shall also solve the Jewish question. The Jews will henceforth be citizens with equal right in Roumania. The Irredentist propaganda which has produced so much evil in Hungary will be restrained, and, finally, precautions will be taken to obtain indemnification for the injustice innocently suffered by many of our countrymen owing to the war.

Finally, we shall strive, by means of a new commercial treaty and the appropriate settlement of railway and shipping questions, to duly protect our economic interests in Roumania.

The peace treaty when finally concluded will be published in full.

Roumania's future lies in the East. Large portions of Bessarabia are inhabited by a Roumanian population, and there are many indications that this Roumanian population desires close union with Roumania. If, therefore, Roumania will only adopt a frank, cordial, and friendly attitude towards us, we shall have no objection to meeting these tendencies in Bessarabia. Roumania can gain in Bessarabia much more than she lost in this war.

I was most anxious in the Roumanian frontier rectifications to take nothing which would leave behind it any permanent feeling of embitterment in Roumania's national soul. I desire that the wound inflicted on Roumania by this war shall be healed. I believe that

Roumania in her own well-comprehended interest must turn to the Central Powers, and my policy aims at re-creating in the future relations of friendly neighborship. The present Roumanian Ministry, which has always favored closer union with the Central Powers, has not altered its views. Roumania's lot will solely depend upon her future policy.

Both in the conclusion of peace with the Ukraine and with Roumania it has ever been my first thought to be in a position to furnish the Monarchy with the most necessary foodstuffs and other raw materials and to guarantee this. Russia did not come into consideration in this connection, as, owing to her widespread disorganization, she is unable to procure and to distribute in her own territory the necessary raw materials.

You know that the Ukraine has promised us to deliver its entire surplus of agricultural products. The commission which was appointed to organize the exchange of commodities with the Ukraine has already met at Kieff and is now busily at work. As soon as the negotiations with the Ukrainian Government on this point are finished, and I hope this will speedily be the case, imports from the Ukraine can begin on a considerable scale.

We have agreed with the Ukrainian Government that the quantities of grain which, according to the peace treaty, are to be delivered to the Quadruple Powers shall amount to at least one million tons, and we hope that the organization to be established will render it possible to collect these supplies and have them transported within the period fixed. At present, however, there are only thirty wagons of grain, peas, and beans of the first transport now *en route* from the Ukraine. Six hundred wagons of various kinds of foodstuffs are ready in the Ukraine to be transported into the interior of Austro-Hungary, and these transports will be continued until the imports are properly organized and can begin regularly on a larger scale.

Larger imports will now be made possible by the peace with Roumania, which will permit transport from Odessa to the Danube ports. We thus hope to be able in course of time to undertake regular transport from the Ukraine.

It should not, however, be forgotten that our numerous troops now in the Ukraine draw supplies from that country itself, a circumstance which is naturally advantageous to our country.

While I admit that the imports from the Ukraine are still small and must be increased, nevertheless the logical conclusion is that our general food situation would have been considerably worse had this

agreement not been concluded. This doubly proves the necessity of peace with the Ukraine.

From Roumania herself we shall obtain seventy thousand tons of maize from last year's harvest. Moreover, about four hundred thousand tons of grain, peas, beans, and cattle fodder will have to be transported *via* the Danube. Roumania will also furnish us with a supply, to be provided immediately, of three hundred thousand sheep and one hundred thousand pigs, which supplies will produce a slight improvement in our present meat supply.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing particulars that everything has been and will continue to be done to obtain by exploitation of the regions which the peace treaties have opened up to us in the East whatever is obtainable.

The difficulties connected with the procuring of these supplies from the Ukraine are, of course, still considerable, as the Ukraine is not as yet consolidated. The State has only just concluded three years of war, and no real condition of order exists there. Assuming the good will of the Ukraine Government, which we do not doubt, to fulfil its treaty obligations, we shall, with the help of our own organization, succeed in overcoming these difficulties.

In this connection I may here remark that an immediate general peace, or such a peace within a measurable period of time, would not give us any other advantages than those which I have sketched. All Europe is today suffering from lack of foodstuffs, as a terrible consequence of the war. After the conclusion of a general peace the other States which are now still at war with us will have to take measures to improve their own food supply. In consequence, however, of diminished cargo space, imports will not be able to make good the deficiency of foodstuffs in Europe. The European granaries of the Ukraine and Roumania remain over as the most important areas for the food supply of Europe, and these have been assured to our group of Powers for the immediate future. We have thus already acquired all that it is possible for peace to bring us in this respect.

Those who are constantly urging me to adopt a policy of annexations are discontented with the peace which has been concluded. I can, however, only tell them that I regard their efforts as entirely wrong. In the first place, the forcible annexation of foreign territory would place difficulties in the way of a general peace; and, in the second place such extensions of territory are not an unconditional strengthening of the Empire. On the contrary, considering the grouping of the Monarchy, they would mean a weakening. What we require

is not territorial annexations, but economic safeguards for the future.

We wish to do everything possible to try to create in the Balkans a situation of lasting calm. We must not, however, forget that not until Russia's collapse did that factor cease to exist which hitherto had made it impossible for us to bring about a definite state of internal peace in the Balkans.

And now as to Serbia. We know that the desire for peace is very great in Serbia, but Serbia has been prevented by the Entente Powers from concluding it. Bulgaria must receive from Serbia certain districts inhabited by Bulgarians. We, however have no desire to destroy Serbia. We will enable Serbia to develop, and would welcome closer economic relations with her. We do not desire to influence future relations between the Monarchy and Serbia and Montenegro by motives conflicting with friendly and neighborly relations.

The best State egoism is to come to terms with a beaten neighbor which will lead to a lasting friendship. This is my egoism as regards Austria-Hungary. After being conquered militarily, our enemies must be conquered morally. Only then is victory complete, and in this respect diplomacy must complete the work of armies. Since I came to office I have striven only after one aim—namely, to secure an honorable peace to the Monarchy, and to create a situation which will secure to Austria-Hungary in the future free development, and, moreover, to do everything possible to ensure that this terrible war will be the last one for time out of mind. I have never spoken differently.

But I do not intend to go begging for peace, or to obtain it by entreaties and lamentation, but to enforce it by our moral right and physical strength. Any other tactics I consider will contribute to the prolongation of the war.

I must say, to my regret, that during the last few weeks and months much has been spoken and done in Austria that prolongs the war. These prolongers of war are divided into various groups, according to their motives and tactics. There are first, those who continually beg for peace. They are despicable and foolish. In France they are termed *défaitists*. To endeavor to conclude peace at any price is despicable, for it is unmanly and foolish, because it continuously feeds the already dying aggressive spirit of the enemy. The desire for peace of the great masses is natural as well as comprehensible. It is no Austro-Hungarian specialty, but it is an international manifestation. But the leaders of the people must consider that certain utterances produce abroad just the opposite effect to what they desired.

Firmly relying, therefore, on our strength and the justice of our

cause, I have already concluded three moderate but honorable peace treaties. The rest of our enemies are now also beginning to understand that we have no other desire but to secure the future of the Monarchy and that of our allies, but also that we intend to enforce this, and can and will enforce it. I shall prosecute this course regardless of consequences and join issue with anyone who opposes me.

The second group of war-prolongers are the annexationists. It is a distortion of fact to assert that Germany has made conquests in the East. Lenin's anarchy drove the border peoples into the arms of Germany. Is Germany to refuse this voluntary choice of foreign border States? The German Government as little desires oppressions as we, and I am firmly convinced that neither annexationists nor weaklings will be able to prevent forever a moderate but honorable peace. They may delay it, but they can not prevent it.

The hopes of our enemies of final victory are not only based upon military expectations and the blockade; they are based to a great extent on our internal political conditions and on certain political leaders, not forgetting the Czech leaders. We know that to be the case very well from numerous corroborative reports from abroad.

Recently, as I have already mentioned, we were almost on the point of entering into negotiations with the Western Powers, when the wind suddenly veered round, and, as we now know with certainty, the Entente decided it was better to wait, as parliamentary and political events in our country justified the hope that the Monarchy would soon be defenseless.

What terrible irony it is that while our brothers and sons are fighting like lions on the battlefield, and millions of men and women at home are heroically bearing their hard lot and are sending up urgent prayers to the Almighty for the speedy termination of the war, certain leaders of the people and the people's representatives agitate against the German alliance, which has so splendidly stood the test; pass resolutions, which no longer have the slightest connection with the State idea; find no word of blame for the Czech troops, which criminally fight against their own country and their brothers in arms; would tear parts out of the Hungarian State, under the protection of their parliamentary immunity; which make speeches which can not be construed otherwise than as a call to enemy countries to continue the struggle, solely in order to support their own political efforts; and ever anew kindle the expiring war spirit in London, Rome, and Paris.

The wretched and miserable Massaryk is not the only one of his kind. There are also Massaryks within the borders of the Monarchy.

I would much rather have spoken on this sad matter in the Delegations, but, as I have already mentioned, the convoking of the Committee has at present proved to be impossible, and I can not wait. I have to return to Roumania within the next few days to finish the peace negotiations there, and, in view of the slow course which the peace negotiations have hitherto taken, I do not know how long my enforced absence will last.

The public, however, which wishes for an honorable end to the war, shall know what, above all, prolongs this war. I raise no general accusation. I know that the Czech people, as a whole, are loyal and Austrian in mind. I know there are Czech leaders whose Austrian patriotism is pure and clear, but I do raise an accusation against these leaders who desire to terminate the war and to attain their aim by the victory of the Entente. We shall certainly triumph over these difficulties, but those who so act load themselves with a terrible responsibility. They are the cause of the further loss of thousands of our sons, of the continuance of the present misery, and of the war dragging on. Do they not shudder at this responsibility? What will the German and what will the Hungarian mothers one day say, when, after peace has returned, the war-prolonging activity of these men is clearly displayed before all the world?

Nay, more. I have no need whatever to refer to the Germans and the Hungarians. As I have already said, the very people whom these gentlemen represent do not think like them. I know Bohemia thoroughly. I know how to distinguish between the Czech people and certain of their leaders. The Czech people and the Czech mother do not think like these men. The mother who fears for her son, the wife who fears for her husband, is international. She is also the same among all the races of the Monarchy. The misery of war binds all races together. All desire that the war shall end, but they are deceived and led astray. They do not perceive that it is certain of their own representatives who are systematically prolonging the war and their consequent sufferings.

I appeal to all those who desire a speedy and honorable end to the war to unite and together carry on the struggle against high treason. No one asserts that the Austrian constitution is not capable of improvement, and the Austrian Government is quite ready, in conjunction with other competent elements, to proceed to revise the same, but those who hope for the victory of the Entente in order thus to realize their political aims commit high treason, and this high treason in the vitals of the State constitutes the last war-prolonging hope of our enemies.

If we expel this poison, then a general and honorable peace is nearer than the public at large imagines.

I appeal to all. I appeal, above all, to the Germans and Hungarians, who in this war have accomplished superhuman things, but I appeal also to the millions of the citizens of all the other races of the Monarchy, who are loyal to the State to the backbone, and who do not think like some of their leaders. Every single Austrian, every single Hungarian, must step into the breach. No one has the right to remain aside. It is a question of the last decisive struggle. Every man must remain on deck; then we shall be victorious.

FURTHER AUSTRIAN EXPLANATION OF THE AUSTRO-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS OF FEBRUARY, 1918[1]

April 5, 1918

On instructions from the Foreign Minister, Count Revertata, counselor of the legation in Switzerland met with a confidential agent of M. Clemenceau, Count Armand, attached to the French War Ministry, who was sent to Switzerland to interview Count Revertata. As a result of the interview of these two gentlemen in Freiburg, Switzerland, on February 2, the question was discussed whether and on what basis a discussion concerning the bringing about of a general peace would be possible between the Foreign Ministers of Austria-Hungary and France, or between official representatives of these Ministers.

Thereupon Count Revertata, after obtaining instructions from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, toward the close of February, declared on behalf of the Minister to Count Armand, for communication to M. Clemenceau, that Count Czernin was prepared for a discussion with a representative of France and regarded it as possible to hold a conversation with the prospect of success as soon as France renounced its plan for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine.

Count Revertata received a reply in the name of M. Clemenceau to the effect that the latter was not in a position to accept the proposed

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, April 6, 1918, p. 3. This statement was possibly drawn forth by an unofficial comment said to have been made by M. Clemenceau, to the effect that "Czernin lied" in his speech of April 2.

renunciation by France of this dis-annexation, so that a meeting of the representatives at that time would, in the view of both parties, be useless.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON ON WAR AIMS AT THE OPENING OF THE THIRD LIBERTY LOAN CAMPAIGN, BALTIMORE [1]

April 6, 1918

FELLOW CITIZENS: This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. The Nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men and, if need be, all that we possess. The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meager earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan. I have come only to give you, if I can, a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reason for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome, are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means because the cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that, if it should be lost, their own great nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow countrymen, that at no stage of this

[1] Text in Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen, and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes, without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others. There can be do difference between peoples in the final judgment, if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present Chancellor has said—in indefinite and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We can not mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rou-

mania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest. They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement; and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their Western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions can not overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favorable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?

Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a program our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That program once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world, a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded, and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind!

The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that what

the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with unpitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I can not mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honor and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destines of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

FRENCH ACCOUNT OF THE BEGINNING OF THE REVERTATA-ARMAND CONFERENCES [1]

April 6, 1918

Upon taking office M. Clemenceau found that some conversations had been begun in Switzerland upon the initiative of Austria between Count Revertata, a personal friend of the Emperor, and Commandant

[1] Text in *Le Temps*, Paris, April 7, 1918, p. 3.

Armand, of the Second Section of the General Staff, designated for that purpose by the Minister at that time.

M. Clemenceau did not believe that he should take the responsibility of interrupting the *pourparlers* which had not yielded any result, but which might furnish useful sources of information. Commandant Armand was able, therefore, to continue to betake himself to Switzerland upon the request of Count Revertata. The instructions which were given him in the presence of his chief by M. Clemenceau were these: "Listen and say nothing."

When Count Revertata was finally convinced that his alluring attempt at a German peace would remain without success, he took the trouble, to the end of giving an appearance of success to his mission, to turn over on the 25th of February to Commandant Armand a note in his own handwriting, the first sentence of which runs thus: "In the month of August, 1917, some conversations had been begun to the end of obtaining from the French Government, with a view to future peace, certain propositions made at the instance of Austria-Hungary, which should be of such a nature that they could be supported by the latter with the Government of Berlin."

Count Revertata, the tempter and not the tempted, therefore confesses in these words that it was a question of obtaining from the French Government some peace proposals under cover of Austria, but destined for Berlin, and behold the fact established by an authentic document which Count Czernin dares to transpose in these words: " M. Clemenceau some time before the beginning of the offensive on the Western front caused me to be questioned whether I were ready to enter into negotiations and upon what basis."

Not only in speaking thus has he not told the truth but, still more, he has told the contrary of the truth. In France that is what we call lying.

It is natural that M. Clemenceau has been unable to restrain his indignation when he has seen Count Czernin, justly uneasy concerning the final consequences of the offensive, reversing so audaciously the rôles in the affair, and representing the French Government as begging peace at the very hour when we were preparing ourselves with our allies to inflict supreme defeat upon the Central Empires. It would be too easy to recall the extent to which Austria has wearied Rome, Washington, and London with her temptations of a pretended separate peace, which had no other object than to slip upon our necks the yoke in which she professes to be so comfortable. Who does not know the history of the recent meeting, in Switzerland of course, of a former

Ambassador of Austria with a high personage of the Entente? The "conference" did not last more than a few minutes. This time, again, it was not our ally who had requested the interview; it was the Austrian Government. Could not Count Czernin recall in his mind the memory of another attempt of the same order, made at Paris and at London, only two months before the Revertata adventure, by a personage of a rank far above his own? There again there exists, as in the present case, an authentic proof, but one much more convincing.

STATEMENT OF EX-PREMIER PAINLEVE ON AUSTRO-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS IN 1917[1]

April 6, 1918

During the year 1917 Austria made several attempts to open semi-official negotiations with the Entente Allies. Notably in June, 1917. I was advised by the Second Bureau that Austria, through the person of Count Revertata, had several times asked through a Swiss intermediary for an interview with the officer attached to the Second Bureau, Major Armand, a distant relative.

Alexander Ribot, then Premier, having been consulted, Major Armand and Count Revertata met in August, 1917. The matter stopped there, and no interview took place from August until November, when I left office.

REVELATION BY PREMIER CLEMENCEAU OF THE PRINCE SIXTUS LETTER[2]

April 8, 1918

A diluted lie is still a lie. Count Czernin told a lie when he said that some time before the German offensive began Premier Clemenceau caused him to be asked "if he was ready to open negotiations and upon what basis."

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, April 7, 1918, p. 4.
[2] *Ibid.*, April 9, 1918, p. 3.

As to the passage in the manuscript note of Count Revertata, where he says he acted for Austria to obtain from France peace proposals, the solicitant's text is authentic and Count Czernin has not dared to dispute it.

To hide his confusion, he tries to maintain that the conversation was resumed at the request of M. Clemenceau. Unfortunately for him, there is a fact which reduces his allegation to nothing, namely, that Clemenceau was apprised of the matter on November 18, 1917 (that is to say, the day after he took over the Ministry of War), by communication from the intermediary dated November 10 and intended for his predecessors. For Count Czernin's contention to be true, M. Clemenceau would have had to take the initiative in question before he was Premier. Thus Count Czernin is categorically contradicted by facts.

He is reduced to maintaining that Major Armand was M. Clemenceau's confidential man. Well, until this incident M. Clemenceau had seen this officer of the Intelligence Department only once, for five minutes at a riding school fifteen or twenty years ago.

Finally, Count Czernin, as a last resource, says that what he attributes to M. Clemenceau is unimportant. "What is really important," he affirms, "is not to know who took the initiative for the conversations before the offensive, but who caused them to fail." Then why all this fuss? To demonstrate that every French Government, like France itself, is immovable on the question of Alsace-Lorraine.

Who would have thought it would have been necessary for Count Revertata to elucidate for Count Czernin a question upon which the Emperor of Austria himself has said the last word? It was no other than Emperor Charles who in a letter dated March, 1917, put on record in his own writing his adhesion to "France's just claim relative to Alsace-Lorraine." A second imperial letter stated that the Emperor was "in agreement with his Minister." It only remained for Czernin to contradict himself.

OFFICIAL AUSTRIAN REPLY TO THE FRENCH DEFENSE AND TO M. PAINLEVÉ[1]

April 8, 1918

In contrast to the first brief declaration of Premier Clemenceau, in which he gave the lie to Foreign Minister Czernin, it is observed with satisfaction that M. Clemenceau's statement of April 6 admits that discussions in regard to the question of peace took place between two confidential agents of Austria-Hungary and France. The account given by M. Clemenceau of the initiation and course of these negotiations, and likewise the statement of M. Painlevé on the same subject, however, deviate in many important particulars and to such a degree from the facts that a detailed correction of the French communication appears to be necessary.

In July, 1917, Count Revertata was requested by an intermediary in the name of the French Government to state whether he was in a position to receive a communication from that Government to the Government of Austria-Hungary. When Count Revertata, after having obtained the sanction of the Austro-Hungarian Government, replied in the affirmative to this inquiry, in the same month—July, 1917—Major Armand was charged with such communication by the then French Premier, Ribot. He arrived on August 7, 1917, at Count Revertata's private residence in Freiburg, the Count being distantly related to him.

Major Armand then addressed to Count Revertata a question as to whether discussions between France and Austria-Hungary were possible. Thus the initiative for these discussions was taken from the French side.

Count Revertata reported to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister that this question had been put on instructions of the French Government, and the Minister thereupon requested Count Revertata to enter into discussions with the French confidential agent, and in the course of these discussions to establish whether by this means a basis for bringing about a general peace could be secured.

On August 22 and 23 Count Revertata entered into discussions with Major Armand, which, however, as Premier Clemenceau quite correctly declares, yielded no result. The negotiations thereupon were broken off.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, April 9, 1918, p. 3.

The Clemenceau version that the discussions between Revertata and Armand were proceeding on his entry into office is incorrect. Not until January, 1918, did Armand, this time on instructions from Clemenceau, again get in touch with Revertata. The thread had been broken in August, 1917, and was therefore again taken up by Clemenceau himself in January, 1918.

From the fresh contact there resulted the discussions referred to in the official *communiqué* of April 4, 1918. It is however correct that Count Revertata handed to Major Armand on February 23, 1918, the memorandum regarding which Premier Clemenceau only cites the first sentence and which confirms that in the discussions with Armand, which had taken place in August, 1917, Revertata was charged with the task of finding out whether proposals were obtainable from the French Government, which had addressed to Austria-Hungary an offer of a basis for a general peace, and also whether they would be such as Austria-Hungary could bring to the knowledge of her allies.

It, therefore, entirely corresponded with the facts when Count Czernin in his speech on April 2 last declared that Premier Clemenceau, some time before beginning of the western offensive, had inquired of me whether I was prepared for negotiations and on what basis.

Nothing is known to the Austro-Hungarian Government of entreaties for an alleged separate peace with which the Austro-Hungarian Government worried the Governments of Rome, Washington, and London. When M. Clemenceau asks the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister whether he remembers that two months before the Revertata affair—that is, about a year ago—an attempt of a like nature was made by a personage of far higher rank, Count Czernin does not hesitate to reply in the affirmative. But for the sake of completeness and entire correctness it should be added that this attempt also led to no result.

So much for the establishment of the facts. For the rést, it need only be remarked that Count Czernin for his part would see no reason to deny it, if, in this or any similar case, he had taken the initiative, because, in contrast to M. Clemenceau, he believes that it can not be a matter for reproach for a government to make attempts to bring about an honorable peace, which would liberate all peoples from the terrors of the present war.

The dispute raised by M. Clemenceau has, moreover, diverted attention from the real kernel of Count Czernin's statement. The essence of this statement was not so much who suggested the discussions undertaken before the beginning of the western offensive, but who

caused their collapse, and M. Clemenceau up to the present has not denied that he refused to enter upon negotiations on the basis of the renunciation of the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine.

FRENCH OFFICIAL STATEMENT CONTAINING THE TEXT OF THE PRINCE SIXTUS LETTER[1]

April 11, 1918

Once caught in the cogwheels of lying, there is no means of stopping. Emperor Charles, under Berlin's eye, is taking on himself the lying denials of Count Czernin, and thus compels the French Government to supply the proof. Herewith is the text of an autograph letter communicated on March 31, 1917, by Prince Sixtus de Bourbon, the Emperor of Austria's brother-in-law, to President Poincaré, and communicated immediately, with the Prince's consent, to the French Premier:

"My Dear Sixtus: The end of the third year of this war, which has brought so much mourning and grief into the world, approaches. All the peoples of my empire are more closely united than ever in the common determination to safeguard the integrity of the monarchy at the cost even of the heaviest sacrifices.

"Thanks to their union, with the generous cooperation of all nationalities, my empire and monarchy have succeeded in resisting the gravest assaults for nearly three years. Nobody can question the military advantages secured by my troops, particularly in the Balkans.

"France, on her side, has shown force, resistance, and dashing courage which are magnificent. We all unreservedly admire the admirable bravery, which is traditional to her army, and the spirit of sacrifice of the entire French people.

"Therefore it is a special pleasure to me to note that, although for the moment adversaries, no real divergence of views or aspirations separates many of my empire from France, and that I am justified in hoping that my keen sympathy for France, joined to that which prevails in the whole monarchy, will forever avoid a return of the state of war, for which no responsibility can fall on me.

"With this in mind, and to show in a definite manner the reality

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, April 12, 1918, p. 1.

of these feelings, I beg you to convey privately and unofficially to President Poincaré that I will support by every means, and by exerting all my personal influence with my allies, France's just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine.

"Belgium should be entirely reestablished in her sovereignty retaining entirely her African possessions without prejudice to the compensations she should receive for the losses she has undergone.

" Serbia should be reestablished in her sovereignty and, as a pledge of our good-will we are ready to assure her equitable natural access to the Adriatic, and also wide economic concessions in Austria-Hungary. On her side, we will demand, as principal and essential conditions, that Serbia cease in the future all relation with, and suppresses every association or group whose political objects aim at the disintegration of the monarchy, particularly the Serbian Political Society, Narodni Ochrana; that Serbia loyally and by every means in her power prevent any kind of political agitation, either in Serbia or beyond her frontiers, in the foregoing direction, and give assurances thereof under the guarantee of the Entente Powers.

" The events in Russia compel me to reserve my ideas with regard to that country until a legal definite government is established there.

" Having thus laid my ideas clearly before you, I would ask you in turn, after consulting with these two Powers, to lay before me the opinion of France and England, with a view thus to preparing the ground for an understanding on the basis of which official preliminary negotiations could be taken up and reach a result satisfactory to all.

" Hoping that thus we will soon be able together to put a limit to the sufferings of so many millions of men and families now plunged in sadness and anxiety, I beg to assure you of my warmest and most brotherly affection.

" CHARLES."

Count Czernin, having recognized by his note of April 8 the existence of this negotiation due to the initiative of a personage of " a rank far above his," the Austrian Government is now summoned to give an explanation of the " attempt " avowed by it and of the details of the conversation of its delegates.

DENIAL OF EMPEROR CHARLES IN A TELEGRAM TO KAISER WILLIAM II [1]

April 11, 1918

The French Prime Minister, driven into a corner, is endeavoring to escape from the net of lies in which he has entangled himself by piling up more and more untruths, and he does not hesitate now to make the completely false statement that I recognized that France had a just claim to the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine. I disavow this assertion with indignation. At a moment when Austro-Hungarian cannon are thundering jointly with German cannon on the Western front it hardly needs proof that I am fighting for these provinces, and am ready to continue fighting exactly as if it were a question of defending my own lands.

Although in the face of this eloquent proof of full community of aims, for which now for almost four years we have been waging war, I consider it to be superfluous to waste even a word on M. Clemenceau's false assertion, I desire, nevertheless, to take this opportunity of again assuring you of the complete solidarity which exists between you and me and your empire and mine. No intrigues, no attempts from whomsoever they may proceed, will imperil our loyal comradeship of arms, and we shall jointly enforce an honorable peace.

TELEGRAM OF KAISER WILLIAM II CONFIRMING HIS FAITH IN EMPEROR CHARLES [2]

April 12, 1918

Accept my heartiest thanks for your telegram, in which you repudiate as entirely baseless the assertion of the French Premier regarding your attitude toward French claims to Alsace-Lorraine, and in which you once again accentuate the solidarity of interest existing between us and our respective empires. I hasten to inform you that in my eyes there was no need whatever for any such assurance on your

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, April 12, 1918, p. 5.
[2] Text in *The New York Times Current History* magazine, June, 1918, p. 495.

part, for I was not for a moment in doubt that you have made our cause your own, in the same measure as we stand for the rights of your monarchy. The heavy but successful battles of these years have clearly demonstrated this fact to every one who wants to see. They have only drawn the bonds close together. Our enemies, who are unable to do anything against us in honorable warfare, do not recoil from the most sordid and the lowest methods. We must, therefore, put up with it, but all the more is it our duty ruthlessly to grapple with and beat the enemy in all the theaters of war. In true friendship.

WILHELM.

AUSTRIAN CLAIM THAT THE PRINCE SIXTUS LETTER WAS FALSIFIED[1]

April 13, 1918

The letter by his Apostolic Majesty, published by the French Premier in his *communiquè* of April 12, 1918, is falsified (*verfaelscht*). First of all, it may be declared that the personality of far higher rank than the Foreign Minister, who, as admitted in the official statement of April 7, undertook peace efforts in the Spring of 1917, must be understood to be not his Apostolic Majesty but Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, who in the spring of 1917 was occupied with bringing about a *rapprochement* between the belligerent States. As regards the text of the letter published by M. Clemenceau, the Foreign Minister declares by All Highest command that his Apostolic Majesty wrote a purely personal private letter in the spring of 1917 to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, which contained no instructions to the Prince to initiate mediation with the President of the French Republic or any one else, to hand on communications which might be made to him, or to evoke and receive replies. This letter, morever, made no mention of the Belgian question, and contained, relative to Alsace-Lorraine, the following passage: "I would have used all my personal influence in favor of the French claims for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, if these claims were just. They are not, however." The second letter of the Emperor mentioned in the French Premier's *communiqué* of April 9, in which his Apostolic Majesty is said to have

[1] Text in *Current History*, June, 1918, p. 494.

declared that he was "in accord with his Minister," is significantly not mentioned by the French *communiqué*.

FRENCH REPLY OF APRIL 14[1]

April 14, 1918

There are rotten consciences. The Emperor Charles, finding it impossible to save his face, falls into the stammerings of a man confounded. He is now reduced to accusing his brother-in-law of forgery, by fabricating with his own hand a lying text. The original document, the text of which has been published by the French Government, was communicated in the presence of M. Jules Cambon, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and delegated for this purpose by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Republic, who, with the authorization of the Prince, handed a copy of it to the Prime Minister.

The Prince spoke of the matter to M. Ribot [then Prime Minister] himself in terms which would have been devoid of sense if the text had not been that published by the French Government. Is it not evidence that no conversation could have been opened and that the President of the Republic would not even have received the Prince a second time if the latter, at Austria's instance, had been the bearer of a document which contested our rights instead of affirming them?

The Emperor Charles's letter, as we have quoted it, was shown by Prince Sixtus himself to the Chief of the State. Moreover, two friends of the Prince can attest the authenticity of the letter, especially the one who received it from the Prince to copy it.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, April 15, 1918, p. 7.

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR ON THE PRINCE SIXTUS EPISODE, ALLIED AIMS AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS [1]

May 16, 1918

Mr. RUNCIMAN (Dewsbury, L.) said he rose to call attention to the Emperor of Austria's letter not with the idea of causing difficulty to the Government, for he realized how delicate the position had been, still was, and might continue to be, but in order to obtain some information as to the part taken by the Prime Minister or other members of the Government who had dealt with the matter in this country. After referring to the events and proceedings which appeared to have arisen from the letter, which was shown by Prince Sixtus to M. Poincaré, the right honorable gentlemen asked the Foreign Secretary: —When the Emperor Charles's letter was first communicated to our Prime Minister, were any of the other Allies, except Baron Sonnino, consulted? Was there any communication to any of the other European Allies, and, in particular, was any communication made by our Prime Minister or by the French Government to the American Government, which was as deeply concerned in the attaining of a peace as we were? That these great transactions—they might have been great—should have gone on without the knowledge of President Wilson was almost inconceivable.

So far as one could ascertain Russia was not informed of what had taken place. M. Kerensky was, it was to be presumed, entirely in the dark at that time and that was the very moment when he was appealing to the Allies to take some steps towards a negotiated peace. Mixed up in this curious tangle of events was the proposed conference at Stockholm. It was impossible to disentangle the Stockholm Conference from this transaction, and it had a direct bearing on the attitude of M. Kerensky and of other important persons since then. He further asked Mr. Balfour: Did our Prime Minister inform the Foreign Office at the time of the communication of the fact of the communication having been made and having been shown to him? Why were the negotiations dropped? Was it on purely territorial grounds? Was it because the demand was made by France, not only for Alsace-Lorraine, but for the 1814 line, or even, as was said in some quarters,

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, May 17, 1918, p. 8.

the 1790 line? If the 1814 line was in any way incorporated in our war aims it would come as a great surprise to public opinion. As far as he had been able to ascertain it had never been contemplated by the Foreign Office or in any statements made by the present or previous Prime Minister, although some members of the War Cabinet had at times made speeches that lent themselves to the view that the 1814 line was part of the war aims which they contemplated. On the general question of the necessity of making a statement now he pointed out that far more information had been given to the Foreign Affairs Committee in France than had been vouchsafed to the House of Commons. He asked for nothing confidential, but merely for such information as the Foreign Secretary felt he could communicate to the House. It was to the interest of the Allies that we should be told as much in England as could be communicated to the public in France.

Mr. BALFOUR, responding to the cries of "Balfour," said: The right honorable gentleman who has just sat down has not been pouring in a series of questions for the last fortnight like honorable gentlemen I see congregated below the gangway, and who have indicated in the ordinary parliamentary fashion that they mean to take a more or less important part in this debate. I conceived, therefore, that I should be only acting for the convenience of the House if I waited until I had heard their case before I attempted to reply. I understand, however, that they have entrusted their case to the right honorable gentleman opposite. (Mr. RUNCIMAN demurred.) I do not suggest that there has been any collusion between them, but I thought the case presented by the right honorable gentleman was their case.

Mr. KING: Is the right honorable gentleman not aware that the noble lord (Lord R. Cecil) has returned, and that we have been informed that he also will take part in the discussion?

Mr. BALFOUR: The honorable gentleman is mistaken on that point. There is no suggestion that my noble friend should deal with this particular topic raised by the honorable gentleman opposite and on which so many questions have been asked me in the course of the last fortnight or three weeks. The subject is very naturally exciting a great deal of interest both in this country and abroad. I must, however, remind the House that there is a very natural tendency to treat this subject as though it was one in which the British Government alone was concerned, and that the Opposition or critics of the Government of the day have a right, therefore, in the public interest, and in their own, to extract the last drop of information which it is in the power of the Government to give. That is a very natural mood for

the House of Commons to be in. It is one to which we are accustomed on ordinary subjects of domestic controversy, and it is a mood of which we can not be expected easily to divest ourselves when we come to deal with these delicate questions of international policy. Although this point was very fully present to the mind of the right honorable gentleman, I am not at all sure that it was present to the mind of many members of this Assembly.

This is not a matter which can be discussed as if it were a domestic question. The people whose conduct is impugned, or against whom suggestions are made, are not merely or chiefly British Ministers; the question is an international question which touches not only our domestic controversies but even more acutely the controversies of many of our neighbors and our allies. It is perfectly impossible, and it would be grossly improper, for anybody holding my office to attempt to deal with the subject in a form which would be not only desirable but necessary if I were merely defending the action of his Majesty's Ministers on a subject deeply affecting the conduct of our foreign relations. That general observation is true and would be true of all discussions on those most delicate subjects of the approaches towards peace discussions.

It is a curious thing in regard to the gentlemen who are proud of the name of pacifists that there is a little inconsistency between their conduct in this House and their professions. Honorable gentlemen must know quite well that when the condition of international affairs has got to its present position in Europe it is not a good thing necessarily to discourage informal attempts at conversations. But directly a suggestion is made, honorable gentlemen, who are always trying to make parliamentary capital, at once proceed to turn it to some controversial purpose. As far as I am concerned let me say this—that we have never at any time laid down that we would not listen to conversations if other people wished it. If any representative of any belligerent desires seriously to lay before us proposals we are prepared to listen to them. Of course we are not going to deal with them without our allies, but in the full confidence of our allies. Certainly the last thing that I should lay down would be that the door must be shut to any kind of informal approach which had in it any elements of authenticity and adequate credentials. The very fact that such conversations are informal at the time necessarily makes them a very improper subject for discussion in this House.

If that is true as a general proposition, it is emphatically and especially true of the international episode which is the subject of our

discussion this afternoon. The letter which has attracted public attention was a private letter written by the Emperor of Austria to a relative, conveyed by that relative to the French President and the French Prime Minister under the seal of the strictest secrecy, and without permission to convey it to anybody except the Prime Minister and the Sovereign of this country, and without permission even to communicate it to the Cabinet colleagues of the Prime Minister of this country.

Mr. ASQUITH: As a matter of fact, was it not conveyed only to the President?

Mr. BALFOUR (turning interrogatively to Mr. Bonar Law): It was conveyed to the Prime Minister?

Mr. BONAR LAW: He knew it.

Mr. BALFOUR: I understand that in the first instance it was conveyed to the President and was communicated to the French Prime Minister and to the English Prime Minister under these pledges. A more inconvenient method of dealing with great transactions could hardly be conceived. The inconvenience was not due to any wish on the part of the French Prime Minister to carry out public business in this most inconvenient fashion. Whenever you depart from the ordinary methods of conducting international affairs you land yourself inevitably in very great difficulties. Records are not kept. Cabinet discussion is hampered, or is impossible. The whole machinery of government works with extreme difficulty. I was in America at the time, and I never heard of these transactions till I returned, when practically the whole subject had become a matter of history in all its main aspects. I confess, as I have very little time for dealing with history, that I did not go into these things as intimately as I might have done, because the transaction was over.

My right honorable friend has asked me whether the President of the United States was informed. I was the Foreign Minister, not indeed the acting Foreign Minister, still the titular Foreign Minister of Great Britain; I was in Washington at the time; I was not informed and could not be informed, under the conditions I have described, of this transaction. I need hardly say, therefore, that the Government with whom I was acting were absorbed with a quite different order of questions, and no better acquainted with these facts than I was. If anybody supposes we have ever shown any want of confidence in the President of the United States they are laboring under a complete delusion. I have no secrets. Every thought I have of the war, of the diplomacy connected with the war, is as open to the President of

the United States as to any other human being. I do not believe it is possible for Great Britain and the United States to carry on the great work on which they are engaged, to deal with the complex problems which meet them from day to day, without complete confidence, and so far as I am concerned, complete confidence is always given.

The second question which the right honorable gentleman put to me related to the Stockholm Conference. I am not going into the whole question of the Stockholm Conference. Personally I think that it is a matter which it is very difficult to speak of with any confidence, a matter on which there is much to be said, and reasonably said, on both sides. But I myself was no believer in the Stockholm Conference. I did not think then, and I do not think now, that it really would have conduced in any important way to a settlement of this great war. The course taken by the British Government with regard to Stockholm had no relation near or remote with the Emperor Charles's private letter to Prince Sixtus, or with the negotiations or conversations that thereupon took place. They were wholly separate transactions decided on quite different principles and absolutely unconnected one with the other.

The right honorable gentleman asked me whether one of the reasons why these incipient conversations did not lead to any fruitful result was that France, not content with asking for the return of the Alsace-Lorraine of 1870, asked in addition to that for those further territories which were attached to Alsace-Lorraine in 1790 or in 1814. He was referring, of course, to all that passed, or was alleged to have passed, between M. Doumergue and the late Czar, I think in the early days of 1917. There was no question of this bigger Alsace-Lorraine being a war aim of the Allies. M. Doumergue's mission to Russia, his conversations with the Czar, were not known to us until very much later. They had no international bearing. Certainly this Government never gave the least encouragement to any such notion. It was altogether outside our whole modes of thought on this subject. It was not a subject which we should ever have seriously contemplated, nor do I think it ever was a very fixed or solid part of the foreign policy for any length of time of any French Government.

Mr. Outhwaite: The reference is not, as the right honorable gentleman supposes, to this treaty, but to the statement in the press that President Poincaré met the Emperor Charles's suggestion by a demand for these further extensions of territory.

Mr. Balfour: *Pourparlers* were not interfered with by any such demands as the honorable gentleman suggests. That was not the point

at all. I know that some members of this House have thought that I have been too reticent in my refusals to answer questions put to me across the floor of this House, and even those who thought, perhaps, that I was well in not answering such questions may think I ought to deal more fully than I propose to do with the subject in debate. But a little consideration will, I think, show the House that I am absolutely well advised on this point.

We do not know exactly what motive influenced Count Czernin, the Emperor Charles, and the German Emperor in these various transactions. I am inclined to think that it was all a part of what now is sometimes called a "peace offensive." An honorable gentleman seemed to interpret the phrase "peace offensive" as carrying with it by inference the suggestion that people who talked about peace offensives were people who intended to reject any propositions for peace, whatever those propositions might be. That is not what peace offensive means. I am quite unable to follow the logic by which the honorable gentleman arrives at that conclusion.

Mr. Ponsonby (Stirling Burghs, L.): May I ask whether the word "offensive" does not necessarily imply rejection or resistance?

The Speaker: Honorable members should allow the right honorable gentleman to continue his speech, seeing that they did not avail themselves of the opportunity of speaking previously.

Mr. Balfour: The honorable gentleman is quite mistaken. The meaning of the expression "peace offensive" is that propositions are made by one party who does not desire peace himself, but who does desire to divide his enemies by making proposals of peace. That is the policy which undoubtedly lay at the root, I will not say of all these transactions, because I am not sure, but undoubtedly of a great many of the transactions which have been brought before the House recently, and which the right honorable gentleman who has just sat down has referred to. Take, for example, the publication by M. Clemenceau of the fact of these offers from the Emperor Charles. How did it arise? Why was it done? It was done because Count Czernin in pursuing a peace offensive tried to suggest to the world, and especially to the Italian world, that they were being made to go on with the fighting in order that France might obtain Alsace-Lorraine. The letter of the Emperor of Austria was directed equally to a peace offensive, but a peace offensive aimed at another member of the Alliance. There the suggestion was that France should have Alsace-Lorraine, but no suggestion was made that Italy should have anything. That is the other side of the peace offensive. No wonder M. Clemenceau, who is

a great man, but not a patient man, seeing this cynical attempt to divide the Allies by suggesting that the whole war was being continued in order that France might obtain Alsace-Lorraine, turned round and said to the people who made that insinuation, "You yourselves offered Alsace-Lorraine to France about a year ago." If you are dealing with people as cynical in their methods as the Central Powers some kind of counter-attack is rendered almost obligatory. The actual mode of counter-attack which was adopted by M. Clemenceau appears to me to have been thoroughly effective in the sense that it has exposed in the clearest manner the methods by which Central European diplomacy is animated. There is much that is obscure in the letter. There is much which I think will always remain obscure. I believe that every other effort at conversation made by the Central Powers has never been made in the interests of a fair and honorable peace, but has always been made in the interests of dividing the Allies against whom the Central Powers are contending. That is the only thread which draws together these disconnected efforts. That is the only common principle that lies at the root of all of them.

That they desire peace on their own terms is, of course, absolutely true. Everybody does. The whole world is passionately desirous of peace if it can be obtained on terms which to the various combatants seem tolerable. There is no symptom whatever at the present time that German public opinion, in so far as German public opinion exists, certainly not the opinion of the soldiers and the civilians dominated by the soldiers who now bear sway in the German Government circles—(Mr. SNOWDEN: Thanks to you.)—either now or at any time have contemplated the possibility of what we should regard as a reasonable peace, a peace which is going to secure the future of the world and the freedom of those who are in danger of falling under German domination. They vary with almost cynical readiness the principles which they profess and the policy which they have adopted. Never under any circumstances does a close examination suggest that they wanted to have the kind of peace with which alone I believe even honorable gentlemen sitting below the gangway would feel themselves content. The very letter which is the occasion of this debate is surely a proof of that. The right honorable gentleman suggested, and he may very well be right—I certainly have no evidence to the contrary—that the two Emperors met together and contrived this little *coup*. It is possible. I do not know whether it is true.

There is this curious and significant fact, that the offer made by the Austrian Emperor to the President of the French Republic under

the narrow limitations which I have endeavored to describe to the House consisted of an offer by the Austrians of something that belonged to the Germans. The Austrians are hardly in a position now, and hardly were in a position then, to offer the territory of their infinitely more powerful ally to anybody without that ally's consent. It is almost incredible that Austria, who notoriously has fallen more and more into the grip of Germany, should have quietly suggested that she would be very glad to make peace at Germany's expense. What the explanation of that may be I do not know, except it be the one which I have indicated to the House, and which I think was suggested by my honorable friend himself. Anyhow, a suggestion of that character is not one which anybody would look on very confidently as in itself containing an arrangement that is likely to mature.

This question has been examined, no doubt with a knowledge of the facts more minute than I can give to the House, by a Committee of the French Chamber. My right honorable friend who just sat down appeared almost to suggest that we should have a Select Committee to inquire into these transactions. I think that would be a most deplorable precedent.

Mr. RUNCIMAN: I did not suggest that. What I did was to incidentally remark that the Government had a horror of Select Committees.

Mr. BALFOUR: I see; it was a delicate reference to another controversy. At all events, however that may be, it is quite clear that we neither have the machinery now for the sort of investigation which the Committee of the French Chamber has carried on, nor that a Select Committee will provide that machinery. I am not going to discuss whether we ought or ought not to modify our institutions as to copy our neighbors in this respect. My own opinion is that it would be inadvisable. We may say this: The French Chamber have the machinery, they have used it freely with regard to this particular controversy, and the conclusion they came to was that the letter of the Emperor Charles did not provide adequate or satisfactory bases for an honorable peace. You may say that the Committee of the French Chamber were prejudiced. You may say that other motives than a judicial consideration of these historical facts animated the verdict, but observe, if they had prejudices at all, it would surely have been in favor of a peace which gave them Alsace-Lorraine without further fighting. That is the point. The suggestion is that the Emperor of Austria made a proposal, which he could have imposed afterwards upon Germany, by which the war should come to an end and France

would obtain Alsace-Lorraine. If there had been any possibility that the proposal really carried with it the seeds of an honorable peace, is it not patent that a Committee of the French Chamber would have expressed its regret that the opportunity had been thrown away by the French Ministers or the French Prime Minister? They came to precisely the opposite conclusion. (Mr. SNOWDEN: Only by one-third majority.) Of course. It was not unanimous. I said that the Committee, by the ordinary procedure of those committees had given its verdict in that way, and with that verdict I think the House might well be content.

We at all events can not be accused of any selfish considerations in this matter. There is nobody who can be more desirous than the British Government of bringing this war to an honorable termination, and if any method by which that can be accomplished is shown to us, of course it will be accepted. But we are fighting as one among Allies against the Central Powers, who, so far as I can make out, have never at any time, and now less than ever, had the least intention of meeting our wishes—I mean the wishes in which I believe the whole House, the whole country, and even many honorable gentlemen sitting below the gangway opposite, entirely agree. Those great aims of ours can only be attained by absolute loyalty between the various Allies. It is not so simple and so easy a matter as some honorable gentlemen appear to suppose to run an alliance, even if the alliance has been founded on the most unselfish principles. So long as human nature is what it is there must be causes of difficulty, there must be causes of friction. It is inevitable that one nation does not look at the problems before it from precisely and exactly the same angle as another nation. Differences of temperament, those small differences of outlook which I have described, even pettier subjects of difference may arise, and must arise, from time to time, even if you confine yourself only, as you have no right to do, to the four or five great belligerents—even confining yourselves to them, where you have five Foreign Offices, five War Departments, five Cabinets, of course there are points of difficulty which must necessarily arise, and everybody knows that that must happen. The one thing which makes it possible to sweep all these things on one side, and to get them in the right proportion, is, in the first place, that we should keep our eyes fixed upon the great common object of the war, and, secondly, that we should have in each other absolute and unbreakable confidence in our mutual loyalty.

The main thing which makes me regret such debates as we are having now, or which makes me see in them some germs of difficulty and

danger, is that the sort of controversy to which we are accustomed, within, as it were, the limits of our own family affairs, should be applied to international affairs. In our own family affairs no harm is done. We are all accustomed to it, we are all familiar with it, it is our daily bread and our daily life. (An honorable member: Very nourishing, too.) But it is a very different thing when you apply those methods, which are not out of place or not much out of place within these walls, to international controversies, to the action of foreign statesmen, to the motives of foreign Parliaments, and to the deeds of foreign armies. Believe me that that kind of freedom of discussion would be absolutely fatal to any alliance. I think there is no greater duty—sometimes it is a duty difficult to perform and rather ungrateful—no duty more incumbent upon the holder, whoever he may be, of the office which is for the moment entrusted to me than to take care that in so far as in him lies nothing shall be said which makes it more difficult to carry out the task which can be accomplished if all the great Allies remain unanimous, but which will be lost irretrievably if any breach were allowed to creep in between them.

Mr. Asquith (Fife, L.): As the right honorable gentleman has very truly said, we are treading here on the most delicate ground—ground which ought not to be entered upon except with the utmost circumspection and reserve, and with the fullest sense of responsibility not only on the part of the members of this House. My right honorable friend (Mr. Runciman), as was acknowledged by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, approached the subject in that spirit. (Mr. Balfour. Hear, hear.) To the appeal which the right honorable gentleman has just made, which I believe will find a ready and cordial response in every quarter of the House, that we should not at this or any stage of the war import into the discussions of matters, whether they be of strategy or diplomacy, the controversial spirit we are accustomed to indulge in with regard to our domestic affairs—that appeal is one which so far as I can, I shall venture not only by precept but by practice to respond to. I rise not for the purpose of probing further into these matters of fact, but simply for the purpose, if I may, of summarizing and recording with satisfaction in two or three sentences the substance and effect of what I venture to think was a most instructive and opportune statement on the part of the Government bench. In the first place, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said—there was nobody who would have doubted it if he had not said it, and it is satisfactory not only to us but to the world at large to know it—that the British Government has closed no door to

overtures and approaches in the direction of an honorable peace—and that they are not confined to what I may call the formal, the normal, and the conventional methods of full-dress diplomacy—from whatever quarter, be it with adequate authority and with real good faith, if an appeal is made which is not merely rhetorical, but which is based upon substantial considerations—from whatever quarter such an appeal is directed to them, they would not, I am certain, turn to it a deaf ear. Let that be clear.

The next point is equally important, and my right honorable friend was well advised to lay the stress upon it that he did. My right honorable friend (Mr. Runciman) asked whether any communication was made of this correspondence and the *pourparlers,* such as they were, which ensued upon it, to the President of the United States. I gather it was not, for what I am quite prepared to suppose were perfectly adequate reasons. The thing did not last long, and it disappeared and became, as the right honorable gentleman said, a matter of history rather than of actual practical diplomacy. I welcome, as I am sure the whole House will welcome, his assurance that not only in matters of this kind will he and the Government at large have no secrets from the President of the United States. What is equally important is that, difficult as the task is, delicate as it is, sometimes almost heartbreaking, to have a complete accord certainly of knowledge and information, based upon a full interchange of knowledge and information, of policy and practice between all the Allies fighting in the same cause—difficult and delicate as that task is, it is one which must never be lost sight of, which must be strenuously pursued in spite of difficulties, even if in the pursuit of it you are obliged from time to time to reject what may seem to be for the moment promising prospects, or, at any rate, to delay their being carried into effect. I am sure you can not carry on a struggle of this kind—we feel it increasingly the larger the area of the alliance—you can not effectually carry on a struggle of this kind unless on the basis of complete mutual confidence between the Allies. The third and last point of which I should like to take note is what my right honorable friend has said in regard to the claim said to be put forward in France as one of the conditions of an honorable peace, that is, what is vaguely but conveniently called "the line of 1814." Now, as a matter of fact, I rather gather from my right honorable friend's statement—he will correct me if I am wrong—he tells us that, so far as his information goes, after the letter was delivered to President Poincaré, the allegation which we have seen in many quarters that

he then put forward this demand for the 1814 line, is, as far as my right honorable friend knows, totally without foundation. I am very glad to hear that, and I may say that I am not in the least surprised to hear it. But I want to go a step further, and take note with still more satisfaction of my right honorable friend's declaration that there never has been in the war aims of the British Government, and that so far as he knows—of course, no one can speak with absolute assurance—so far as he knows, it has not been, and is not now, to be accounted a part of the settled policy of the French Government. Am I right in that?

Mr. BALFOUR: Yes, I think so.

Mr. ASQUITH: I am extremely glad to hear it, though I never had any doubt of it, and I think the country and the world will be glad to hear what the right honorable gentleman said today, for let me say once more that while, in my judgment, there has not been, and there should not be, any contraction, so equally, in my judgment, there should not be any expansion of the declared aims and purposes for which we entered on the war, and for which we have prosecuted the war, for the sake of which we desire to see the war brought to a successful issue, and the attainment of which will be, in our opinion, the only foundation of a durable peace.

Mr. KING asked for a statement of the policy of the Government in the East, and, in particular, with relation to Russia. Quoting from *The Times* of that morning the remarks made by Sir G. Buchanan at the dinner of the British Russia Club, he said they afforded some ground for hope; but there was no public sign that the British Government were offering any encouragement, help, or hope to the Russian people. The Bolshevist Government had lasted longer than had been expected and was gaining strength. We must sooner or later recognize it as the *de facto* Government of Russia, and he suggested that his Majesty should act in the closest accord with President Wilson in the matter, and should send immediately to Russia some sympathetic person to represent this country. Mr. SNOWDEN (Blackburn, Lab.), observing that the Foreign Secretary had not answered the question why the negotiations broke down, thought it was clear, from what they did know, that this was because of demands made by certain of the Allies, which went far beyond the original war aims of this country. He criticized the statements made by Lord R. Cecil in an interview with Reuter's representative a fortnight ago, and complained that the effect of the whole diplomacy of this country had been to cement the different classes in Germany.

Lord R. Cecil, Minister of Blockade (Hitchin, U.), replying to points raised, said it had been his practice to give a weekly interview to American journalists on Monday afternoons, at which questions could be addressed to him. His object was not to lay down policy, but to give information. At the interview which had been the subject of criticism, one of the gentlemen asked him to speak about the peace offensive. He thereupon explained the view which he rightly or wrongly held as to the international situation. The nature of a peace offensive was diplomatic, or semi-diplomatic, action, with a view to helping war, and that was the sort of action he thought exceedingly likely to happen. As to the suggestion that he intended to convey the idea that any offer which came from Germany ought to be rejected—he did not think that there was a word or syllable that he uttered which could be so construed by any fair-minded man. He adhered fully to what his right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary had said that afternoon, that if any offer were made from any source, provided that it was a reasonable and trustworthy source, it deserved examination by the Government because they at any rate were as desirous of peace as the honorable member for Blackburn was.

The honorable member had chosen to make a perfectly undeserved and baseless attack upon one of our allies, and for what purpose he did it except to assist and comfort the enemy he could not imagine. He was very reluctant to believe that that was the reason, but it was not an accidental lapse from the proper responsibility of a Member of Parliament because the honorable member went on doing these things. The Government utterly repudiated the views of the honorable member, and they believed that the aims of Italy were as high and pure as those of any other belligerent in this war. They valued Italy's assistance to the greatest possible degree, and were as determined to preserve our alliance with her as they were to preserve the alliance with the rest of our Allies.

As to the suggestion that there should be a Versailles Diplomatic Council, he confessed that he had some doubt about it. He agreed that nothing was more important than the complete unity of the Allies, and it was of the utmost possible importance that we should keep in closest touch and agreement with President Wilson. But he was not sure that the establishment of a permanent representative at some center would really do more than could be done by the existing machinery. It should not be forgotten that when it came to a final question of policy and the determination of the course which any particular country should pursue that country would always insist on

the decision being taken at the seat of government of that country, and would never delegate to any representatives, however distinguished, in some distant foreign town the decision of questions which might affect the future prosperity or the existence of the country concerned. At the same time he could assure the House that if there was any way by which they could promote the closer cooperation of the Allies, he should be very glad to see the proposal carried out.

As to Russia, we had no quarrel with that country at all. On the contrary, with the Russian people we have always desired to be on the closest possible terms of friendship. It could not be denied that we had suffered grave loss through the course which Russian politics had pursued, but we were anxious to do all we could to support and assist the Russian people in their difficulties, and to preserve Russia as a great country, not only now, but for the period after the war. An honorable member who had spoken seemed to entertain the idea that we had, as it were, some personal or political quarrel with the Bolshevists, not arising out of their international policy, but arising out of some disapproval of their domestic policy. He could assure the honorable member that he was quite mistaken. The domestic policy of Russia in the Government's view, was a matter for Russia alone. Whatever Government the Russians desired to have they ought to have, and it was not for us to interfere in any way in that matter. The point he wanted to emphasize was that we had no quarrel with the Bolshevists because they were Bolshevists. We desired to see Russia preserved as an Allied country, or if that was impossible, at any rate as a non-German country. That was the foundation of our policy.

He had nothing to add to what had been said frequently in Parliament about the desirability of establishing a League of Nations. He did not, however, agree that they could disregard all territorial questions, which were the bases of most wars that had taken place, and although he was a convinced and passionate supporter of the principle of a League of Nations, he was also convinced that it would have no prospect of success, no chance of effecting useful work in Europe unless it was established on a basis that was just and likely to endure. A league established on the basis of existing territorial occupations he feared would not, when there might be so much inflammable material about, do anything to preserve the permanent peace of Europe. It would mean deception and delusion, and would lead not to peace, but to further struggles, and increase rather than diminish the danger of future wars.

STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER BURIAN ON THE ROUMANIAN TREATY AND IN REPLY TO MR. LLOYD-GEORGE[1]

June 11, 1918

Our economic alliance must not exhibit any hostile face to the world. The agreements we propose to adopt will have no influence on the possibility of receiving other nations into the contemplated system. All doors will remain open.

There is an inseparable connection between the Polish question and the rendering of the Austro-German alliance more intimate. The Polish question can only be solved by the mutual consent of the Allies, and account must be taken in this solution of the separate interests of each; otherwise the solution would bring with itself new difficulties. It is not our intention to introduce a new center of disturbance in the Northeast. The Polish problem will be discussed in Berlin, and naturally we must not lose sight of the effect on home policy which may result from every solution. The South Slav problem was not brought on the tapis by the war, but four years of war have produced what may be called a hot house atmosphere in which everything political matures much more quickly.

Our readiness to conclude peace has not undergone change in a single respect. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy desires no annexation. The monarchy has thus far signed four peace treaties, not one of which has brought what one might call conquest. Naturally, in making peace with Roumania we have been obliged to take care that our hitherto unprotected frontiers should be guaranteed. This is precisely the same as if anybody noticed that his front door insufficiently protected him from danger without, and therefore, caused a safety lock to be put on. That we have taken an uninhabited strip along the Carpathians can not be described as subjecting foreign races to our yoke. Moreover the Roumanians also have received the impression that they are not too hardly treated by us. So long, however, as foreign statesmen speak as does Mr. Lloyd-George, nothing can remain to us but to fight on resolutely. This however, does not change in the least our readiness to conclude peace, or our honest effort to arrive at peaceful agreement.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, June 12, 1918, p. 6.

SPEECH OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR ON THE SECRET TREATIES AND THE UNITY OF ALLIED AIMS AND THE PEACE OFFENSIVE[1]

June 20, 1918

The honorable member threw out a challenge earlier in his speech and asked me to define what was meant by a peace offensive. I will tell him what I mean by a peace offensive. I mean any effort by speech or otherwise, under the guise of asking for an honorable termination of the present unhappy war, to divide the Allies who, as I believe, are now fighting for the great cause of liberty and to discourage the individual members of the Alliance. If anyone asks me to give an example of what is indicated by that definition, I should say that the speech we have just listened to is one of the most perfect examples of a peace offensive that has ever been made in or out of this House.

. . . . . .

The honorable member has made his usual survey of the suggestions of peace which have from time to time been made by the Central Powers. Is there one of those cases in which the sober historian would ever see the basis of a possible peace? Is there any likelihood that these suggestions, such as the Emperor of Austria's letter and the other transactions to which the honorable member referred were made with a view to obtaining that sort of peace which even the honorable gentleman himself could regard as a reasonable peace carrying with it some prospect of security for the future liberties of the world. We have never rejected any proposals which we thought had the slightest probability of producing the sort of peace which most of us, and I hope all of us, desire. There is no evidence whatever that the German Government has ever been serious in making such offers of peace. I have more than once referred to Belgium, though I always do so with some hesitation, lest the honorable gentlemen run away with the idea that in my judgment the restoration of Belgium would by itself give all that we ought properly to ask for as a result of the war. The case for Belgium is merely an example. It is a good example of German methods. The treatment of Belgium is and remains the greatest blot upon German honor and German humanity.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, June 21, 1918, p. 11.

German honor and German humanity, I think, have been violated in many parts of the world, but Belgium stands out as the great and unanswerable proof of what the German Government will do if they think that any military advantage is to be got by it. Has the German Government ever openly and plainly said in any document or in any speech that Belgium is to be given up, that Belgium is to be restored, that Belgium is to be placed in a position of absolute economic as well as political independence? I know of no such statement. It has been suggested that Belgian territory should be restored. There have been other suggestions of one kind or another, but you will never find any frank avowal that Belgium, having been taken by one of the most iniquitous acts of which history has record, is to be put back so far as the perpetrators of the crime are concerned as far as possible in the position in which she was before the crime was committed. Does not the honorable gentleman think that perhaps when he is discussing the reasonableness of terms he might have reminded the House of that fact?

What the honorable gentleman does is to point to ambiguous speeches and doubtful resolutions. He turns his eyes resolutely away from the clear cut and unmistakable statements on the other side made by German writers of repute and German politicians of position. He turns his eyes resolutely away from what Germans write and from what Germans say. And he turns his eyes still more resolutely away from what Germans do both in the East and in the West. Then he presents a picture of German statesmen on that side offering reasonable terms of peace to the English statesmen on this side, and the English statesmen obstinately shutting their ears and insisting on going on with the war and determinedly forcing this country and the Allies to go on with the expenditure of blood and of treasure. . . .

If I understood one part of his speech aright, he seemed to think that we differed from President Wilson upon these points. So far as I know there is no difference between the Allies and President Wilson upon war aims. I believe that we cherish the same ideals, we are fighting for the same purpose on the same field of battle, we are making similar sacrifices and we are working toward the same end. I can not conceive why the honorable gentleman suggests that there should be in the matter of war aims, the smallest difference between us and our American ally. There is no such difference, neither is the honorable gentleman right when he supposes that these secret treaties are an obstacle to peace. The notion is fantastic. I am not going to discuss the secret treaties. I have often explained that these treaties

were made not by me, not by the party to which I belong, not by the present Government. They were made in obedience to motives which I believe would have moved any Government in power at the time to make the same or similar arrangements. It is very easy for the honorable gentleman to say that if the treaty with Italy to which he referred were discussed, it would be disapproved of in this meeting or that meeting throughout the country. If you want to judge a treaty rightly, remember the circumstances under which it was made, and ask the people whether if they had been responsible for the conduct of affairs, they would have hesitated to come to arrangements of that kind. The honorable gentleman is wrong in supposing that, even if the treaty is open to criticism—and I am not going to make any admissions about it—it stands in the way of peace.

The Allies are prepared to listen collectively to all responsible arrangements. Certainly his Majesty's Government are not going to shut their eyes to anything that can be called a reasonable suggestion. If such a suggestion were made, which met with the approval of the Allies collectively, does the honorable gentleman really suppose that the fact that three years ago or whenever it may have been, they took a different view, would stand in the way of accepting this reasonable suggestion? Of course it would not. Any proposal to the Allies will be considered by the Allies on its merit. These treaties were entered into by this country with other members of the alliance, and to these treaties we stand. The national honor is bound up with them. . . .

But it is a profound error to suppose that the time will come when the British Government, surveying the whole situation and the Italian Government, surveying the whole situation, will find themselves in this position: The British Government saying, "I think you ought to make peace in spite of this treaty," and the Italian Government saying "There is the treaty and we mean to hold to every word of it." When the time comes the treaty may be a proper instrument to carry out in every detail. What I say is that whatever judgment may be come to, when the time comes, by the British Government, that is probably the judgment which the Italian Government would share to the full. I have no reason to think that in the future any more than in the past there will be any diversions between the Allies for carrying on this war. If it should turn out that in the common interest of the Allies as a whole, treaties made some years ago should require modification, I do not know whether a modification will be made by the Italians themselves. It rests with them. They are our ally and we are bound to them, and we mean to keep to the full to the bargain we have made.

The Jugo-Slavs' meeting in Rome was one of the very greatest interest and significance, and I think it did show a certain change, I will not say of view, but of mode, of temper, in connection with this particular question. I do not propose to discuss or to suggest any discussion upon topics like that. I think that it would be quite inexpedient. I content myself with the broad statement that I believe to be true, that these treaties whether they are carried out to the letter, or whether they are modified in practice are no obstacle to the conclusion of a reasonable peace. And they will not form any ground of discord between us and our Italian ally.

This is the very last moment in which we are likely to make peace proposals to the Central Powers or the Central Powers are likely to make peace proposals to us except for one purpose. The purpose of a peace offensive. So far as I am able to judge what the Central Powers mean to do in the way of peace proposals is not to propose reasonable terms to the alliance as a whole, but to select some member of the alliance to offer terms which may prove extremely tempting to that member of the alliance if it considers only its obvious and immediate interests and not the alliance as a whole, and in that way to disintegrate the members of the alliance, some of whom would, of course, be perfectly helpless, taken in isolation, but would be quite strong as long as they are united. I do not blame the Central Powers for making such attempt. The people I blame are those who fall into the trap and the people I blame most of all are those who, like the honorable gentleman opposite, appear to think it almost criminal not to fall into the trap. As far as I can make it out his criticism is that we went to war for Belgium and France, and that if Belgium and France are satisfied, why should we think of Italy. That spirit is fatal because you might change it round, and you might say to Italy, "You are bound by the alliance. Very good terms are offered you. Why do you bother about anything else?" You can not work an alliance on those terms. The only terms on which you can work an alliance are those of mutual confidence and mutual trust. And the only way you can have mutual confidence and mutual trust are by being open and above board with those with whom you are working.

The honorable gentleman suggested, and he did more than suggest in his speech, that we have not been open and above board with the Belgian Government. He is quite mistaken. The Belgian Government have our full confidence and I believe that we have their full confidence. There is no attempt, and there never has been any attempt to

keep back from any of those with whom we are working something which it is really material to the common purpose that they should know. I can not conceive a greater folly at this moment than entering formally and ostentatiously into any reconsideration of the instruments which have regulated now for two or three years the relations of the Allies.

SPEECH OF FOREIGN MINISTER VON KÜHLMANN ON GERMAN PEACE TERMS[1]

June 24, 1918

In Austria-Hungary that brilliant representative of foreign policy, Count Czernin, has retired from his post for reasons of internal politics. His successor, Count Burian, is a well tried diplomatist whose loyalty, friendship and devotion to the alliance were assured. . . .

The attention of our diplomacy has been lately occupied in the very greatest degree by events in Russia. Revolutionary phenomena of immense scope, almost unprecedented in the world's history, have made their appearance within the Russian Colossus, due first to ferment of a political character, and secondly and in addition to ferment of a social character. It is impossible to believe that this great process of fermentation, this wild vortex of conflicting, irregular forces, which the disappearance of the power of the Czar released, has already reached a permanent equilibrium. All conditions in the former empire of the Czar must to a certain extent be described as uncertain. The guiding line of our policy in view of this situation is close observation and the utmost caution, and so far as purely internal events are concerned, a correspondingly wise reserve.

The leaven of national fermentation within the Russian body politic lead to the detachment and severance of a whole series of energies which have partly obtained full national status, and are partly developing towards that end. In Finland the battle has been decided in favor of the party which has been striving for Finland's independence. German troops, as is known, at the request of the Finnish Government took part in the battles in Finland and although their number was not great, undoubtedly contributed their share in giving things there

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, June 26, 1918, p. 7.

the shape they have received. We have concluded with the Finnish Government certain treaties which were made public. We hope and desire that the new state is moving towards internal consolidation and prosperous development.

On the other side of the Baltic lie those provinces where, despite all the efforts of the Russian Government at repression or oppression, the old German culture since the days of the Teutonic knights has played a leading rôle. By the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Courland and Lithuania were already in fact severed from the Russian empire. It was from the outset clear to the negotiators that the partition of the Baltic region by a line fixed in the peace treaty would create an extraordinarily difficult situation. It was hard for the Lettish population to enjoy the prospect of being cut up. The historical internal cohesion, also, of the entire Baltic region suggested already at that time objections against the possibility of a lasting separation between Livonia, Esthonia and Courland. But the conditions arising from the difficult situation created on the one hand by complete dissolution of the Russian state, and on the other hand for us, by the desire and necessity of arriving at a certain settlement in the East, involved for us the necessity of concluding peace as was done and as was submitted to you.

In agreement, I may say, with the entire German public opinion, we resolved to lend an ear to Livonia's appeal for help, and to replace the régime of terror carried on there by the Red Guard by a régime of peace and order. The inhabitants of these provinces, mindful of the misgovernment and terrible sufferings which they had to endure, turned to the German authorities. The petition of the Eastern Livonians and the Imperial Chancellor's reply are public property.

The Imperial Government took from the outset the standpoint that it was highly desirable before finally giving diplomatic recognition to States which had detached themselves from the former Russian empire to come to an understanding with the Russian Government as to the form under which the recognition of such new States should take place. In the present case also this line of conduct will not be departed from. Apart from this question conditions and events have created the necessity, in regard to a long series of other questions, for a discussion with the Soviet Government at Moscow. In a discussion which is to be held in Berlin under my presidency with the plenipotentiary representatives of the Russian Republic, we are about to make an attempt to bring about a friendly agreement on all points still

pending. Amongst the points to be dealt with is also the question of what form of political recognition is to be accorded by Germany to Esthonia and Livonia. I can express the hope that the result of the discussion will completely correspond with the requirement and wishes of the population there, and the interests of the German nation. I will not go more closely into the question of the future state of Courland and Lithuania which lie mainly within the domain of internal organization, because these questions fall in many respects within the domain of the home department. This was indicated by the fact that a special Imperial Commissioner was appointed to the Imperial Home Office, whose special task it is to deal with these questions of future organization.

As regards Poland the mold in which its future lot is to be cast has formed since I took over the Foreign Office. The object of continual and thorough negotiation, mainly with Austria-Hungary, both in our discussions at main headquarters and at Berlin, the future settlement of the Polish question which is at the same time of the greatest importance for the future arrangement of German-Austro-Hungarian relations has been the subject of thorough discussion. Not only the great difficulty inherent in this question itself, but the almost inseparable connection existing between this question and the solution of economic questions as between Austria-Hungary and Germany has so far presented the attainment of a final result. I believe, however, I may give expression to a sure hope that in good time even before the general peace negotiations begin in Europe the zealous efforts of all the statesmen concerned will succeed in finding a solution to this question which is acceptable to all parts.

In south Russia the occupation of the Crimea led to certain incidents respecting the Russian fleet which found some echo in the press, but these are now satisfactorily settled.

The disappearance of the Czar's government gave rise to a whole series of questions in the Caucasus. The State of Georgia which was by far the most consolidated as a nation aimed from the beginning—after the disappearance of Russian supremacy—at building up anew and carrying on its national life independently. Georgia was followed by other comparatively new and insecurely established entities. Armenia tried to obtain independence as a State. The Tartars also, who formed the predominating element of the population in the Eastern Caucasus region as far as the neighborhood of Baku, combined into the State of Tartary. These three States are trying on the other hand to unite in the form of a Trans-Caucasian republic, thereby to increase

their internal strength and their power of resistance towards the outside world.

Turkey, which in the Brest-Litovsk treaty has received the promise of getting back those districts which she had lost in 1877 to the Russians, found herself obliged quite recently by the strategic development in Upper Mesopotamia to utilize the line Batum-Tabriz-Julfa in order to lay a line of communication across Nothern Azerbaijan to the Tigris Valley. In its advance from the territory falling to it under the Brest-Litovsk treaty, the Turkish army for reasons of safety pushed the left wing of its advancing troops fairly wide into regions which indubitably, according to the Brest-Litovsk treaty, could not come into question for permanent occupation or annexation by Turkey. Both chief army commands have had a thorough discussion on this matter. The Turkish advance to the Caucasus has been, we have been informed, stopped. The condition of the future settlement of Caucasian affairs will be determined at the Conference in Constantinople.

The State of Georgia, with which we have entered into friendly relations and which we have recognized by a diplomatic exchange of notes as *de facto* existing, has sent us to Berlin its Foreign Minister, with whom we are engaged in a friendly exchange of views. We, for our part, to attain a satisfactory insight into the situation in Georgia itself and the very confused situation in the Caucasus have sent General von Kress on a diplomatic mission to Tiflis. We wish a prosperous future to the Georgian State and its brave population and rich land, and we shall gladly do what in us lies to build up friendly relations between Georgia and Germany.

The solution of the Eastern problems which ensues from the three successive conclusions of peace, brought prominently into the foreground the importance of the Baltic Sea, which before this war was frequently overlooked, and thrust into the foreground one of the Baltic questions, namely the question of the Aaland Islands. The same principle applies that applies to our entire attitude towards Finland and Sweden, and, in brief, towards the peoples bordering on the Baltic, namely that we desire to treat isolated questions that may arise in friendly and harmonious relations with them. Meanwhile a diplomatic agreement has been reached. That fortifications erected contrary to treaty on the Aaland Islands should be removed. A final decision has not yet been reached about the future of these islands. We hope and desire that this important question will be so settled that the maximum of guarantee can be given that to the advantage of all

dwellers by the Baltic their non-employment for military purposes may be assured for all time. . . .

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So much as regards guilt for the war. . . .

I consider it, however, useful and necessary, not only to persist in a denial, not only to say that Mr. Balfour's declaration is a chimera if not a calumny, but I consider it necessary to say quite simply and in a way easy for all to understand what our positive desires are. We wish on earth for the German people, and the same applies *mutatis mutandis* to our allies, to secure a free, strong and independent existence within the boundaries drawn for us by history. We desire to have overseas possessions corresponding to our greatness, wealth, and proved colonial capacity. We wish to have the possibility of freedom for carrying our trade on the free seas to all Continents. These are in a few brief, general, comprehensible words, quite roughly sketched, the aims, the achievement of which is an absolute vital necessity for Germany.

In a former debate here, I pointed out that the absolute integrity of the territory of the German empire, and its allies, formed a necessary prerequisite condition—I say expressly prerequisite condition—for entering into any peace discussion or peace negotiation whatever. I declared at the time that outside this point, all questions might be subject to discussion and agreement. I believe things are still so today.

From England the reproach is constantly made that we are not prepared on a hint from England to state our attitude publicly on the Belgian question. On this point the fundamental views of the Imperial Government differ from those ascribed to us by English statesmen. We regard Belgium as one of the questions in the entire complex. We must, however, decline to make, as it were, a prior concession by giving a statement on the Belgian question which would bind us without in the least tying the enemies. Mr. Balfour, moreover, by way of precaution, has added that we must in no way imagine that an agreement on the Belgian question exhausts the stock of English or Entente wishes. He has prudently abstained from describing those points in which he intends to announce more far reaching claims or desires. The supposition is not unjustified by previous experience that these words were on the one hand addressed to Paris, and that, on the other hand, covetous desires float across the Mediterranean to Palestine and Mesopotamia, at present occupied by British

troops. I hear already the justification which will be duly given for such desires—namely, that England could not possibly make such sacrifices of blood and treasure without reserving for herself a modest gain.

As regards the probable course of events the Chancellor and I have previously declared that in the present stage of development far reaching developments on the road to peace are hardly any longer to be expected from the public statements which we shout to each other from the speaker's tribune. We can also entirely adopt the words spoken on May 16, by Mr. Asquith if we substitute "Imperial Government" for "British Government." The Imperial Government has not shut the door to a step in the direction of an honorable peace. If a proposal is made to us, from whatever side it may come, if it is not couched in ambiguous terms, but reposes on firm foundation, then I am sure that such a proposal to our government will not fall on deaf ears. This should be clear. We can for our part make the same declaration, aware as we are that it fully and entirely covers our policy. Once the moment has come (when it will come I should not care to prophesy) that the nations which are at present battling, enter upon an exchange of views, a necessary prior condition will especially be that there should be a certain degree of mutual confidence in each other's probity and chivalry.

So long as every overture is regarded by the others as a peace offensive, as a trap, as something false for the purpose, and sowing dissension between allies, so long as every attempt at *rapprochement* is immediately most violently denounced by the enemies of *rapprochement* in all countries, so long it is impossible to see how any exchange of ideas can be started leading to peace.

Without such an exchange of ideas, in view of the enormous magnitude of this coalition war, in view of the number of Powers, including those from overseas, involved in it, an absolute end can hardly be expected through purely military decisions alone, without any diplomatic negotiations. Our position on the battlefield, our enormous reserves and military resources, our situation and determination at home make it possible for us to use such language. We hope that our enemies perceive that against the resources at our disposal the idea of a victory for the Entente is a dream and an illusion, and that they will in due course, as Mr. Asquith expected from us, find a way to approach us with peace offers which correspond to the situation and satisfy German vital needs.

STATEMENT OF CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING ON PEACE TERMS AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS[1]

June 25, 1918

I originally had no intention of taking part in this debate. The reasons for my contemplated reserve are obvious, namely, the experiences I have had, together with my predecessor's remarks in previous speeches.

If we spoke our willingness for peace, that was regarded as a symptom of weakness and of our immediately impending collapse. By others it was interpreted as a crafty trap.

Did we speak on the other hand, of our unshakable will to defend ourselves in a war of conquest so criminally thrust upon us, it was said that it was the voice of German militarism, to which even the leading statesmen must submit willy-nilly.

I went a step further on February 24 and expressly stated my attitude toward the message of President Wilson, in which he discussed his four points, and gave, in principle, my assent to them. I said that these four points of President Wilson might possibly form the basis of a general world peace. No utterance of President Wilson whatever followed this, so that there is no object in spinning any further the threads there started.

There is still less object after statements which have since reached us, especially from America. These statements, indeed, made it really clear what is to be understood from a peace league or a league of peoples for the maintenance of freedom and justice.

Our opponents made it clear that they would be the kernel of this league of peoples, and that it would in this way not be difficult to isolate the uncomfortable upward strivings of Germany and by economic strangulation to extinguish her vital breath.

I consider it, as against this, quite proper that the Foreign Secretary make a statement on the details of our political position in the East, from Finland to the Black Sea, and, in my opinion, he fulfilled the task thoroughly. On the other hand, some of his statements were given a more or less unfriendly reception in wide circles.

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[1] Text in *The New York Times*, June 27, 1918, p. 1.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON AT MOUNT VERNON ON PEACE TERMS[1]

July 4, 1918

GENTLEMEN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND MY FELLOW CITIZENS: I am happy to draw apart with you to this quiet place of old counsel in order to speak a little of the meaning of this day of our nation's independence. The place seems very still and remote. It is as serene and untouched by the hurry of the world as it was in those great days long ago when General Washington was here and held leisurely conference with the men who were to be associated with him in the creation of a nation. From these gentle slopes they looked out upon the world and saw it whole, saw it with the light of the future upon it, saw it with modern eyes that turned away from a past which men of liberated spirits could no longer endure. It is for that reason that we can not feel, even here, in the immediate presence of this sacred tomb, that this is a place of death. It was a place of achievement. A great promise that was meant for all mankind was here given plan and reality. The associations by which we are here surrounded are the inspiriting associations of that noble death which is only a glorious consummation. From this green hillside we also ought to be able to see with comprehending eyes the world that lies about us and should conceive anew the purposes that must set men free.

It is significant—significant of their own character and purpose and of the influences they were setting afoot—that Washington and his associates, like the barons at Runnymede, spoke and acted, not for a class, but for a people. It has been left for us to see to it that it shall be understood that they spoke and acted, not for a single people only, but for all mankind. They were thinking, not of themselves and of the material interests which centered in the little groups of landholders and merchants and men of affairs with whom they were accustomed to act, in Virginia and the colonies to the north and south of her, but of a people which wished to be done with classes and special interests and the authority of men whom they had not themselves chosen to rule over them. They entertained no private purpose, desired no peculiar privilege. They were consciously planning that men of every class should be free and America a place to which men out of every nation might resort who wished to share with them the rights

[1] Text as issued by the White House.

and privileges of free men. And we take our cue from them—do we not? We intend what they intended. We here in America believe our participation in this present war to be only the fruitage of what they planted. Our case differs from theirs only in this, that it is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure but the liberties of every other people as well. We are happy in the thought that we are permitted to do what they would have done had they been in our place. There must now be settled once for all what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw today. This is surely a fitting place from which calmly to look out upon our task, that we may fortify our spirits for its accomplishment. And this is the appropriate place from which to avow, alike to the friends who look on and to the friends with whom we have the happiness to be associated in action, the faith and purpose with which we act.

This, then, is our conception of the great struggle in which we are engaged. The plot is written plain upon every scene and every act of the supreme tragedy. On the one hand stand the peoples of the world—not only the peoples actually engaged, but many others also who suffer under mastery but can not act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world—the people of stricken Russia still, among the rest, though they are for the moment unorganized and helpless. Opposed to them, masters of many armies, stand an isolated, friendless group of governments who speak no common purpose but only selfish ambitions of their own by which none can profit but themselves, and whose peoples are fuel in their hands; governments which fear their people and yet are for the time their sovereign lords, making every choice for them and disposing of their lives and fortunes as they will, as well as of the lives and fortunes of every people who fall under their power—governments clothed with the strange trappings and the primitive authority of an age that is altogether alien and hostile to our own. The Past and the Present are in deadly grapple and the peoples of the world are being done to death between them.

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the

world; or, if it can not be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that can not be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.

These great ends can not be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and opportunity.

I can fancy that the air of this place carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people as well as of the people of the United States; and I stand here now to speak—speak proudly and with confident hope—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself! The

blinded rulers of Prussia have roused forces they knew little of—forces which, once roused, can never be crushed to earth again; for they have at their heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph!

STATEMENT OF GERMAN PEACE POLICY BY CHANCELLOR VON HERTLING ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK[1]

July 11, 1918

I maintain the standpoint of the Imperial reply to the peace note of the Pope. The pacific spirit which inspires this reply also inspired me. However, I added at the time that this spirit must not give our enemies a free hand for the interminable continuation of the war. What have we lived to see, however? Whilst for years there can have been no doubt whatever of our willingness to hold out our hand toward an honorable peace, we have heard until these last few days inciting speeches delivered by the enemy statesmen. Mr. Wilson wants war until we are destroyed, and what Mr. Balfour has said must really drive the flush of anger to the cheeks of every German. We feel for the honor of our fatherland, and we can not allow ourselves to be constantly and openly insulted in this manner. And behind these insults is the desire for our destruction. As long as this desire for our destruction exists we must endure together with our faithful nation. I am also convinced—I know it—that in the widest circles of our nation the same serious feeling exists everywhere. As long as the desire for our destruction exists we must hold out, and we will hold out with confidence in our troops, our army administration, our magnificent people, which bear so well these difficult times, with their great privations and continuous sacrifices.

Because, gentlemen, I must also say this immediately: If in spite of these hostile attempts by these statesmen any serious efforts were to show themselves for a paving of the way to peace, then quite certainly we would not adopt a negative attitude from the very beginning. But we would examine these seriously meant—I say expressly seriously meant—efforts immediately with scrupulous care.

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, July 13, 1918, p. 6.

Naturally it is not sufficient when some agent or other approaches us and says to us "I can bring about peace negotiations then and there," but it is necessary for appointed representatives of the enemy Powers duly represented by their Government to give us to understand that discussions are possible, discussions which for the time being will naturally be within a limited circle. But the statesmen who have spoken up to the present have not said a word about such possibilities. When such possibilities manifest themselves and when serious inclinations towards peace show themselves on the other side, then we will immediately go into them. That is to say, we will not reject them, and we will speak, to begin with, in a small circle.

Gentlemen, I can also tell you that this standpoint is not merely my own standpoint, but that it is shared emphatically by the Chief Army Administration. The Chief Army Administration also does not conduct war for the sake of war, but has said to me, "As soon as the serious desire for peace manifests itself on the other side, we must follow it up."

You, gentlemen, will be interested to know how, working on this standpoint, certain problems will appear which the present time forces upon us. Exhaustive discussions took place regarding these questions on July 1st and 2d, at general headquarters under the presidency of his Majesty the Kaiser. Naturally I can only announce here quite generally the lines which were laid down at that time.

Regarding the East, we stand on the basis of the peace of Brest-Litovsk, and we wish to see this peace carried out in a loyal manner. That is the wish of the German Imperial Administration and it is supported in this by the Chief Army Administration. However, the difficulty of the execution of the peace at Brest-Litovsk does not lie on our side, but in the fact that conditions in Russia are still so exceedingly uncertain. . . .

However, our principle is, we stand on a basis of the peace at Brest-Litovsk. . . .

All indications point to the fact that the accursed deed (the murder of Mirbach) was instigated by the Entente in order to involve us in a fresh war with the present Russian Government—a state of things which we are most anxious to avoid; we do not want a fresh war with Russia. . . .

The name of the man who has been proposed as Herr von Kühlmann's successor is known to you. Herr von Hintze possesses a thorough knowledge of Russian affairs, which is a matter of great importance in the present situation, but it goes without saying that I will

only give my countersignature or signature to the appointment of Herr von Hintze on the condition that Herr von Hintze follows my line of policy and not his own. However, as far as I am concerned, I already have a sure guarantee for this in Herr von Hintze's promise. I will direct the line of policy. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has merely to carry out my policy. The proposed Secretary of State is absolutely clear on this point. The course with which the great majority of the Reichstag declared itself to be in agreement in November of last year will still be followed.

REPORT OF FOREIGN MINISTER BURIAN ON AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND HER PEACE TERMS AND ATTITUDE TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S MOUNT VERNON ADDRESS[1]

July 16, 1918

Amidst the terrible struggle and in every phase of this war of successful defense the Central Powers have had no other aim in view but to fight to secure the enemy's will to peace. If we sum up all that has been said on the enemy's side in regard to their war aims we recognize three groups of aspirations which are being set forth to justify the continuation of bloodshed. The ideals of mankind are to be realized. The freedom of all nations, which latter are to form a league of nations, and which in future shall settle their differences by arbitration and not by arms, is to reign. The domination of one nation by another nation is to be excluded. Various territorial changes are to be carried out at the expense of the Central Powers. These annexationist aims, though variously shaped, are generally known. The intention, however, also exists, especially in regard to Austria-Hungary, to carry out her internal disintegration for the purpose of the formation of new States. Finally, our opponents demand our atonement because we dared to defend ourselves, and successfully, against their attacks. Our ability to defend ourselves is termed militarism and must therefore be destroyed.

Territorial aims are, in fact, the only things now separating the different belligerent groups. For the great interests of humanity—for justice, freedom, honor, and the peace of the world as set forth in

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, July 17, 1918, p. 5.

the laws of modern political conception, regarding which we can not accept any advice—we also are ready to fight.

There is hardly any difference between the general principles enunciated by the statesmen of both groups. President Wilson's four new points of July 4 shall not, apart from certain exaggerations, arouse our opposition. On the contrary, we are able to approve of them heartily and to a great extent. Nobody would refuse homage to this genius of mankind, and nobody would refuse his cooperation. This, however, is not the main point, but it is what can also be understood in the interests of mankind.

Both groups should certainly honestly attempt to clear this up and settle it by mutual agreement, but not in the same manner as, for instance, our peace treaties in the East were judged. The fact is that all our opponents were invited to join in these peace negotiations, and they could have contributed their share in bringing them to a different issue. But now, when it is too late, their criticism stands on weak ground, for there is no legal right which would entitle them to condemn the peace conditions which were acceptable to the contracting parties or which could not be avoided. From the confident utterances of our opponents it appears that they have no fear of being defeated. If they, nevertheless, represent these peace treaties as a warning of our treatment of a defeated enemy, we do not consider the reproach justified.

We must, however, observe that none of the belligerent States need ever come into the position of Russia or Roumania, because we are ever ready to enter into peace negotiations with all our opponents. If our enemies continuously demand atonement for wrong done, and "restitution," then this is a claim which we, on our part, could urge with much more justification against them, because we have been attacked and the wrong done to us must above all be redressed. But this kind of interest will hardly prevent, to a considerable degree, the unraveling of the terrible war entanglement.

The enemy's obstinacy in regard to his territorial demands concerning Alsace-Lorraine, Trentino, Trieste, the German colonies, et cetera, appears to be insurmountable. Herein lies the limit of our readiness for peace. We are prepared to discuss everything, but not the cession of our own territory.

The enemy not only wants to cut from Austria-Hungary what he would like for himself, but the inner structure of the Monarchy itself, too, is to be attacked, and the Monarchy to be dissolved, if possible, into its component parts. Now that it is recognized that ordinary

war methods have not sufficed to defeat us, then suddenly the interest in our internal affairs arose supreme. The Entente, however, discovered its sympathy for our internal affairs at so late a period of the war that many an enemy statesman who now prates about the Monarchy's national questions as a war aim had probably no idea of their existence at the beginning of the war. This fact can be recognized from the amateurish and superficial manner in which our opponents discuss and attempt to solve these complicated problems. This method, however, appeared to them to be useful. They have, therefore, organized it as they have organized the blockade, and in England they have now also a Propaganda Minister. We wish to place this attack on record, but without any useless indignation or whining.

The choice of this means of fighting us, however, does not show too great confidence in the success of our enemy's previous efforts. We are certain that it will be unsuccessful. Our opponents start from a completely mechanical misjudgment of the character of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and prefer, in their satisfaction, to overlook the present difficult internal problems and the fact that these States, with their various nationalities, are no accidental structure, but a product of historical and ethnographical necessity which carry in themselves the fundamental principle of life and race. They, therefore, possess, and this applies fully to Austria and Hungary, the necessary elasticity and adaptability to reform themselves according to the necessities of their standard of development, and to solve all internal crises without uncalled-for foreign interference.

Our enemies want to paralyze us by an offensive of irritation and so render us helpless. They want to crush our very powerful organism in order to make the weak parts one after the other serviceable to their own purposes. In this they will fail.

The Foreign Minister, who declared that "we regard this war as senseless and purposeless bloodshed which might at any moment be ended by the re-emergence of the feelings of humanity in our enemies," said that the source of their confidence was found in their united war alliances, and above all, in their old alliance with the German Empire, "Which, in peace as in war, has proved a blessing, and which, in accordance with the undivided will of the peoples protected by it, will continue to afford a secure basis, so that, with united strength, we may force our way out of this world crisis, and then, with powerful mutual support, undertake the task of reconstruction and effect a hopeful and joyful return to a peaceful and secure political and economic life." The alliance would henceforward, as hitherto, preserve its exclusively

defensive character. The new treaty must not only cover the political relationship of the two Powers, but must also lead to the adaptation to altered conditions and to the insight gained of their manifold economic, military, and other relations, which were in future to be drawn closer.

The negotiations which were proceeding between the allied Governments were governed by a most careful regard, both in form and substance, to the sovereignty, the complete equality, and the independence of the contracting Powers. Henceforward, too, the alliance would not mean a threat or unfriendliness towards anyone. Nothing would be included in it which was calculated to necessitate or to offer a stimulus to the formation of counter-groupings. Everything which in future could be realized of the sublime idea of a universal League of Nations would find in the alliance no obstacle, but a favorable nucleus and a prepared group which could easily and naturally unite with every general combination of States resting on cognate principles.

STATEMENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL AT WASHINGTON ON THE AIMS OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS IN RUSSIA[1]

July 27, 1918

There have been so many promising campaigns started in Russia during the last year of which nothing more is heard that the people in this country watch with a certain lack of confidence the successes of the Czecho-Slovak forces in Siberia and Eastern European Russia.

Will they be permanent or will they come to nothing, as did the ill-fated campaigns of Korniloff, the Don Cossacks, the various Siberian governments and many others? Can the Czecho-Slovaks stand their ground, a hundred thousand men among a hundred million, and are they not themselves talking about withdrawing from Russia?

It is, of course, well known that the Czecho-Slovaks are not Russians. The Czecho-Slovak army in Russia was created in order to fight the Germans and the Austrians, and when Russia deserted the cause of the Allies arrangements were made by Professor T. G.

[1] *Current History*, September, 1918, p. 468.

Masaryk, President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and, by virtue of that, Commander in Chief of the Czecho-Slovak forces, with the Allied representatives in Russia, and also with the Bolsheviki to march the Czecho-Slovaks out of Russia and take them to the western front.

It should be kept clearly in mind that occupation of Russian territory or the restoration of an eastern front was not thought of when these arrangements were made, in February, 1918. It was due to one of those German blunders, like the one that brought America into the war, that the Czecho-Slovaks, instead of withdrawing from Russia, are now in control of Siberia and of considerable territory west of the Urals.

Under pressure of Austrian and German demands, Trotzky tried to disarm the Czecho-Slovaks and put them in prison camps, with a view of turning them over to the Austrian authorities. The Czecho-Slovaks, being attacked, had to defend themselves, and as a result found themselves in control of the greatest portion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Volga River. They were like Saul, who went to seek his father's asses and found a kingdom.

Professor Masaryk was by this time in America, and the Czecho-Slovak leaders, under the changed conditions, hesitated as to their course of action. The only orders they had were to take their forces to the Pacific. They had no desire to play policemen in Russia, and they realized that their position could not be indefinitely sustained unless they were assured of a steady flow of supplies. And yet the unparalleled strategic opportunities which their position gave them made a strong appeal to their imagination. This seems evident from the fact that, instead of withdrawing from European Russia, they occupied more cities on the Volga, stretching out their detachments in the direction of the Murman coast.

A week ago Professor Masaryk received a lengthy cable report from the leader of the Czecho-Slovak forces, in which the following words are found indicative of the present desires of these men:

"In our opinion it is most desirable and also possible to reconstruct a Russia-Germany front in the east. We ask for instructions as to whether we should leave for France or whether we should stay here to fight in Russia by the side of the Allies and of Russia. The health and spirit of our troops are excellent."

Professor Masaryk has since then instructed the forces in Siberia to remain there for the present. The question, however, of staying in Russia or getting out does not depend on the Czecho-Slovaks

alone. That is something which must be decided by the Allies. The Czecho-Slovak army is one of the Allied armies, and it is as much under the order of the Versailles War Council as the French or American army. No doubt the Czecho-Slovak men in Russia are anxious to avoid participation in a possible civil war in Russia, but they realize at the same time that by staying where they are they may be able to render far greater service both to Russia and the Allied cause, than if they were transported to France. They are at the orders of the Supreme War Council of the Allies.

DECLARATION OF AIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERVENING IN RUSSIA [1]

August 3, 1918

In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia, rather than help her out of her distress. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be more efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profit by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women, and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are

[1] *Current History,* September, 1918, p. 465.

attacking them, and to steady any effort at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now cooperating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient forces to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of cooperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, as far as it may be, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military forces may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and those Governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the Governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia

a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best method of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the Governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

DECLARATION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT UPON ITS AIMS IN INTERVENING IN SIBERIA[1]

August 3, 1918

The Japanese Government, actuated by sentiments of sincere friendship towards the Russian people, have always entertained most sanguine hopes of the speedy reestablishment of order in Russia and of the healthy, untrammeled development of her national life.

Abundant proof, however, is now afforded that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the defenseless and chaotic conditions in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to Russia's eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume a position of command.

The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern.

In the presence of the danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops

[1] *Current History,* September, 1918, p. 466.

actually are exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events, and a certain number of their troops already have been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok.

The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for the early dispatch of troops to relieve the pressure weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government, have decided to proceed at once to make disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission, and a certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok.

In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the object above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ANTI-BOSHEVIK GOVERNMENTS IN SIBERIA—THEIR AIMS[1]

August 5, 1918

Direct and authoritative information has been received by the Russian Embassy concerning the program and intentions of the group which have newly revealed themselves in Siberia, and which without bloodshed or violence have succeeded the Soviets, the latter having disappeared naturally by the very fact of the valiant Czecho-Slovak troops liberating different cities and regions of Russia. It appears at present that the group in Vladivostok, known under the title of "The Siberian Temporary Government," is closely united and, in fact, does not differ in any way from the authorities established in Omsk, which seem to be but a part of the same Government.

[1] Issued by the Russian Embassy in Washington; *Current History,* September, 1918, p. 467.

The United Siberian Government states that it was elected on the 25th of January, 1916, by the members of a regional Siberian Duma-representative assembly. The point where this Government has temporarily transferred its center is Vladivostok, the other member of it remaining at Omsk. A message from those at Omsk has just been received, stating that owing to combined efforts of the Czecho-Slovaks and the military organizations of the Siberian Government itself, the following cities have been liberated from the Bolsheviki: Marlinsk, Novo Nicolaievsk, Tomsk, Narime, Tobolsk, Barnaoul, Camipalatinsk, Carcaralinsk, Atchinski, and Crasnoiarsk.

Everywhere the people belonging to different classes and political groups have manifested vivid interest and sympathy with the organization of their army, which is intended to reestablish, together with the Allies, a battlefront against Germany, and the formation of which is proceeding very successfully. Their relations with Czecho-Slovaks are brotherly.

To that most valuable information the " Temporary Government of Siberia " adds a public statement of its political aims, which are: The creation of a Russian Army, well disciplined, in order to reestablish, in cooperation with the Allies, a battlefront against Germany. Siberia being an inseparable part of United Russia, the Temporary Government of Siberia believes it to be its first duty to safeguard, in the territory of Siberia, the interest of the whole of Russia, to recognize all the international treaties and agreements of Russia with friendly nations which were in force until October 25, 1917, the moment of the Bolshevist uprising. The Siberian Government is tending to reestablish government and order in Siberia and to start the reconstruction of a unified Russia and the creation of a central all-Russian authority which would be generally recognized.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ANTI-BOLSHEVIK GOVERNMENT IN ARCHANGEL—ITS AIMS [1]

August 7, 1918

The power of the Bolsheviki is ended. Because of the treason to the country committed at Brest-Litovsk; because of famine, the failure to recognize the rights and liberties of the country; because of pillaging,

[1] *Current History,* September, 1918, p. 471.

illegal shootings and constant arrests, the power of the so-called Soviet, of traitors and criminals, is past: The representatives of the so-called People's Government have fled.

At the present moment, in the interests of all Russia, we take upon ourselves the duty of governing the Country of the North.

By this proclamation we inform the inhabitants that from today the power of government is confided to the supreme direction of the Government of the Country of the North, which is composed of members of the Constituent Assembly and representatives of the Zemstvos of this district, which considers itself as the supreme authority from now on to hand over power immediately after Russia has chosen her government and as soon as there is a possibility of freely communicating with her. The aims of the Government are:

1. Regeneration of Russia, the resumption of relations between Russia and other Governments, and the organization of local power with the Government of the North.
2. Defense of the region of the north and the whole nation against all territorial violation by Germany, Finland, and other enemies.
3. Reunion with Russia of the peoples taken from her.
4. Reestablishment of the two organs of the people, the Constituent Assembly, Municipal Dumas and Zemstvos.
5. Reestablishing legal order by the expressing of the will of the citizens and reestablishing political and religious liberty.
6. The security of the rights of agricultural workers.
7. Defense of the interests of labor in accordance with the political and economic interests of the north and the rest of Russia.
8. Suppression of famine.

The Government counts upon the Russian, American, and British peoples, as well as those of other nations, for aid in combating famine and relieving the financial situation. It is recognized that intervention by the Allies in Russia's internal affairs is not directed against the interest of the people, and that the people will welcome the Allied troops who have come to fight against the common enemy.

The Government in making the present declaration, calls upon all the people to preserve calm and order.

SPEECH OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON PEACE TERMS[1]

August 8, 1918

It is perhaps right that the session should not conclude without some discussion not merely upon the progress of the war, such as was given by the Prime Minister yesterday in his masterly survey of the situation, but by some observations, if there are any to be made, on the subject of peace. I therefore came down to the House hoping to be illuminated upon this great theme by the wisdom of honorable gentlemen sitting on the bench opposite, who devote so much attention to the subject of negotiations with Germany. I listened with great attention to the member for Sheffield, who opened the debate. I confess I did not receive from his speech all the illumination I had hoped for. That may partly be due, indeed very likely is entirely due, to the fact that I have far passed that age after which, the honorable member explained, no statesman can be expected to understand new ideas. He adorned his speech with a large number of extracts. No extract seemed to be more worthy of attention than the one he made from the writings of Mr. Wells, who laid down the proposition to which the honorable member for Sheffield assented, that Europe was unhappily governed by old men instead of young men. I think there may be very great force in that observation. But perhaps the honorable member will forgive me for saying that, though happily for himself he has not reached the magic age of forty-five, and is still in that period of comparative youth when new ideas can be assimilated and produced, he sat down without giving us one single new idea on the subject of the European situation. I listened with the deepest attention to all he said. I recognized all the familiar commonplaces of the subject, and I think I also recognized some quotations from my own speeches, but so far as suggesting any new idea, any new method of judging the situation, any new estimate of the German war aims or of our own war aims, nothing whatever fell from the honorable gentlemen's lips that added in the smallest degree to the knowledge already possessed by the House. The honorable member who has just sat down began by giving an essay upon universal history as shown in its wars. I began to think I might be illuminated by some novel ray of light upon this dark and difficult subject. Broadly speaking he laid

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, August 9, 1918, p. 10.

it down that the basis of all wars was trade. I had myself thought that the personal ambition of rulers like Frederick the Great and Napoleon may have had something to do with war. I remember that the word "religion" has been whispered as one of the causes that produced war, and that territorial and racial feelings were one of the most fertile sources of internecine conflict between neighboring nationalities. But the honorable gentleman says all war reduces itself to a war for commercial purposes, and therefore he argued with great logical force that the proper way to stop all wars was, I do not think he meant to say to stop all commerce, which would, perhaps, be the most logical conclusion, but he thought free trade between nations would bring all wars to an end. He gave us an illustration—and a very singular illustration—the question of the iron mines of Lorraine, and he pointed out with perfect truth that a great deal of the supply of iron which Germany has at present is derived from the provinces which she wrested from France in 1871. He told us, that if you gave these back to France you would perpetuate the sources of war, and the idea of a general European peace would forever be dissipated. What has that to do with free trade? The iron mines must belong presumably to somebody. If they belong to one nation and a neighboring nation desires to have them, and if that is to be recognized as a cause of war, how does the honorable gentleman's talk about free trade get over the difficulty? How is his universal panacea for the abolition of war, which is not a League of Nations but universal free trade, going to deal with the question of the iron mines in Lorraine?

The real fact of the matter is, does all this talk about bringing your ideas home to the democracy of Germany and getting peace by inducing the German Majority Socialists to change their opinion—for I presume that is what it comes to—really brush aside the true obstacles to any peace? The true obstacle to any legitimate peace is what has been concisely described as German militarism. German militarism is based, not on the ambition of a few soldiers, not, indeed, upon a strictly military caste; it is based unfortunately on the fact that German writers and professors, men of theory and men of action, those engaged in historical speculation, are all united in the theory that the true policy of any nation which wishes to be great is the policy of universal domination. You may call it militarism, but it precisely expresses the instrument by which that policy is carried out. But the difficulty is that this gross and immoral heresy has spread its roots right through the most educated classes in Germany, and until those roots are eradicated there is very small hope that Germany will

willingly become a peaceful member of a peaceful society of nations. How is that eradication to be produced? The evil originally came into being by the facile successes which Germany attained in war, and the only way to eradicate it is to show that war does not always lead to facile success, or to success at all. If you can once make it clear to German minds that in modern civilization the moral view of a majority of nations is sufficient to coerce a recalcitrant member of the human society, then, and not until then, is there some prospect of that peace which all so earnestly desire.

German theory and German practice in this matter harmonize much more closely than, I am sorry to say, human theory and human practice usually do. There is absolute congruity between what they preach and what they practise, and we need not trouble to ask whether the doctrines—abominable doctrines—which I have just mentioned are the crochets of a few independent thinkers, or whether they really represent the views of the German Government. You have only to look to see what the German Government does. First read your Treitschke and Bernhardi, and then go and see how the German Government, when it gets the chance, carried out the doctrines which have been preached so universally from university chairs, from patriotic associations, by all the machinery of internal propaganda which has been going on in Germany for the last twenty-five years and more. We have then an opportunity of knowing exactly what it is that the German Government wish to do, and what the German people are ready to approve, because we can see them at work.

Of Belgium, I will say nothing now, except to remind the House that never yet, even when the way in which the war was going gave the greatest impulse to the pacifist element in Germany, never even at that moment could a German statesman bring himself to say plainly, clearly, definitely, and without ambiguity: "We took Belgium without excuse; we mean to give it back, and so far as lies in us with all we have taken from her." Never once have they said that. They have introduced qualifications, they have invented history, they have spread calumnies about Belgian policy, they have made mendacious statements on British policy in connection with Belgium, they have endeavored to divide Belgian opinion. But never yet have they clearly stated the only policy which the extremest pacifists on that bench have determined that they shall carry out before the war is brought to an end.

There is an even more striking example of the carrying out of German theories when Germany has the power, on the Eastern frontier

of Germany. I think that Germany's action in the East is an even more instructive subject of study than Germany's action in the West, and it will repay the closest study. Consider what influence Germany now has from the north of Finland right down to the Black Sea. She has gained it by the collapse of Russia. How has she used it? You have there a specimen on a large scale of what Germany does, how she carries out a single aim in different manners accordingly as the situation happens to direct her policy. The pose which she favors is that of a liberator. Next to being enslaved by Germany there is no worse fate than being liberated by her. Finland now finds herself in the grip of Germany, Germany insisting and dictating what kind of government she is to be under. Germany, as far as I can make out, is stripping her of copper and other material and not supplying her with foodstuffs, but garrisoning her with her troops and attempting to drag her into the war, and to use her as an instrument for further aggressions on Russia and further interference with the forces on whom Russia must depend for her regeneration. Go a little further south to the Baltic provinces, Esthonia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine, and you will find Germany proclaiming herself anxious that they shall be free from Russian domination, but pursuing only one end. Steadily, remorselessly, without wavering, without pity, she endeavors by every means in her power, by force, by treaty, by treaty extorted by force, to bring these peoples under German economic and military domination, so that they shall be merely her handmaids in matters of commerce and supply her with troops in times of war. So determined is she to keep these nations under her heel that, having absolutely the power to rearrange the map of this part of Europe as she pleases, she has been careful not to arrange it according to national or ethnic limitations. I do not believe it is possible to exaggerate the cynical audacity with which she has pursued and is pursuing this method. She does not want to absorb those countries into the German State because if she absorbs them as German States she will have to give them German institutions and they will have representation, for what it is worth, in the German Reichstag, and they would have their place in the German Empire. She wants them to be united under a personal tie to the Prussian monarchy, coerced, therefore, whenever occasion requires, by Prussian soldiers, with no voice in the Prussian Parliament and no power of directing Prussian politics. I can not conceive any peace being assented to by the Powers of the Entente which leaves that state of things unremedied. If it were unremedied, future wars would be an absolute certainty, and Germany's power of

waging those wars would be enormously increased. Toward these provinces she professes to act the part of liberator, a liberator who insists on forced contributions, for instance, of corn from the Ukraine, and at this moment is endeavoring to compel the Ukraine, I fear, to contribute to her armies as she is endeavoring to make Poland contribute to her armies.

If you go to Roumania you see her methods written in even larger and more unmistakable character. She has not merely forced Roumania to give immense contributions, indirectly perhaps, but not the less effectually, to her war expenditure, but she has got control of all Roumania's industries, railways and dockyards. She holds Roumania at this moment, not merely in military, but in economic domination, absolute and complete—a dominion which shows no mercy, which will destroy the independence of the Roumanian people if it is allowed to stand, for generations, and which demonstrates if anything is required to demonstrate it, that when a German talks of peace he means only a domination compared with which some of the worse dominations of the world seem to me to be merciful because they have been less successful, less effective, carried out with less systematic method, and with less absolute indifference to the feelings of the subject population.

I do not believe any one can study these treaties which Germany has made or is in the act of making without understanding and perhaps understanding for the first time what German domination means, and what a German peace for the world really signifies. In the course of this war, Germany has overrun fair districts both on the East and on the West.

We also have had our measure of territorial conquest. We have occupied the southern part of Palestine. We have occupied large portions of Mesopotamia and we have taken German colonies. If you want to know the difference between British methods and German methods compare the fate of the districts we have occupied with the fate of the districts occupied by the Germans. Wherever we have gone in the course of the war, security has been assured, trade has grown, and wealth has increased almost before your eyes. Mesopotamia at this moment, I believe, is growing more corn than she has grown for centuries. Palestine, that part of it at any rate in British occupation, is more prosperous than it has ever been, and if you come to the German colonies, I do not think that anybody who has really studied German methods of colonization will be surprised to know that the improvement is great there also.

Turn your eyes from Palestine and Mesopotamia and look at Poland and Belgium. Germany is not content with the inevitable sufferings which are produced by an army of occupation or an army passing through any territory, those sufferings need not be great if the army is disciplined. They may be almost insignificant. German soldiers wherever they have been have produced a desert and left a desert. They have stripped of their machinery, of every means of production, all the great Belgian towns. From the great manufacturing towns of Poland also, the machinery has been taken. Germany according to some of those who write on her behalf has done this in order that Lodz may never again be a competitor with German manufacturers. Poland, Belgium and the Ukraine, all these districts where the Germans have been, show even from the very beginning of the German occupation what a German peace means. It means that Germany is flourishing, and everybody else is to serve the ends and purposes of Germany. Some of their officials in Roumania, when the Roumanians bitterly complained of the way in which they were treated by the framers of the Roumanian peace treaty, said: "Why do you complain? We are treating you as friends. You should see the treaty which we mean to impose upon France and England, when the proper time comes." I have no doubt that that sentiment, however bad it may be in point of prophecy, absolutely and accurately represents the mentality of the man who spoke that phrase, and the mentality of the people who sent him to carry out his work. The real difficulty in the way of peace is not what the honorable gentlemen sitting on that bench suppose. They think in their innocence that all that is required is to bring two or three trade union leaders together from Germany and the Allied countries and something will be settled.

The Governments are most anxious to take any opportunity of arriving at an honorable, a safe and durable peace. But negotiation is perfectly useless unless the negotiators are approaching one another before the negotiation takes place. If the differences which divide them are obviously much greater than can be got over by conversation and friendly discussion and argument, discussion and friendly argument are in vain. I do not at this moment, study as I will, see either in the actions of the German Government, in the statements of German politicians which are available, or in the writings of German publicists, which meet with greatest favor in their country, the slightest sign or symptoms that they have as yet come sufficiently close to make discussion likely to be fruitful. If they give any sign that I am wrong, well and good. As I have said before, anything they wish to say, we

shall be glad to listen to, but they say a great deal to their own people in their own newspapers, and they do a great deal of the kind of talking that I have described to the House, and from this, at present, we must judge them. Judged by that standard the abyss that separates the associated Powers on the one side, and the Central Powers on the other is profound. It is almost immeasurable, it is so deep as hardly to be plumbed, and so wide as hardly to be bridged. The honorable gentlemen whose whole business it is to show that negotiation ought to be easy, have had the opportunity in countless debates of showing that Germany is closer than I fear she is. They have never given any argument which indicates it at all. I can not conceive under these circumstances what they expect to gain by debates of this character. Do they wish, for instance, to hand back to Germany, as Germany is now, the African colonies? They know that that means, in the first place, giving Germany submarine bases on all the great trade routes of the world, and putting therefore the world's commerce at Germany's disposal. They know in the second place that it means the tyrannical government of the native Africans, of which the House knows much and of which when a Blue Book, which is being prepared on one aspect of this question, is published, it will know more. It means in the third place that Germany will deliberately set to work and create a great black army in Central Africa which will make peaceable development —(Mr. SNOWDEN: As France has done already)—Certainly France has done it, but has France menaced the peace of all her neighbors? That is the whole point. The honorable gentleman never has discovered yet that nations have a soul; that they have a character; that the German soul and the German character, as Germany is now, are going to use those powers—they make very little secret of it—for the purposes not merely of defense but of aggression. It is not the abstract wickedness of having a disciplined army of black men to which I object. That may be necessary, or unnecessary. If unnecessary, it ought not to be done; if it is necessary, by all means do it. What I object to is giving back to Germany at the end of the war, an instrument so powerful for universal evil as a great colonial empire. No greater instrument for disturbing the peace of the world, or increasing the miseries of humanity could be conceived than the possession by Germany of great central African dominions to be used as she would know how to use them, for offense within the continent of Africa, and for offense perhaps even more perilous to all the great arteries of trade that join civilized nations together.

Then do the honorable gentlemen think that Germany is ready to

abandon her Russian policy? That policy has been most astute, and at first sight the most successful. Indeed the only really successful thing she has done during the war, and she is proportionately proud of it. But what does it mean for a very large fraction of the human race? Does this House contemplate with equanimity this row of subordinate States under German domination, feeding German trade though starved themselves, supplying Germany with armies, in quarrels with which they have no concern, and stretching from the Baltic right down to the Black Sea? Further do they contemplate with equanimity one of the inevitable results of that which is that Russia will be cut off from all direct intercourse with her Western friends, and that the task of self-rehabilitation and self-reconstitution which we all earnestly desire that Russia should carry through—do they contemplate with equanimity that that task should be almost impossible? Germany rejoices at Russian disintegration; she rejoices that Russia is going to be little more than the hinterland of her own dominating influence. I think it a calamity to mankind, but unless Germany's methods change and Germany's heart changes, or unless a victory, a complete victory on the part of the associated Powers convinces everybody in Germany that, whether they will it or not, their policy is a failure, unless one of those two things happens, I fail utterly to see how this great rehabilitation of Russia is ever to take place. The honorable gentlemen, who I believe quite sincerely and earnestly desire the peaceful progress of the human race, seem to be quite incapable of appreciating the magnitude of the obstacle which Germany presents to the realization of their own ideals. They desire peace, as we all desire peace, but they desire it on terms which would not merely make a future war practically inevitable but would leave an immense fraction of civilized mankind absolutely under the German heel; absolutely incapable therefore of carrying out their own developments in their own way, and which would put back the whole progress of civilization, which, as I believe, consists in the growing friendly intercourse between nation and nation of such a kind that while each influences the other, each may, nevertheless, in conformity with its own character, its own history, its own national aspirations, give to the common task that work which they are best fitted to carry out. That ideal will never and can not be carried out so long as your treaties of Brest-Litovsk remain untouched, or if you contemplate giving back to Germany her possessions in Africa, or if you give back to Turkey the Arab districts which are now happily relieved from Turkish rule. For these reasons I believe that the honorable gentlemen below the gangway opposite are doing the very

worse service they possibly can to the cause they have at heart by taking the course in this House and out of it to which we have now become unhappily too familiar.

AUSTRIAN STATEMENT RELATIVE TO BRITISH RECOGNITION OF CZECHO-SLOVAK BELLIGERENCY[1]

August 17, 1918

The form and contents of this latest declaration of the British Government must be emphatically repudiated. The Czecho-Slovak's National Council is a committee of private persons who have no mandate from the Czecho-Slovak people and still less from the Czecho-Slovak "nation," which exists only in the imagination of the Entente.

Equally absurd is it to represent this committee as a future Government, which as yet does not exist.

In reference to the Czecho-Slovak "army," it may constitute a part of the Entente army, but it certainly can not be an ally of the Entente in the sense of international law. It is well known to us that only a slight fraction of the self-styled Czecho-Slovak Army are Austrian or even Hungarian citizens of Slovak tongue.

These disloyal elements, guilty of perjury, will, notwithstanding the Entente's recognition, be regarded and treated as traitors. It can not be permitted that the peoples who have always fulfilled their duties as Austrian and Hungarian citizens, and whose sons as members of the Austro-Hungarian Army fought bravely against the Entente, shall be subjected to the suspicions cast upon them by such methods as employed by the British official declaration. The Austro-Hungarian Government reserves its steps in this regard.

[1] *The New York Times,* August 18, 1918, p. 1. For the British recognition itself see, below, under date of September 2; compare the foregoing with the Austrian note to the United States of October 29.

REPLY OF COLONIAL MINISTER SOLF TO MR. BALFOUR[1]

August 21, 1918

We have before us today one of the most important utterances of British policy in Mr. Balfour's speech in the House of Parliament. The British Foreign Secretary formally announces Great Britain's plans for the annexation of our colonies and does not hesitate to advance moral grounds for this plan.

Mr. Balfour's accusation against Germany demands a reply. . . . Mr. Balfour asserts that intellectually Germany is dominated by a moral (mailed fist) doctrine. Here and there are chauvinists and jingoes, here and there are people who worship the eternal yesterday and await with anxiety and lack of understanding the approaching tomorrow of a new time. Before the war these people formed in this country a small group without influence in politics, and without influence under government which constantly combated them. During the war their number has indeed increased.

Where does the blame lie? Nowhere but in the spirit which animates our enemies, that spirit which dishonors and has turned to scorn the grand ideal of a League of Nations by its simultaneous demand for a commercial war against Germany. If I believed that that spirit, which at present seems to prevail in England, which speaks clearly in Mr. Balfour's speech, or which was manifested against us in the Pemberton-Billing case—if I had to believe that this spirit would always have the upper hand in England, then I also would advocate that the war should be fought out to the death. I am, however, firmly convinced that before the end of the war comes an intellectual revulsion must and will supervene against this knock-out spirit. For otherwise the realization of the League of Nations remains a Utopian war aim.

I now turn to the points of Mr. Balfour's speech in detail. Mr. Balfour first mentions Belgium. The Chancellor declared last month in the Reichstag to all who wished to hear that we do not intend to retain Belgium in any form whatsoever. Belgium shall arise again after the war as an independent State, vassal to no one. Gentlemen, nothing stands in the way of the restoration of Belgium but the enemy's will to war. How small a part regard for Belgium plays in the plans of the Entente is most clearly shown by an extract from the American

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, August 22, 1918, p. 4.

press which England's Minister of Propaganda, Lord Northcliffe, printed with enthusiastic approval in one of his papers. *The New York Times* wrote: "Germany's assurance that she does not intend to retain Belgium is neither of interest nor of value. The Allies will drive the Germans out of Belgium and France." Referring to this, Lord Northcliffe says in the *Evening News* of July 16: "We rejoice to hear such a clear, resounding voice from America. That is the way to speak. Germany must be destroyed in the sense of the *New York Times*—we mean, destroyed by bloody and absolutely irreparable defeats on the battlefield, so that nothing remains of Germany in France and Belgium but the bones of her dead soldiers. There is no other way." Thus speak the protectors who for the sake of Belgium have drawn the sword.

Mr. Balfour's second charge is directed against our Eastern policy. To this I reply that the Brest-Litovsk peace came about by the agreement between the German and Russian Governments, that the frontier peoples of Russia, after centuries of oppression, were to live their own national life, for which object they have been striving. This agreement on the fate of the border peoples is a fact of world importance which can never be erased from history. Not about the aim but about the ways and means leading to the conferring of their own national life upon these peoples did the Russian and German conceptions differ. Our conception was and is that the path of freedom shall not lead to anarchy, to wholesale murder. Between the first bursting of the bonds and capability for self-determination of the border peoples there lies a natural transitory period. Until the regulating forces should cooperate in various countries Germany felt herself called upon to protect these communities in their own as well as the general interest, as indeed she has been called upon to do by both the national majorities and minorities. The Brest-Litovsk peace is a frame work and the picture which is to appear within is only sketched in the rough lines. The German Government is firmly resolved not to misuse the protection which it has been asked for and which it has granted, for forcible annexations would bar the way now open to oppressed peoples, the road to freedom, order, and mutual tolerance.

England has forfeited the right to act as a moral champion of the Russian border States in their unparalleled time of suffering. During the war they repeatedly appealed to England for help. It was always denied them. There was a time when England combated Czaristic Russia more bitterly than any other nation. But when in the course

of the war Russia in its own country suppressed the people, plundered and murdered, England remained mute, and, more than that, before all the world excused and falsified facts about conditions in Russia. Thus, thanks to England's moral support, Russia committed murders on an unparalleled scale without interference from the conscience of the world. The receiver of stolen goods can not be the judge. The problem of foreign races, even the entire Russian problem is regarded by England entirely from the point of view of assisting British warfare. England is satisfied with any kind of constitution which maintains Russia as a serviceable piece of war machinery and were Ivan the Terrible to rise again to weld Russia together to renewed fighting, he would be a welcome ally to England in the crusade for freedom and right.

But if Russia is unable to continue the war against Germany then there must be at least civil war in order to prevent law and order from being established on Germany's eastern borders. The recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks, those landless robber bands, as an Allied Power is the logical keystone of the singular structure of Anglo-Russian friendship. The economic distress in the territories, occupied by us, is undoubtedly great, but it is cynicism when England laments this, because England's hunger blockade was directed against the occupied territories, just as it was directed against the neutrals and against the whole world.

Mr. Balfour discusses our relations to every one of these border States. He begins by asserting that German intervention in Finland aimed at reducing Finland to a subject-state to Germany—in other words at creating a German Portugal. What an unheard of debasement of a finished fight for independence, which for decades has filled all the sincere friends of small nations with enthusiasm! It appears, however, that Finland meets with no sympathy from England because it feels itself menaced by English measures in north Russia, and because it objects to being cut off from its communication with the ice-free Murman coast. With reference to our relations with the Baltic provinces, Poland and the Ukraine, Mr. Balfour makes monstrous accusations. Briefly, we are accused of having treated these countries as England treated Greece, meaning that we pressed these peoples into active military service against Germany's enemies. Not a single soldier in these countries has been forced to fight for Germany's cause.

Next come Mr. Balfour's accusations against German Roumanian policy. Here England plays the rôle of a man shouting " Stop thief,"

but the world's memory is not quite such a short one. Who induced Roumania to leave its sound traditions?

I now come to what Mr. Balfour said about colonies, and I quote verbally: "We have expanded our territory. We have taken Germany's colonies, and I do not believe that any one who has really studied Germany's method of civilization will be surprised when we say that the improvement is great." Then, Mr. Balfour continued, "shall we return these colonies to Germany, thereby placing at Germany's disposal U-boat bases on all the great trading routes of the world and also of world commerce? German rule in the colonies would mean tyrannical rule over the natives and the establishment of a large black army in Central Africa."

This means that England conquers land and asserts that she could govern it better than its lawful owner, and from this derives a claim to annex it. By such arguments could the British world Monroe Doctrine be explained. I should like to put the following questions: Does the British State Secretary know nothing of the decimation of the colored populations of various African colonies by the Entente's actions, nothing of enforced recruiting in British East Africa, as admitted in the House of Commons, nothing of gigantic armies, of warriors and workers, from British and French colonies? Did he consult his colleagues of the English Colonial Office as to what it meant to wage war with natives against natives? Has he any idea of the immeasurable damage to the colonial mission of all civilized races which must result from the use of black armies in battle against white races, and the bringing of the former to Europe? Does Mr. Balfour seriously doubt that the fate of all Africa would have been better if England had not disregarded the Congo agreement? Has he forgotten that Germany is the only Power waging war which has definitely adopted the prohibition of the militarization of Africa as one of her war aims? Is Mr. Balfour ready to promise the same on behalf of England as to break with French methods and Churchillian plans?

I do not expect any answer to these questions. Mr. Balfour's speech was not intended as a statesmanlike declaration. A khaki election casts its shadow before. The short history of our colonies shows, that neither in Africa nor in the Pacific Ocean did we wish to pursue nor have we pursued, an aggressive policy. We strive for no supremacy and no preponderance of power. We wish for compromise between the colonial Powers and we desire a settlement of colonial questions, on the principle that colonial possessions shall cor-

respond to the economic strength of the European nations, and to the merits which they have shown in history in the protection of the colored races intrusted to their care. Economic energy alone is not a sufficient claim. Colonization alone means mission work. Those States which endeavored to act before the war on the principle of respecting humanity also in the colored races have won a moral right to be colonial Powers. This right was won by Germany before the war. The *beau geste* of the liberator with which the annexations of the German colonies as God's work is made plausible is blasphemy. Mr. Balfour appears to think that justification for the instinct for robbery of the English imperialistic spirit is something obvious. Is it so obvious to him that he does not notice how ridiculous it is in one and the same breath to brand Germany's striving for general mastery and to put forth for his own country an open claim to an undisguised policy of annexation in Africa and Asia? At the end of the speech of the Foreign Secretary stands a sentence saying that the abyss between the Central Powers and the Allies is so deep that it can not be bridged. Mr. Balfour can go on and claim for himself that he has made this abyss deeper. Permit me to cite words from Kant's "Eternal Peace" which weigh like a serious reproach on the world: "There must, amidst war, still remain some confidence in the way of thinking of an enemy, because otherwise no peace could ensue and hostilities would deteriorate into a war of extermination."

The psychological situation on which the British statesman's actions are based is clear—namely that our enemies do not want peace by negotiation. Once again a wave of arrogance is overwhelming people, just as was the case when Italy and Roumania joined in the war, and as has happened after every passing political or military success, and once again the old war aims come to the forefront which are so clearly laid down in secret treaties which are still valid.

Today the Entente is again waging war for plunder and glory. These facts clearly permit the conclusion that we must regard Mr. Balfour's speech as an appeal to the German people to gather anew in the fifth year of war all its energy to suffer, to fight, and to be victorious as in the great days of mobilization in August, 1914. Shall we respond as we feel, shall we also take our stand on the will to annihilation, on the knock-out policy, and abandon all those aims behind which lies the idea of the reconciliation of peoples? I decline such a policy. It would be the greatest relief possible to the enemy in his war. We should allow the enemy to dictate to us our laws and our

political actions. Let us not allow ourselves to be deceived by Mr. Balfour. He fights with a keen eye against the threatening possibility of peace. If the enemy statesmen had fought so vigilantly against the threatening war as they do today against the threatening peace, then there would never have been a world war.

In all lands, there are today groups of men which can be regarded as centres of European conscience. Do not think of isolated names either at home or in enemy countries. In these centers there stirs something like a recognition of the fact that a way into the open can be found if the war-waging nations awaken to a knowledge of their common tasks. How can we avoid future wars? How can we assure the efficacy of international agreements in case of fresh wars? How can we assure the safety of noncombatants? How can we spare neutral States in future? How can we protect national minorities, how can we regulate our common duties of honor towards the minor races of the world? These are burning questions for humanity. Behind them stands the opinion of millions, behind them stands the unspeakable suffering of unparalleled experiences. Mr. Balfour can postpone that victory. But he can not prevent it.

RECOGNITION OF THE BELLIGERENCY OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS BY THE UNITED STATES[1]

September 2, 1918

The Czecho-Slovak peoples having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and having placed organized armies in the field, which are waging war against those empires under officers of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations, and

The Czecho-Slovaks having, in prosecution of their independent purposes in the present war, confided supreme political authority to the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

The Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks thus organized and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

[1] Text in *Current History,* October, 1918, p. 85.

It also recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the *de facto* Government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary.[1]

STATEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER CZERNIN ON THE BASIS OF PEACE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS[2]

September 10, 1918

We must try not to stray from peace by understanding again, or otherwise the war will continue until friend and foe alike have perished. The opposition to disarmament is the greatest test of all obstacles to peace. Therefore, I regard this opposition as a serious mistake.

I must admit that the league of nations as envisaged by Entente statesmen intends to secure Entente predominance and therefore is inacceptable to us. But I deny that no single form could be found that would impose equal rights and duties upon all States.

From the banks of the Danube this call ought to go forth to the world: "Wake up, wake up from the bad dreams of blood and force, for a new and better future must be shaped. War as a political means must be combated." The day will come when millions in all countries will repeat this call.

[1] The British Government had already, on August 13, recognized the belligerency of the Czecho-Slovaks. In both cases there are evidences of an intention to go just as far in the direction of full *de jure* recognition as the uncertain circumstances of the time permit. The British declaration follows:

Since the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovak nation has resisted the common enemy by every means in its power. The Czecho-Slovaks have constituted a considerable army, fighting on three different battlefields, and attempting in Russia and Siberia to arrest the Germanic invasion. In consideration of its efforts to achieve independence, Great Britain regards the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied nation and recognizes the unity of the three Czecho-Slovak armies as an Allied and belligerent army waging regular warfare against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Great Britain also recognizes the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the supreme organ of Czecho-Slovak national interests and as the present trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government to exercise supreme authority over this Allied and belligerent army.—*Current History, October,* 1918, p. 85.

[2] Text in *ibid.,* October, 1918, p. 133.

ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE ON WAR AIMS[1]

September 12, 1918

My view is that nothing but heart failure can prevent us from achieving a real victory. Still, the end of all war is to impose a just and desirable peace on your enemies. What are the conditions of a just and desirable peace? The first indispensable condition, in my judgment, is that civilization should establish beyond doubt its power to enforce its decrees. As long as there is doubt left in the mind of either the offender or the defender of the irresistible character of this power, once it is challenged, this war will not have achieved its purpose. Victory is essential to sound peace. Unless you have the image of victories stamped on the surface the peace will depreciate in value. As time goes on the Prussian military power must not only be beaten but Germany itself must know it. The German people must know that if their rulers outraged the law of nations, the Prussian military strength can not protect them from punishment. There is no right you can establish, national or international, unless you establish the fact that the man who breaks the law will meet inevitable punishment. Unless this is accomplished the loss, the suffering, and the burden of this war will have been in vain. We shall have to repeat the horror, our children will have to repeat the horror, of war.

Do you realize what this war means? We went into it with an equipment which every soldier regarded as perfectly adequate. So it was to every conception of war that has been formed. What has happened? Discoveries have been made in the art of destruction which if we had only time to perfect them would simply destroy and crush civilization from the face of the globe. You can see now what these weapons of war are. High explosives, powerful artillery that has never taken a battlefield before, cities bombarded at a distance of seventy or eighty miles—and there is no reason why it should not be a hundred—bombarding aeroplanes getting more and more powerful and more and more destructive, submarines, poison in the air; that is the result of three or four years of intense thought and human ingenuity. Give a man that most terrible of all things, give him twenty or thirty years of concentrated thought on these lines, and what is to happen to following generations? This must be the last war. The last or, believe me—I have been studying all this machinery of war

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, September 13, 1918, p. 7.

for months as my business and for years as a part of my business—believe me, if this is not the last war there are men here today who will see the last of civilization. That is why in all earnestness I want to say to those who have the same horror of war as I have, who would like to see any rational means of bringing this madness to an end, do not let us be misled into the belief that the establishment of a League of Nations without power will in itself secure the world against that catastrophe. A League of Nations with a military power triumphant! Why, it would be a league of fox and geese—one fox and many geese, many at first then gradually diminishing in number. Read the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Poland was once a greater nation than Prussia and in its day as great as France. The Teuton has absorbed it. Unless there is victory the plans for the new world on which we hope to see the dawn bursting—those plans might as well be shelved. I tell you the best time, the best thought, the best energy, the best resources of a nation devoted to averting conflict or preparing for it are useless unless you stamp out for all time the rule of brute force which has challenged humanity in this war.

I am for a league of nations. In fact, the league of nations has begun. The British Empire is a league of nations. The Allied countries who are fighting the battle of international right are all a league of nations. If, after the war, Germany repudiates and condemns her perfidy, or, rather, the perfidy of her rulers, then a Germany freed from military domination will be welcomed into the great league of nations, but the only sure foundation is a complete victory for the cause of justice and international freedom which the Allied nations are now carrying along the road of triumph through barbed wired entanglements, deep emplacements, and the serried ranks of a redoubtable foe. There have been other terms which have been indicated. I have stated them repeatedly on behalf of the British nation. They were so moderate as to command even the support of the whole of the trade labor representatives of this country. President Wilson has stated them from time to time, and we stand by them. I will only make this further observation about peace. It must be a peace that will lend itself to the common sense and conscience of the nation as a whole. It must not be dictated by extreme men on either side. You can not allow the Bolsheviks to force on us a peace so humiliating as to dishonor and to make repetition of the horrors of this war inevitable. Nor can we allow chauvinists to impose terms that will leave a stain upon the conscience of the Allied people and subject them to the inevitable punishment that wrong-doing brings in its train. We must

not arm Germany with a real wrong. In other words, we shall neither accept ourselves nor impose upon our friends a Brest-Litovsk treaty. Now when a peace of the character I have indicated is secured, we can then proceed with a clear conscience and a steady nerve to build up a new world in which those who have sacrificed so much may dwell in peace, security and content. To establish the new world we must take heed in time lest we fall back into the welter of the old.

ADDRESS OF VICE CHANCELLOR PAYER ON PEACE TERMS[1]

September 12, 1918

. . . . . .

Can any thinking man really expect that this terrible struggle, in which almost the entire world is taking part, will end with a peace of the customary character? Is it believable that the very natural endeavor of the human race to make this war of wars the last will die away unheeded, that the human race, after those sacrifices, will be satisfied with a sort of armistice for a couple of decades and regard war as a quite inevitable evil for all eternity? Governments will conclude the coming peace treaties not alone, but in close harmony with the entire people. The main thing for them in a peace is not the acquisition of peoples, land, treasure and glory. The aim, nowadays, at least, is the conclusion of a lasting peace. Therefore, there will be no peace of conquest. That may mean for our enemies who have made the destruction and political shattering of us and our lives their aim, a disappointment and renunciation which will be almost equivalent to a confession of defeat. Not so for Germany, whose government during the entire war has remained faithful to the Kaiser's word, "The lust of conquest does not animate us," and has thereby demonstrated that its policy was not merely just but farsighted.

Old Russia might have remained capable of existence if she had had that intention and if she had succeeded in granting tolerable conditions of existence to her enslaved races by a federalistic constitution. She collapsed because she could not maintain internal cohesion. Our

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, September 14, 1918, p. 5. See, also, *ibid.*, September 13, 1918, p. 7.

victories and those of our allies have now given the subjects of that colossal Empire the opportunity to liberate themselves. Should we now contribute to the restoration of this despotic Czaristic Empire, which by its mere existence always menaced the world and endangered our future, by collecting together again the parts into which old Russia naturally dissolved? It is unthinkable; we can not hand over the Kingdom of Poland against Russia. Nor can we acquiesce in having Finland again placed under the Russian yoke. We can not leave to their fate the border States which lie on the German frontier and the Baltic to be subjected again against their will to Russian Czarism or to be thrown into all the perils of civil war and anarchy.

The fact that these States have come to an understanding with us as those who are most nearly interested can only be of advantage to the world. We can never permit any one to meddle with us in this matter from the standpoint of the present European boundaries or power, or rather British predominance. Just as little will we submit to the Entente for its gracious approval or alteration our peace treaties with the Ukraine, Russia and Roumania. In the east we have peace and it remains for us peace whether it pleases our western neighbors or not.

For the rest the territorial possessions which existed before the war can be everywhere restored. The preliminary condition for us and our allies is that all territory should again be restored which we possessed on August 1, 1914. Germany must therefore, in the first place, receive back her colonies, in which connection the idea of an exchange on grounds of expediency need not be excluded. We Germans, as soon as peace is concluded, can evacuate the occupied regions. We can, when once things have got to that stage, restore Belgium. If we and our allies are once again in possession of what belonged to us, if we are first sure that in Belgium no other State will be more favorably placed than we, then Belgium, I think I may say, can be given back without cumbrance and without reserve. The requisite understanding between Belgium and ourselves will be all the easier because our economic interests are frequently parallel and Belgium is even directly dependent on us as a hinterland. We have also no reason to doubt that the Flemish question will be solved in accordance with the dictates of justice and wise statesmanship. It is hypocrisy to represent Belgium as the innocent victim of our policy and to clothe her, as it were, in the white garment of innocence. The Belgian Government (and that is what matters, not the Belgian people) took an active part in Great Britain's policy of encircling Germany.

There is still the question of war indemnities from one or other party. Had we been allowed to pursue our work in peace there would have been no war, no injury. There can be no question therefore of our paying, but only whether we should receive compensation for injuries inflicted on us. We are deeply convinced that as the innocent and attacked party we have the right to indemnification. To go on prosecuting war, however, to that point would cost us such heavy sacrifices, irreplaceable by money, that we prefer on calm reflection and even with our favorable military situation to abandon this idea, quite apart from the question of the jeopardizing of future peace which would be inevitable if compensation were forcibly urged. Despite everything the peace treaty will have purely positive contents. The nations of the earth cry out for preservation from the further misery of wars, for leagues of nations, international courts of arbitration and also for agreements in regard to equal disarmament. The enemy Governments, partly from inner conviction, partly also from tactical considerations, have made these cries their own. None of these demands, whose fulfilment would be calculated to lighten the lot of posterity, will be wrecked on opposition from the German Government. We are, on the contrary ready to collaborate to the best of our ability. The idea of a league of nations, of a real one which comprised all who were willing, was familiar to us Germans at a time when Great Britain and France thought of nothing but the enslaving of foreign peoples. Arbitration courts, even international ones, are for us nothing new.

We desire to have a disarmament agreement on the condition of complete reciprocity, applied not to merely the land armies, but even to naval forces. In pursuance of the same idea and going even beyond it, we will raise in the negotiations a demand for the freedom of the seas and sea routes, for the open door in all overseas possessions, and for the protection of private property at sea, and, if negotiations take place in regard to the protection of small nations and of national minorities in individual States, we shall willingly advocate the international arrangements which will act like a deliverance in countries under Great Britain's domination. In all seriousness, we hope that after the experiences of this war every serious attempt at improvement in this respect will bear such rich fruit.

Unreasonable conditions should not, of course, be laid down for our participation in peace negotiations . . . we laugh at the idea that we should first penitently ask for mercy ere we are admitted. We laugh at the fools who babble of revenge. I have wished only to

show that a peace by understanding will bring nothing humiliating for us nor a period of misery and wretchedness. Strong and courageous in the consciousness of our invincibility, equal among the nations of the earth, we will live a life of labor but also of contentment and with an assured future. In common with others we will protect the world peace from future dangers.

It would be an illusion to calculate on a will to peace in those circles among our enemies which are responsible for the opening and the continuation of hostilities. For years they have been living on the inflaming of the war passion. They can not admit to their countrymen that their aims are unattainable and their sacrifices made in vain. Others among those peoples will think differently. Moreover they will prevail soon or late. Until then, however, there remains nothing for us to do but defend our lives. We place the responsibility for the blood which will yet flow on the enemy's shoulders. But whoever will not hear must feel. On our outer and inner front the will to destruction of our enemies will be shattered. Germany's strength and capacity, her courage and self-sacrifice, to which for four years we owe everything, must teach them that it has become hopeless for them to continue to wage this baneful war.

AUSTRIAN PEACE PROPOSAL

Minister of Sweden to the Secretary of State.[1]

LEGATION OF SWEDEN,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,

September 16, 1918.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to communicate to you the following note addressed by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the Royal Government of Sweden and received by me on this day by telegraph:

Although it was declined by the enemy Powers, the peace proposal made on December 12, 1916, by the four Allied Powers which never desisted from the conciliatory intent that had prompted it, nevertheless, was the beginning of a new phase in the history of this war. From that day the question of peace after two and a half years of fierce struggle suddenly became the main topic of discussion in Europe, nay, in the world, and has been steadily gaining prominence ever since.

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* September 17, 1918.

From that day nearly every belligerent state has repeatedly voiced its opinion on the subject of peace. The discussion, however, was not carried on along the same lines. Viewpoints varied according to the military and political conditions, and so, thus far at least, no tangible or practical result has been achieved. Notwithstanding those fluctuations, a lessening of the distance between the viewpoints of the two parties could be noted though no attempt will be made to deny the great divergences of opinions which divide the two enemy camps and which it has heretofore been impossible to reconcile. One may be, nevertheless, permitted to notice that some of the extreme war aims have been departed from, and that the fundamental basis of a universal peace is to some extent agreed upon. There is no doubt that on either side the desire of the peoples to reach an understanding and bring about peace is becoming more and more manifest. The same impression is created when the manner in which the peace proposal of the four allied Powers was received in the past is compared with the subsequent utterances of their adversaries whether they came from responsible statesmen or from personages holding no office but likewise wielding political influence. By way of illustration confined to a few instances, the Allies in their reply to President Wilson's note advanced claims which meant nothing less than the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the mutilation and radical changes in the political structure of Germany, and also the annihilation of European Turkey. With time, those terms that could not be enforced without a crushing victory were modified or partly abandoned by some of the official declarations of the Entente.

Thus Mr. Balfour, in the course of last year, plainly declared to the English Parliament that Austria-Hungary was to solve her domestic problems by herself and that Germany could not be given another constitution through foreign influence; Mr. Lloyd George afterward announced, in the beginning of this year, that the Allies were not fighting for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or to despoil the Ottoman Empire of its Turkish provinces, or, again, to bring internal reforms to Germany. We may also add that in December, 1917, Mr. Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy had pledged itself to create an independent state including the German territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the utterances of the Central Powers, they leave no doubt that those states are merely fighting to defend the integrity and safety of their territories. Much greater than in respect to concrete war aims is the evidence that the principles upon which peace could be concluded and a new order of things established in Europe and throughout the world have in a way drawn nearer to one another. On this point President Wilson in his address of February 12, and July 4, 1918, formulated principles that have raised no objection from his Allies and whose wide application will shortly meet with objections from the four allied Powers provided to be general and consistent with the vital interests of the states concerned. To agree upon general principles, however, would not suffice; an agreement should also be reached as to their

interpretation and application to the several concrete questions of war and peace.

To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a compromise peace has been enormously strengthened; that the conviction is increasing that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will check its development for decades to come—and this without any guarantee of thereby bringing about the decision by arms which four years of efforts, hardships and immense sacrifices have failed to bring about. Now, by what means, in what manner can the way be paved that will finally lead to such a compromise. Can anyone in earnest expect that goal to be attained by adhering to the method heretofore followed in the discussion of the peace problem? We dare not answer that question in the affirmative. The discussion as conducted until now from one rostrum to another by the statesmen of the several countries was substantially but a series of monologues. It lacked sequence above all. Speeches delivered, arguments expounded by the orators of the opposite parties, received no direct immediate reply. Again, the publicity of those utterance, the places where they were delivered, excluded every possible serviceable result. In such public utterances the eloquence used is of the high-pitched kind which is intended to thrill the masses. Whether intentionally or not, the gap between conflicting ideas is thus widened. Misunderstandings that cannot easily be eradicated spring up, and a simple straightforward exchange of ideas is hampered as soon as mentioned, and even before an official answer can be made by the adversary every declaration of the statesmen in power is taken up for passionate and immoderate discussion by irresponsible persons, but the statesmen themselves are obsessed by a fear that they may unfavorably influence public opinion in their country and thereby compromise the chances of the war, and also of prematurely disclosing their true intentions. That is why they use thunderlike[1] speech and persist in upholding unflinching points of view. If, therefore, it were intended to seek the basis for a compromise apt to make an end of the war, whose prolongation would mean nothing but suicide, and to save Europe from that catastrophe, resort should be had in any event to some other method which would permit of continuous and direct converse between the representatives of the governments and between them only. Such an exchange of views would take in the conflicting views of the several belligerent states to the same extent as the general principles on which to build up peace and the relations between states, and might first lead to an understanding as to those principles. The fundamental principles once agreed upon, an effort should be made in the course of the informal negotiations to apply them concretely to the several peace questions and thereby bring about their solution. We indulge the hope that none of the belligerents will object to this proposed exchange of views.

[1] The French text has "donnantes," which is here meaningless; "tonnantes," with the above meaning, was probably the word sent and distorted in transmission.

There would be no interruption of military operations. The conversation would go no further than deemed useful by the participants; the parties concerned could be put to no disadvantage thereby. The exchange of views, far from doing any harm, could be but beneficial to the cause of peace; what might fail at the first attempt could be tried over again; something will at least have been done toward elucidating the problems. How many are the deep-rooted misunderstandings that might be dispelled! How many the new ideas that would break their way out! Human sentiments so long pent up could burst forth from all hearts, creating a warmer atmosphere while safeguarding every essential point and dispel many a discussion which at this time seems important. We are convinced that it is the duty of all belligerents to mankind to take up together the questions whether there is no way, after so many years of a struggle which, notwistanding all the sacrifices it has cost, is still undecided and the whole course of which seems to demand a compromise, of bringing this awful war to an end. The Imperial and Royal Government, therefore, comes again to the governments of all the belligerent states with a proposal shortly to send to a neutral country, upon a previous agreement as to the date and place, delegates who would broach a confidential non-binding conversation over the fundamental principles of a peace that could be concluded. The delegates would be commissioned to communicate to one another the views of their respective governments on the aforesaid principles and very freely and frankly interchange information on every point for which provision should be made.

The Imperial and Royal Government has the honor to apply for your kindly good offices and to request that the Royal Government of Sweden kindly communicate the present communication, which is addressed to all the belligerent states simultaneously, to the Government of the United States of America and of Great Britain.

(Signed) BURIAN.

Be pleased to accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

(Signed) W. A. F. EKENGREN.

His Excellency,
MR. ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State of the United States,
etc., etc., etc.

STATEMENT OF MR. BALFOUR IN REPLY TO HERR PAYER AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE[1]

September 16, 1918

I had intended to say something today on the certain broad aspects of Russian policy which, in my opinion, concern not merely Great

[1] Text in *The Times*, London, September 17, 1918, p. 7.

Britain and the Dominions but the whole body of Allied co-belligerents and indeed the whole civilized world; but I feel that, on the afternoon of a day on which the morning papers announce proposals on the part of one of our principal antagonists to take part in something which I suppose may be described, or is intended to be described, as a peace conference, it is quite impossible for the Foreign Secretary to allow such an occasion to pass without some comment. At the same time, let it be remembered that this comment is made within an hour or two of having seen in the press an account of this proposal—this particular Austrian proposal—and that I have not had an opportunity of consulting with my colleagues, and what I say must be taken as an individual utterance of a member of the government made upon what may truly be described as "the spur of the moment."

The issues of peace and war are so tremendous, the calamities imposed upon mankind by the continuation of hostilities are so overwhelming, that I would never wish to treat with disrespect any proposal made from a responsible source. Nothing should be closer to the heart, and, as I believe, closer to the hearts of anybody, whether they be Members of Parliament or members of the government or leaders of the press—nobody occupying a responsible position would ever take upon himself the heavy burden of rejecting with a light heart any proposal made which might diminish the magnitude or shorten the length of the present calamitous period through which the whole civilized world is passing. Therefore I wish to say nothing in a scoffing mood which would indicate or wish to be interpreted as indicating, either that I am indifferent, or that the government is indifferent, to the cause of peace, and yet I can not honestly say that in the proposals now made, so far as I have been able to study them, I see the smallest hope that the goal we all desire to reach, the goal of a peace which shall be more than a truce, can really be attained.

Let me say at once that I agree with the Austrian note when its authors point out that the whole of civilization is at stake. I agree that the prolongation of hostilities is risky, indeed is sacrificing a great deal that is rightly dear to everybody interested in the progress of mankind. There I am with them. How do they propose to remedy this, and bring this calamitous state of things to an end? Their suggestions, as far as I can understand, can be stated in a word. It is that there should be no cessation of hostilities, but that there should be an initiation of irresponsible conversations. I do not deny that such conversations may, in certain circumstances, be a very valuable method of arriving at an agreement. It may heal wounds that can not be

healed by mere interchange of embittered speeches and documents, and there may be circumstances in public life, as in private life, in which friendly talk, started for the purpose of removing misunderstandings and arriving at an agreement may prove to be a happy and fortunate instrument for the renewal of peace. But is there the slightest prospect that the conditions now prevailing are conditions under which such conversations can be profitably initiated? With every desire to look favorably at these proposals, personally I am utterly unable to see it.

The Austrian note conveying these suggestions points out with perfect truth that the views of the parties to this controversy vary with the various changes occurring on the field of battle and elsewhere. The war has been going on for four years, and no doubt there had been changes made in that time. In all that period the Germans have not, as a Government, or indeed through the mouth of any responsible member of the Government, made anything which deserves to be called a peace proposition. I observe with some surprise that the Austrian note refers to a transaction in December, 1916, which they call a proposal for peace. I have refreshed my memory upon this. It was a brief document, which was largely occupied in saying how brave and powerful and invincible the German armies were and partly occupied in saying that, of course, they could never admit themselves to be beaten; but it did not contain, as far as I remember, a single concrete proposal as to what should be done to bring about peace, what terms Germany would accept, on what basis the peace they profess to desire should be obtained. There is a phrase which indicates the degree of self-knowledge to which at that time the Central Powers had attained. It contained this sentence: "Not for an instant would they (that is the German and Austrian Governments) swerve from the conviction that respect for the rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate aspirations." That is the nearest approach, so far as I remember, made towards peace by either Government in that document. But this is a suggestion which every citizen of the Allies knows to be untrue and that history will assert it is untrue. How then can the authors say that they started negotiations in 1916? Imagine conversations carried on as the Austrians desire they should be carried on. They say that the views of the belligerents vary from day to day. Picture to yourself half a dozen distinguished diplomatists collected in a room, their conversations entirely noncommittal, carrying with them no final responsibility in regard to particular affairs; and imagine them watch-

ing from day to day the varying fortunes on the field of battle. I can imagine the German representatives if things were going badly, taking a position of comparative humility. Then perhaps a German success occurs, and the German headquarters staff say upon their authority that they hold the situation in hand—I think that is the consecrated phrase—and thereupon the tenor of the conversation on the German side wholly varies and a wholly different attitude is taken up.

There is much more fundamental objection to these conversations. Every man here knows, the world knows, that you can not arrive at an agreement by talking the matter over unless there is some misunderstanding to be dispelled, some explanation to be made, some small question of pride, or *amour propre* to be got over. There are questions between friends who have fallen out on which conversations may be invaluable, and there are a great many questions connected with peace upon which I believe such conversations would be invaluable. But are we near the stage when these questions can be decided? I feel we are not. Before we get to that stage, there are bigger questions to be determined and on these bigger questions there is no error and there is no mistaking the different attitude of the Government. Their positions have been stated with absolute explicitness and there is no chance of their coming to an agreement. What then is the use of their entering into these irresponsible talks?

Let me illustrate the general principle by application to the present moment. Three days, I think it was, before we had the Austrian suggestion of irresponsible talk, to remove or minimize the differences between the combatants, we have an authoritative statement from the German Vice Chancellor. He made a long speech in which he gave utterance to words which are perfectly explicit and quite unmistakable on several vital questions upon which I had no doubt whatever. Did the Viennese authorities, the authors of this suggestion, know, or did they not know, of the Vice Chancellor's speech? The Vice Chancellor is Vice Chancellor by reason of the fact partly that he is supposed to represent what in Germany is called Liberalism, and that he in particular is supposed to possess the favor of the Reichstag majority. He therefore speaks, not for the Pan-Germanists, not for the Extremists—he speaks for the Liberal wing of the German Government. He is perfectly explicit. Take Belgium, for example. The phrase he uses, is a very curious one, but I suppose it is intended to mean that Germany feels she really must restore Belgian independence. He said explicitly that she will not do anything to restore Belgian prosperity or indemnify the country she has wasted, brutalized and

ravished. But it seems that if Belgium will consent to make certain modifications in her internal arrangements she is to be allowed to get back her independence. That, I think, is the most explicit statement we have yet heard upon that subject from any German official. Observe it explicitly refuses that which we think is obviously just—namely, the restoration of and indemnity to Belgium, which has been so brutally treated. It is not as if Germany were opposed to the principle of giving an indemnity for the loss incurred by the war. She has at this moment squeezed out of the subservient Bolshevist Government three hundred million pounds compensation for losses which she alleges Germany has suffered from Russia. I should like to know what wrong Russia has inflicted upon Germany comparable with the wrong Germany has inflicted upon Belgium. Are we to be told seriously that Germany is going to extract this three hundred million pounds from Russia and not give a shilling compensation to Belgium? If that represents the opinion of the German Government no conversation can put that right. It is explicit and clear difference of opinion. A conversation would emphasize differences of that sort, but it could not remove them.

Then it seems that Germany is to insist upon the return of her colonies. I look around an assembly which is in a very peculiar degree representative of the Dominions whose interests are vitally affected by the subsequent allocation of the German colonies. I am not going to discuss that question, but I say emphatically here again is a point upon which there can be no misunderstanding, and upon which the Germans stand on one side and we stand on the other. I say it is impossible to conceive that any conversations can bridge over a difference so deep or restore to the power of Germany those unhappy populations which she has misused and give back to Germany the control of those naval bases which would make her the controller not merely of the lines of communication which join one part of the British Empire to another, but would make her the mistress of the lines of communication of the civilized world. How is that to be put right by conversation? I know not.

Alsace and Lorraine are another point. Germany has said explicitly last week—I am not talking of last year or two years ago—through the mouth of her Vice Chancellor that she is not going to alter the boundaries of the German Empire, or give up German territory in which she included Alsace and Lorraine, in any circumstances whatever. How is a conversation going to put that right? I utterly fail to see. Then take her monstrous pretentions in the East of

Europe. The Liberal German Vice Chancellor has laid it down that the fate of Poland and the fate of these peoples that border on the Western frontier of Russia, and the treaty of Bucharest, which reduces Roumania to a condition of vassalage, are sustained, and that Germany alone is to settle what degree of servitude is to be imposed upon her Eastern neighbors. That is definite and explicit, and there is no misunderstanding there. It is stated in black and white without circumlocution or fine phrasing—stated with brutal frankness. No dexterity of dialogue is going to remove differences of that kind, until those who rule the destinies of Germany, whether they be the headquarters staff, or the Emperor, or the Chancellor, or the Vice Chancellor, or the Reichstag—are prepared to show an open mind, or at least are prepared to see a solution in conformity with what we and our co-belligerent Powers believe to be the cause of justice and civilization. Mere conversations must be fruitless.

There is something almost cynical to me in the way in which the Austrians have made their proposals within a few hours of the Vice Chancellor's speech. I suppose it is that they count upon the illimitable gullability of the public in the Entente countries. The public in the Entente countries are earnestly desirous, even passionately desirous, of peace but not so stupid as some of their critics among the Central Powers seem to suppose. They can look below the surface to the realities and they know quite well that, until Germany is prepared to look at the problems which confront us in a very different spirit from that which animates her statesmen, conversations must be useless; and therefore I am forced to the conclusion that, when they put forward such proposals as these, they do it, not because such proposals would be accepted, not because they can be accepted but because they believe it may do something to divide one ally from another, or to embitter any differences there may be within the allied countries themselves, and in so doing weaken that coordinated effort for victory which at present is showing itself on every front—in France, in Italy, in Mesopotamia, and in Russia.

I can not bring myself to believe that this is an honest desire among our enemies to arrive at an understanding with us on terms which it would be possible for us to accept. I am driven perforce with great reluctance, but with very little doubt, to the opposite conclusion—that this is not an attempt to make peace by understanding, but that it is an attempt to weaken forces which are proving too strong for them in the field by working upon those sentiments, honorable in their origin, mistaken in development, which they believe to exist in all

countries and which they think capable of being turned to their purpose to work out their end. We have little to hope for in this effort. It can not produce peace, but I am just as sure that it will not produce division among the Allied Powers. It is true that all alliances have weaknesses. There has never been a coalition in the world which has not its weak side, but I believe at the same time there never was a coalition in the world animated throughout by so earnest a desire for the common good, so resolute a determination not to pursue particular interests as distinguished from the common aim, as that which exists between the Allies. I believe that mutual trust and confidence exists to the fullest degree. Certainly everything which this country can do has been done, is being done, and will be done to keep that mutual confidence bright and to make it effective—to make it, as it ought to be, both the cause and the result of common effort and common successes. In that I am sure we shall be seconded by all our allies.

We are not the victims of clumsy German diplomacy. The German excels when he deals in methods of direct, simple, and efficient brutality. When he tries to dress himself in President Wilson's colors, or to act the part which he thinks President Wilson would like him to play, he is very clumsy because he is very insincere. However he may dress himself, the mailed fist always appears and surely those are right who think that negotiations can never be effective or never be fruitful until those responsible for German policy understand that merely by borrowing and endeavoring clumsily to adapt President Wilson's phrase to their policy at the very moment when in every part of the world they are violating the very essence of President Wilson's teaching—that, surely, is a policy which can never take in the most simple-minded of our countrymen or of the population of our allies.

You will judge from what I have said that to me it seems almost incredible that anything good can come of this proposal. If it can be shown, if any of my critics in public or private will show me that in the few minutes I have had time to study this scheme I have mistaken either the tenor of German utterances or the effects of German policy in the east, in the west, or in distant colonies—if anybody can show me there is some misunderstanding dividing us from the Central Powers which conversation will remove, nobody would rejoice more than I, nobody would more gladly withdraw what I have said. But I do not believe any such commentary can be made. The more this document is considered, and considered in conjunction with German deeds and utterances, the more it can be seen that this plan can do nothing but excite hopes impossible to realize, and it brings us not a yard

nearer that goal and consummation which all passionately look forward to—the goal and consummation of an honorable peace which shall not merely put an end to the ills from which we suffer, but which will be some guarantee and some security that our children and our children's children will not suffer under a repetition of them.

REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL

The Secretary of State to the Minister of Sweden [1]

September 17, 1918

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note, dated September 16th, communicating to me a note from the Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary, containing a proposal to the Governments of all the belligerents States to send delegates to a confidential and unbinding discussion on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace. Furthermore it is proposed that the delegates would be charged to make known to one another the conception of their Governments regarding these principles and to receive analogous communications, as well as to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.

In reply I beg to say that the substance of your communication has been submitted to the President who now directs me to inform you that the Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

Mr. W. A. F. EKENGREN,
Minister of Sweden,
In Charge of Austro-Hungarian Interests.

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* September 17, 1918.

OFFICIAL ITALIAN STATEMENT ON THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL[1]

September 18, 1918

The Italian Government up to the present has no knowledge of the Austrian peace note except from what has been published by telegraph agencies. If, however, the text supplied by correspondents is correct, the Italian Government must point out that the Austrian proposal aims at creating a phantom of peace negotiations without any real substance or probability of a practical issue. The recent declarations of members of the Austro-Hungarian and German Governments, which exclude any cession of territory and would establish as definitive the iniquitous treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, make any useful opening of negotiations impossible.

The Entente Powers and the United States have widely made known their sincere desire for a just peace, and at the same time also on what essential bases this peace ought to be founded. On this point the Austrian note does not say a word. The same can be said, for instance, as regards that which more directly affects Italian aspirations. These are well known to the Austrian Government and are recognized by the Allies, and they can be summed up by stating that they aim at the attainment of national unity by the deliverance of the Italians hitherto subject to Austria and at the realization of conditions which are indispensable for the security of Italy.

Until the Austrian Government also recognizes these special aims, as well as the general and special aims for which all the Allies are unitedly fighting, Italy will not cease the struggle the object of which is to lead humanity to the better and safer shelter of a durable peace founded on liberty and justice.

[1] Text in *The Times,* London, September 20, 1918, p. 5.

BULGARIAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REQUEST FOR AN ARMISTICE[1]

September 24, 1918

In view of the conjunction of circumstances which have recently arisen, and after the position had been jointly discussed with all competent authorities, the Bulgarian Government, desiring to put an end to the bloodshed, authorized the Commander-in-Chief of the army to propose to the Generalissimo of the armies of the Entente at Saloniki, a cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations for obtaining an armistice and peace.

The members of the Bulgarian delegation left yesterday evening in order to get in touch with the plenipotentiaries of the Entente belligerents.

REPLY OF GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY TO THE BULGARIAN REQUEST FOR AN ARMISTICE[2]

September 26, 1918

My response, which I sent through the Bulgarian officer bearing the letter in question, can not be, because of the military situation, other than the following:

I can accord neither an armistice nor the suspension of hostilities tending to interrupt the operations in course. On the other hand I will receive with all due courtesy the delegates, duly qualified, of the Royal Bulgarian Government, to which your Excellency alludes in the letter. These delegates should present themselves at the British lines accompanied by an interpreter.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, September 29, 1918, p. 1. The request was presented to General Franchet d'Esperey on September 25 at 5 p. m.

[2] Text in *The New York Times*, September 29, 1918, p. 1. The armistice signed with Bulgaria on September 29, 1918, is printed *infra*, p. 405.

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT WILSON IN OPENING THE FOURTH LOAN CAMPAIGN[1]

September 27, 1918

My Fellow Citizens: I am not here to promote the loan. That will be done—ably and enthusiastically done—by the hundreds of thousands of loyal and tireless men and women who have undertaken to present it to you and to our fellow citizens throughout the country; and I have not the least doubt of their complete success; for I know their spirit and the spirit of the country. My confidence is confirmed, too, by the thoughtful and experienced cooperation of the bankers here and everywhere, who are lending their invaluable aid and guidance. I have come, rather, to seek an opportunity to present to you some thoughts which I trust will serve to give you, in perhaps fuller measure than before, a vivid sense of the great issues involved, in order that you may appreciate and accept with added enthusiasm the grave significance of the duty of supporting the Government by your men and your means to the utmost point of sacrifice and self-denial. No man or woman who has really taken in what this war means can hesitate to give to the very limit of what they have; and it is my mission here tonight to try to make it clear once more what the war really means. You will need no other stimulation or reminder of your duty.

At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well defined purposes which we did not determine and which we can not alter. No statesman or assembly created them; no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were perhaps not clear at the outset; but they are clear now. The war has lasted more than four years and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peo-

[1] Text as issued by the White House.

ples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us, and we responded, fiercely and of course.

The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them

deal with other Governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We can not "come to terms" with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we can not accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the practical implications that are involved in it.

If it be in deed and in truth the common object of the Governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality, by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It can not be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace can not be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved

untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Roumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance

of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I have made this analysis of the international situation which the war has created, not, of course, because I doubted whether the leaders of the great nations and peoples with whom we are associated were of the same mind and entertained a like purpose, but because the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubtings and mischievous perversions of counsel and it is necessary once and again to sweep all the irresponsible talk about peace intrigues and weakening morale and doubtful purpose on the part of those in authority utterly, and if need be unceremoniously, aside and say things in the plainest words that can be found, even when it is only to say over again what has been said before, quite as plainly if in less unvarnished terms.

As I have said, neither I nor any other man in governmental authority created or gave form to the issues of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly and with a resolution that has grown warmer and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be wilfully. I am bound to fight for them, and happy to fight for them as time and circumstance have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline.

And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purpose of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the

background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they were seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be. They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and divisions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of those deepseated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the questions asked because they did not know how searching those questions were and what sort of answers they demanded.

But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken or can get someone to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the Governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of those issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battlefield; and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance

of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. "Peace drives" can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed forever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the "terms" she will accept; and always finds that the world does not want terms. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

BULGARIA ARMISTICE CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 29, 1918[1]

Military Convention Regulating the Conditions of Suspension of Hostilities Between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria

(1) Immediate evacuation of the territories still occupied by Bulgarians in Greece and Serbia; no cattle, cereals, or provisions to be exported from such territories, which must be left undamaged; the Bulgarian civil administration will continue to function in the parts of Bulgaria actually occupied by the Allies.

(2) Immediate demobilization of the entire Bulgarian Army, with the exception of a fighting force comprising 3 divisions of 16 battalions each, 4 regiments of cavalry, which will be employed, 2 divisions for the defense of the east frontier of Bulgaria, and of the Dobrudja and 1 division for guarding the railways.

(3) Surrender at points designated by the high command of the armies of the east of arms, munitions, and military vehicles belonging to the elements demobilized, which will be stored by the Bulgarian authorities and under the control of the Allies. The horses also will be handed over to the Allies.

(4) Restitution to Greece of the material of the Fourth Greek Army Corps, taken from the Greek Army at the occupation of eastern Macedonia, in so far that it has not been sent to Germany.

(5) The elements of the Bulgarian troops now at the west of the meridian of Uskub will lay down their arms and will be considered, until further order, as prisoners of war; the officers will be allowed to keep their swords.

(6) The Bulgarian prisoners of war in the East will be employed

[1] Senate Document No. 147, 66th Congress, 1st Session.

by the Allied armies until the peace without reciprocity as concerning the prisoners of war of the Allies. These last will be immediately surrendered to the Allied authorities and deported civilians will be wholly free to reenter their own country.

(7) Germany and Austria will be allowed a delay of four weeks to withdraw their troops and military organizations from Bulgaria. The diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as well as their citizens, must withdraw in this same period. The orders for the cessation of hostilities will be given at the time of the signature of the present convention.

(Signed) Gen. FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.
(Signed) ANDRÉ LIAPTCHEW.
Gen. LOUKOFF.

Military Covenant Regulating the Conditions of the Suspension of Hostilities Between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria

SECRET ARTICLES

(1) The eventual passage of the Allied military forces over Bulgarian territory, as well as the utilization of railways, roads, waterways, and harbors, will be the object of a special covenant between the Bulgarian Government and the High Command of the Army of the East. Some negotiations to this effect will begin in about eight days at the most. They will concern, also, the control of telephone, telegraph, and the stations of T. S. F.

(2) A certain number of strategical points in the interior of the Bulgarian territory will be occupied by the great Allied powers. This occupation will be provisional, and will serve purely as a guaranty. It will not give way to coercion or arbitrary requisition. The General in Chief of the armies gives assurance that unless unusual circumstances arise, Sofia will not be occupied.

(3) The General in Chief reserves for himself, in case of necessity, the right to demand absolute cessation of every relation between Bulgaria and her former allies.

(4) The opening of Bulgarian ports to the vessels of allied and neutral powers.

(Signed) Gen. FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.
(Signed) ANDRÉ LIAPTCHEW.
Gen. LOUKOFF.

COMMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER BALFOUR ON THE PROGRAM LAID DOWN BY PRESIDENT WILSON ON SEPTEMBER 27[1]

October 1, 1918

The main theme, as I understood him, which he developed was this: that if the world is not only to have peace, but is to be sure that it is going to have peace, it must come to some arrangement by which the malefactors or would-be malefactors are to be kept in order. Justice, as between great and small nations, is to be preserved not merely by pious sentiment, not merely by elaborate treaties, but by some machinery which will be effective for carrying out the objects for which it was created. That was his first proposition, a League of Nations or some machinery such as is contemplated in this scheme for a League of Nations. Some such scheme must be brought into being, if we are to be sure that our labors in the present war are to bear their full fruit.

The second proposition, as I understood it, was that, if you are to carry out this great ideal with all its obvious and immense difficulties, the only time to do it effectually is the moment when the peace itself is being forged by the labors of the victorious Powers. Allow that moment to pass, and do you suppose that the world, weary of its tremendous effort, absorbed in the domestic problems which will crowd upon us, neutrals and belligerents alike, when this war is over, will have the patience, endurance, and resolution really to contrive the international machinery which shall carry out our objects? The President's opinion is—and personally I am very much of his mind—that to allow this occasion to sink into the past would be to lose one of the great opportunities given to mankind permanently to put international relations on a sound, lasting, and moral footing.

These, as I understand it, are the two great pillars of the policy to which he has given eloquent expression.

But evidently something yet further is required. Evidently we are bound to see that the labors, the work which you require your new machinery to do, shall not be greater than any machinery can be asked to do. In other words if you are going to bring into existence an international machinery for the securing of peace, you must so arrange the map of Europe and of the world that the great occasions for wars will not overwhelm you.

[1] Text in *The New York Times,* October 2, 1918, p. 12.

If you perpetuate the state of things which exists in Central Europe, if you render permanent, for example, German domination over Russia, especially over Western Russia, if you leave no hope to the small peoples along the Baltic, if you refuse to redress the century or more than century of wrong to Poland and leave Poland where she has been for all these generations, a reproach to all civilization—if these subordinated peoples who have for generations been trampled in the Austrian Empire under the heel of the German and Magyar minorities, if you leave them still in their present position, if the Balkans are again to be the scene of bloody wars among themselves and the occasion of hostilities among their neighbors, if the Turk is to be allowed to resume his bloody sway over the territories which have been torn from him, if he is still to massacre at will and to plunder at will, if Italy is not to have restored to her those populations which will really make her indeed Italy Redeemed, if Greece is to be threatened by the domination of the Central Powers, if Serbia is not to be restored after all her appalling sacrifices and after all her glorious gallantry, if France is not to resume her full place in Western Europe, and if Belgium is not to have restored to her in full measure all that the abominable brigandage of the Central Powers has torn from her—if all those evils are not potentially to recur, then you must do something more than merely establish a League of Nations.

You must put these wrongs right before the League of Nations sets to work; you must give them a clean slate to work upon; you must not bring them in as a great reforming machinery, for a great reforming machinery on those lines I believe to be impossible.

You must bring them in to show that after you have carried out these great reforms, after you have freed Europe from Prussian militarism, after you have restored Asia as well as Europe to a position in which self-development is possible for the various nationalities which occupy them, then, and only then, will your League of Nations work.

Therefore, in order to make the League of Nations possible, victory, and complete victory, is absolutely necessary. The dream of the Germans that by merely subscribing their names to a petition for such a league they can persuade their enemies that their heart is changed—that is a vain illusion. Germany really seems to suppose that when we, the Allies, talk of a change of heart and the destruction of militarism, all that is required are a few constitutional modifications

of the Prussian State and subscription to the admirable propositions which from time to time President Wilson has laid down.

These superficial changes are of no value whatever if they stand by themselves. Germany can only be a member of the League of Nations when the international system has been reformed by a great and wise and all-embracing peace; and that can never take place until Germany not merely has been obliged to change her profession of faith, but until Germany finds herself in a position when all her dreams of world domination are torn to pieces before her eyes, and when she is left powerful, indeed, as she will be left powerful doubtless, prosperous doubtless, and wealthy, but no longer the tyrant who can use the nations which she is in a position to influence to subserve her own dreams of world empire.

CHANCELLOR MAXIMILIAN'S EXPLANATION OF HIS AIMS IN ASKING FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS [1]

October 5, 1918

In accordance with the Imperial decree of September 30, the German Empire has undergone a basic alteration of its political leadership. As successor to Count George E. von Hertling, whose services in behalf of the Fatherland deserve the highest acknowledgment, I have been summoned by the Emperor to lead the new Government. In accordance with the governmental method now introduced, I submit to the Reichstag, publicly and without delay, the principles upon which I propose to conduct the grave responsibilities of the office.

These principles were firmly established by the agreement of the Federated Governments and the leaders of the majority parties in this honorable House before I decided to assume the duties of Chancellor. They contain, therefore, not only my own confession of political faith, but that of an overwhelming portion of the German people's representatives—that is, of the German nation—which has constituted the Reichstag on the basis of a general, equal, and secret franchise, and according to their will. Only the fact that I know the conviction and will of the majority of the people are back of me has given me strength to take upon myself conduct of the empire's affairs in this hard and earnest time in which we are living.

[1] *Current History,* November, 1918, p. 242.

One man's shoulders would be too weak to carry alone the tremendous responsibility which falls upon the Government at present. Only if the people take active part, in the broadest sense of the word, in deciding their destinies; in other words, if responsibility also extends to the majority of their freely elected political leaders, can the leading statesman confidently assume his part of the responsibility in the service of folk and Fatherland.

My resolve to do this has been especially lightened for me by the fact that prominent leaders of the laboring class have found a way in the new Government to the highest offices of the empire. I see therein a sure guarantee that the new Government will be supported by the firm confidence of the broad masses of the people, without whose true support the whole undertaking would be condemned to failure in advance. Hence, what I say today is not only in my own name and those of my official helpers, but in the name of the German people.

The program of the majority parties, upon which I take my stand, contains, first, an acceptance of the answer of the former Imperial Government to Pope Benedict's note of August 1, 1916, and an unconditional acceptance of the Reichstag resolutions of July 19, the same year. It further declares willingness to join a general league of nations based on the foundation of equal rights for all, both strong and weak.

It considers the solution of the Belgian question to lie in the complete rehabilitation (*wiederherstellung*) of Belgium, particularly of its independence and territorial integrity. An effort shall also be made to reach an understanding on the question of indemnity.

The program will not permit the peace treaties hitherto concluded to be a hindrance to the conclusion of a general peace.

Its particular aim is that popular representative bodies shall be formed immediately on a broad basis in the Baltic provinces, in Lithuania, and Poland. We will promote the realization of necessary preliminary conditions therefor without delay by the introduction of civilian rule. All these lands shall regulate their Constitutions and their relations with neighboring peoples without external interference.

In the matter of international policies I have taken a clear stand through the manner in which the formation of the Government was brought about. Upon my motion, leaders of the majority parties were summoned for direct advice. It was my conviction, gentlemen, that unity of imperial leadership should be assured, but not through mere schismatic party allegiance by the different members of the Government. I considered almost still more important the unity of

ideas. I proceeded from this viewpoint, and have, in making my selections, laid greatest weight on the fact that the members of the new Imperial Government stand on a basis of a peace of justice, regardless of the war situation, and that they have openly declared this to be their standpoint at the time when we stood at the height of our military successes.

I am convinced that the manner in which imperial leadership is now constituted with the cooperation of the Reichstag, is not something ephemeral, and that when peace comes a Government can not again be formed which does not find support in the Reichstag and does not draw its leaders therefrom.

The war has conducted us beyond the old multifarious and disrupted party life, which made it so difficult to put into execution a uniform and decisive political wish. The formation of a majority means the formation of a political will, and an indisputable result of the war has been that in Germany, for the first time, great parties have joined together in a firm, harmonious program and have thus come into position to determine for themselves the fate of the people.

This thought will never die. This development will never be retracted, and I trust, so long as Germany's fate is ringed about by dangers, those sections of the people outside the majority parties and whose representatives do not belong to the Government will put aside all that separates us and will give the Fatherland what is the Fatherland's.

This development necessitates an alteration of our Constitution's provisions along the lines of the imperial decree of September 30, which shall make it possible that these members of the Reichstag who entered the Government will retain their seats in the Reichstag. A bill to this end has been submitted to the Federal States and will immediately be made the subject of their consideration and decision.

Gentlemen, let us remember the words spoken by the Emperor on August 4, 1914, which I permitted myself to paraphrase last December at Karlsruhe: "There are, in fact, parties, but they are all German parties."

Political developments in Prussia, the principal German Federal State, must proceed in the spirit of these words of the Emperor, and the message of the King of Prussia promising the democratic franchise must be fulfilled quickly and completely. I do not doubt, also, that those Federal States which still lag behind in the development of their constitutional conditions will resolutely follow Prussia's example.

For the present, as the example of all belligerent States demon-

strates, the extraordinary powers which a condition of siege compels can not be dispensed with, but close relations between the military and civilian authorities must be established which will make it possible that in all not purely military questions, and hence especially as to censorship and right of assemblage, the attitude of the civilian executive authorities shall make itself heard and that final decision shall be placed under the Chancellor's responsibility.

To this end, the order of the Emperor will be sent to the military commanders. With September 30, the day of the decree, began a new epoch in Germany's internal history. The internal policy whose basic principles are therein laid down is of deciding importance on the question of peace or war.

The striking force which the Government has in its strivings for peace depends on whether it has behind it the united, firm, and unshakable will of the people. Only when our enemies feel that the German people stand united back of their chosen leaders—then only can words become deeds.

At the peace negotiations the German Government will use its efforts to the end that the treaties shall contain provisions concerning the protection of labor and insurance of laborers, which provisions shall oblige the treaty-making States to institute in their respective lands within a prescribed time a minimum of similar, or at least equally, efficient institutions for the security of life and health, as for the care of laborers in case of illness, accident, or invalidism.

Of direct importance are the conclusions which the Government in the brief span of its existence has been able to draw from the situation in which it finds itself and to apply practically to the situation. More than four years of bloodiest struggle against a world of numerically superior enemies are behind us, years full of the hardest battles and most painful sacrifices. Nevertheless, we are of strong heart and full of confident faith in our strength, resolved to bear still heavier sacrifices for our honor and freedom and for the happiness of our posterity, if it can not be otherwise.

We remember with deep and warm gratitude our brave troops, who, under splendid leadership, have accomplished almost superhuman deeds throughout the whole war and whose past deeds are a sure guarantee that the fate of us all will also in future be in good and dependable hands in their keeping. For months a continuous, terrible, and murderous battle has been raging in the west. Thanks to the incomparable heroism of our army, which will live as an immortal, glorious page in the history of the German people for all times, the front is unbroken.

This proud consciousness permits us to look to the future with confidence. But, just because we are inspired by this feeling and the conviction that it is also our duty to make certain that the bloody struggle be not protracted for a single day beyond the moment when the close of the war seems possible to us which does not effect our honor, I have, therefore, not waited until today to take a step to further the idea of peace.

Supported by the consent of all duly authorized persons in the empire, and by consent of all our allies acting in concert with us, I sent on the night of October 4-5, through the mediation of Switzerland, a note to the President of the United States, in which I requested him to take up the bringing about of peace and to communicate to this end with all the belligerent States.

The note will reach Washington today or tomorrow. It is directed to the President of the United States because he, in his message to Congress January 8, 1918, and in his later proclamations, particularly in his New York speech of September 27, proposed a program for a general peace which we can accept as a basis for negotiations.

I have taken this step not only for the salvation of Germany and its allies, but of all humanity, which has been suffering for years through the war.

I have taken it also because I believe the thoughts regarding the future wellbeing of the nation which were proclaimed by Mr. Wilson are in good accord with the general ideas cherished by the new German Government and with it the overwhelming majority of our people.

So far as I am personally concerned, in earlier speeches to other assemblages, my hearers will testify that the conception which I hold of a future peace has undergone no change since I was entrusted with the leadership of the empire's affairs.

I see, hence, no distinction whatever between the national and international mandates of duty in respect of peace. For me the deciding factor is solely that all participants shall with equal honesty acknowledge these mandates as binding and respect them, as is the case with me and with the other members of our new Government. And so, with an inner peace, which my clear conscience as a man and as a servant of the people gives me, and which rests at the same time upon firm faith in this great and true people, this people capable of every devotion, and upon their glorious armed power, I await the outcome of the first action which I have taken as the leading statesman of the empire.

Whatever this outcome may be, I know it will find Germany firmly resolved and united either for an upright peace which rejects every

selfish violation of the rights of others or for a closing of the struggle for life and death to which our people would be forced without our own fault if the answer to our note of the Powers opposed to us should be dictated by a will to destroy us.

I do not despair over the thought that this second alternative may come. I know the greatness of the mighty powers yet possessed by our people, and I know that the incontrovertible conviction that they were only fighting for our life as a nation would double these powers.

I hope, however, for the sake of all mankind that the President of the United States will receive our offer as we mean it. Then the door would be open to a speedy, honorable peace of justice and reconciliation for us, as well as for our opponents.

GERMAN REQUEST FOR AN ARMISTICE

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland to President Wilson [1]

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 6, 1918.

DEPARTMENT OF
GERMAN INTERESTS
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, upon instructions from my government, the original text of a communication from the German Government, received by this Legation late this afternoon, from the Swiss Foreign Office.

An English translation of this communication is also enclosed. The German original text, however, is alone to be considered as authoritative.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. OEDERLIN,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland,
In charge of German interests in the
United States.

MR. WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States,
Washington.

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 9, 1918.

(Enclosure)

Translation of communication from the German Government to the President of the United States, as transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland, on October 6, 1918:

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918. In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

MAX, PRINCE OF BADEN,
Imperial Chancellor.

AUSTRIAN EXPLANATION OF THE PEACE MOVE AND ITS PURPOSE[1]

October 6, 1918

It is first to be emphasized that this step by Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Germany is not to be regarded as a decision taken suddenly under the stress of military events. It constitutes rather, in the history of our peace policy, the last link in the chain of logical and continual evolution, regard being paid at the same time to the latest internal political developments in Germany.

As is known, the point of departure of our peace policy was Baron Burian's note of December, 1916. The step then taken was of a very vague character. The conditions were not described, but only indicated in broad outlines.

In the course of the development the conditions have become crystallized. During February, March, and April, expressions regarding a general and just peace without annexations or compensations came into currency.

Subsequently the idea of establishing an international court of arbitration and a reduction of armament was discussed, and, further

[1] Semi-official statement in the Vienna papers of October 6; *Current History*, November, 1918, p. 245.

the principle of freedom of the seas was proclaimed, and, finally, the principle was set forth that economic wars and economic oppression after the war must be prevented. Out of these guiding principles has arisen the present program.

All these points, it will be recalled, were accepted by Count Czernin (former Austrian Foreign Minister), in speeches and interviews, as a suitable basis for peace negotiations, and finally received the approval also of the German Reichstag, so that uniformity in the conception of the allies (Teutonic) thereby found expression.

Then followed the peace note of Pope Benedict, whose proposals and fundamental ideas were accepted by us as forming an acceptable basis. Only President Wilson, in his note of January 8, 1918, in his fourteen points made proposals and proclaimed principles which substantially accorded with the program of the Central Powers.

Count Czernin and Count von Hertling described President Wilson's proposals, apart from a reserve regarding certain points, as a suitable basis for peace. The Austro-Hungarian delegations and the German Reichstag have described their attitude toward these proposals in a similar manner. It should be noted also that it was always President Wilson who occupied himself with a concrete peace program, while the Entente adhered to its intentions of conquest. Then came Baron Burian's last proposal for a preliminary discussion by the belligerent Powers.

The proposal was rejected by President Wilson, not, however, with the intention of cutting off peace discussion, because, in his speech of September 27 he again reverted to it and in an objective manner set forth the necessity of a just peace—a peace that would not be one-sided, but just to both sides, and thus fulfil the principle of high justice to all.

At this moment of the proclamation of this principle of equal justice for all parties it became clear that it was possible in this manner to come near to attaining peace, because the principle of the elimination of any one-sided preference provides for the solution of a group of delicate questions.

In the consideration of the future circumstance that owing to the internal political change in Germany certain difficulties were cleared out of the way, it became clear that a uniform decision of the Central Powers regarding peace could be effected.

On this day of the new German Government's entering office we are in a position to undertake a step which reaches as far back as the beginning of 1917.

This step was not born of the events of the moment but continually had won its way through in the course of a natural development.

In the circumstances we expect our step will lead to *rapprochement* and discussion. At the same time in expressing this hope we do not know how the Entente and President Wilson will view this step. It is, however, politically justified on the ground alone that President Wilson represents sole power and is not politically bound to the Entente.

In a formal manner it is also pointed out that our step is not to be interpreted as a request for mediation. This is out of the question, as only a neutral could act as a mediator. We approach President Wilson because the points formulated by him represent a basis on which we could negotiate.

Our step will assuredly be regarded generally as one of great historic moment. In the note it is expressed with full clearness that the much-calumniated Central Powers are pursuing no imperialistic policy, and, moreover, their conditions are in full accord with their program of defense.

Should our proposal not be accepted, then our opponents will have to undertake full responsibility. The note is presented separately because the allies (Teutonic) are represented in America by protecting States—we by Sweden, Germany by Switzerland.

The note at this moment has already been handed to the American Ministers at Stockholm and Berne.

AUSTRIAN REQUEST FOR AN ARMISTICE

Minister of Sweden to the Secretary of State [1]

LEGATION OF SWEDEN,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

(*Translation*)

October 7, 1918.

EXCELLENCY:

By order of my government I have the honor confidentially to transmit herewith to you the following communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President of the United States of America:

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 19, 1918.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war, and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to His Lordship the President of the United States of America and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12, 1918, should serve as a foundation and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account.

Be pleased to accept, etc.

(Signed) W. A. F. Ekengren.

His Excellency,
Mr. Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington.

INQUIRY FROM PRESIDENT WILSON CONCERNING THE GERMAN PROPOSAL

The Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland [1]

Department of State,
Washington.

October 8, 1918.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge, on behalf of the President, your note of October 6th, enclosing a communication from the German Government to the President; and I am instructed by the President to request you to make the following communication to the Imperial German Chancellor:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 9, 1918.

the United States on the eighth of January last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answers to these questions vital from every point of view.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

MR. FREDERIC OEDERLIN,
Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland ad interim,
In charge of German interests in the United States.

REQUEST OF TURKEY FOR AN ARMISTICE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS[1]

October 14, 1918

The undersigned, Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey, has the honor, acting upon instructions from his Government, to request the Royal Government to inform the Secretary of State of the United States of America by telegraph, that the Imperial Government requests the President of the United States of America to take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace; to notify all belligerent States of this demand and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations. It (the Imperial Government) accepts as a basis for the negotiations the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, specially the speech of September 27.

In order to put an end to the shedding of blood, the Imperial Ottoman Government requests that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

[1] State Department text.

GERMAN ANSWER TO INQUIRY OF PRESIDENT WILSON

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland to the Secretary of State [1]

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 14, 1918.

DEPARTMENT OF
GERMAN INTERESTS.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, upon instructions from my government, the original text, received this morning, of a communication from the German Government to the President of the United States, in reply to his communication to the Imperial German Chancellor, transmitted to me by Your Excellency on October 8, 1918.

I beg herewith also to enclose the English translation of this communication, as transmitted by the German Legation in Berne to the Swiss Foreign Office.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. OEDERLIN,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland.
In charge of German interests in the United States.

His Excellency,
ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State.

(Enclosure)

Translation of the reply from the German Government to the communication of October 8, 1918, of the President of the United States transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland to the Secretary of State on October 14, 1918:

In reply to the question of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January the eighth and in his subsequent addresses as the foundations of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently, its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the governments of the

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 15, 1918.

Powers associated with the United States also accept the position taken by President Wilson in his addresses.

The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation.

The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

SOLF,
State Secretary of Foreign Office.

REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE GERMAN REQUEST

The Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland [1]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

October 14, 1918.

SIR:

In reply to the communication of the German Government, dated the 12th instant, which you handed me today, I have the honor to request you to transmit the following answer:

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the com-

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 15, 1918.

munications of the German Government of the eighth and twelfth of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present inforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain, not only, but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany can not be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary, also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the fourth of July last. It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it can not be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency." The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indis-

pensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond peradventure with whom they are dealing.

The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

MR. FREDERICK OEDERLIN,
Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland ad interim,
In charge of German interests in the United States.

COMMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER BURIAN ON THE PROGRAM OF PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE AUSTRIAN PEACE POLICY[1]

October 16, 1918

Although the Central Powers have been able to face the new military situation, it must be stated that we can not hope any longer for a decisive success by arms, while our adversaries are not sure of their power to crush our resistance. Hence further bloodshed is useless.

A sentiment of pure humanity always pervaded President Wilson's ideas on the solution of world problems even when he joined our adversaries and laid down certain principles directed against us. His declarations, therefore, never remained without influence among us, and were never rejected by us in principle.

The creation of a League of Nations constitutes a preliminary condition for the establishment of a peace of impartial justice such as President Wilson and we desire. Such a league would form the framework of the new world. It is upon it that the various States will build up their reciprocal relations.

Such a league will replace the policy of an equilibrium of groups of Powers, depending on force, by an organization of States voluntarily submitting to an international law established by themselves with the creation of an executive power above the States to enforce the law. International arbitration tribunals will settle disputes and armaments will lose the reason for their existence.

It is not my place to enter into a discussion as to the reasons why

[1] Text in *The New York Evening Post*, October 16 and 17, 1918, p. 1.

President Wilson delayed his reply to us when he has communicated with Germany with a view to enlightening certain preliminary questions, for I should be reduced to a pure hypothesis. I would only say that our confidence in President Wilson's word is so firm that we categorically reject suppositions attributing to this procedure motives, tactical reasons or intentions malevolent towards the monarchy.

I have confidence that Turkey will remain faithful to the Teutonic alliance. I also reassert Austria-Hungary's fidelity to Germany.

We shall enter upon the negotiations closely united with our faithful German ally and with Turkey, which continues to keep her engagement towards the alliance, notwithstanding the difficult situation in which she is placed by the disappearance of Bulgaria.

I wish to point out as a self-evident fact resulting from this close union of the allies that we shall always regulate our attitude in the approaching negotiations in constant reciprocal agreement with them. If the bases of the agreements to be concluded existed as the result of the acceptance of the points of the program of President Wilson, the application and execution of these divers points in their practical bearing can, nevertheless, give rise to differences of opinion which we must try to dissipate by carefully weighing the opposing points of view, and vigorously defending the conditions of our constitutional existence.

The allies will have to support each other in these discussions. They will have to find in the settlement of litigious questions that line of agreement which will protect their interests from injury.

. . . . . .

I nourish the hope today most fully for if the contents of President Wilson's reply are studied there is nothing to be found to frustrate such a hope, or even to delay its realization considerably. The political point in President Wilson's reply is settled, as Germany's reply will undoubtedly establish, by the modifications which are being made in the Constitution.

TEXT OF DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK NATION ADOPTED BY PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AT PARIS[1]

October 18, 1918

At this grave moment, when the Hohenzollerns are offering peace in order to stop the victorious advance of the Allied armies and to prevent the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and when the Hapsburgs are promising the federalization of the Empire and autonomy to the dissatisfied nationalities committed to their rule we, the Czecho-Slovak National Council, recognized by the Allied and American Governments as the Provisional Government of the Czecho-Slovak State and nation, in complete accord with the declaration of the Czech deputies made in Prague on January 6, 1918, and realizing that federalization and, still more, autonomy, means nothing under a Hapsburg dynasty, do hereby make and declare this our declaration of independence.

We do this because of our belief that no people should be forced to live under a sovereignty they do not recognize and because of our knowledge and firm conviction that our nation can not freely develop in a Hapsburg mock federation, which is only a new form of the denationalizing oppression under which we have suffered for the past 300 years. We consider freedom to be the first prerequisite for federalization, and believe that the free nations of central and eastern Europe may easily federate should they find it necessary.

We make this declaration on the basis of our historic and natural right. We have been an independent State since the seventh century, and in 1526, as an independent State, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, we joined with Austria and Hungary in a defensive union against the Turkish danger. We have never voluntarily surrendered our rights as an independent State in this confederation. The Hapsburgs broke their compact with our nation by illegally transgressing our rights and violating the constitution of our State, which they had pledged themselves to uphold, and we therefore refuse longer to remain a part of Austria-Hungary in any form.

We claim the right of Bohemia to be reunited with her Slovak brethren of Slovakia, once a part of our national State, later torn from our national body, and 50 years ago incorporated in the Hungarian

[1] Text in the *Official Bulletin*, October 19, 1918, p. 3.

State of the Magyars, who, by their unspeakable violence and ruthless oppression of their subject races, have lost all moral and human right to rule anybody but themselves.

The world knows the history of our struggle against the Hapsburg oppression, intensified and systematized by the Austro-Hungarian dualistic compromise of 1867. This dualism is only a shameless organization of brute force and exploitation of the majority by the minority; it is a political conspiracy of the Germans and Magyars against our own as well as the other Slav and the Latin nations of the monarchy. The world knows the justice of our claims, which the Hapsburgs themselves dared not deny. Francis Joseph in the most solemn manner repeatedly recognized the sovereign rights of our nation. The Germans and Magyars opposed this recognition, and Austria-Hungary, bowing before the Pan-Germans, became a colony of Germany and, as her vanguard to the East, provoked the last Balkan conflict, as well as the present world war, which was begun by the Hapsburgs alone without the consent of the representatives of the people.

We can not and will not continue to live under the direct or indirect rule of the violators of Belgium, France, and Serbia, the would-be murderers of Russia and Roumania, the murderers of tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers of our blood, and the accomplices in numberless unspeakable crimes committed in this war against humanity by the two degenerate and irresponsible dynasties. We will not remain a part of a State which has no justification for existence and which, refusing to accept the fundamental principles of modern world organization remains only on artificial and immoral political structure, hindering every movement toward democratic and social progress. The Hapsburg dynasty, weighed down by a huge inheritance of error and crime, is a perpetual menace to the peace of the world, and we deem it our duty toward humanity and civilization to aid in bringing about its downfall and destruction.

We reject the sacrilegious assertion that the power of the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties is of divine origin; we refuse to recognize the divine right of kings. Our nation elected the Hapsburgs to the throne of Bohemia of its own free will and by the same right deposes them. We hereby declare the Hapsburg dynasty unworthy of leading our nation, and deny all of their claims to rule in the Czecho-Slovak Land, which we here and now declare shall henceforth be a free and independent people and nation.

We accept and shall adhere to the ideals of modern democracy, as

they have been the ideals of our nation for centuries. We accept the American principles as laid down by President Wilson; the principles of liberated mankind—of the actual equality of nations—and of governments deriving all their just power from the consent of the governed. We, the nation of Comenius, can not but accept these principles expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, the principles of Lincoln, and of the declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen. For these principles our nation shed its blood in the memorable Hussite Wars 500 years ago; for these same principles, beside her allies, our nation is shedding its blood today in Russia, Italy, and France.

We shall outline only the main principles of the constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Nation; the final decision as to the constitution itself falls to the legally-chosen representatives of the liberated and united people.

The Czecho-Slovak State shall be a republic. In constant endeavor for progress it will guarantee complete freedom of conscience, religion and science, literature and art, speech, the press, and the right of assembly and petition. The Church shall be separated from the State. Our democracy shall rest on universal suffrage; women shall be placed on an equal footing with men, politically, socially, and culturally. The rights of the minority shall be safeguarded by proportional representation; national minorities shall enjoy equal rights. The government shall be parliamentary in form and shall recognize the principles of initiative and referendum. The standing army will be replaced by militia.

The Czecho-Slovak Nation will carry out far-reaching social and economic reforms; the large estates will be redeemed for home colonization; patents of nobility will be abolished. Our nation will assume its part of the Austro-Hungarian pre-war public debt; the debts for this war we leave to those who incurred them.

In its foreign policy the Czecho-Slovak Nation will accept its full share of responsibility in the reorganization of Eastern Europe. It accepts fully the democratic and social principle of nationality and subscribes to the doctrine that all covenants and treaties shall be entered into openly and frankly without secret diplomacy.

Our constitution shall provide an efficient, rational, and just government, which will exclude all special privileges and prohibit class legislation.

Democracy has defeated theocratic autocracy. Militarism is overcome—democracy is victorious; on the basis of democracy mankind

will be recognized. The forces of darkness have served the victory of light; the longed-for age of humanity is dawning.

We believe in democracy; we believe in liberty, and liberty evermore.

Given in Paris, on the eighteenth of October, 1918.

PROFESSOR THOMAS G. MASARYK,
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance.
GENERAL DR. MILAN R. STEFANIK,
Minister of National Defense.
DR. EDWARD BENES,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Interior.

REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL

The Secretary of State to the Minister of Sweden [1]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

October 18, 1918.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 7th instant in which you transmit a communication of the Imperial and Royal Goverment of Austria-Hungary to the President. I am now instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following reply:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he can not entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 19, 1918.

that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

GERMAN COUNTER-REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland to the Secretary of State [1]

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 22, 1918.

DEPARTMENT OF
GERMAN INTERESTS.

SIR:

By direction of my government, I have the honor to transmit herewith to Your Excellency the original German text of a communication dated October 20, 1918, from the German Government, which has today been received from the Swiss Foreign Office. I beg to also enclose an English translation of the communication in question as transmitted to the Swiss Foreign Office by the German Government with the request that it be forwarded to Your Excellency's Government.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. OEDERLIN,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland.

His Excellency,
ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State,
Washington.

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 23, 1918.

(Enclosure)

Translation issued by the German Government of its communication dated October 20, 1918, transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland on October 22, 1918:

In accepting the proposal for an exacuation of the occupied territories the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary and are insofar permitted by international law. The German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes with regard to all these charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions for peace, the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people in decision on peace and war. These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed in complete accord with the wishes of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. In future no Government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of

the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the Constitution of the Empire so that the consent of the representatives of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

(Signed) SOLF,
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, October 20, 1918.

COMMENT OF CHANCELLOR MAX ON THE NOTES OF PRESIDENT WILSON AND GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE ALLIES[1]

October 22, 1918

The whole German people is anxious to hear the views of the Government regarding the prospects of peace, but I am able to speak only with the greatest reserve and urge that the members of the Reichstag limit debate as is consistent with the seriousness of the present hour. The whole German people have been spoken to by President Wilson, and this fact gives the utterances of the representatives of all parties added force.

Today, therefore, I am going to say only this regarding the international situation: The President's first answer to the peace move of the German Government has in all countries brought the question of a peace of justice against a peace of violence to the highest point. President Wilson's last note did not make clear to the German people how this public agitation will end. His next answer will, perhaps, bring definite certainty. Until then we must in all our thoughts and in our actions prepare for both eventualities—first, that the enemy Governments are anxious for war, in which case there is no choice

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, October 24, 1918, p. 3.

for us but to put ourselves in a posture of defense with all the strength of our people driven to the last extremity.

Should this necessity arise, I have no doubt that the German Government, in the name of the German people, will issue a call for national defense in the same way that it spoke for the German people when it took action for peace. He who honestly took a stand on the basis of peace will also undertake the duty of not submitting to a peace of violence without a fight. The Government which would act otherwise would be left to the mercy of the fighting and working people. It would be swept away by public opinion.

There is also another possibility. The German people must not be blindly brought to the conference table. The German people today have the right to ask, if peace is realized on the basis of President Wilson's condition, what they mean for our future. Our answers to the President's question must be framed on the German people's understanding of that question. What it now wants is clearness.

The decision will be of stupendous import. It will not be our strength that will decide, but it will be what is thought to be right in free discussion with our opponents, that will give the decision. This is a great effort for a proud people accustomed to victory. The legal questions involved will not stop at our national boundaries, which we will never of our own accord open to violence. The principles upon which we have agreed as a rule of conduct also involve internal questions. From many quarters it has been represented to me that an acceptance of President Wilson's conditions would mean submission—anti-German submission—to an anti-German court of justice which would decide legal questions entirely from the viewpoint of its own interests. If that is the case why then is it that the extreme apostles of force in the Entente fear the council chamber as the guilty fear the court of justice?

The essence of President Wilson's program for a league of nations can not be achieved unless all peoples have the right of national self-determination. This realization of community law means the abandonment of part of the unqualified independence which hitherto has been the indication of sovereignty both by us and others. Should we at home maintain as fundamental the national egoism which until a short time ago was the dominating force of the people's life there would be no restitution and no renovation for us. There would be a feeling of bitterness which would cripple us for generations.

But if we comprehend that the significance of this frightful war is above all a victory for the idea of justice and if we do not resist this

idea but submit with all good faith then we shall find in it a cure for our present wounds and a reservoir of future strength.

. . . . . .

Whether the next few days or weeks shall call us to fight on or open the way to peace there is no doubt we are now equal to the task of either war or peace by carrying out the Government's program and definitely breaking away from the old system.

. . . . . .

Deputies will take part in the direction of imperial policies and in the name of the Chancellor will be responsible without being ministers. Thus a new way is open for arriving at responsible conduct of imperial affairs—the parliamentary way. We are convinced that it will supply not only the Government but indirectly parliament with precious forces from the people which have hitherto not been utilized.

. . . . . .

The new system involves, as a natural consequence, a new mode of government in Alsace-Lorraine.

. . . . . .

Our aim is the political authority of the German people. This is the guiding star of my collaborators and myself.

. . . . . .

The German people has long been in the saddle. Now it is to ride. Our first and last thought is for the brave men who are defending themselves against superior forces and whom we must defend against unjust charges. No one must think that he can attack our army without attacking the honor of our people. The lot of our soldiers today is terribly difficult. They fight with anxiety for the homeland and with their minds fixed on peace and they hold their ground. We trust and thank them. We cry to them: "The homeland will not abandon you. What you want, what it can give in men, material, and food, you shall have."

. . . . . .

His Majesty's decrees which I announced recently have now been issued. They concern not only the censorship, the right of public meet-

ing, and restrictions on personal liberty, but have to do with economic, social and political matters. If local military authorities disagree with the civil officials the decision must be reached immediately by the highest commander who will not be able to promulgate any decision to which agreement is not given by myself or my representative, namely, Secretary of State Gröber. Care will be taken that the state of siege is maintained in the spirit in which I assumed the functions of the Government and in which I am resolved to discharge them.

. . . . . .

A bill has been introduced making the Reichstag responsible for war and peace, the measure to become effective when the project for a league of nations shall become operative. The bill provides for the definitive embodiment in the constitution of the fundamental idea of our new system of government. The effect will be to make the Reichstag the people's house of representatives which will be responsible in the decision of the most important question for the nation, namely, of peace and war.

That means peaceful development of the Empire and its relations with other Powers. In such an extension of the people's rights the Imperial Government is willing to lend a hand when a league of nations has taken practical form. When such a league puts an end to all secret separate treaties I am confident that all agreements can be amplified in this sense.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S CONSENT TO PROPOSE AN ARMISTICE TO THE ALLIES

The Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland[1]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1918.

SIR:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the twenty-second transmittting a communication under date of the twen-

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin*, October 24, 1918.

tieth from the German Government and to advise you that the President has instructed me to reply thereto as follows:

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the twenty-seventh of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he can not decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the twentieth of October, it does not appear that the principle of a government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been

reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and can not trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States can no deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

MR. FREDERICK OEDERLIN,
Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland ad interim,
In charge of German interests in the United States.

ADDRESS OF FOREIGN MINISTER SOLF ON ALSACE-LORRAINE AND POLAND[1]

October 25, 1918

At yesterday's sitting the question was put to the Government from various sides, whether it has the intention of honestly carrying out President Wilson's principles. The Government most emphatically repudiates any doubt of this intention. Having in its reply to President Wilson taken its stand on his messages it is resolved to act accordingly. As to Alsace-Lorraine, it is at once clear that as the territories are expressly mentioned amongst the fourteen points, we agree to the regulation of both questions by peace negotiations. Moreover, having

[1] *The Times*, London, October 28, 1918, p. 4.

accepted the Wilson program as a basis for the entire peace work, we will loyally and in the sense of complete justice and fairness, fulfil the program in all directions and at all points.

When, however, Deputy Hanssen asserted that by the provision of the Peace of Prague there is a positive legal claim to a plebiscite with reference to North Schleswig the Government must term this legal conception erroneous, because the Peace of Prague, according to international law, created claims only between the contracting parties, and, as regards article five, these claims were annulled by the agreement of 1878. That is recognized by the Danish Government by the so-called "Optanten" Treaty of 1907.

The Deputy, Dr. Ricklin, passed a sharp judgment on the Government reorganization initiated in Alsace-Lorraine. The Government will not let itself be restrained by this criticism from continuing on the path which is recognized to be proper and right. The population of Alsace-Lorraine is thereby to obtain the right to regulate the country's affairs as it chooses. This action corresponds with those aspirations that the majority from which the present Government issued has for a considerable time pursued, at the suggestion and with the approval of Dr. Ricklin and his political friends, as well as other Reichsland Deputies. The Government has considered it its duty forthwith to convert these aspirations into acts. A different solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question is thereby in no way forestalled.

With regard to the future Polish State, I would declare that the German Government has frankly and sincerely accepted the program of the President of the United States. This program is founded on a peace of justice and reconciliation, and does not desire to give rise to fresh antagonisms and wars. When the spokesman of the Polish faction permits it to be conjectured that, for example, he claims for Poland Danzig, undoubtedly a German town, with two to three per cent of its population Polish, he places himself in glaring contradiction to the principles of President Wilson himself, who only wants to see territories of undoubtedly Polish population united to an Independent Poland. In no passage of the program is it said that the indisputably German-populated parts of Poland are to be allotted to Poland. Such an interpretation of the clause about free, guaranteed, and secure access to the sea is not in the sense of a just international agreement, but in the sense of the territorial conquest of land inhabited by a foreign people. That, gentlemen, is in contradiction to the right of self-determination of peoples proclaimed by President Wilson. Polish claims ought, on the Polish side too, to be brought

into harmony with the principles according to which new elements of dispute and enmity must not be produced which would soon again disturb the peace of Europe and thus of the entire world. I can not conceal from the spokesman of the Poles that the German people's feeling of justice is cut to the quick by every highhanded interpretation of the new principles of international law, and claims to stretches of territory which are vitally bound to the German Empire by history, ethnography, and economic conditions are high-handed. When the spokesman of the Poles puts forward claims for war compensation and sharply criticizes certain measures of the Prussian Government, I need only remind him what Germany has done for the liberation of Poland at the cost of blood and treasure. The Polish spokesman really makes it hard for me to reach the conciliatory conclusion that I intended. Democratic Germany, whose historic attitude to the Polish question is also known to the Poles, has an earnest and sincere desire to live in lasting, peaceful, and friendly relations with the Polish people. This aim is undoubtedly in the interests of the Polish people, whose economic and cultural development requires good relations with the West. This can, however, only be obtained if both sides honestly strive after it.

REPLY OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE NOTE FROM PRESIDENT WILSON CONSENTING TO PROPOSE AN ARMISTICE

Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland to the Secretary of State [1]

LEGATION OF SWITZERLAND,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 28, 1918.

DEPARTMENT OF
GERMAN INTERESTS.

SIR:

I am instructed by my government and have the honor to submit to Your Excellency the original German text of a communication from the German Government, dated October 27, 1918, which has today been received from the Swiss Foreign Office.

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 29, 1918.

I beg leave also to enclose an English translation of the above-mentioned communication, the German text of which, however, is alone to be considered as authoritative.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) F. Oederlin,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland.

His Excellency,
Mr. Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington.

Translation of a communication from the German Government, dated October 27, 1918 as transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Switzerland on October 28, 1918:

The German Government has taken cognizance of the reply of the President of the United States. The President knows the far-reaching changes which have taken place and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure. The peace negotiations are being conducted by a government of the people, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the authority to make decisions. The military powers are also subject to this authority. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice, which is the first step toward a peace of justice, as described by the President in his pronouncements.

(Signed) Solf,
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Berlin, October 27, 1918.

DECREE OF KAISER WILLIAM II AT THE PUBLICATION OF AN AMENDMENT TO THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION [1]

October 28, 1918

Your Grand Ducal Highness: I return herewith for immediate publication the bill to amend the Imperial Constitution and the law of March 17, 1879, relative to the representation of the Imperial Chancellor, which has been laid before me for signature.

On the occasion of this step, which is so momentous for the future history of the German people, I have a desire to give expression to my feelings. Prepared for by a series of Government acts, a new order comes into force which transfers the fundamental rights of the Kaiser's person to the people.

[1] *The New York Times,* November 4, 1918, p. 1. The decree is addressed to Prince Max. The date in the decree should be of 1878.

Thus comes to a close a period which will stand in honor before the eyes of future generations. Despite all struggles between invested authority and aspiring forces, it has rendered possible to our people that tremendous development which imperishably revealed itself in the wonderful achievements of this war.

In the terrible storms of the four years of war, however, old forms have been broken up, not to leave their ruins behind, but to make a place for new, vital forms.

After the achievements of these times, the German people can claim that no right which may guarantee a free and happy future shall be withheld from them.

The proposals of the Allied Governments which are now adopted and extended owe their origin to this conviction. I, however, with my exalted allies, indorse these decisions of Parliament in firm determination, so far as I am concerned, to cooperate in their full development, convinced that I am thereby promoting the weal of the German people.

The Kaiser's office is one of service to the people. May, then, the new order release all the good powers which our people need in order to support the trials which are hanging over the empire and with a firm step win a bright future from the gloom of the present.

WILHELM, I. R.

Berlin, October 28, 1918.
(Countersigned.)
MAX, PRINCE OF BADEN.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON RELATIVE TO THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS AND JUGO-SLAVS AND ASKING FOR A SEPARATE PEACE

The Minister of Sweden to the Secretary of State[1]

DEPARTMENT OF AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN INTERESTS,
LEGATION OF SWEDEN,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,

October 29, 1918.

EXCELLENCY:

By order of my government, I have the honor to beg you to transmit to the President the following communication from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary:

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* October 31, 1918.

In reply to the note of the President, Mr. Wilson, to the Austro-Hungarian Government, dated October 18 of this year, and about the decision of the President to take up, with Austria-Hungary separately, the question of armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the President and his opinion of the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President had put upon entering into negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning those negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into negotiations for a peace between Austria-Hungary and the Entente States, and for an immediate armistice on all the fronts of Austria-Hungary, and begs the President, Mr. Wilson, to take the necessary measures to that effect.

Be pleased to accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) W. A. F. Ekengren.

His Excellency,
Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

NOTE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRASSY TO SECRETARY LANSING[1]

October 29, 1918

Immediately after having taken direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and after the dispatch of the official answer to your note of October 18, 1918, by which you were able to see that we accept all the points and principles laid down by President Wilson in his various declarations and are in complete accord with the efforts of President Wilson to prevent future wars and to create a league of nations, we have taken preparatory measures in order that Austrians and Hungarians may be able, according to their own desire and without being in any way hindered, to make a decision as to their future organization and to rule it.

Since the accession to power of Emperor King Charles his immovable purpose has been to bring an end to the war. More than ever

[1] Text in *The Washington Post,* October 30, 1918, p. 1.

this is the desire of the sovereign of all the Austro-Hungarian peoples, who acknowledged that their future destiny can only be accomplished in a pacific world, by being freed from all disturbances, privations and sorrows of war.

This is why I address you directly, Mr. Secretary of State, praying that you will have the goodness to intervene with the President of the United States in order that in the interest of humanity, as in the interest of all those who live in Austria-Hungary, an immediate armistice may be concluded on all fronts, and for an overture that immediately negotiations for peace will follow.

SEMI-OFFICIAL AUSTRIAN NOTE ON THE REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON [1]

October 29, 1918

Austria was obliged to conform to the methods of President Wilson, who had successfully replied to the three members of the Triple Alliance, and act apart from her allies. The Monarchy, which has formally adopted President Wilson's line of action, shares his opinion, as was shown by the Emperor's manifesto to the peoples, which, in proclaiming the federalization of the Monarchy, exceeded President Wilson's program.

However, the complete reorganization of Austria can only be carried out after an armistice. If Austria-Hungary has declared herself ready to enter into negotiations for an armistice and for peace, without awaiting the result of negotiations with other States, that does not necessarily signify an offer of a separate peace. It means that she is ready to act separately in the interests of the reestablishment of peace.

[1] Text in *The New York Times*, October 29, 1918, p. 1.

REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE TURKISH REQUEST[1]

October 31, 1918

EXCELLENCY: I did not fail to lay before the President the note which you addressed to him on the 14th instant, and handed to me on that date.

Acting under the instructions of your Government, you enclosed with that note the text of a communication received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, from the Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey at Madrid on October 12, in which the good offices of the Government of Spain were sought to bring to the attention of the President the request of the Imperial Ottoman Government that he take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace, and that he notify all belligerent States of the request, and invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations, the Imperial Ottoman Government accepting as a basis for the negotiation the program laid down by the President in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially his speech of September 27. It is further requested by the Imperial Ottoman Government that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

By direction of the President I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Government of the United States will bring the communication of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires to the knowledge of the Governments at war with Turkey.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

His Excellency,
Señor Don Juan Riano y Gayangos,
Ambassador of Spain.

[1] State Department text.

ARMISTICE WITH TURKEY—BRITISH STATEMENT MADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS [1]

October 31, 1918

I ask leave to make a statement which I know will be of interest to the House. Some days ago General Townshend was liberated in order to inform the British Admiral in command in the Ægean that the Turkish Government asked that negotiations should be opened immediately for an armistice between Turkey and the Allies. A reply was sent that if the Turkish Government sent fully accredited plenipotentiaries, Vice Admiral Calthorpe was empowered to inform them of the conditions on which the Allies would agree to a cessation of hostilities and sign an armistice on these conditions on their behalf.

The Turkish plenipotentiaries arrived at Mudros early this week, and an armistice was signed by Vice-Admiral Calthorpe on behalf of the Allied Governments last night, and came into operation at noon today.

It is not possible as yet to publish the full terms of the armistice, but they include a free passage for the Allied fleets through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea, the occupation of the forts in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus necessary to secure their passage, and the immediate repatriation of all Allied prisoners of war.

OFFICIAL BRITISH PARAPHRASE OF THE TURKISH ARMISTICE [2]

October 31, 1918

1. Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

2. Positions of all minefields, torpedo-tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

3. All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons

[1] *The Times,* London, November 1, 1918, p. 7, col. 6.
[2] *The Times,* London, November 2, 1918, p. 7.

and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish Army, except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.

6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters, or in waters occupied by Turkey. These ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

7. The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

8. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and demobilization of the Army.

9. Use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

10. Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

11. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northwest Persia to behind the prewar frontier has already been ordered, and will be carried out. Part of Transcaucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops, and remainder to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

12. Wireless telegraph and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.

13. Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material.

14. Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal, oil-fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

15. Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Transcaucasian railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

16. The surrender of all garrisons in the Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied commander and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause 5.

17. The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

18. The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

19. All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions. Those in remote districts as soon after as may be possible.

20. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport of that portion of the Turkish Army which is demobilized under Clause 5.

21. An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all necessary for this purpose.

22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.

23. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

24. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

25. Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, October 31, 1918.

PROTOCOL OF THE CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY [1]

November 3, 1918

MILITARY CLAUSES

1. The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea, and air.

2. Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

[1] *Official U. S. Bulletin,* November 4, 1918 [corrected].

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in clause 3 below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force a maximum of 20 divisions, reduced to pre-war effectives.

Half the divisional, corps, and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

3. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of war. Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the commander-in-chief of the allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the heights of Oetz and Ziller; the line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier of the Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis, and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou), and the watershed of the Cols di Podberdo, Podlaniscam and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast toward the Schneeberg excluding the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries: from the Schneeberg it goes down toward the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia, and Volosca, in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present Province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisariga and Trivania and, to the south, territory limited by a line from the shore of Cape Planca to the summits of the watershed eastwards, so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water-courses flowing toward Sebenico, such as the Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon Pago and Patadura in the north up to Meleda in the south, embracing Sant Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza, and Lagosta, as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta, and Brazza.

All territories thus evacuated will be occupied by the troops of the allies and of the United States of America.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal), belonging to or within these territories to be left *in situ* and sur-

rendered to the allies according to special orders given by the Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage or requisition to be done by enemy troops in territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the Associated Powers.

4. The allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation.

The armies of the Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the troops of the Associated Powers wherever they may be.

5. Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days, not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts, but all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within that date.

6. The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be entrusted to the local authorities under the control of the allied and associated armies of occupation.

7. The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all allied prisoners of war and interned subjects and of civil populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by the commanders-in-chief of the forces of the associated powers on the various fronts.

8. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from exacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

NAVAL CONDITIONS

I. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

II. Surrender to allies and the United States of America of fifteen Austro-Hungarian submarines, completed between the years 1910 and

1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed, and to remain under the supervision of the allies and United States of America.

III. Surrender to the allies and United States, with their complete armament and equipment, of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the allies and the United States of America. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the allies and United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of allies and United States of America.

IV. Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of allied and Associated Powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the Riven Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The allies and Associated Powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine-fields and obstructions, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation on the Danube the allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

V. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the allies and the United States of America.

VI. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the allies and the United States of America.

VII. Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

VIII. Occupation by the allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

IX. All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the allies and Associated Powers to be returned.

X. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

XI. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, declare approved the conditions above indicated.

November 3, 1918.

Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army:

Victor Weber Edler von Webenau.
Karl Schneller.
Y. von Liechtenstein.
J. V. Nyekhegyi
Zwierkowski.
Victor Freiherr von Seiller.
Kamillo Ruggera.

Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Italian Army:

Ten. Gen. Pietro Badoglio.
Magg. Gen. Scipione Scipioni.
Colonn. Tullio Marchetti.
Colonn. Pietro Gazzera.
Colonn. Pietro Maravigna.
Colonn. Alberto Pariani.
Cap. Vasc. Francesco Accinni.

Annex [1]

Protocol containing the details and the clauses of execution of certain points of the Armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary.

(1) military clauses

1. Hostilities on land, sea, and air, will cease on all Austro-Hungarian fronts twenty-four hours after the signing of the armistice, i.e., at 3 o'clock on November 4 (Central European time).

From that hour the Italian and allied troops will not advance beyond the line then reached.

The Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must retire

[1] Senate Document No. 147, 66th Congress, 1st Session.

to a distance of at least 3 kilometers (as the crow flies) from the line reached by the Italian troops or by troops of allied countries. Inhabitants of the 3-kilometer zone included between the two lines (above-mentioned) will be able to obtain necessary supplies from their own army or those of the Allies.

All Austro-Hungarian troops who may be at the rear of the fighting lines reached by the Italian troops, on the cessation of hostilities, must be regarded as prisoners of war.

2. Regarding the clauses included in Articles 2 and 3 concerning artillery equipment and war material to be either collected in places indicated or left in territories which are to be evacuated, the Italian plenipotentiaries representing all the allied and associated powers, give to the said clauses the following interpretation, which will be carried into execution:

(*a*) Any material or part thereof which may be used for the purpose of war must be given up to the allied and associated powers. The Austro-Hungarian army and the German troops are only althorized to take personal arms and equipment belonging to troops evacuating the territories mentioned in Article 3, besides officers' chargers, the transport train, and horses specially allotted to each unit for transport of food supplies, kitchens, officers' luggage, and medical material. This clause applies to the whole army and to all the services.

(*b*) Concerning artillery, it has been arranged that the Austro-Hungarian army and German troops shall abandon all artillery material and equipment in the territory to be evacuated.

The calculations necessary for obtaining a complete and exact total of the artillery divisions and army corps at the disposal of Austro-Hungary on the cessation of hostilities (half of which must be given up to the associated powers) will be made later, in order to arrange, if necessary, for the delivery of other Austro-Hungarian artillery material and for the possible eventual return of material to the Austro-Hungarian army by the Allied and Associated armies.

All artillery which does not actually form part of the divisional artillery and army corps must be given up, without exception. It will not, however, be necessary to calculate the amount.

(*c*) On the Italian front the delivery of divisional and army corps artillery will be effected at the following places: Trento, Bolzano, Pieve di Cadore, Stazione per la Carnia, Tolmino, Gorizia, and Trieste.

3. Special commissions will be selected by the commanders-in-chief of allied and associated armies on the various Austro-Hungarian fronts, which will immediately proceed, accompanied by the necessary

escorts, to the places they regard as the most suitable from which to control the execution of the provisions established above.

4. It has been determined that the designations M. Toblach and M. Tarvis indicate the groups of mountains dominating the ridge of Toblach Mountains and the Valley of Tarvis.

5. The retirement of Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies beyond the lines indicated in Article 3 of the protocol of armistice conditions will take place within 15 days of the cessation of hostilities, as far as the Italian front is concerned.

On the Italian front, Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must have retired beyond the line Tonale—Noce—Lavis—Avisio—Pordoi—Lavinallongo—Falzarego—Pieve di Cadore—Colle Mauria—Alto Tagliamento—Fella—Raccolana—Selle Nevea—Isonzo by the fifth day; they must also have evacuated the Dalmatian territory indicated above.

Austro-Hungarian troops on land and sea, or those of her allies, not having evacuated the territories indicated within the period of 15 days will be regarded as prisoners of war.

6. The payment of any requisitions made by the armies of the Allied and Associated armies on Austro-Hungarian territory will be carried out according to paragraph 1 of page 227 of "Servizio in Guerra—Part II, Edizione 1915," actually in force in the Italian army.

7. As regards railways and the exercise of the rights confirmed upon the Associated Powers by Article 4 of the armistice agreement between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary, it has been determined that the transport of troops, war material, and supplies for Allied and Associated Powers on the Austro-Hungarian railway system, outside territory evacuated in accordance with the terms of the armistice, and the direction and working of the railways shall be effected by the employees of the Austro-Hungarian railway administration, under the supervision of special commissioners selected by the Allied Powers, and the military Italian headquarters which it will be considered necessary to establish, the Austro-Hungarian authorities will give priority to allied military trains and will guarantee their safety.

8. On territory to be evacuated at the cessation of hostilities all mines on roads or railway tracts, all mine fields and other devices for interrupting communications by road or rail must be rendered inactive and harmless.

9. Within a period of eight days from the cessation of hostilities, prisoners and Italian subjects interned in Austria-Hungary must cease

all work, except in the case of prisoners and interned who have been employed in agricultural pursuits previous to the day on which the armistice was signed. In any case they must be ready to leave at once on request of the commander in chief of the Italian Army.

10. Austria-Hungary must provide for the protection, safety, and supplies (expenses of these to be repaid) of the various commissions selected by the Allied Governments to take over war material and to exercise general control, whether in the territory to be evacuated or in any other part of Austria-Hungary.

(II) NAVAL CLAUSES

1. The hour for the cessation of hostilities by sea will be the same as that of the cessation of hostilities by land and air.

Before that time the Austro-Hungarian Government must have furnished the Italian Government, and those of the associated powers, with the necessary information concerning the position and movements of the Austro-Hungarian ships, through the wireless station at Pola, which will transmit the information to Venice.

2. The units referred to in Articles II and III, to be surrendered to the associated powers, must return to Venice between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. on November 6; they will take a pilot on board fourteen miles from the coast. An exception is made as regards the Danube monitors, which will be required to proceed to a port indicated by the commander in chief of the forces of the associated powers on the Balkan front, under such conditions as he may determine.

3. The following ships will proceed to Venice:

Teghethoff.
Prinz Eugen.
Ferdinand Max.
Saida.
Novara.
Helgoland.

Nine destroyers of *Tatra* type (at least 800 tons) of most recent construction.

Twelve torpedo boats (200-ton type).

Mine layer *Chamaleon.*

Fifteen submarines built between 1910 and 1918, and all German submarines which are, or may eventually be, in Austro-Hungarian waters.

Premeditated damage, or damage occurring on board the ships to

be surrendered will be regarded by the Allied Governments as a grave infringement of the present armistice terms.

The *Lago di Garda* flotilla will be surrendered to the associated powers in the port of Riva.

All ships to be surrendered to the associated powers will be concentrated in the ports of Buccari and Spalato within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

4. As regards the right of sweeping mine fields and destroying barrages, the Austro-Hungarian Government guarantees to deliver the maps of mine fields and barrages at Pola, Cattaro, and Fiume to the commander of the port of Venice, and to the admiral of the fleet at Brindisi within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities, and within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, maps of mine fields and barrages in the Mediterranean and Italian lakes and rivers, with additional notification of such mine fields or barrages laid by order of the German Government as are within their knowledge.

Within the same period of 96 hours a similar communication concerning the Danube and the Black Sea will be delivered to the commander of the associated forces on the Balkan front.

5. The restitution of merchant ships belonging to the associated powers will take place within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, in accordance with the indications determined by each associated power which will be transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Associated Powers reserve to themselves the constitution of the commission referred to in Article 5, and of informing the Austro-Hungarian Government of its functions and of the place in which it will meet.

6. The naval base referred to in Article VI is Spalato.

7. The evacuation referred to in Artcle VII will be effected within the period fixed for the retirement of the troops beyond the armistice lines. There must be no damage to fixed, mobile, or floating material in the ports.

Evacuations may be effected via the Lagoon canals by means of Austro-Hungarian boats which may be brought in from outside.

8. The occupation referred to in Article VIII will take place within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities must guarantee the safety of vessels transporting troops for the occupation of Pola and of islands and other places as provided for in the terms of the armistice for the land Army.

The Austro-Hungarian Government will give directions that the

ships belonging to associated powers proceeding to Pola should be met 14 miles out by pilots capable of showing them the safest way into port. All damage to the persons or property of the Associated Powers will be regarded as a grave infringement of the present armistice terms.

The undersigned duly authorized plenipotentiaries have signified their approval of the above conditions.

November 3, 1918.

Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army:

Victor Weber Edler von Webenau.
Karl Schneller.
Y. von Liechtenstein.
J. V. Nyekhegyi.
Zwierkowski.
Victor Freiherr von Seiller.
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Colonn. Pietro Gazzera.
Colonn. Pietro Maravigna.
Colonn. Alberto Pariani.
Cap. Vasc. Francesco Accinni.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE RESULT OF THE CONFERENCES AT PARIS[1]

November 4, 1918

According to an official report received this evening the terms of the armistice to be offered to Germany have just been agreed to unanimously and signed by the representatives of the Allies and the United States in Paris. The report further states that diplomatic unity has been completely achieved under conditions of utmost harmony.

[1] State Department text.

RECOGNITION OF THE AUTONOMY AND BELLIGERENCY OF THE POLISH ARMY AND NATIONAL COUNCIL [1]

November 4, 1918

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of October 18 and October 25, requesting the Government of the United States to associate itself with the Governments of France and Great Britain by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States has not been unmindful of the zeal and tenacity with which the Polish National Committee has prosecuted the task of marshaling its fellow countrymen in a supreme military effort to free Poland from its present oppressors.

This Government's position with respect to the Polish cause and the Polish people could hardly be more clearly defined than was outlined by the President in his address before the Congress on January 8, 1918. Therefore, feeling as it does a deep sympathy for the Polish people and viewing with gratification the progress of the Polish cause, this Government experiences a feeling of genuine satisfaction in being able to comply with your request by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous and co-belligerent.

REPLY TO GERMANY ON THE RESULT OF THE PARIS CONFERENCES [2]

November 5, 1918

SIR: I have the honor to request you to transmit the following communication to the German Government:

In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles

[1] Letter of Secretary Lansing to President Dmowski, *The New York Times*, November 5, 1918, p. 12.
[2] *Official U. S. Bulletin*, November 6, 1918.

indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view.

The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows:

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause two relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air."

I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

Mr. HANS SULZER,
Minister of Switzerland.
In charge of German interests in the United States.

MANIFESTO OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT[1]

November 5, 1918

The burden of the present time is weighing heavily on the world and the German nation. We must overcome these hard days and their consequences. We must begin working for the happier times to which the German nation has a right.

The new Government is engaged on this important work. Equal suffrage is assured in Prussia. The new Government is made up of representatives of the majority parties in the Reichstag. The military administration has been placed under the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor, a far-reaching amnesty has been granted, and freedom of the press and the right of assembly have been guaranteed. There still remains, however, much to do.

The transformation of Germany into a People's State second to no other country in respect of political freedom and care for the welfare of the masses will be continued resolutely. The reorganization can only exercise its beneficial effects if it encounters among administrative and military authorities a spirit which recognizes and promotes its aims. We expect from our countrymen who serve the Commonwealth in official positions willing cooperation.

In all parts of the State and Empire we need the maintenance of public safety by the nation itself. We have confidence in the German people. It has proved its brilliant qualities during four terrible years of war and will not allow itself to be driven senselessly and uselessly into new misery by visionaries. Self-discipline and order are needed. All lack of discipline will most seriously endanger the conclusion of a speedy peace.

The Government and the commanders of the army and fleet want peace. They want it honestly and they want it soon. Until that time we must protect our frontiers against invasion by the enemy. The troops who for weeks have been engaged in severe fighting must be relieved and rested. It is for this reason, and no other, that more men have recently been called up.

Men of the army and fleet: Our especial thanks are due to you, as well as to your leaders. By your defiance of death and your discipline you have saved the Fatherland.

One of our most important tasks is economic reconstruction so that soldiers and sailors returning home from the front may find the possibility of assuring existence for themselves and their families. All

[1] *The New York Times*, November 7, 1918, p. 2.

large associations of employers have declared themselves ready to re-employ immediately their former employes and workmen now serving the colors. Provisions for employment, the support of the unemployed and for housing and other measures with the same object are in preparation or have been carried out.

With the conclusion of peace will come an improvement in food and all other conditions of existence.

MESSAGE TO THE ROUMANIAN GOVERNMENT AT JASSY: THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ROUMANIAN PROBLEM [1]

November 6, 1918

The Government of the United States has constantly had in mind the future welfare and integrity of Roumania as a free and independent country, and prior to the existence of a state of war between the United States and Austria-Hungary, a message of sympathy and appreciation was sent by the President to the King of Roumania.

Conditions have changed since that time, and the President accordingly desires me to inform you that the Government of the United States is not unmindful of the aspirations of the Roumanian people without as well as within the boundaries of the kingdom. It has witnessed their struggles and suffering and sacrifices in the cause of freedom from their enemies and oppressors. With the spirit of national unity and the aspirations of the Roumanians everywhere the Government of the United States deeply sympathizes and will not neglect at the proper time to exert its influence that the just political and territorial rights of the Roumanian people may be obtained and made secure from all foreign aggression.

[1] *The New York Times,* November 7, 1918, p. 11; a few days previously a memorandum on Roumanian national aspirations had been handed to Secretary Lansing by Captain Vasile Stoica, President of the Roumanian National League in the United States.

CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA AT THE TIME OF THE GERMAN ARMISTICE [1]

November 7, 1918

A. Despatch Received by the Russian Embassy in Washington, November 7 [1]

There has been effected a final fusion between the All-Russian Government and the Siberian Government and the supreme power is now concentrated in the All-Russian Provisional Government.

The Siberian Government has resigned its authority, and the power of the All-Russian Government now extends practically throughout the whole of Siberia and parts of the following provinces liberated from the Bolsheviki and situated in European Russia: Samara, Orenburg, Ufa, Ural, and Archangel. In the latter province the Northern Government, headed by Tchaikovsky, has also submitted to the All-Russian Government, which is headed by Peter V. Vologodsky.

B. Telegram from the All-Russian Government to President Wilson, November 7 [2]

It is evident that the exit of Russia from the number of belligerents and the process of dismemberment which it is suffering has a deep influence on the fate of all the other countries. Furthermore, the problems of the future of Russia should be considered by Governments and nations of the universe as a problem of their own future. Russia will not perish. She is greatly suffering, but not dead. Her national forces are regaining with remarkable quickness, and her effort to recover her unity and greatness will not cease until she attains this sublime aim.

Moreover, the reconstruction of a powerful and prosperous Russia presents itself as a condition necessary to the maintenance of order and international equilibrium. It is, therefore, that the new Provisional Government, into whose hands has been entrusted the supreme power by the people of Russa, the regional governments, the convention,

[1] *The New York Times,* November 8, 1918, p. 10.
[2] *Ibid.*

and committee of the members of the Constitutent Assembly, the Zemstvos, and municipalities, addresses itself to the Allied Powers. It expects to receive their aid, and considers itself in (the) right to demand insistently such help.

It is to the head of the great American democracy, recognized apostle of peace and fraternity of the nations, that it makes its appeal. All aid already extended to Russia by the Allies would be in vain if the new help should arrive too late, or in insufficient quantity. Every hour of delay threatens with innumerable calamities Russia, the Allies, and other nations.

AMERICAN NOTE TO GERMANY PROTESTING AGAINST DESTRUCTIONS IN THE COURSE OF EVACUATION [1]

November 7, 1918

In its note of October 20th the German Government announced that "the German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability."

Information has now reached the Government of the United States to the effect that the German authorities in Belgium have given notice to the coal mining companies that all men and animals should be brought out of the pits; that all raw materials in the possession of the companies should be delivered to the Germans, and that the mines will be destroyed at once.

Acts so wanton and malicious, involving as they do the destruction of a vital necessity to the civilian population of Belgium, and the consequent suffering and loss of human life which will follow, can not fail to impress the Government and the people of the United States as wilfully cruel and inhuman. If these acts, in flagrant violation of the declaration of October 20 are perpetrated, it will confirm the belief that the solemn assurances of the German Government are not given in good faith.

In the circumstances the Government of the United States, to which the declaration of October 20 was made, enters an emphatic protest against the measures contemplated by the German authorities for whose conduct the Government of Germany is wholly responsible.

[1] State Department text.

ANGLO-FRENCH STATEMENT OF AIMS IN MESOPOTAMIA AND SYRIA [1]

November 7, 1918

The aim of France and Great Britain in carrying on in the Near East the war let loose by Germany's ambitions is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and the free choice of the native populations.

In view of following out this intention, France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and help the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia actually liberated by the Allies, and in the territories they are now striving to liberate, and to recognize them as soon as effectively established.

Far from seeking to force upon the populations of these countries any particular institution, France and Great Britain have no other concern than to ensure by their support and their active assistance the normal working of the governments and institutions which the populations shall have freely adopted, so as to secure just impartiality for all, and also to facilitate the economic development of the country in arousing and encouraging local initiative by the diffusion of instruction, and to put an end to discords which have too long been taken advantage of by Turkish rule.

Such is the rôle that the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN SERBIANS AND JUGOSLAVS AT GENEVA—SERBIAN POLICY IN THE BALKANS [2]

November 7, 1918

A. Report of the Geneva Conference

In a written note presented to the conference, the delegates from Agram asked the Serbian Government and the other Allied Govern-

[1] Formal statement issued by the British Embassy in Washington by direction of the Foreign Office; *The New York Times,* November 8, 1918, p. 2.
[2] *The New York Times,* November 19, 1918, p. 12.

ments to recognize the National Council of Agram as the supreme power of a State newly constituted within the frontiers of the Serbo-Croato-Slovene nation, hitherto being parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and as Commander in Chief of the fleet of that State, until the formalities of the final union with Serbia were carried out.

They further asked that the Jugoslav troops should be recognized by the Allies as a belligerent and friendly force, and gave Dr. Trumbitch full powers to represent the National Council of Agram before the Allied Governments until a common organ was created to assure the common diplomatic representation.

The Serbian Prime Minister, Mr. Pashitch, undertook to present the note of Dr. Koroshetz to the Allied Governments asking the recognition of the Jugoslav National Council of Agram and to support it with all his authority,

The conference unanimously hailed with enthusiasm the creation of a common Ministry for the United Serbian, Croat, and Slovene State.

The conference further proclaimed that there were no longer any interior political or customs frontiers between the entire Serbian, Croat, and Slovene territory. The local administration of the Jugoslav countries will not for the time being undergo any modification. The changes to be made will be definitely settled by the Constituent Assembly.

The conference further protested against the action of the Italian authorities on Jugoslav territory.

B. Comment by the Serbian Press Bureau in Washington

This important statement proves once more how absurd the rumors were which have been spread recently by the enemy propaganda in neutral countries (and which have found an echo in the American press) regarding an alleged divergence of views between the Serbian Government, the Jugoslav Committee of London, and the newly created National Council of Agram.

It is, I am sorry to say, a well-known fact among our American friends that some Jugoslavs living in this country have publicly repudiated the Declaration of Corfu and any future connection with the Serbian Government.

On the one hand it was alleged by the enemy propagandists that Serbia was carrying out an Imperialistic policy, desiring to annex the Croats and Slovenes against their will, while Dr. Ante Trumbitch (who is the leader of the exiled Jugoslavs) was discribed as a " royal Serbian agent who has no support from the Jugoslav people in Austria-

Hungary." On the other hand, some days ago a despatch from Berne announced the strange news that the Provisional Government of Agram had expressed its desire to remain under the domination of the Hapsburgs. This news gave rise to the unjustified conclusion that the Jugoslavs of Austria-Hungary did not approve the policy followed by Mr. Pashitch and Dr. Trumbitch.

We now see that Nicholas Pashitch and Dr. Trumbitch have the entire confidence of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary, who have just been liberated from the Austrian and Magyar yoke.

This precise declaration of the delegates of Agram is the best proof of this, and the Serbian Government has already notified the Allied Governments officially that Serbia recognizes the National Council of Agram as the legal representative of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of the former Dual Monarchy, leaving to the people of the Jugoslav provinces full liberty to make known by a plebiscite whether or not they desire a union with Serbia.

Serbia has always taken her stand on the principle of nationality and self-determination of people, and she is doing it now. She does not wish to impose her rule on any part of the territory inhabited by the Jugoslavs outside of Serbia, which should be given the fullest freedom of choice of their future government. That does not mean that Serbia has abandoned the policy of liberation and national unification of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes into a single State, as planned by the Declaration of Corfu (of July, 1917), which was solemnly signed by the Serbian Prime Minister, Pashitch, on behalf of Serbs from Serbia, and by Dr. Ante Trumbitch, on behalf of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from Austria.

Even before that declaration, from the very beginning of the great war, the Serbian policy was in the direction of creating such a State where all three branches of the Southern Slav people would enjoy a perfect equality in political, economic, and religious liberties. For such an ideal the Serbian Army was fighting these four years, and Serbia's enormous sacrifices in blood and in suffering during this war were made because she was loyal not only to the common Allied cause, but also to the common ideal of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Twice, in December, 1914, and September, 1915, Serbia refused very alluring terms of separate peace with Austria and Germany, and she refused them because she was faithful not only to her allies in the field, but also to her oppressed brothers on the other side of the fighting line. Serbia has been fighting to the end, and considers it a national

duty to liberate these brothers with no selfish aim. All she expects is that, once free, the freest opportunity will be given to them to express themselves if they wish to join Serbia, and, if so, to be permitted to do it.[1]

PROCLAMATION OF KING NICHOLAS TO THE MONTENEGRINS RELATIVE TO JUGOSLAVIA[2]

November 7, 1918

BROTHERS: With the liveliest and most joyous enthusiasm, sure of the approbation of my faithful people, I solemnly declare that my dear Montenegro should become a constituent part of Jungoslavia, and enter into the Jugoslav community frankly and honestly, as it has struggled and suffered for it. I desire that we unite ourselves as brothers in a confederated Jugoslavia in which each (State?) will retain its rights, institutions, religion, and customs, and in which no one will dare pretend to supremacy, but where all will be equal.

. . . . . .

Learning of the just and virile reply addressed by the great President of the United States to our secular enemy, Austria, a response which sharply affirms the right to independence and union of the Jugoslavs, I have felt profound joy that at last justice is rendered our race which has suffered so much.

. . . . . .

Salutations to our dear brother Jugoslavs from their old and tried and today happiest Jugoslav, the King of Montenegro.

Long live President Wilson! Long live the Allies!

(Signed) NICHOLAS.
(Countersigned) POPOVITCH.
VOUIVITCH.
HAIDOUKOVITCH.
CHOTCH.

[1] On November 5 the following Serbian official *communiqué* was issued (*The Times*, London, November 7,1918, p. 5): On November 4, our troops executed all intended movements. In Banat, Croatia, Bosnia, and all other Jugoslav countries the people have organized enthusiastic manifestations, expressing joy at their liberation and at the fulfilment of national unity, cheering for King Peter. A considerable number of prisoners and interned civilians are returning from Austria-Hungary.

[2] *The New York Times*, November 8,.1918, p. 4.

PROCLAMATIONS OF CHANCELLOR MAXIMILIAN TO GERMANS ABROAD AND AT HOME[1]

November 7, 1918.

A. To Germans Abroad

In these difficult days the hearts of many among you, my fellow-countrymen, who outside the frontier of the German Fatherland are surrounded by manifestations of malicious joy and hatred, will be heavy. Do not despair of the German people.

Our soldiers have fought to the last moment as heroically as any army has ever done. The homeland has shown unprecedented strength in suffering and endurance.

In the fifth year, abandoned by its allies, the German people could no longer wage war against the increasingly superior forces.

The victory for which many had hoped has not been granted to us. But the German people has won this still greater victory, over itself and its belief in the right of might.

From this victory we shall draw new strength for the hard time which faces us and which you also can build.

B. To Germans at Home.

For more than four years the German nation, united and calm, has endured the most severe sufferings and sacrifices. If, at this decisive hour, when only absolute unity can avert from the entire German people great dangers for its future, internal strength gives way, then the consequences are unforeseeable.

An indispensable demand in these decisive hours, which must be made by every people's government, is the maintenance of the hitherto existing calm, under voluntary discipline. May every citizen be conscious of the high responsibility toward this people in the fulfilment of their duty!

[1] *The New York Times,* November 11, 1918, p. 1.

REORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE[1]

November 9, 1918

A. Decree of the Imperial Chancellor

The Kaiser and King has decided to renounce the throne.[2]

The Imperial Chancellor will remain in office until the questions connected with the abdication of the Kaiser, the renouncing by the Crown Prince of the throne of the German Empire and of Prussia, and the setting up of a regency have been settled.

For the regency he intends to appoint Deputy Ebert as Imperial Chancellor, and he proposes that a bill shall be brought in for the establishment of a law providing for the promulgating of general suffrage and for a constitutional German National Assembly, which will settle finally the future form of government of the German nation and of those peoples which might be desirous of coming within the empire.

The Imperial Chancellor.

B. Statement Issued by the People's Government[3]

November 9, 1918

In the course of the forenoon of Saturday the formation of a new German people's government was initiated. The greater part of the Berlin garrison, and other troops stationed there temporarily, went over to the new Government.

[1] *The New York Times,* November 10, 1918, p. 1.

[2] The exact effect of this announcement by itself may be judged from the actual abdication of the Kaiser contained in the following document issued by the new German Government in Berlin on November 30 (see *The New York Times,* December 1, 1918, p. 1):

By the present document I renounce forever my rights to the crown of Prussia and the rights to the German Imperial crown. I release at the same time all the officials of the German Empire and Prussia and also all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Prussian Navy and Army and of contingents from confederated States from the oath of fidelity they have taken to me as their Emperor, King, and supreme chief.

I expect from them until a new organization of the German Empire exists that they will aid those who effectively hold the power in Germany to protect the German people against the menacing dangers of anarchy, famine, and foreign domination.

Made and executed and signed by our own hand with the imperial seal at Amerongen, Nov. 28.

William.

[3] *The New York Times,* November 11, 1918, p. 1.

The leaders of the deputations to the Social-Democratic Party declared that they would not shoot against the people. They said they would, in accordance with the people's government, intercede in favor of the maintenance of order. Thereupon in the offices and public buildings the guards which had been stationed there were withdrawn.

The business of the Imperial Chancellor is being carried on by the Social-Democratic Deputy, Herr Ebert.

It is presumed that, apart from the representatives of the recent majority group, three independent Social-Democrats will enter the future government.

BRITISH PRESS BUREAU STATEMENT ON THE DOMINIONS AND THE PEACE CONFERENCES[1]

November 9, 1918

The statement of Premier Hughes of Australia that the terms of peace have been definitely settled at the recent conference at Versailles without consultation with the dominions makes it necessary to put on record the actual position with regard to this question.

From the first the British Government has recognized that the magnificent efforts and sacrifices made by the dominions and India in the common cause have entitled them to an equal voice with the United Kingdom in the settlement of the terms of peace.

It was with this specific object in view that the first Imperial War Cabinet was summoned last year. On that occasion every aspect of the general peace settlement was exhaustively discussed by the two committees of the Imperial War Cabinet, on each of which the dominions and India were represented as well as by the Imperial War Cabinet itself.

The Australian Government, for reasons of a domestic character, was not represented at these discussions, but the conclusions of the committee and of the Imperial War Cabinet on these matters were communicated to the Australian Government at the time and have since then been again reviewed at this year's session of the Imperial War Cabinet in a series of discussions in which representatives of Australia participated.

[1] *The New York Times,* November 10, 1918, p. 4.

Nothing that has been done by the British representatives at the recent meeting of the Supreme War Council is inconsistent with the general conclusions arrived at in these discussions or has been precluded or prejudiced the effective attainment in the final peace terms of any specific objects to which the attention of the Imperial War Cabinet was drawn by the representatives of the dominions and India.

The British Government has every intention of associating the Governments of the dominions and India with itself at every stage in the future discussions of terms of peace.

From the moment that it became clear that such discussions were imminent the Prime Ministers of the dominions and India were warned to hold themselves in readiness to come over or to send representatives with a view to their remaining in constant and the closest touch in their capacity of members of the Imperial War Cabinet with developments of the situation and to their being represented at the interallied conference which is to be convened in the near future in order to consider in detail the practical application of general principles of peace settlements.

ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE AT THE GUILDHALL ON TERMS OF PEACE[1]

November 9, 1918

. . . . . .

Our people are preeminently a sane people. I have seen no despair in the hour of defeat. I have seen no frenzy in the hour of victory and a nation that maintained its calm through reverses will also keep its sobriety in success. All the same, we can not forget the reckless wantonness with which the rulers of Germany, with the full consent of her people, committed this atrocious crime against humanity. They cheered their rulers; they would have cheered them today had they won. We must bear that in mind when we seek security. We are waging no war against a people, but we should be indeed unwise if we forgot. It is but four years ago. There must be terms that will discourage ambition and arrogance from repeating this atrocity against

[1] *The Times*, London, November 11, 1918.
[2] The address began with a review of the stupendous victory about to be completed by the Allied Powers.

humanity. We shall do no wrong; we will abandon no right. Justice—divine justice—the foundation of civilization—must be satisfied. We do not seek a yard of real German soil. We are not going to commit the folly of 1870, which has been so disastrously punished. It would come even to us and to our Allies if we imitated the folly, the crime, the wrong. Deferred castigation is the worst of all punishments and Germany is enduring that today. We have no designs on the liberties of the German people; we wish them well rid of all their oppressors, for they are the oppressors of Europe as well. But, whilst we have no intention of interfering with the freedom of the German people, we can not treat the guilt, the infamy of this horrible war as if it were merely an idle pageant which entailed no judgment upon the empire and the system responsible for it. Four and a-half years of horror inflicted on humanity, millions of the finest young men of England, France, Italy, Russia, and many of America, Belgium, Serbia, slain without count, millions more mutilated, torn—countless numbers of men and women who mourn! This generation will have passed away ere the torture and suffering of this war will have ceased. The country that recklessly plunged the world into that agony must expect a stern reckoning.

. . . . . .

We must not forget in this old country what we owe to those sturdy children of ours beyond the seas, who have set up free households of their own and of their own free will came to the aid of this land. Their share in the victory stands conspicuous, and they must have a voice which is equal to their sacrifice, in the determination of the terms of peace. Last year we consulted them fully as to conditions which this country should impose if it came to a Peace Conference. This year we reconsidered those terms with the representatives of the dominions and of India at the Imperial War Cabinet, and again arrived at a perfectly unanimous conclusion; and at Versailles my colleagues and I agreed to nothing which would preclude us from pressing at the Peace Conference, as we intend to do, all the conditions which the dominions, India, and ourselves determined upon at this conference which we held. These young nations have fought bravely; they have contributed greatly; and they have won their place at the council table. What is true of them is equally true of the great Empire of India, which has helped us materially to win those brilliant victories which were the beginning of the disintegration of our foes, and their interests must not be forgotten when the Peace Conference is reached.

PROCLAMATION OF CHANCELLOR EBERT[1]

November 10, 1918

CITIZENS: The ex-Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, in agreement with all the Secretaries of State has handed over to me the task of liquidating his affairs as Chancellor. I am on the point of forming a new government in accord with the various parties, and will keep public opinion freely informed of the course of events.

The new government will be a government of the people. It must make every effort to secure in the quickest possible time peace for the German people and consolidate the liberty which they have won.

The new government has taken charge of the administration, to preserve the German people from civil war and famine and to accomplish their legitimate claim to autonomy. The government can solve this problem only if all the officials in town and country will help.

I know it will be difficult for some to work with the new men who have taken charge of the empire, but I appeal to their love of the people. Lack of organization would in this heavy time mean anarchy in Germany and the surrender of the country to tremendous misery. Therefore, help your native land with fearless, indefatigable work for the future, every one at his post.

I demand every one's support in the hard task awaiting us. You know how seriously the war has menaced the provisioning of the people, which is the first condition of the people's existence. The political transformation should not trouble the people. The food supply is the first duty of all, whether in town or country, and they should not embarrass, but rather aid, the production of food supplies and their transport to the towns.

Food shortage signifies pillage and robbery, with great misery. The poorest will suffer the most, and the industrial worker will be affected hardest. All who illicitly lay hands on food supplies or other supplies of prime necessity or the means of transport necessary for their distribution will be guilty in the highest degree toward the community.

I ask you immediately to leave the streets and remain orderly and calm.

[1] *The New York Times,* November 11, 1918, p. 1.

ABDICATION OF EMPEROR CHARLES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY[1]

November 11, 1918

Since my accession I have incessantly tried to rescue my peoples from this tremendous war. I have not delayed the reestablishment of constitutional rights or the opening of a way for the people to substantial national development.

Filled with an unalterable love for my peoples I will not, with my person, be a hindrance to their free development. I acknowledge the decision taken by German-Austria to form a separate State.

The people has by its deputies taken charge of the government. I relinquish every participation in the administration of the State. Likewise I have released the members of the Austrian Government from their offices.

May the German-Austrian people realize harmony from the new adjustment. The happiness of my peoples was my aim from the beginning. My warmest wishes are that an internal peace will be able to heal the wounds of this war.

(Signed) CHARLES.
(Countersigned) LAMMASCH.

ADDRESS OF PRIME MINISTER LLOYD-GEORGE TO LIBERAL PARTY LEADERS ON PEACE TERMS[2]

November 12, 1918.

. . . . . .

One of the principal issues at the forthcoming general election will be the nature of the peace settlement. It will mean the settlement of the world. What are the principles on which that settlement is to be effected? Are we to lapse back into the old national rivalries and animosities and competitive armaments, or are we to initiate the reign on earth of the Prince of Peace? It is the duty of Liberalism to use its influence to ensure that it shall be the reign of peace. What are the

[1] *The New York Times*, November 14, 1918, p. 2. The precise intention of the second sentence of the third paragraph may not justify the term "abdication."
[2] *The Times, London*, November 13, 1918, p. 9.

conditions of peace? They must lead to a settlement which will be fundamentally just. No settlement that contravenes the principles of eternal justice will be a permanent one. The peace of 1871 imposed by Germany on France outraged all the principles of justice and fair play. Let us be warned by that example. We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to override the fundamental principles of righteousness. Vigorous attempts will be made to hector and bully the government in the endeavor to make them depart from the strict principles of right, and to satisfy some base, sordid, squalid ideas of vengeance and of avarice. We must relentlessly set our faces against that. The mandate of this government at the forthcoming election will mean that the British delegation to the Peace Congress will be in favor of a just peace.

Let me next allude to the question of a League of Nations. Such a league is more necessary now than ever, and the conditions that prevailed in the Balkans before the war are now affecting practically two-thirds of Europe. A large number of small nations have been reborn in Europe, and these will require a League of Nations to protect them against the covetousness and ambitions of grasping neighbors. In my judgment, the League of Nations is an absolute essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the Peace Conference to guarantee that the League of Nations is a reality. I am one of those who believe that without peace we can not have progress. A League of Nations guarantees peace, and guarantees an all-round reduction of armaments, and that reduction of armaments is a guarantee that you can get rid of conscription here. Of course, we must have in this country an efficient army to police the empire, but I am looking forward to a condition of things with the existence of a League of Nations, under which conscription will not be necessary in any country.[1]

[1] President Wilson sent the following message of endorsement to Prime Minister Lloyd-George upon this address. (See *The New York Times,* November 18, 1918, p. 1.)

May I express my sincere admiration of the admirable temper and purpose of your address of the 12th, just reproduced in part in our papers. It is delightful to be made aware of such community of thought and counsel in approaching the high and difficult task now awaiting us.

ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY

Proclamation of the Armistice with Germany by President Wilson, November 11 [1]

My Fellow Countrymen: The armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober friendly counsel, and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.

Woodrow Wilson.

Address of President Wilson to Congress Giving the Terms of the Armistice Granted to Germany, November 11 [2]

Gentlemen of the Congress: In these anxious times of rapid and stupendous change it will in some degree lighten my sense of responsibility to perform in person the duty of communicating to you some of the larger circumstances of the situation with which it is necessary to deal.

The German authorities, who have at the invitation of the Supreme War Council, been in communication with Marshal Foch, have accepted and signed the terms of armistice which he was authorized and instructed to communicate to them. These terms are as follows: [3]

The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.

It is not now possible to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another, until all the world was on fire, is at an end and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion and in such force as to contribute, in a way of which we are all deeply proud, to the great result. We know too, that the object of the war is attained; the object upon which all free men had set their hearts; and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed imperialism such as the men conceived who were but yesterday the masters of Germany is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. Who will now seek to revive it?

[1] Washington, November 11, 10 a. m.; *The New York Evening Post,* November 11, 1918, p. 1.

[2] *Congressional Record,* November 11, 1918, p. 11537.

[3] The President here read the terms of the armistice as given below (first draft).

The arbitrary power of the military caste of Germany which once could secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world is discredited and destroyed. And more than that—much more than that—has been accomplished. The great nations which associated themselves to destroy it have now definitely united in the common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy the longing of the whole world for disinterested justice, embodied in settlements which are based upon something much better and much more lasting than the selfish competitive interests of powerful States. There is no longer conjecture as to the objects the victors have in mind. They have a mind in the matter, not only, but a heart also. Their avowed and concerted purpose is to satisfy and protect the weak as well as to accord their just rights to the strong.

The humane temper and intention of the victorious Governments have already been manifested in a very practical way. Their representatives in the Supreme War Council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distressing want that is in so many places threatening their very lives; and steps are to be taken immediately to organize these efforts at relief in the same systematic manner that they were organized in the case of Belgium. By the use of the idle tonnage of the Central Empires it ought presently to be possible to lift the fear of utter misery from their oppressed populations and set their minds and energies free for the great and hazardous tasks of political reconstruction which now face them on every hand. Hunger does not breed reform; it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an ordered life impossible.

For with the fall of the ancient governments, which rested like an incubus upon the peoples of the Central Empires, has come political change not merely, but revolution; and revolution which seems as yet to assume no final and ordered form, but to run from one fluid change to another, until thoughtful men are forced to ask themselves, with what governments and of what sort are we about to deal in the making of the covenants of peace? With what authority will they meet us, and with what assurance that their authority will abide and sustain securely the international arrangements into which we are about to enter? There is here matter for no small anxiety and misgiving. When peace is made, upon whose promises and engagements besides our own is it to rest?

Let us be perfectly frank with ourselves and admit that these ques-

tions can not be satisfactorily answered now or at once. But the moral is not that there is little hope of an early answer that will suffice. It is only that we must be patient and helpful and mindful above all of the great hope and confidence that lie at the heart of what is taking place. Excesses accomplish nothing. Unhappy Russia has furnished abundant recent proof of that. Disorder immediately defeats itself. If excesses should occur, if disorder should for a time raise its head, a sober second thought will follow and a day of constructive action, if we help and do not hinder.

The present and all that it holds belongs to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their Governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by the sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness.

The peoples who have but just come out from under the yoke of arbitrary government and who are now coming at last into their freedom will never find the treasures of liberty they are in search of if they look for them by the light of the torch. They will find that every pathway that is stained with the blood of their own brothers leads to the wilderness, not to the seat of their hope. They are now face to face with their initial test. We must hold the light steady until they find themselves. And in the meantime, if it be possible, we must establish a peace that will justly define their place among the nations, remove all fear of their neighbors and of their former masters, and enable them to live in security and contentment when they have set their own affairs in order. I, for one, do not doubt their purpose or their capacity. There are some happy signs that they know and will choose the way of self-control and peaceful accommodation. If they do, we shall put our aid at their disposal in every way that we can. If they do not, we must await with patience and sympathy the awakening and recovery that will assuredly come at last.

CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY[1]

Signed November 11, 1918

(Translation)

BETWEEN Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, in conjunction with Admiral Wemyss, First Sea Lord, of the one part; and Secretary of State Erzberger, President of the German Delegation, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Count von Oberndorff, Major-General von Winterfeldt, Captain Vanselow (German Navy), furnished with full powers in due form and acting with the approval of the German Chancellor, of the other part;

An Armistice has been concluded on the following conditions:—

CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH GERMANY

(A)—*On the Western Front*

1. Cessation of hostilities on land and in the air six hours after the signature of the Armistice.

2. Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries:—Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, so ordered as to be completed within fifteen days from the signature of the Armistice. German troops which have not evacuated the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will be made prisoners of war. Joint occupation by the Allied and United States forces shall keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation or occupation shall be regulated in accordance with a Note (Annexe No. 1), drawn up at the time of signature of the Armistice.

3. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within fifteen days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or convicted).

4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following war material:—

5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field).

25,000 machine-guns.

3,000 trench mortars.

1,700 fighting and bombing aeroplanes—in the first place, all D 7's and all night-bombing aeroplanes.

[1] Miscellaneous Parliamentary Publications, No. 25 (1918).

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in Annexe 1, drawn up at the time of signature of the Armistice.

5. Evacuation by the German armies of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine. These territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories shall be carried out by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridgeheads, at these points, of a 30 kilometre radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of each area. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the river, and at a distance of 10 kilometres from the Dutch to the Swiss frontier. Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhineland (left and right banks), shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of sixteen days—thirty-one days in all after the signature of the Armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated according to Annexe 1, drawn up at the time of signature of the Armistice.

6. In all the territories evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or detriment shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for participation in military measures prior to the signature of the Armistice. No destruction of any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be handed over intact, as well as military stores, food, munitions and equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, &c., shall be left *in situ*. No measure of a general or official character shall be adopted which may result in a depreciation of industrial establishments or in a reduction of their personnel.

7. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs and telephones shall be in no way damaged. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall be maintained. 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good running order, and provided with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed by Annexe No. 2, which shall not exceed thirty-one days. 5,000 motor lorries in good running order shall also be handed over within thirty-six days.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within

thirty-one days, together with all personnel and material belonging directly to these lines. Further, material necessary for the working of railways in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for upkeep of permanent way, signals, and repair-shops, shall be left *in situ* and maintained by Germany as far as the working of these lines on the left bank of the Rhine is concerned. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note appended as Annexe No. 1 regulates all details under this head.

8. The German Command shall be bound to disclose, within 48 hours after the signature of the Armistice, all mines or delay action apparatus disposed on the territory evacuated by the German troops, and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German Command shall also disclose all harmful measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of springs, wells, &c.). All the foregoing under penalty of reprisals.

9. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States Armies in all occupied territories, settlement of accounts with the persons concerned being provided for. The maintenance of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be defrayed by the German Government.

10. Immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war (including those under trial or convicted), according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed. The Allied Powers and the United States shall dispose of these prisoners as they think fit. This condition cancels previous agreements on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the agreement of July, 1918, in course of ratification. The repatriation of German prisoners interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall, however, continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners shall be settled upon the conclusion of the peace preliminaries.

11. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German armies shall be cared for by German personnel, to be left on the spot with the material required.

(B)—*Clauses relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany*

12. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey, must at once withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as these existed on August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in territories which

before the war formed part of Russia shall likewise withdraw within the German frontiers as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall consider this desirable, having regard to the interior conditions of those territories.

13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian or military agents now within Russian territory (as defined on August 1, 1914), to be recalled.

14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions, seizures, or coercive measures for obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (according to frontiers existing on August 1, 1914).

15. Annulment of the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of supplementary treaties.

16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either viâ Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to revictual the populations of those territories or to maintain order.

(C)—*In East Africa*

17. Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period fixed by the Allies.

(D)—*General Clauses*

18. Repatriation within a maximum period of one month, without reciprocity, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians, including hostages, and persons under trial or convicted, who may be nationals of the Allied or Associated States other than those mentioned in clause 3.

19. *Financial Clauses.*—With the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and United States shall remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are required:—

Reparation for damage done.

While the Armistice lasts, no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a guarantee to the Allies for the recovery of reparation for war losses.

Immediate restitution of cash deposits in the National Bank of Belgium, and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, and securities of every kind (together with plant for the issue thereof) affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Restititution of the Russian and Roumanian gold removed by the Germans or handed over to htem. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

(E)—*Naval Conditions*

20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to Neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

21. Release, without reciprocity, of all prisoners of war in German hands belonging to the navies and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers.

22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of all existing submarines (including all submarine cruisers and mine-layers) with armament and equipment complete, in ports specified by the Allies and the United States. Those which cannot put to sea shall be paid off and disarmed, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States. Submarines which are ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports as soon as orders are received by wireless for them to proceed to the port of surrender, and the rest shall follow as soon as possible. The conditions of this clause shall be fulfilled within fourteen days after the signature of the Armistice.

23. The following German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing these, in Allied ports designated by the Allies and the United States, and there placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States, only guards being left on board, namely:—

6 battle cruisers.

10 battleships.

8 light cruisers, including two mine-layers.

50 destroyers of the most modern types.

All other surface warships (including river craft) shall be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States, completely disarmed, and there placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet shall be disarmed. All vessels selected for internment

shall be ready to leave German ports seven days after the signature of the armistice. Sailing orders shall be given by wireless.

24. The Allies and the United States shall have the right to sweep all mine-fields and destroy all obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters. The position of such mine-fields and obstructions is to be indicated.

25. Freedom of access to and egress from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers; to secure this the Allies and the United States shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defense works of all kinds in all the channels from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep and destroy all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters. The plans and exact positions of the above shall be furnished by Germany, who may not raise any question of neutrality.

26. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers shall remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships met at sea shall remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany, during the armistice, to such extent as shall be found necessary.

27. All aircraft shall be concentrated and immobilized in German bases specified by the Allied Powers and the United States.

28. In evacuating the Belgian coast and ports, Germany shall leave *in situ* and intact all harbor material and material for inland navigation, all merchant craft, tugs, and barges; all naval aircraft, equipment, and stores, together with all armament, equipment, and stores of every description.

29. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; Russian warships of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States; all neutral merchant ships seized are to be released; war and other material of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned, and German material as specified in clause 28 is to be abandoned.

30. All merchant ships now in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers shall be restored, without reciprocity, in ports specified by the Allies and the United States.

31. No destruction of ships or of material to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

32. The German Government shall formally notify all neutral Governments, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions imposed on the trading

of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately cancelled.

33. No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after the signature of the Armistice.

(F)—*Duration of the Armistice*

34. The duration of the Armistice shall be thirty-six days, with option to extend.

During such period the Armistice may, owing to non-execution of any of the above clauses, be denounced by one of the contracting parties, who shall give forty-eight hours' notice of its intention to that effect. It is agreed that the Armistice shall not be denounced owing to non-sufficient execution of the stipulations of clauses 3 and 18 within the time-limits specified, except in the case of intentional negligence in execution. To insure the adequate fulfilment of the present agreement, the principle of a Permanent International Armistice Commission is admitted. This Commission shall work under the high authority of the military and naval Command-in-Chief of the Allied forces.

This Armistice was signed on the 11th November, 1918, at 5 A.M. (French time).

(Signed)

F. FOCH.
R. E. WEMYSS.

ERZBERGER.
OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

Addendum

The Allied Representatives declare that, owing to recent events, it appears necessary to them that the following condition should be added to the clauses of the armistice:—

"In the event of the German vessels not being handed over within the periods specified, the Allied and United States Governments shall have the right to occupy Heligoland so as to insure the surrender of the vessels." (Signed)

R. E. WEMYSS, *Admiral.* F. FOCH.

The German delegates state that they will transmit this declaration to the German Chancellor, with the recommendation that it should be accepted, together with the reasons upon which this demand on the part of the Allies is based.

(Signed) ERZBERGER.
WINTERFELDT.
OBERNDORFF.
VANSELOW.

(Translation)

ANNEX No. 1

I.—*The Evacuation of the Invaded Territories of Belgium, France, and Luxemburgh, as well as of Alsace-Lorraine,*

Shall be carried out in three successive stages under the following conditions:—

1st Stage.—Evacuation of the territory situated between the present front and line No. 1 as shown on the attached map, to be completed within five days after the signature of the armistice.

2d Stage.—Evacuation of the territory situated between line No. 1 and line No. 2, to be completed within four further days (nine days in all after the signature of the armistice).

3d Stage.—Evacuation of the territory situated between line No. 2 and line No. 3, to be completed within six further days (fifteen days in all after the signature of the armistice).

Troops of the Allies and of the United States shall enter these different zones on the expiration of the periods allowed to the German troops for their evacuation. Thus the present German front line will be crossed by the Allied troops as from the sixth day following the signature of the armistice, line No. 1 as from the tenth day, and line No. 2 as from the sixteenth day.

II.—*Evacuation of the Rhine Lands.*

This evacuation shall also be carried out in several successive stages, viz.:—

1st Stage.—Evacuation of the territories situated between line 2, line 3, and line 4 to be completed within four further days (nineteen days in all after the signature of the armistice.

2d Stage.—Evacuation of the territory situated between line 4 and

line 5 to be completed within four further days (twenty-three days in all after the signature of the armistice).

3d Stage.—Evacuation of the territory situated between line 5 and line 6 (line of the Rhine) to be completed within four further days (twenty-seven days in all after the signature of the armistice).

4th Stage.—Evacuation of the bridgeheads and of the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine to be completed within four further days (thirty-one days in all after the signature of the armistice).

The armies of occupation of the Allies and the United States shall enter these different zones on the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each zone; thus line No. 3 shall be crossed by them as from the twentieth day following the signature of the Armistice; line No. 4 shall be crossed by them as from the twenty-fourth day following the signature of the Armistice; line No. 5 as from the twenty-eighth day; and line No. 6 (Rhine) as from the thirty-second day, for the occupation of the bridgeheads.

III.—*Surrender by the German Armies of the War Material fixed by the Armistice Conditions*

This war material shall be handed over in the following manner: The first half before the tenth day, the second half before the twentieth day. This material shall be handed over to each Allied and United States Army by each tactical group of the German army in proportions to be laid down by the Permanent Armistice Commission.

(Translation)

ANNEX No. 2

Conditions relating to the means of Communication (railways, waterways, roads, river harbors, seaports, telegraphs and telephones)

1. All means of communication up to and including the Rhine, or included on the right bank of that river within the bridgeheads occupied by the Allied armies, shall be placed under the full and complete control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who shall have the right to take any steps which he may judge necessary in order to insure their occupation and use. All documents relating to the means of communication shall be held in readiness to be delivered to him.

2. All the material and all civil and military personnel at present employed for the upkeep and use of the means of communication will be maintained *in toto* on these communications throughout the territory evacuated by the German troops.

Any additional material necessary for the maintenance of these lines of communication in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be furnished by the German Government throughout the duration of the armistice.

3. *Personnel.*—The French and Belgian personnel belonging to the communication services, whether interned or not, shall be returned to the French or Belgian Armies within fifteen days of the signature of the Armistice. The personnel directly employed on the Alsace-Lorraine railway system shall be retained or shall return to their posts in order to keep these railways running.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies shall have the right to change or replace any of the personnel of the communication services as he may think fit.

4. *Material:*—

(*a*) *Rolling-Stock.*—The rolling-stock handed over to the Allied Armies in the zone between the front line and line No. 3 (not including Alsace-Lorraine) shall amount to at least 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons. Delivery of this rolling-stock shall be carried out within the periods fixed by clause 7 of the Armistice, and under the detailed conditions to be settled by the Permanent International Armistice Commission.

All this rolling-stock shall be in a good state of repair and in running order, and provided with all usual spare parts or accessories. It shall be used (with its own or any other personnel) at any point of the railway system of the Allied Armies.

The rolling-stock directly employed on the railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be retained *in situ* or returned to the French Army.

The material to be left *in situ* in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, as well as within the bridgeheads, must allow of normal traffic being maintained on the lines in these areas.

(*b*) *Permanent-way, Signals, and Workshop Plant.*—The signaling apparatus, machinery and tools removed from the workshops and depôts of the French and Belgian railways shall be replaced in accordance with detailed conditions to be settled by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. The permanent-way material, rails, appurtenances, apparatus, bridging material, and timber neces-

(THE 10 KM. NEUTRAL ZONE IS SHADED)



sary for repairing the destroyed lines beyond the present front shall be supplied to the Allied Armies.

(*c*) *Fuel and Materials for Upkeep.*—During the period of the Armistice, fuel and materials for upkeep shall be supplied by the German Government to the depôts normally serving the traffic in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

5. *Telegraphic and Telephonic Communications.*—All telegraph and telephone lines and fixed wireless stations shall be surrendered to the Allied Armies with all the civil and military personnel and all equipment, including all stores existing on the left bank of the Rhine.

All additional stores necessary for the maintenance of traffic shall be supplied by the German Government during the period of the Armistice, as and when required.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies shall assume military control of this system, guarantee its organization, and replace or change any of the personnel as he may think fit.

He shall return to the German Army all the military personnel which he does not consider necessary for the working and maintenance of the system.

All plans of the German telegraph and telephone systems shall be handed over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

TEXT OF MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND HUNGARY. SIGNED AT BELGRADE, NOVEMBER 13, 1918 [1]

Military Convention Regulating the Conditions under which the Armistice, Signed between the Allies and Austria-Hungary, is to be Applied in Hungary

1. The Hungarian Government will withdraw all troops north of a line drawn through the upper valley of the Szamos, Bistritz, Maros-Vásárhely, the river Maros to its junction with the Theiss, Maria-Theresiopel, Baja, Fünfkirchen (these places not being occupied by Hungarian troops), course of the Drave, until it coincides with the frontier of Slavonia-Croatia.

The evacuation to be carried out in eight days, the Allies to be entitled to occupy the evacuated territory on the conditions laid down by the general commander in chief of the Allied Armies. Civil administration will remain in the hands of the Government.

[1] Senate Document No. 147, 66th Congress, 1st Session.

In actual fact only the police and gendarmerie will be retained in the evacuated zone, being indispensable to the maintenance of order, and also such men as are required to insure the safety of the railways.

2. Demobilization of Hungarian naval and military forces. An exception will be made in the case of six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, required for the maintenance of internal order and in the case of small sections of police mentioned in paragraph 1.

3. The Allies to have the right of occupying all places and strategic points, which may be permanently fixed by the general commander in chief of the Allied armies.

The Allied troops to be allowed to pass through or to remain in any part of Hungary.

The Allies to have permanent right of use, for military purposes, of all rolling stock and shipping belonging to the State or to private individuals resident in Hungary, also of all draft animals.

4. The rolling stock and railway staff usually employed in the occupied territory will remain (see paragraph 1), and a reserve of 2,000 wagons and 100 locomotives (normal gauge), and 600 wagons and 50 locomotives (narrow gauge), will also be handed over within the month to the general commander in chief. These will be for the use of the allied troops and to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. Some portion of this material could be levied from Austria. The figures are approximate.

5. The ships and crews, usually employed in the service of the occupied territory will remain, in addition to monitors will be surrendered to the Allies immediately at Belgrade. The rest of the Danube flotilla will be assembled in one of the Danube ports, to be appointed later by the general commander in chief, and will be disarmed there. A levy of 10 passenger vessels, 10 tugs, and 60 lighters will be made on this flotilla as soon as possible for the use of the allied troops, to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. The figures are approximate.

6. Within 15 days a detachment of 3,000 men from the railway technical troops are to be placed at the disposal of the general commander in chief, supplied with the material necessary to repair the Serbian railways. These figures are approximate.

7. Within 15 days a detachment of sappers of the telegraph branch are to be placed at the disposal of the general commander in chief provided with material necessary for establishing telegraphic and telephone communications with Serbia.

8. Within one month, 25,000 horses are to be placed at the disposal of the general commander in chief, together with such transport material as he may deem necessary. These figures are approximate.

9. Arms and war material to be deposited at places appointed by the general commander in chief. A portion of this material will be levied for the purpose of supplying units to be placed under the orders of the general commander in chief.

10. Immediate liberation of all allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, who will be collected at places convenient for their dispatch by rail. They will there receive directions as to time and place of repatriation, according to the orders issued by the general commander in chief. Hungarian prisoners of war to be provisionally retained.

11. A delay of 15 days is granted for the passage of German troops through Hungary and their quartering meanwhile, dating from the signing of the armistice by General Diaz (November 4, 3 p.m.). Postal and telegraphic communication with Germany will only be permitted under the military control of the Allies. The Hungarian Government undertakes to allow no military telegraphic communication with Germany.

12. Hungary will facilitate the supplying of the allied troops of occupation; requisitions will be allowed on condition that they are not arbitrary and that they are paid for at current rates.

13. The situation of all Austro-Hungarian mines in the Danube and the Black Sea must be communicated immediately to the general commander in chief. Further, the Hungarian Government undertakes to stop the passage of all floating mines sown in the Danube upstream from the Hungarian and Austrian frontier and to remove all those actually in Hungarian waters.

14. The Hungarian postal service, telegraphs, telephones, and railways will be placed under allied control.

15. An allied representative will be attached to the Hungarian ministry of supplies in order to safeguard allied interests.

16. Hungary is under an obligation to cease all relations with Germany and stringently to forbid the passage of German troops to Roumania.

17. The Allies shall not interfere with the internal administration of affairs in Hungary.

18. Hostilities between Hungary and the Allies are at an end.

Two copies made November 13, 1918, at 11.15 p.m., at Belgrade.

Signed for the Allies by the delegates of the general commander in chief.

VOIVODE MISHITCH.
GEN. HENRYS.

Signed for Hungary by the delegates of the Hungarian Government.

BÉLA LINDER.

INDEX

INDEX

PAGE

Aaland Islands. Speech of German Foreign Minister. June 24, 1918 . 342

Allied Military Missions in Russia. Protest against Russian separate peace. Nov. 27, 1917 191

Alsace-Lorraine
- Evacuation of
  - Address of German Chancellor Solf. Oct. 25, 1918 436
  - Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 . . . . . 477, 484
- Plebiscite for. Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
- Referred to in letter of Prince Sixtus. See **Sixtus, Prince, Letter of.**
- Restoration to France
  - British supplement to Entente reply to President Wilson's note of Dec. 18, 1916. Jan. 13, 1917 47
  - Resolution of French Chamber of Deputies. June 5, 1917 . . 103
  - Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour. July 30, 1917 125
  - Statement of French Premier Painlevé. Sept. 18, 1917 . . . 136
  - Statement of German Foreign Minister von Kühlmann. Oct. 9, 1917 157
  - Speech of British ex-Premier Asquith. Oct. 11, 1917 . . . 164
  - Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour. Nov. 6, 1917 . . . 171
  - Fourteen Points of President Wilson. Address of Jan. 8, 1918 . 238
  - Statement of Premier Lloyd-George on Fourteen Points. Jan. 18, 1918 244
  - Reply of German Chancellor to President Wilson's address of Jan. 8. Jan. 24, 1918 252
  - Reply of Foreign Minister Balfour to Austrian note. Sept. 16, 1918 393

American Mission to Russia. Message of President Wilson. June 9, 1917 104

Andrassy, Austrian Foreign Minister. See **Austria-Hungary.**

Arbitration, compulsory
- Proposals of Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
- Reply of Austria-Hungary. Sept. 21, 1917 138
- Reply of Germany. Sept. 21, 1917 140
- Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Sept. 26, 1917 146
- Speech of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Oct. 2, 1917 . 152

Archangel, establishment of anti-Bolshevik government in. Aug. 7, 1918 . 363

Armaments, limitation of
- Speech of President Wilson. Jan. 22, 1917 53
- Proposals of the Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
- Reply of Austria-Hungary. Sept. 21, 1917 138
- Reply of Germany. Sept. 21, 1917 140
- Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Sept. 26, 1917 146
- Speech of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Oct. 2, 1917 . 153
- Statement of Premier Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 233

PAGE

Armaments, limitation of—*Continued.*
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 237
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling. Jan. 24, 1918 . . . 250
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. April 2, 1918 . 302

Armed merchant ships. Statement of United States, Mar. 12, 1917 . . 82

Armed neutrality. Address of President Wilson, Feb. 26, 1917 . . . 76

Armenia. Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167

Armistice
Austria-Hungary
Austrian request for an armistice. Oct. 7, 1918 417
Reply of President Wilson. Oct. 18, 1918 428
Protocol of an armistice. Nov. 3, 1918 446
Conditions upon which armistice is to be applied in Hungary. Nov. 13, 1918 488
Bulgaria
Bulgarian request for an armistice. Sept. 24, 1918 398
Reply of Allies. Sept. 26, 1918 398
Armistice convention. Sept. 29, 1918 408
Germany
German request for an armistice. Oct. 6, 1918 414
President Wilson's inquiry concerning request. Oct. 8, 1918 . . 418
Answer of Germany. Oct. 14, 1918 420
President Wilson's reply to German request. Oct. 14, 1918 . . 421
Note of President Wilson consenting to propose an armistice to Allies. Oct. 23, 1918 434
German reply to President Wilson's note of October 23. Oct. 27, 1918 438
Announcement by United States of agreement among Allies on terms of an armistice. Nov. 4, 1918 455
Notification of the foregoing to Germany. Nov. 5, 1918 . . . 456
Proclamation and address of President Wilson. Nov. 11, 1918 . 474
Conditions of the armistice. Nov. 11, 1918 477
Roumania. Official announcement of an armistice. Dec. 7, 1917 . . 203
Russia
Note of Foreign Minister Trotsky offering an armistice. Nov. 21, 1917 188
Russian proclamation of an armistice. Dec. 7, 1917 202
Russian statement of German violation of. Feb. 19, 1918 . . 278
Turkey
Request for an armistice. Oct. 14, 1918 419
Reply of President Wilson. Oct. 31, 1918 443
Statement in House of Commons. Oct. 31, 1918 444
British paraphrase of armistice. Oct. 31, 1918 444

Asquith, British ex-Premier. See **Great Britain.**

Austria-Hungary
Abdication of Emperor Charles. Nov. 11, 1918 472
Address of Foreign Minister Czernin. Oct. 2, 1917 152
Armistice protocol. Nov. 3, 1918 446
Conditions upon which the armistice is to be applied in Hungary. Nov. 13, 1918 488
Autonomy of peoples of Austria. Reply of President Wilson to Austrian proposal for an armistice. Oct. 18, 1918 428

PAGE

Austria-Hungary—*Continued.*
Czecho-Slovakia, statement relative to British recognition of belligerency of. Aug. 17, 1918 373
Entente Powers
Comment upon reply of, to President Wilson's note. Jan. 12, 1917 42
Comment of Supreme War Council on statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Feb. 3, 1918 262
France
Revelation of French peace maneuvers. April 2, 1918 . . . 298
Further explanation of French peace maneuvers. April 5, 1918 . 308
French account of peace maneuvers. April 6, 1918 312
Statement of ex-Premier Painlevé on Austro-French negotiations. April 6, 1918 314
Revelation by Premier Clemenceau of Prince Sixtus letter regarding negotiations in 1917. April 8, 1918 314
Reply of France regarding Prince Sixtus letter. April 8, 1918 . 316
French official statement containing text of Prince Sixtus letter. April 11, 1918 318
Denial of Emperor Charles of Prince Sixtus letter. April 11, 1918 320
Claim of Austria that Prince Sixtus letter was falsified. April 13, 1918 321
Reply of France. April 14, 1918 322
Great Britain
Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin in reply to address of Premier Lloyd-George. July 28, 1917 120
Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour on treatment of Austria-Hungary. July 30, 1917 123
Reply of Premier Lloyd-George to statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Feb. 12, 1918 271
Address of Foreign Minister Balfour on statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Feb. 13, 1918 273
Statement of Austria-Hungary relative to British recognition of Czecho-Slovak belligerency. Aug. 17, 1918 373
Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour in reply to Austrian note on compromise peace. Sept. 16, 1918 389
Italy. Official Italian statement on Austrian proposal for compromise peace. Sept. 18, 1918 397
League of Nations. Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Sept. 10, 1918 380
Official statement. Dec. 12, 1916 5
Peace terms. Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Dec. 25, 1917 . 221
Roumanian treaty, statement of Austria on. June 11, 1918 . . . 337
Scandinavia, reply of Austria-Hungary to note of. Jan. 1, 1917 . . 31
Switzerland, reply of Austria-Hungary to note of. Dec. 27, 1916 . . 24
Ukrainia, official report of Austria on peace with. Feb. 9, 1918 . . 263
United States
Reply to note of President Wilson of Dec. 18, 1916. Dec. 26, 1916 . 23
Severance of diplomatic relations. April 8, 1917 94
Address of President Wilson recommending declaration of war. Dec. 4, 1917 193
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin. Dec. 7, 1917 204
Declaration of war against United States. Dec. 7, 1917 . . . 206
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson's address of January 8, 1918. Jan. 24, 1918 255
Reply of President Wilson to the foregoing. Feb. 11, 1918 . . 265
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson. April 2, 1918 298
Report of Foreign Minister Burian on Austrian attitude toward address of President Wilson. July 16, 1918 354

PAGE

Austria-Hungary—*Continued.*
Proposal of Austria for a compromise peace. Sept. 16, 1918 . . 386
Reply of President Wilson to proposal. Sept. 17, 1918 . . . 396
Explanation of peace move. Oct. 6, 1918 415
Austrian request for an armistice. Oct. 7, 1918 417
Comment of Foreign Minister Burian on President Wilson's program. Oct. 16, 1918 423
Reply of President Wilson to request for an armistice. Oct. 18, 1918 428
Note from Foreign Minister Andrassy to Secretary Lansing. Oct. 29, 1918 441
Semi-official note on reply to President Wilson. Oct. 29, 1918 . . 442
Reply to President Wilson's note of October 18, 1918. Oct. 29, 1918 440
Vatican. Reply to Vatican proposals. Sept. 21, 1917 137

Autonomy of peoples of Austria-Hungary
Note of President Wilson. Oct. 18, 1918 428
Reply of Austria-Hungary. Oct. 29, 1918 440

Autonomy of Poland, recognition of. Nov. 4, 1918 456

Balfour, British Foreign Minister. See **Great Britain.**

Balkan States
Allied declaration on policy. July 26, 1917 120
Autonomy for disputed districts. Instructions of Russian Soviets to representatives to Paris Conference. Oct. 20, 1917 . . . 167
Economic independence and territorial integrity. Jan. 8, 1918 . . . 238
Serbian policy. Nov. 7, 1918 462

Baltic Provinces, popular representative bodies in. German Chancellor Maximilian's explanation. Oct. 5, 1918 410

Belgium
Evacuation of
Proposals of Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 . . . . . 477, 484
Germany. Statement of Chancellor Michaelis. Sept. 28, 1917 . 152
Reply to Vatican proposals. Dec. 27, 1917 223
Restoration of and indemnity for
Reply of Entente Powers to note of President Wilson. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Reply of Belgium. Jan. 10, 1917 39
Speech of Premier Lloyd-George. July 21, 1917 118
Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Sept. 26, 1917 143
Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Oct. 11, 1917 165
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour. Nov. 6, 1917 . . . 171
Address of President Wilson. Dec. 4, 1917 196
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 . . . 229
Fourteen Points of President Wilson. Jan. 8, 1918 237
Statement of Premier Lloyd-George on the Fourteen Points. Jan. 18, 1918 241
Reply of Foreign Minister Balfour to Chancellor von Hertling. Feb. 27, 1918 287
Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour in reply to Austrian note. Sept. 16, 1918 392
German Chancellor Maximilian's explanation. Oct. 5, 1918 . . 410

PAGE

Bethmann-Hollweg, German Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer of Great Britain. See **Great Britain.**

Brazil. Reply to note of President Wilson of December 18, 1916. Jan. 6, 1917 32

Brest-Litovsk
Statement of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin of the terms on which the Central Powers were willing to conclude a general peace at. Dec. 25, 1917 221
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George in reply to statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Jan. 5, 1918 225
Address of President Wilson on the conditions of peace. Jan. 8, 1918 . 234
Opinion of Russian Foreign Minister Trotsky on the German position. Jan. 23, 1918 245
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling to speech of President Wilson of January 8, 1918. Jan. 24, 1918 246
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 24, 1918 255
The origin of the separate peace according to Foreign Minister von Kühlmann. Jan. 25, 1918 261
German and Austrian official reports of the peace with Ukrainia. Feb. 9, 1918 263
Russian proclamation of the end of the war and of demobilization. Feb. 10-11, 1918 263
Statement of Russian Prime Minister Lenine and Foreign Minister Trotsky on the German violation of the armistice and their readiness to sign a peace treaty. Feb. 19, 1918 278
Russian acceptance of German peace terms. Feb. 24, 1918 . . . 278
German official report of the signing of the peace with Russia. March 3, 1918 295
Ratification of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Congress of Soviets. March 16, 1918 295
Statement of London Conference of Entente Ministers in regard to the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. March 18, 1918 . 296
Statement of Ambassador Francis on the attitude of the United States towards Russia and the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 19, 1918 298
Foreign Minister Czernin of Austria-Hungary. Discussion of peace terms. April 2, 1918 298
Annulment of treaty of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 . 280

Briand, French Premier. See **France.**

British Dominions, statement of Great Britain on peace conferences and the. Nov. 9, 1918 468

Bucharest, Treaty of
Official Roumanian announcement of armistice with Central Powers. Dec. 6, 1917 203
Peace negotiations begun. Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson. Feb. 25, 1918 283
Statement of the London Conference of Entente Ministers in regard to the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. March 18, 1918 . 296
Foreign Minister Czernin's discussion of peace terms. April 2, 1918 . 298

PAGE

Bucharest, Treaty of—*Continued.*
Statement of Foreign Minister Burian on the Roumanian treaty and in reply to Mr. Lloyd-George. June 11, 1918 337
Annulment of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 480

Bulgaria
Reply to note of President Wilson of December 18, 1916. Dec. 30, 1916 29
Declaration of Premier Radslavoff in the Sobranje. Dec. 30, 1916 . 30
Request for an armistice. Sept. 24, 1918 398
Reply of Allies. Sept. 26, 1918 398
Armistice convention. Sept. 29, 1918 405

Burian, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. See **Austria-Hungary.**

Charles, Emperor of Austria. See **Austria-Hungary.**

China. Reply to President Wilson's note of Dec. 18, 1916. Jan. 9, 1917 . 34

Clemenceau, French Premier. See **France.**

Colonial questions
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 237
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling. Jan. 24, 1918 . . . 250

Compromise Peace
Austrian proposal. Sept. 16, 1918 386
Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour. Sept. 16, 1918 389
Reply of President Wilson. Sept. 17, 1918 396
Official Italian statement. Sept. 18, 1918 397

Conquered territories. See **Occupied territories.**

Czecho-Slovaks
Aims of, in Russia. July 27, 1918 357
Autonomy of. Reply of Austria-Hungary to President Wilson's note of October 18, 1918. Oct. 29, 1918 440
Belligerency of
Austro-Hungarian statement regarding British recognition of. Aug. 17, 1918 373
Recognized by the United States. Sept. 2, 1918 379
Independence declaration. Oct. 18, 1918 425
Liberation of. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37

Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. See **Austria-Hungary.**

Dardanelles, free passage through: President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 238

Diplomatic relations, severance of
Address of President Wilson to Congress suggesting severance with Germany. Feb. 3, 1917 68
Note of United States to Germany severing relations. Feb. 3, 1917 . 66
Announcement by United States concerning resumption of diplomatic negotiations. Feb. 12, 1917 72
Telegram from American Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna announcing the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the United States and Austria-Hungary. April 9, 1917 94

PAGE

Diplomatic relations, severance of—*Continued.*
Official announcement of United States on severance with Turkey. April 23, 1917 96

Disarmament
Proposals of the Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
Speech of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Oct. 2, 1917 . 154
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 168
Fourteen Points of President Wilson. Jan. 8, 1918 234
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. Jan. 24, 1918 . . . 259
Address of German Vice Chancellor Payer. Sept. 12, 1918 . . . 385

Dominions, British, British statement on peace conferences and. Nov. 9, 1918 468

East Africa, evacuation of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 . 480

Ebert, German Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Entangling alliances. Speech of President Wilson. Jan. 22, 1917 . . 54

Entente Powers
Note of President Wilson to. Dec. 18, 1916 12
Reply to German proposals. Dec. 29, 1916 26
Reply to President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916. Jan. 10, 1917 . 35
German comment upon reply. Jan. 12, 1917 40
Austro-Hungarian comment upon reply. Jan. 12, 1917 42
British supplement to reply. Jan. 13, 1917 45
Statement in regard to treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. March 18, 1918 296

Equality of nations. Speech of President Wilson. Jan. 22, 1917 . . 52

Evacuation of occupied territories. See also **Occupied territories.**
Protest of United States to Germany against destruction in course of. Nov. 7, 1918 461
Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 484

"Fourteen Points" of President Wilson. Speech of Jan. 8, 1918 . . 237
Statement of Premier Lloyd-George. Jan. 18, 1918 240
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling. Jan. 24, 1918 246
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Jan. 24, 1918 . 255
Germany's acceptance of 414, 420
Austrian acceptance of 417
Turkey's acceptance of 419
Reply of United States to Germany. Nov. 5, 1918 456

France
Briand, Premier. Speech in Chamber of Deputies. Dec. 13, 1916 . 7
Chamber of Deputies resolution on peace terms. June 5, 1917 . . 103
Clemenceau, Premier. Telegram endorsing statement of Premier Lloyd-George. Jan. 6, 1918 233
England. Anglo-French aims in Mesopotamia and Syria. Nov. 7, 1918 462
Evacuation of invaded territories and reparation. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 . . . 37
Evacuation of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 . . 477, 484
Painlevé, ex-Premier, statement of, on Alsace-Lorraine. Sept. 18, 1917 136

PAGE

France–Austria-Hungary
Austro-Hungarian revelation of peace maneuvers. April 2, 1918 . . 298
Further Austro-Hungarian explanations of peace maneuvers. April 5, 1918 308
Account of beginning of peace maneuvers. April 6, 1918 312
Statement of ex-Premier Painlevé on Austro-French negotiations. April 6, 1918 314
Revelation by Premier Clemenceau of the Prince Sixtus letter. April 8, 1918 314
Reply of Austria-Hungary regarding Prince Sixtus letter. April 8, 1918 316
French official statement containing text of Prince Sixtus letter. April 11, 1918 318
French reply concerning Prince Sixtus letter. April 14, 1918 . . . 322

Freedom of the seas
Speech of President Wilson. Jan. 22, 1917 53
Proposals of the Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
Reply of Austria-Hungary. Sept. 21, 1917 138
Reply of Germany. Sept. 21, 1917 140
Speech of Foreign Minister Czernin of Austria-Hungary. Oct. 2, 1917 152
Address of ex-Premier Asquith. Dec. 11, 1917 209
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 237
Statement of Premier Lloyd-George regarding the Fourteen Points. Jan. 18, 1918 243
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling to Fourteen Points. Jan. 24, 1918 250
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin to Fourteen Points. Jan. 24, 1918 259

German Colonies
Restitution of
Proposals of Germany. Aug. 1, 1917 130
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Statement of Austro-Hungarian Minister Czernin. Dec. 25, 1917 . 222
Address of German Vice Chancellor Payer. Sept. 12, 1918 . . 384
Reply of Foreign Minister Balfour to Austrian note of Sept. 16, 1918 393
Self-determination for. Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Dec. 20, 1917 217
Jan. 5, 1918 231

German peoples, extermination of, not design of Allies. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37

Germany
Abdication of Emperor William II. Nov. 9, 1918 467
Armistice
German request for. Oct. 6, 1918 414
Inquiry of President Wilson. Oct. 8, 1918 418
Answer of Germany. Oct. 14, 1918 420
Reply of President Wilson to German request. Oct. 14, 1918 . . 421
Counter-reply of Germany. Oct. 20, 1918 429
Comment of Chancellor Max. Oct. 22, 1918 431
Note of President Wilson consenting to propose an armistice to the Allies. Oct. 23, 1918 434
Reply of Germany. Oct. 27, 1918 438

PAGE

Germany—*Continued.*
Announcement by United States of agreement among the Allies on terms of. Nov. 4, 1918 455
Note of United States to Germany on agreement among Allies. Nov. 5, 1918 456
Note of United States protesting against destruction in course of evacuation under armistice. Nov. 7, 1918 461
Proclamation and address of President Wilson. Nov. 11, 1918 . 474
Conditions of armistice. Nov. 11, 1918 477
Austria. Telegram of Kaiser William II to Emperor Charles denying Prince Sixtus letter. April 12, 1918 320
Belgium, Germany's attitude toward. Statement of Chancellor Michaelis. Sept. 28, 1917 152
Bethmann-Hollweg, statement in Reichstag. Dec. 12, 1916 . . . 1
Brest-Litovsk, statement regarding. July 11, 1918 352
Constitution of, decree of William II publishing an amendment to. Oct. 28, 1918 439
Democratization of. Speech of British Foreign Minister Balfour. July 30, 1917 125
Eastern frontiers of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 . . 479
Ebert, Chancellor. Proclamation. Nov. 10, 1918 471
Entente Powers
Reply to proposals of Germany. Dec. 29, 1916 26
Comment of Germany upon Entente reply to President Wilson. Jan. 12, 1917 40
Comment of Allied Supreme War Council on statement of Foreign Minister von Hertling. Feb. 3, 1918 262
Statement in regard to treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. March 18, 1918 296
Great Britain
Address of Premier Lloyd-George in reply to Chancellor Michaelis. July 21, 1917 117
Comment of ex-Premier Asquith on German reply to Vatican. Sept. 26, 1917 141
Statement of Foreign Minister von Kühlmann on German reply to Vatican and in reply to Mr. Asquith. Sept. 28, 1917 . . 148
Reply of Premier Lloyd-George to von Kühlmann. Oct. 11, 1917 . 161
Reply of von Hertling to Lloyd-George. Dec. 17, 1917 . . . 215
Reply of Lloyd-George to von Hertling. Feb. 12, 1918 . . . 271
Reply of Balfour to von Hertling. Feb. 27, 1918 285
Reply of German Colonial Minister Solf to Balfour. Aug. 21, 1918 374
Kühlmann, German Foreign Minister. Statement in Reichstag. Oct. 9, 1917 157
Speech on peace terms. June 24, 1918 342
League of Nations. Speech of Chancellor von Hertling. June 25, 1918 348
Manifesto. Nov. 5, 1918 458
Maximilian, Chancellor. Explanation of German aims. Oct. 5, 1918 . 409
Proclamations to Germans abroad and at home. Nov. 7, 1918 . 466
Michaelis, Chancellor. Speech to Reichstag. Sept. 28, 1917 . . . 147
Statement in Reichstag. Oct. 9, 1917 156
Payer, Vice Chancellor. Address. Sept. 12, 1918 383
Peace proposals of Dec. 12, 1916 2
Reichstag, Resolution of. July 19, 1917 114
Address of Chancellor Michaelis on. July 19, 1917 115
Reorganization of Empire. Nov. 9, 1918 467
Russia
Address of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on war aims and peace with. May 15, 1917 98

PAGE

Germany—*Continued.*
Speech of Chancellor Michaelis on Russian separate peace. Nov. 29, 1917 191
Opinion of Russian Foreign Minister Trotsky on position of Germany at Brest-Litovsk. Jan. 23, 1918 245
Origin of Russian separate peace according to Foreign Minister von Kühlmann. Jan. 25, 1918 261
Statement of Russia on German violation of the armistice. Feb. 19, 1918 278
Acceptance of German peace terms. Feb. 24, 1918 278
Official report on signing of peace with Russia. March 3, 1918 . 295
Sixtus, Prince, letter of. Telegram of Kaiser William II to Emperor Charles. April 12, 1918 320
Solf, Foreign Minister. Address on Alsace-Lorraine and Poland. Oct. 25, 1918 436
Submarine war. Address of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in Reichstag. Feb. 27, 1917 80
Switzerland, reply of Germany to note of. Dec. 28, 1916 25
Ukrainia, official report of peace with. Feb. 9, 1918 263
United States
Reply to President Wilson's note. Dec. 26, 1916 22
German note to United States announcing unrestricted submarine warfare. Jan. 31, 1917 61
Severance of diplomatic relations. Feb. 3, 1917 66
Address of President Wilson to Congress. Feb. 3, 1917 . . . 68
Announcement by Department of State concerning resumption of negotiations with Germany. Feb. 12, 1917 72
Address of President Wilson recommending declaration of war. April 2, 1917 85
Resolution of Congress declaring war. April 6, 1917 93
Reply of Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson's address of January 8, 1918. Jan. 24, 1918 246
Address of President Wilson in reply to statement of Chancellor von Hertling. Feb. 11, 1918 265
Reply of Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson. Feb. 25, 1918 279
Vatican
Note of Germany to. Dec. 12, 1916 3
Reply of Germany to Vatican proposals. Sept. 21, 1917 . . . 139
Statement of Foreign Minister von Kühlmann on German reply to the Pope and to Mr. Asquith. Sept. 28, 1917 . . . 148
Wilhelm II, Proclamation to German people. Jan. 13, 1917 . . . 45

Great Britain
Asquith, ex-Premier
Address on war aims. Oct. 11, 1917 162
Address on war aims. Dec. 11, 1917 206
Austria-Hungary
Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin in reply to Premier Lloyd-George's speech at Belgian National Festival. July 28, 1917 120
Address of Foreign Minister Balfour on speech of Foreign Minister Czernin. Feb. 13, 1918 273
Reply of Foreign Minister Burian to Lloyd-George on Roumanian treaty. June 11, 1918 337
Austro-Hungarian statement regarding British recognition of Czecho-Slovak belligerency. Aug. 17, 1918 373
Austrian proposal for compromise peace. Sept. 16, 1918 . . . 386

PAGE

Great Britain—*Continued.*
Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour in reply to Austrian proposal. Sept. 16, 1918 389
Austrian explanation of peace move. Oct. 6, 1918 415
Balfour, Foreign Minister
Speech in House of Commons. July 30, 1917 122
Debate in House of Commons. Nov. 6, 1917 171
Statement of British policy in Palestine. Nov. 8, 1917 . . . 188
Speech in House of Commons. Aug. 8, 1918 365
Czecho-Slovak State, belligerency of. Austro-Hungarian statement regarding British recognition of. Aug. 17, 1918 373
Dominions, British statement on peace conferences and. Nov. 9, 1918 468
France
Telegram of Premier Clemenceau endorsing statement of Premier Lloyd-George of January 5, 1918. Jan. 6, 1918 . . . 233
Anglo-French aims in Mesopotamia and Syria. Nov. 7, 1918 . . 462
Germany
Speech of Premier Lloyd-George on German proposals. Dec. 19, 1916 16
Address of Premier Lloyd-George in reply to Chancellor Michaelis. July 21, 1917 117
Address of ex-Premier Asquith commenting on German reply to the Pope. Sept. 26, 1917 141
Statement of German Foreign Minister Kühlmann in reply to Mr. Asquith. Sept. 28, 1917 148
Statement of Premier Lloyd-George in reply to Foreign Minister von Kühlmann. Oct. 11, 1917 161
Reply of Chancellor von Hertling to Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Dec. 17, 1917 215
Reply of Prime Minister Lloyd-George to addresses of Chancellor von Hertling and Foreign Minister Czernin. Feb. 12, 1918 271
Reply of Foreign Minister Balfour to German Chancellor von Hertling. Feb. 27, 1918 285
Reply of Colonial Minister Solf to Mr. Balfour. Aug. 21, 1918 . 374
Lloyd-George, English Premier
Address on peace terms. June 29, 1917 107
Address on war aims. Dec. 14, 1917 210
Statement on peace terms. Dec. 20, 1917 216
Statement of British war aims. Jan. 5, 1918 225
Address on war aims. Sept. 12, 1918 381
Address on terms of peace. Nov. 9, 1918 469
Address to Liberal Party on peace terms. Nov. 12, 1918 . . . 472
Mesopotamia, Anglo-French aims in. Nov. 7, 1918 462
Palestine, statement of British policy in. Nov. 8, 1917 188
Roumanian treaty. Reply of Austrian Foreign Minister Burian to Premier Lloyd-George. June 11, 1918 337
Russia
Reply to Russian note in regard to allied war aims. June 11, 1917 . 106
Attitude of Great Britain toward. May 16, 1918 334
Secret treaties. Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour. June 20, 1918 . 338
Sixtus, Prince, Letter of. Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour in House of Commons. May 16, 1918 323
Syria, Anglo-French aims in. Nov. 7, 1918 462
Turkey, statement in House of Commons concerning armistice with. Oct. 31, 1918 444
United States
British supplement to Entente reply to President Wilson's note of Dec. 18, 1916. Jan. 13, 1917 45

PAGE

Great Britain—*Continued.*
Comment of Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on address of President Wilson. Jan. 24, 1917 57
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George on President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 18, 1918 240
Comment of Foreign Minister Balfour on speech of President Wilson of September 27, 1918. Oct. 1, 1918 407
Vatican. Address of ex-Premier Asquith commenting on German reply to Vatican proposals. Sept. 26, 1917 141

Greece. Reply to President Wilson's note of Dec. 18, 1916. Jan. 8, 1917 . 32

Hertling, German Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Hungary
Speech of Premier Tisza on address of President Wilson. Jan. 25, 1917 59
Text of military convention with Allies. Nov. 13, 1918 488

Indemnities
For Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Resolution on, passed by French Chamber of Deputies. June 5, 1917 . 103
Renunciation of
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 168
Statement of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Dec. 25, 1917 222
Address of German Vice Chancellor Payer. Sept. 12, 1918 . . 385

Invaded territories. See **Occupied territories.**

Italian Provinces of Austria
Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 . 37
Restoration to Italy. British supplement to reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 13, 1917 47
Autonomy of. Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167

Italy
Speech of Foreign Minister Sonnino. Dec. 18, 1916 12
Readjustment of frontiers. President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 238
Reply of German Chancellor to President Wilson's address of January 8. Jan. 24, 1918 252
Official statement on Austrian proposal of September 16, 1918. Sept. 18, 1918 397

Japan
Speech of Viscount Motono. Jan. 23, 1917 55
Declaration of aims in intervening in Siberia. Aug. 3, 1918 . . . 361

Jews
Equality of
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister to President Wilson. April 2, 1918 302
Establishment of, in Palestine. Statement of British Foreign Minister Balfour. Nov. 8, 1917 188

PAGE

Jugo-Slavs
Autonomy for. Reply of Austria-Hungary to President Wilson's note. Oct. 29, 1918 440
Agreement with Serbia. Nov. 7, 1918 462
Proclamation of King of Montenegro relative to Jugo-Slavia. Nov. 7, 1918 465

Kühlmann, German Foreign Minister. See **Germany.**

Labor, protection of. German Chancellor Maximilian's explanation of peace negotiations. Oct. 5, 1918 412

Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States. See **United States.**

League of Nations
Austria-Hungary. Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Sept. 10, 1918 380
Germany
Statement of Chancellor von Hertling. June 25, 1918 . . . 348
Address of Vice Chancellor Payer. Sept. 12, 1918 385
Great Britain
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Sept. 12, 1918 . . 382
Address of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Nov. 12, 1918 . . . 472
United States
Speech of President Wilson. Sept. 27, 1918 401
Comment of British Foreign Minister Balfour on speech of President Wilson of September 27. Oct. 1, 1918 407
Acceptance of, by Austrian Foreign Minister Burian. Oct. 16, 1918 423

Lettish Provinces, autonomy for. Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167

Lithuania
Autonomy for. Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Self-determination for. Speech of German Chancellor Michaelis on Russian separate peace. Nov. 29, 1917 192
Popular representative bodies in. German Chancellor Maximilian's explanation of peace negotiations. Oct. 5, 1918 410

Lloyd-George, British Premier. See **Great Britain.**

Luxemburg, evacuation of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 477, 484

Max, German Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Maximilian, German Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Mesopotamia, Anglo-French statement of aims in. Nov. 7, 1918 . . 462

Mexico
Proposals of, for terminating the war. Feb. 12, 1917 73
Reply of United States. March 16, 1917 82

Michaelis, German Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Military missions in Russia. Protest against Russian separate peace. Nov. 27, 1917 191

PAGE

Minorities, protection of
Enfranchisement of populations subject to Turkey. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Statement of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. Dec. 25, 1917 . . 222

Montenegro
Restoration of
Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Statement of British Premier Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 . . 229
Proclamation of King Nicholas relative to Jugo-Slavia. Nov. 7, 1918 . 465

Nicholas, King of Montenegro. See **Montenegro.**

Occupied territories, evacuation of
Austria-Hungary
Statement of Foreign Minister Czernin. Dec. 25, 1917 . . . 221
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 24, 1918 258
Entente Powers. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Germany
Address of Vice Chancellor Payer. Sept. 12, 1918 384
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson's address of Jan. 8, 1918. Jan. 24, 1918 251
Agreement to evacuate. Oct. 14, 1918 420
Counter-reply to President Wilson. Oct. 20, 1918 429
Armistice. Nov. 11, 1918 . . . . . 477, 484
Great Britain
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Dec. 20, 1917 . . 216
Statement of Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 229
United States
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 238
Inquiry of President Wilson concerning German proposal for an armistice. Oct. 8, 1918 418
Protest of United States to Germany against destruction in course of. Nov. 7, 1918 461
Vatican. Proposals. Aug. 1, 1917 130

Occupied territories, repatriation of inhabitants of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 477

Ottoman Empire
Expulsion from Europe. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Turkish portions of. President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 238

Painlevé, Premier of France. Statement on Alsace-Lorraine. Sept. 18, 1917 136

Palestine, statement of British policy in. Nov. 8, 1917 188

Payer, German Vice Chancellor. See **Germany.**

Pokrovsky, Russian Foreign Minister. Speech in the Duma. Dec. 15, 1916 9

PAGE

Poland
Address of German Chancellor Solf. Oct. 25, 1918 436
Autonomy for
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Recognition of. Nov. 4, 1918 456
Independence of
Statement of British Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 . 230
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 238
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson's address of January 8. Jan. 24, 1918 252
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling to President Wilson. Feb. 25, 1918 279
Reply of British Foreign Minister Balfour to Chancellor von Hertling. Feb. 27, 1918 286
Liberation of. Reply of Great Britain to Russian note. June 11, 1917 . 106
Popular representative bodies in. German Chancellor Maximilian's explanation of peace negotiations. Oct. 5, 1918 410
Self-determination for.
Speech of German Chancellor Michaelis on Russian separate peace. Nov. 29, 1917 192
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 24, 1918 257

Radslavoff, Bulgarian Premier. Declaration in the Sobranje. Dec. 30, 1916 30

Reorganization of Europe. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37

Reparation
Assurance of, to Belgium. Reply of Belgium to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 39
Proposals of Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
Statement of British Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 . . 232
Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 480

Restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37

Rhine Lands, evacuation of. Armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 478, 484

Roumania
Austrian statement on treaty with. June 11, 1918 337
Boundaries of. Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Oct. 11, 1917 . . . 165
Entente Powers' statement in regard to treaty of Bucharest. March 18, 1918 296
Evacuation of. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
German treaty with. Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson. April 2, 1918 300
Liberation of. Reply of Entente Powers to note of President Wilson. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Official announcement of an armistice. Dec. 6, 1917 203
Restoration of. Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
United States position on Roumanian problem. Nov. 6, 1918 . . . 459

PAGE

Russia
Armistice
Note of Foreign Minister Trotsky offering an armistice. Nov. 21, 1917 188
Proclamation of Foreign Minister on armistice. Dec. 6, 1917 . . 202
Statement on German violation of the armistice. Feb. 19, 1918 . 278
Brest-Litovsk
Opinion of Foreign Minister Trotsky on German position at Brest-Litovsk. Jan. 23, 1918 245
Russian ratification of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 16, 1918 295
Statement of Entente Powers in regard to treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 18, 1918 296
Statement of United States attitude regarding the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. March 19, 1918 298
Conditions in, at time of German armistice. Nov. 7, 1918 . . . 460
Czecho-Slovaks, aims of, in Russia. July 27, 1918 357
Duma. Resolution of acceptance of German proposals. Dec. 15, 1916 . 11
Evacuation of territories by German troops
Reply of the Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 237
Germany. Address of Bethmann-Hollweg on war aims and peace with Russia. May 15, 1917 98
Great Britain
Reply to Russia in regard to allied war aims. June 11, 1917 . . 106
Attitude toward Russia. Statement of Foreign Minister Balfour. May 16, 1918 334
Instructions of Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 . . . 167
Japanese to respect territorial integrity of. Aug. 3, 1918 361
Pokrovsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Speech in Duma. Dec. 15, 1916 9
Proclamation of end of war. Feb. 10-11, 1918 263
Provisional government
Proclamation in reference to war aims. April 10, 1917 . . . 95
Statement in regard to war aims, the alliance and a separate peace. May 19, 1917 102
Statement of war policy. Aug. 2, 1917 132
Revolutionary committee. Proclamation. Nov. 7, 1917 187
Separate peace
Statement of provisional government in regard to. May 19, 1917 . 102
Statement of United States in respect to Russia concluding a separate peace. April 23, 1917 97
Speech of Foreign Minister Terestchenko. Oct. 29, 1917 . . . 168
Statement of Russian Embassy at Washington regarding. Nov. 2, 1917 170
Proclamation in reference to a separate peace. Nov. 22, 1917 . . 189
Protest of Allies against. Nov. 27, 1917 191
Speech of German Chancellor. Nov. 29, 1917 191
Origin of, according to German Foreign Minister von Kühlmann. Jan. 25, 1918 261
Acceptance by Russia of German peace terms. Feb. 24, 1918 . . 278
German official report on signing of peace. March 3, 1918 . . 295
United States
Message of President Wilson to Russia on visit of American Mission. June 9, 1917 104
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin to President

PAGE

Russia—*Continued.*
Wilson's Fourteen Points concerning German peace with Russia. Jan. 24, 1918 255
Declaration of aims in intervening in Russia. Aug. 3, 1918 . . 359

Scandinavian peace note. Dec. 29, 1916 29
Austro-Hungarian reply. Jan. 1, 1917 31

Secret treaties. Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour. June 30, 1918 . 338

Self-determination
Speech of President Wilson. Jan. 22, 1917 52
Statement of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Dec. 25, 1917 222

Separate peace. See **Russia.**

Serbia
Agreement with Jugo-Slavs concerning policy in Balkans. Nov. 7, 1918 462
Boundaries of. Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Oct. 11, 1917 . . . 165
Restoration of, and indemnity for
Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
Instructions of Russian Soviets to Paris representatives. Oct. 20, 1917 167
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 . . . 229

Siberia
Establishment of anti-Bolshevik governments in. Aug. 5, 1918 . . 362
Japanese declaration of aims in. Aug. 3, 1918 361
United States declaration of aims in. Aug. 3, 1918 359

Sixtus, Prince, letter of
Revealed by Premier Clemenceau of France. April 8, 1918 . . . 314
Reply of Austria. April 8, 1918 316
French official statement. April 11, 1918 318
Denial of Emperor Charles of Austria, and telegram from Kaiser William II to Emperor Charles. April 12, 1918 320
Claim of Austria-Hungary that letter was falsified. April 13, 1918 . 321
Reply of France. April 14, 1918 322
Debate in House of Commons. May 16, 1918 323

Slavs, liberation of. Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37

Solf, German Colonial Minister. See **Germany.**

Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister. See **Italy.**

Spain. Reply to President Wilson's note. Dec. 30, 1916 30

Submarine warfare, unrestricted
Announcement of, by Germany. Jan. 31, 1917 61
Address of Bethmann-Hollweg. Feb. 27, 1917 80

Supreme War Council. Reply to German and Austrian statements. Feb. 3, 1918 262

PAGE

Switzerland
Reply to President Wilson's note. Dec. 23, 1916 21
Reply of Austria-Hungary to note of. Dec. 27, 1916 24
Reply of Germany to note of. Dec. 28, 1916 25

Syria, Anglo-French statement of aims in. Nov. 7, 1918 462

Terestchenko, Russian Foreign Minister. Speech on separate peace. Oct. 29, 1917 168

Territorial questions
Proposals of Vatican. Aug. 1, 1917 130
Speech of ex-Premier Asquith. Oct. 11, 1917 164
Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 233
Address of President Wilson. July 4, 1918 351

Tisza, Premier of Hungary. Speech on address of President Wilson. Jan. 25, 1917 59

Treaties
Sanctity of. Statement of Prime Minister Lloyd-George. Jan. 5, 1918 233
Secret. Speech of Foreign Minister Balfour. June 20, 1918 . . . 338

Trotsky, Russian Foreign Minister. See **Russia.**

Turkey
Armistice
Request. Oct. 14, 1918 419
Reply of President Wilson. Oct. 31, 1918 443
Statement in House of Commons. Oct. 31, 1918 444
British paraphrase of armistice. Oct. 31, 1918 444
Expulsion from Europe. British supplement to Entente reply to President Wilson's note. Jan. 13, 1917 47
Minorities in
Reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 10, 1917 37
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Jan. 8, 1918 238
Reply of German Chancellor to President Wilson's address of January 8. Jan. 24, 1918 252
United States
Turkish reply to President Wilson's note. Dec. 26, 1916 . . . 23
Statement on severance of diplomatic relations. April 23, 1917 . 96

Ukrainia, German and Austrian official report of peace with. Feb. 9, 1918 263

United States
Armed merchant ships, statement embodying decision in the matter of. March 12, 1917 82
Armed neutrality. Address of President Wilson. Feb. 26, 1917 . . 76
Austria-Hungary
Reply to President Wilson's note. Dec. 26, 1916 23
Comment upon reply of Entente Powers to President Wilson's note. Jan. 12, 1917 42
Severance of diplomatic relations. April 8, 1917 94
Address of President Wilson recommending declaration of war. Dec. 4, 1917 193
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin. Dec. 7, 1917 204
Declaration of war. Dec. 7, 1917 206
Reply of Foreign Minister Czernin to President Wilson. April 2, 1918 298

PAGE

United States—*Continued.*
Proposal of Austria for compromise peace. Sept. 16, 1918 . . 386
Reply of President Wilson. Sept. 17, 1918 396
Comment of Austria on program of President Wilson. Oct. 16, 1918 423
Reply of President Wilson to Austrian proposal for an armistice. Oct. 18, 1918 428
Reply of Austria-Hungary to President Wilson's note of October 18. Oct. 29, 1918 440
Note of Foreign Minister Andrassy to Secretary Lansing. Oct. 29, 1918 441
Semi-official Austrian note on reply to President Wilson. Oct. 29, 1918 442
Belgium. Reply to note of President Wilson. Jan. 10, 1917 . . . 38
Belligerent Powers, note of President Wilson to. Dec. 18, 1916 . . 12
Brazil. Reply to note of President Wilson. Jan. 6, 1917 32
Brest-Litovsk treaty, statement of United States attitude toward. March 19, 1918 298
Bulgaria. Reply to note of President Wilson. Dec. 30, 1916 . . . 29
China. Reply to note of President Wilson. Jan. 9, 1917 34
Czecho-Slovaks, belligerency of. Recognition by United States. Sept. 2, 1918 379
Entente Powers
Reply to note of President Wilson. Jan. 10, 1917 35
German comment on Entente reply to President Wilson's note. Jan. 12, 1917 440
British supplement to Entente reply to President Wilson's note. Jan. 13, 1917 45
Fourteen Points of President Wilson
Speech of the President. Jan. 8, 1918 234
Statement of Lloyd-George. Jan. 18, 1918 240
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling. Jan. 24, 1918 . . 246
Reply of Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Czernin. Jan. 24, 1918 255
Address of President Wilson. Feb. 11, 1918 265
Reply of German Chancellor von Hertling. Feb. 25, 1918 . . 279
Fourth Loan Campaign
Address of President Wilson. Sept. 27, 1918 399
Comment of Foreign Minister Balfour. Oct. 1, 1918 407
Germany
Reply to note of President Wilson. Dec. 26, 1916 22
Note to United States announcing unrestricted submarine warfare. Jan. 31, 1917 61
Address of President Wilson on severance of diplomatic relations. Feb. 3, 1917 68
Severance of diplomatic relations. Feb. 3, 1917 66
Announcement by Department of State concerning resumption of negotiations with Germany. Feb. 12, 1917 72
Address of President Wilson recommending declaration of war. April 2, 1917 85
Resolution declaring war. April 6, 1917 93
Inquiry of President Wilson concerning proposal for an armistice. Oct. 8, 1918 418
German answer. Oct. 14, 1918 420
Reply of President Wilson to request for an armistice. Oct. 14, 1918 421
German counter-reply. Oct. 20, 1918 429
Comment of German Chancellor Max on Germany's position before the Allies. Oct. 22, 1918 431

PAGE

United States—*Continued.*
President Wilson's consent to propose armistice to Allies. Oct. 23, 1918 434
Reply of Germany. Oct. 27, 1918 438
Announcement by United States of agreement among Allies upon terms of an armistice. Nov. 4, 1918 455
Note of President Wilson to Germany on above announcement. Nov. 5, 1918 456
United States note to Germany protesting against destruction in course of evacuation. Nov. 7, 1918 461
Proclamation and address of President Wilson on armistice with Germany. Nov. 11, 1918 474
Conditions of the armistice. Nov. 11, 1918 477
Great Britain. Comment of Bonar Law, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, on address of President Wilson. Jan. 27, 1917 . 57
Greece. Reply to note of President Wilson. Jan. 8, 1917 32
Hungary. Speech of Premier Tisza on address of President Wilson. Jan. 25, 1917 59
Mexico. United States reply to proposals for ending the war. March 16, 1918 82
Neutral Powers, note of President Wilson to. Dec. 18, 1916 . . . 12
Peace terms
Address of President Wilson on. July 4, 1918 349
Austro-Hungarian attitude toward foregoing address. July 16, 1918 354
Roumania. Position of United States on Roumanian problem. Nov. 6, 1918 459
Russia
Statement of United States in respect to conclusion of separate peace. April 23, 1917 97
Message of President Wilson to. June 9, 1917 104
Statement of United States regarding possibility of a separate peace. Nov. 2, 1917 170
Statement of United States on attitude toward Russia. March 19, 1918 298
Siberia, declaration of aims in intervening in. Aug. 3, 1918 . . . 359
Spain. Reply to note of President Wilson. Dec. 30, 1916 . . . 30
Switzerland. Reply to note of President Wilson. Dec. 23, 1916 . . 21
Third Liberty Loan, address of President Wilson on opening. April 6, 1918 309
Turkey
Reply to note of President Wilson. Dec. 26, 1916 23
United States announcement of severance of diplomatic relations with. April 23, 1917 96
Reply of President Wilson to Turkish request for an armistice. Oct. 31, 1918 443
Vatican. Reply of President Wilson to Vatican proposals. Aug. 27, 1917 133

Vatican
Note of Germany to. Dec. 12, 1916 3
Proposals of. Aug. 1, 1917 129
Reply of the United States. Aug. 27, 1917 133
Reply of Austria-Hungary. Sept. 21, 1917 137
Reply of Germany. Sept. 21, 1917 139
Comment of Mr. Asquith on German reply. Sept. 26, 1917 . . 141
Statement of German Foreign Minister von Kühlmann on German reply. Sept. 28, 1917 148
Reply of Belgium. Dec. 27, 1917 223

PAGE

War, declaration of
Between the United States and Germany. April 6, 1917 93
Address of President Wilson recommending. April 2, 1917 . . 85
Between the United States and Austria-Hungary. Dec. 7, 1917 . . 206
Address of President Wilson recommending. Dec. 4, 1917 . . 193

Wilhelm II, Kaiser of Germany. See **Germany.**

Wilson, President of the United States. See **United States.**

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